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“Why Are You Confident That Booking Holdings Will Survive The COVID-19 Crisis?”

Booking Holdings is suffering because of the coronavirus, COVID-19. Can the company survive the crisis? I think it can. Here’s why.

A few days ago, I received a text from a friend asking the question that is the title of this article. He knew that Booking Holdings (NASDAQ: BKNG), an online travel agent, is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s investment portfolio.

Stalled growth

On 18 February 2020, I published my investment thesis on Booking. In it, I wrote that “The world – particularly China – is currently battling COVID-19. If the situation worsens, Booking’s business could be hurt.” Little did I know how badly Booking would suffer. International travel activities have essentially grounded to a halt since the publication of my thesis for Booking, with many countries closing their borders to control the spread of COVID-19.

In particular, the businesses of hotels and airlines across the globe have been crushed. A few days ago, Arne Sorenson, CEO of hotel operator Marriott International, said that the company’s seeing revenue declines of more than 75% in the US. At home, Singapore Airlines cut 96% of its flight capacity last week. Booking, as an online travel agent focusing on accommodations, is also facing a brutal operating environment.

Confidence 

What gives me the confidence that Booking can survive? The company is the largest online travel agent in the world. The entire travel industry is awash in pain at the moment. But this also gives Booking the opportunity to win even more market share if some of its smaller/weaker competitors falter.

I believe that the COVID-19 crisis will blow over eventually (hopefully sooner rather than later, so that the incredible human suffering that’s currently happening can end as soon as possible). This will allow the travel industry to return to strength. When this happens, Booking will be in an even stronger position compared to before.

But Booking has to survive from now till then. I think the chances are very good that the company will. At the end of 2019, Booking held US$8.5 billion in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments (this sum excludes US$3.3 billion in strategic investments) against total debt of US$8.6 billion.

I would prefer Booking to have significantly more cash than debt. But Booking’s debt is mostly long-term in nature (88.5% comes due on or after 31 December 2020). Moreover, the company’s debt has well-staggered maturities as shown in the table below. The earliest due-date for Booking’s long-term debt is September 2021 and it involves a manageable sum of US$1 billion. So there’s plenty of time for Booking to maneuver, and to wait for the travel industry’s health to improve.

Source: Booking 2019 annual report

No guarantee

But there’s no guarantee that Booking will survive. It could eventually crumble should the travel market undergo a long winter if COVID-19 proves to be a particularly tricky disease to combat. This is where diversification is important. 

I mentioned earlier that Booking is one of the 50-plus companies in my family’s investment portfolio. Even if Booking fails to survive, my family’s portfolio will. Diversification is how I guard the portfolio against specific-company risks. With diversification, my family and I are able to stay invested in Booking and participate in its potential recovery without having to worry about a significant hit to the portfolio. 

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

3 Lessons From My Biggest Stock Market Losers

Here are 3 lessons I’ve picked up from my biggest investing mistakes, so that you can benefit from my experience without going through the same pain.

It’s great to learn from our own mistakes. But it’s even better to learn from those of others. COVID-19 has brought extreme market volatility and economic distress to the world. In a time like this, it’s easier for us to make investment mistakes.

I’m here to share the eggs I’ve had on my face in the stock market and what I’ve learnt from them, so that you can benefit from my errors. 

The backdrop

I started investing for my immediate family on 26 October 2010. The portfolio I help manage consists of stocks listed in the US market. There are currently over 50 stocks in it.

Some of the biggest losers in the portfolio include Atwood Oceanics, Ford (NYSE: F), Gilead Sciences (NASDAQ: GILD), GoPro (NASDAQ: GPRO), National Oilwell Varco (NYSE: NOV), Tapestry (NYSE: TPR), Under Armour (NYSE: UAA), and Zoe’s Kitchen.

Source: Yahoo Finance for current prices

Atwood Oceanics and Zoe’s Kitchen were privatised in October 2017 and November 2018, respectively, and I sold their shares on September 2016 and November 2018. I sold National Oilwell Varco in June 2017. I still own the other stocks mentioned.

Lesson 1: It’s okay to fail if you have the right investment framework 

My family’s investment portfolio has clearly had many epic losers. But from 26 October 2010 (the inception of the portfolio) to 29 March 2020, the portfolio has still grown in value by 16.0% annually, without including dividends. This is significantly higher than the S&P 500’s return of 10.7% per year over the same period, with dividends.

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; Google Finance; author’s calculations (from 26 October 2010 to 29 March 2020)

It’s okay to have multiple failures in your portfolio. There’s an investment framework that I’ve been using for my family’s portfolio for years. It has guided me towards massive winners, such as Netflix (NASDAQ: NFLX), Amazon (NASDAQ: AMZN), and MercadoLibre (NASDAQ: MELI). The winners in the portfolio have more than made up for the losers.

If you’re investing with a sound investment framework, then don’t beat yourself up too hard if some of your stocks are down big. Look at your performance from a portfolio-perspective, and not harp on how each position is doing.

Lesson 2: Diversify smartly, and stay away from commodity-related companies

Atwood Oceanics and National Oilwell Varco are companies in the oil & gas industry. When I invested in them, Atwood was an owner of oil rigs while National Oilwell Varco was supplying the parts and equipment that kept oil rigs running.

They were among my first-ever investments, back when I was a greenhorn in the stock market. I invested in them because I wanted to be diversified according to sectors. I also thought that oil & gas was a sector that is worth investing in since demand for the commodities would likely remain strong for a long time. My views were right, but only to a small extent. I was wrong on two important areas.

First, it is important to be diversified according to sectors (and geography too!). But there are some sectors that are just not worth investing in for the long run because their economic characteristics are poor. For instance, the energy, materials, and transport sectors have historically produced poor returns on invested capital. This is illustrated in the chart below from a 2006 McKinsey report which mapped out the average return on invested capital for various sectors from 1963 to 2004. Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett’s long-time lieutenant, once said:

“Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return that the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns six percent on capital over forty years and you hold it for that forty years, you’re not going to make much different than a six percent return – even if you originally buy it at a huge discount.”

Source: McKinsey report

Second, demand for oil did indeed grow from 2010 to 2016. But oil prices fell significantly over the same period. The trends in oil consumption and oil prices for that period are depicted in the chart below.

The sharp fall in oil prices despite the rising demand illustrates the difficulty in predicting oil prices. In fact, it’s practically impossible. I recently learnt about a presentation that Peter Davies gave in 2007 titled What’s the Value of an Energy Economist? In it, he said that “we cannot forecast oil prices with any degree of accuracy over any period whether short or long.” Back then, Davies was the chief economist of British Petroleum, one of the largest oil & gas companies in the world.

With lower oil prices, the business results and share prices of Atwood Oceanics and National Oilwell Varco plummeted. The chart below shows National Oilwell Varco’s share price and earnings per share from 2010 to 2016 (data for Atwood Oceanics is not available since it’s now a private company). I think the predicament of Atwood Oceanics and National Oilwell Varco can be extrapolated to other commodity-related companies. It’s tough to predict the price movements of commodities; this in turn makes it difficult to have a good grasp on the business results of a commodity-related company over a multi-year period.

Lesson 3: Not selling the losers is as important as not selling the winners

You’ll notice that my family’s portfolio is still holding onto many of the big losers. The sales of Atwood Oceanics and National Oilwell Varco happened because of something that Motley Fool co-founder David Gardner shared a few years ago:

“Make your portfolio reflect your best vision for our future.”

Part of the vision I have for the world is that our energy-needs are entirely provided by renewable sources that do not harm the precious environment we live in. For this reason, I made the rare decision to voluntarily part ways with stocks in my family’s portfolio (referring to Atwood Oceanics and National Oilwell Varco).

I sell stocks very rarely and very slowly. This aversion to selling is by design – because it strengthens my discipline in holding onto the winners in my family’s portfolio. Many investors tend to cut their winners and hold onto their losers. Even in my earliest days as an investor, I recognised the importance of holding onto the winners in driving my family portfolio’s return. Being very slow to sell stocks – even the big losers – has helped me hone the discipline of holding onto the winners. And this discipline has been a very important contributor to the long run performance of my family’s portfolio.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Making Financial Sense Of Singapore Airlines’s Massive Fundraising

Recently, Singapore Airlines announced a complex rights issue and mandatory convertible bonds offering. I’m breaking down the factual numbers.

Singapore Airlines (SGX: C6L) recently announced a massive round of fundraising. In all, Singapore’s national carrier is looking to raise S$15 billion. The first slice of the fundraising involves a S$5.3 billion rights shares issue, and a S$3.5 billion tranche of mandatory convertible bonds (MCBs).

Temasek Holdings is one of the Singapore government’s investment arms and the current major shareholder of Singapore Airlines (SIA) with a 55% stake. It has committed to mop up all the rights shares issue and MCBs that other SIA shareholders do not want.

My blogging partner Jeremy Chia published a wonderful article yesterday. He shared his thoughts on why he’s not interested in investing in SIA despite Temasek’s promise to provide up to S$15 billion in capital. I’m not here to share my thoughts on investing in SIA. Instead, I’m here to provide you with a factual breakdown of the numbers behind SIA’s rights shares issue and MCBs.

I recognise that SIA’s latest fundraising activity is complex, and there’s a lot of confusion about it. I want to help clear the air, to the best of my abilities. The Good Investors exists to demystify investing for you – so here I am!

Details of the rights shares issue of Singapore Airlines

Here are the important numbers concerning SIA’s rights shares issue:

  • Total sum: S$5.3 billion.
  • Number of rights shares to be issued: Up to 1.778 billion rights shares to be issued, on the basis of 3 rights shares for every 2 shares of SIA that currently exist. There are 1.185 billion SIA shares that exist right now.
  • Price per rights share: S$3.00.
  • Renounceable? Yes, this rights shares issue is renounceable, so you will get to trade the rights.
  • Changes in SIA’s book value per share (BVPS) and earnings per share (EPS) because of the rights issue: As of 31 December 2019, SIA’s BVPS and trailing-12-months EPS were S$10.25 and S$0.67, respectively. After the rights shares issue, the BVPS will fall to around S$5.89 while the EPS will decline to S$0.27, assuming everything else stays constant.
  • What you have to effectively pay for SIA’s shares: At the time of writing (11:20 am, 30 March 2020), SIA’s share price is S$5.82. If you subscribe for your full allotment of rights shares, you’re effectively paying a price of S$4.13 per share for SIA’s shares. The math works this way: Effective price per share = [S$5.82 + (S$3.00 x 1.5)] / 2.5.
  • The effective valuations you’re getting: At an effective share price of S$4.13, SIA will have a price-to-book ratio of 0.7 and a price-to-earnings ratio of 15.

Details of the MCBs of Singapore Airlines

For the MCBs, do note that the total sum SIA is looking for is S$9.7 billion. But the current tranche involves just S$3.5 billion. The key financial numbers for the current tranche of MCBs are as follows:

  • Total sum: S$3.5 billion.
  • Number of rights MCBs to be issued: Up to S$3.5 billion, in the denomination of S$1.00 per rights MCB, on the basis of 295 rights MCBs for every 100 shares of SIA that currently exist. As mentioned earlier, there are 1.185 billion SIA shares that exist right now.
  • Issue price per rights MCB: S$1.00, meaning you’ll pay S$1.00 to purchase each rights MCB.
  • Renounceable? Yes, this rights MCB issue is renounceable, so you will get to trade the rights.
  • Maturity date of MCB: 10 years from the date of issue of the rights MCBs.
  • Conversion terms of MCB: SIA is obliged to convert the rights MCBs into SIA shares when the MCBs mature. The conversion price is S$4.84 per SIA share. When the MCBs are converted at the maturity date (10 years from the date of issue), every S$1,000 worth of the MCBs will “grow” to S$1,806.11. This S$1,806.11 will then be converted into SIA shares at a price of S$4.84 each, giving us 373 SIA shares. The math works this way: Number of shares obtained upon conversion = S$1,806.11 / S$4.84
  • Redemption terms of the MCB: SIA has the right – but not the obligation – to redeem the MCBs every six months from the date of issue at a certain price, giving you a certain yield. If the MCBs have yet to be redeemed when we hit the 10-year mark from the date of issue, SIA is obliged to convert the MCBs into SIA shares, as mentioned earlier. The redemption prices and yields are given in the table below. Note that you cannot ask for the redemption – it is entirely up to SIA to decide.
Source: SIA regulatory announcement
  • What you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares under the MCB, assuming it is converted: As mentioned earlier, if the MCBs are converted, every S$1,000 in MCBs will be converted into 373 shares. This gives rise to an effective price of S$2.68 per SIA share under the MCB. The math works this way: Effective price paid = S$1,000 / 373 shares. 
  • What you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares, in all, under the MCB, assuming it is converted: But to get hold of the MCBs, you’ll have to own SIA shares. Every 100 shares has a full allotment of 295 rights MCBs. At the time of writing, SIA’s share price is S$5.82. This works out to an overall effective price of S$3.47 per share. Here’s the math: Overall effective price paid = ([100 x S$5.82) + (295 x S$2.68)] / (100 +295). 
  • Circumstances where you’ll make money on the MCBs alone (ignoring what happens to your SIA stake): There are a few scenarios where you’ll make a profit: (1) SIA redeems the MCBs before they are converted; (2) SIA allows the MCBs to convert into shares 10 years later and SIA’s share price is significantly higher than S$2.68 at that point in time. To be clear, the price of S$2.68 is the price you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares in the event of the MCBs’ conversion. If SIA’s share price is around S$2.68 at the point of conversion, it’s very likely you’ll be losing money on the MCBs;  if SIA’s share price is lower than S$2.68 at the point of conversion, you’ll be losing money on the MCBs.
  • When is it beneficial for SIA to redeem the MCBs? Redemption of the MCBs will require SIA to fork out cash, which negatively impacts SIA’s financial health. On the other hand, the conversion of the MCBs does not require SIA to dole out any cash. So from this perspective, it’s beneficial for SIA to not redeem the MCBs at all. This is important to note for the MCB holders for cash-flow-planning purposes, since SIA could very well choose not to redeem the MCBs.

Other important points to note

Shareholders of Singapore Airlines can choose to participate in the company’s fundraising activity in one of the following ways:

  1. Subscribe for both the rights issue and rights MCBs
  2. Subscribe for just the rights issue but not the rights MCBs
  3. Subscribe for the rights MCBs but not the rights issue
  4. Do not subscribe for both the rights issue and rights MCBs

If you’re a Singapore Airlines shareholder and you choose the fourth option, you can still recover some capital by selling the rights issues and rights MCBs (both are renounceable, so the rights can be actively traded). But you will face massive dilution, since the airline’s share count will increase significantly.

Source: SIA regulatory announcement

I hope laying out all these numbers will help you – if you’re a Singapore Airlines shareholder or are interested in its shares and/or MCBs – to make a better-informed decision.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Why I’m Not Buying Singapore Airlines Shares Even After Temasek Promised To Save It

Temasek is underwriting a massive rights offering that will provide Singapore Airlines with much needed capital. But here’s why I’m still not convinved.

Much ink has been spilt on the whole Singapore Airlines Ltd (SGX: C6L) fiasco. 

The latest news now is that Temasek, one of the Singapore government’s investment arms, has stepped in to provide our country’s flag carrier with much-needed capital. 

This comes as Singapore Airlines (SIA) is confronting liquidity problems due to its high debt load and fixed costs, and the disruption to its business because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The rescue

In essence, Temasek, which currently owns around 55% of SIA, has underwritten a S$5.3 billion equity fundraising by the airline. Temasek has also underwritten a $9.7 billion issuance of mandatory convertible bonds (MCBs) by SIA; the MCBs will either be converted to shares in 10 years or redeemed before then. What this means is that Temasek will not only subscribe to all the rights and relevant bonds that it’s entitled to; it will also purchase any of the rights or bonds that other SIA shareholders do not want.

But despite Temasek coming in to save the day, I’m not interested in investing in SIA, even at these seemingly low prices.

How did it get into this situation in the first place?

Much like other airline companies, SIA is heavily leveraged due to the capital-intensive nature of its business. The high cost of replacing and upgrading SIA’s fleet has also led to negative free cash flow in four of the last five years.

To keep itself afloat, our flag carrier has been increasingly making use of the debt markets for its cash flow requirements. In fact, the company issued bonds to the public just last year to raise more capital. At the end of 2019, the airline had S$1.6 billion in cash, but S$7.7 billion in total debt.

The aviation industry is highly competitive too and the emergence of low-cost carriers have led to thinner margins for airlines.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the straw that broke the camel’s back as the significant loss of revenue (SIA recently cut 96% of its flight capacity) finally led to severe cash flow problems for the company and Temasek ultimately had to step in to save the day.

Temasek saving the day but shareholders will be diluted

Let’s be clear, this is not a government bailout. It is nothing like what the American airlines got from the US government, which included a massive grant. 

SIA’s situation is simply a major shareholder promising to back the company when it sells new shares to raise capital.

The new shares will dilute existing shareholders if they don’t take up the rights issue. On top of that, the mandatory convertible bonds will also dilute shareholders in 10 years when they are converted, unless they are redeemed before then.

SIA shares seem cheap but it really is not

Under the rights issue portion of SIA’s latest fundraising exercise, existing shareholders of the airline will be given the opportunity to buy three new shares at S$3 per share for every two shares they own.

Based on SIA’s current share price of S$6.03, I will get shares for an average price of S$4.21 each if I buy in today and subscribe to the rights issue. That seems cheap – but it really is not.

As of 31 December 2019, SIA had a net asset value per share of S$10.25. But that will drop substantially after the rights issue.

The rights issue will increase shareholders’ equity from S$12.1 billion to S$17.4 billion, or an increase of 43% from 31 December 2019. At the same time, the number of shares will increase from 1.2 billion to 3 billion. After the dilution, the net asset value per share will fall to around S$5.80 per share based on SIA’s last reported financials.

I also expect SIA’s net asset value per share to fall even more than that because of the heavy losses suffered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the quarter ended 31 December 2019, Singapore Airlines incurred about S$800 million in staff costs, S$210 million in aircraft maintenance expenses, and S$522 million in depreciation. Most of these fixed costs will likely still need to be accounted for during the period of near-zero flights, despite SIA grounding its planes. These costs add up to around S$0.50 per share per quarter.

Together with the upcoming dilution and the heavy losses, Singapore Airlines’ shares could have a net asset value of close to or even less than S$5.30 per share in the future, depending on how long the pandemic lasts.

Earnings per share dilution

Earnings per share will also fall after the issuance of new shares because of the rights issue. SIA reported trailing 12 months profit of S$765 million.

Even if our flag carrier can achieve similar profit after the whole pandemic passes, its earnings per share will drop substantially because of the larger number of outstanding shares.

By my calculation, normalised earnings per share will decline from S$0.63 to just S$0.25 after the rights issue.

I’m not buying shares just yet…

The injection of cash will put SIA in a much better financial position but I’m still not convinced. 

Even if I buy shares today and subscribe to all my allotted shares in the rights issue, I don’t think I’ll be getting that great of a deal. I’ll be paying an average price of around S$4.21 per share, which translates to only a small discount to my calculated adjusted net asset value per share. It is also slightly more than 16 times SIA’s normalised earnings post-rights issue, which is not that cheap.

Moreover, if SIA is unable to redeem the mandatory convertible bonds before they get converted in 10 years time, they will potentially lead to further dilution to shareholders.

Let’s not forget too that our flag carrier (1) has a history of inconsistent free cash flow, (2) operates in an industry that is a slave to fuel prices, and (3) has strong competition from low-cost carriers. 

Given all these, despite the seemingly low share price, I still don’t think Singapore Airlines shares are cheap enough for my liking.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

What We’re Reading (Week Ending 29 March 2020)

The best articles we’ve read in recent times on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 29 March 2020:

1. Wounds Heal, Scars Last – Morgan Housel

When people feel the correlation between their decisions and their outcomes is high, there’s less desire for a strong social safety net. But when something impacts everyone at once, and can ruin the careful as much as the reckless, there’s a history of people coming together to support a public backstop. We saw that Wednesday, when a $2 trillion rescue package passed the Senate 96-0. I suspect we’ll be seeing more of it for years to come.

2. Why the Stock Market Rallies on Bad News [link goes to video] – The Compound

Michael [Batnick] and Barry [Ritholtz] discuss the latest record-breaking unemployment numbers and why the market is rallying on this bad news? What is going on?

3. What we learn from the past – Samuel Rhee

The markets were down almost 50% and everybody had lost their shirt. We worried we wouldn’t have any money to manage when all was said and done. And more importantly we thought we would all soon be out of a job. We were desperate for some guidance and sage advice from Barton. I asked him, “Barton – is this the worst thing you’ve ever seen?” He paused and thought for a moment, then he slowly opened his mouth. His answer was completely unexpected to everybody in the room. He said, “to be honest, I think 1974 was much worse.” We all turned to each other and looked around the room and asked. Wait what? 1974?

4. Stock Market Commentary: Confront the brutal facts, yet never lose faith – Chuin Ting Weber

So we keep the faith amidst the brutal facts in the short term, because the faith in our long-term destiny is ultimately our faith in humanity’s ability to overcome, as we have done in the past. Once again, our economies will grow on the back of human innovation, industry and our collective and relentless pursuit of a better life. Together, or probably preceding this, the stock market will go up again. We do not know exactly how long the pain would last or when the upturn would come, but come it definitely will!

5. How Did We Ever Get to The Roaring Twenties? – Ben Carlson

It’s also hard to believe the U.S. was ever able to pick itself up off the turf to make the Roaring 20s happen in the first place. Let’s go through a list of what occurred in the lead up to one of the biggest boom times in our country’s history:

World War I (1914-1918)Influenza Pandemic (1918-1919)Post-War Recession (1918-1919)The Depression (1920-1921)… This 8 or so years looks like hell on earth:

And yet…look at what came during the aftermath.

6. What If You Buy Stocks Too Early During a Market Crash? – Ben Carlson

I know of a professional trader who foresaw the Great Recession, went to cash in the summer of 2008 before things got crazy and came up with a wonderful plan to put his money back to work at the lows.

He planned on putting his cash into a simple S&P 500 index fund in 25% chunks when the S&P hit 650, 600, 550, and finally 500. It was a generational buying opportunity and I was jealous he had such a wonderful plan of attack.

The only problem with this plan is the S&P never got to those levels, even though plenty of people were predicting it at the time.

The S&P hit an intraday low of 666, he put his cash to work and ended up never getting back in. He assumed the initial bounce was of the dead cat variety and a double-dip recession would give him another opportunity to buy but stocks never looked back.

I’m not sure many investors sitting in cash or bonds at the moment are worried about being too late. Those with dry powder left are far more concerned with being too early, as most assume things will only get worse.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Government Bailouts and What They Mean For Shareholders

US airlines are getting a massive US$60 billion bailout. Here’s a look at bailouts in the past and how shareholders have been impacted.

US airlines finally got something to cheer about.

Earlier this week, US senate leaders came to an agreement on a US$2 trillion stimulus bill. A whopping US$60 billion of that will be used to bail out struggling US airlines.

Airlines, in return, must forgo layoffs until the fall (sometime in the fourth quarter of 2020), accept limits on executive compensation and dividends, and maintain certain routes. Despite the limitations, I think this is a deal the airlines will happily take to save themselves from bankruptcy.

Bailouts are nothing new though. The US has a long history of bailing out companies that were deemed too important to fail. These companies either provided essential services, accounted for a decent chunk of the economy, or employed a large number of people.

But bailouts take different shapes and forms. The ways that the government injects cash into companies (or individuals), the kind of industries the government tries to save, and the impact on shareholders differ every time.

In light of the latest bailout, I decided to take a short trip down memory lane to see the different kinds of bailouts that have occurred.

The Great Depression

One of the greatest economic catastrophes of modern history occurred from 1929 to the early 1940s. It was the longest, deepest, and most widespread depression of the 20th century.

In 1933 US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt took the oath of office and started implementing solutions to bring the economy out of the recession. 

One of the things he did was to bail out struggling homeowners. At that time, the national unemployment rate was around 25%, so many Americans who lost their jobs were unable to pay off their home mortgages and were left homeless. 

The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was set up to solve the problem. The newly formed government agency purchased defaulted mortgages from banks and refinanced them at lower rates, allowing about a million homeowners to benefit from lower mortgage rates.

This bailout was targetted at individuals at that time and kept people off the street. However, it was not until World War II ended that the depression was officially over and the post-war boom began.

The Great Financial Crisis

The next most important economic crisis occurred much more recently in 2007-2008. Known as the Great Financial Crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers amid the bursting of the housing bubble culminated in a global financial crisis.

However, this time, the US government’s response was swifter and the bailouts introduced saved banks, restored confidence, allowed banks to lend again, and eventually led to the 12-year bull market that ended this year.

So what did the US government do in 2008? The Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act of 2008, often called the “bank bailout,” was signed into law by then-President George W. Bush. The new law led to the creation of the US$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to inject capital into banks. But these funds were not given as grants, rather they were used to purchase toxic assets from the banks.

A key part of the US federal government’s plan was to buy up to US$700 billion of illiquid mortgage-backed securities. These were essentially a bundle of home loans packed into one.

On top of that, the US government injected cash into banks through the purchase of preferred stock. Citibank needed a particularly big injection of capital, with the government purchasing US$45 billion in preferred and common Citigroup stock. Selling stock when your share price is down 80% is never going to be pretty and Citigroup shareholders learnt that the hard way as they were diluted almost six-fold. Till today, Citigroup’s share price is still more than 80% off the high it reached in 2007. However, what the bailout achieved was to save Citigroup from insolvency and shareholders could at least survive to fight another day.

Overall, TARP improved the balance sheet and reduced the potential losses of banks and financial institutions.

The net effect for the government was also positive as it was reported that TARP recovered US$441.7 billion of US$426.4 billion invested, earning a US$15.3 billion profit when everything was done and dusted.

COVID-19 Crisis

Fast forward to today and we are once again seeing a massive bailout, this time with the aviation industry.

As mentioned earlier, struggling US airlines are getting an early Christmas present this year, to the tune of US$60 billion.

According to a draft of the legislation, airlines will receive up to US$25 billion in direct grants. That’s practically free money for the airlines as long as they promise not to layoff workers till the fourth quarter of 2020, accept limits on executive compensation and shareholder dividends.

Additionally, the bill also grants US$25 billion in loans and loan guarantees for passenger airlines and US$4 billion for cargo air carriers. The promise of loans will help struggling airlines raise much needed new capital even if the banks won’t lend to them.

The news is, of course, great for shareholders and employees. Employees get to keep their jobs while shareholders don’t have to worry about potential bankruptcies. The injection of cash will tide airlines through this challenging period. Airline shares have been creeping up since rumours of a bailout began.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

Bailouts may seem like a bad word but they are great for shareholders. The injection of cash into a company can tide them through when all hope seemed to be lost.

However, bailouts also bring to light that the company was not managing its finances well enough. Overleverage, bad investments, and in the case of Airlines, overspending on share buybacks destroyed their balance sheets to the brink of collapse.

Although bailouts can eventually save the day, they are one-off special situations and investors should never rely on them to get them out of trouble.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Is Zoom’s Stock Too Expensive Now?

Zoom’s stock has defied gravity, climbing around 30% in the past 30 days compared to the brutal 20%-plus fall for the S&P500. But is it too expensive now?

While stocks markets around the world plunged over the last month, Zoom Video Communications‘s (NASDAQ: ZM) share price has defied gravity, zooming up by close to 30%.

Investors are anticipating great things for the company this year as the COVID-19 epidemic accelerates the adoption of video conferencing tools around the globe.

With the hype surrounding Zoom, I thought it would be an opportune time to share some of my thoughts on the fast-growing company and whether it is still worth investing at today’s price.

Fast growth

Zoom is one of the fastest-growing listed software-as-a-service firms in the world today. That says a lot.

In fiscal 2020 (ended 31 January), Zoom recorded revenue of US$622.7 million, up a staggering 88% from a year ago.

New customers and a net dollar expansion rate of more than 130% contributed to the sharp rise in sales. Over the course of 2019, Zoom had 641 customers contributing more than US$100,000 in trailing-12-months revenue, an increase of 86% from a year ago. 

Consistently strong performance

Last year’s growth was by no account a one-off. Zoom has been growing rapidly for the three years prior to its IPO in 2019. Annual revenue increased by 149% and 118% in fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2019, respectively.

The company’s net dollar expansion rate has also been north of 130% for seven consecutive quarters, a testament to the strength of the business platform.

COVID-19, a catalyst for greater use of Zoom’s tools

On top of the long-term tailwinds for video conferencing, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the adoption of Zoom’s video conferencing tools. Many people – from university students to work-at-home employees – have begun using Zoom’s software as they take shelter at home.

My sister who has returned home from Australia during this COVID-19 outbreak is using Zoom’s software for “long-distance” tutorials. Fortune magazine reported that teachers are even conducting piano lessons through Zoom.

Huge addressable market

Video is increasingly becoming the way that individuals communicate with each other at work and in their daily lives. And Zoom is the market leader in the space.

Zoom addresses the Hosted/Cloud Voice and Unified Communications, Collaboration Application, and IP Telephony Lines segments within the communication and collaboration market. Market researcher International Data Corporation estimates that these segments would be worth US$43.1 billion by 2022.

Remember that Zoom’s trailing-12-months revenue is just US$622.7 million. That’s a mere 1.4% of the addressable market, so there’s plenty of room for Zoom to grow into.

A cash-generating business

Unlike some of the other fast-growing SaaS (software-as-a-service) companies, Zoom is already cash-flow positive. In fiscal 2020, Zoom generated US$151.9 million and US$113.8 million in operating cash flow and free cash flow, respectively. That translates to a healthy free cash flow margin of 18.3%, with room for further margin expansion as usage of Zoom’s services grows.

In addition, even after accounting for stock-based compensation, Zoom is still profitable, with GAAP (generally-accepted accounting principles) net income of US$21.7 million in fiscal 2020, or US$0.09 per share.

Zoom’s high gross margin of more than 80% enables it to spend a large chunk of its revenue to acquire customers and grow the business while still sustaining a decent free cash flow margin and squeeze out some GAAP profit.

A robust balance sheet

A time when many businesses are being momentarily put on hold due to the COVID-19 spread highlights the importance of a company with a strong balance sheet. Companies that have enough cash to pay off their fixed costs during pauses in sales are more resilient to economic hardships.

Although Zoom is thriving in the current COVID-19 situation, there could be other incidents that may cause temporary disruptions to its business. It is hence heartening to note that Zoom has a robust balance sheet.

As of 31 January 2020, the video conferencing software company had US$283 million in cash and no debt. In fact, Zoom has been so adept at generating cash flow that it said that much of the primary capital it had raised prior to its IPO was still on its balance sheet.

Competition threat

Competition is perhaps the biggest threat to Zoom. The video conferencing company faces competition from mega tech firms such as Google, which has the free Google Hangout video conferencing service. Facebook and Amazon have also spent heavily on video communication tools.

However, Zoom’s video-first focus has propelled it to become the market leader in the video conferencing space. Unlike other companies that added video tools to their legacy communication software, Zoom built a video-conferencing tool with video at the front and centre of its architecture. This focus gives Zoom users a better video conferencing experience.

For now, Zoom remains the forefront in this space with most users preferring its software over competitors but it must consistently add features and update its software to keep users on its platform.

But is it too expensive?

There is no doubt that Zoom has all the makings of a great company. The software-as-a-service firm is growing rapidly and already boasts free cash flow margins in the mid-teens range.

I foresee Zoom’s free cash flow growing much faster than revenue in the future as margins expand due to economies of scale. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating the adoption of video conferencing software, which is great news for Zoom, being the market leader in this space.

Having said all that, Zoom’s stock has skyrocketed well above what I believe is reasonable. Zoom, which is still run by founder Eric Yuan, has a market cap of around US$38 billion currently.

That’s an astonishing 62 times fiscal 2020 revenue. Even if Zoom’s profit margin was 40% today (a level I think it can achieve in the future), its current market cap would still translate to 176 times earnings.

My conclusion

Based on its share price, the market is anticipating big things for Zoom in the coming quarters as more companies are forced to adopt video conferencing software. On top of that, Zoom, even before the COVID-19 outbreak, was already successfully riding on the coattails of a rapidly growing industry.

As an investor, I would love to participate in Zoom’s growth. However, I think Zoom’s stock is priced for perfection at the moment. Even if Zoom can deliver on all fronts over a multi-year time frame, investors who buy in at this price may still only achieve mediocre returns due to its high valuation.

As such, even though I wish I could be a shareholder of Zoom, I’ll happily wait at the sidelines until a more reasonable entry point arises.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Which S-REIT Could Face a Cashflow Problem?

REITs have fallen hard the last couple of weeks. Here’s a look at some REITs that could face cashflow issues if their tenants defaults.

It has been a nightmarish two weeks for Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) investors in Singapore’s stock market. 

Almost every S-REIT was massively sold down, with many losing more than 50% of their value. Investors who invested on margin were hit especially hard as their losses were amplified and they were forced into selling off positions at a loss.

Investors of REIT-ETFs also reportedly rushed to the exits, further exacerbating the situation.

It does not help that global economic activity has slowed down significantly because of COVID-19. Although most REITs will likely be able to weather this short-term storm, there are some that could face difficulties.

Last week, I published Which S-REIT Can Survive This Market Meltdown? In it, I said that some REITs may face a cashflow crisis if their tenants default on rent. This can lead to a vicious cycle of REITs struggling to pay their interest and end up having to sell assets or raise capital through rights offerings or private placements.

REITs that have a concentrated tenant base, high-interest expense, and less headroom to take on more debt (the regulatory ceiling is a 45% debt-to-asset ratio) are more at risk of a cashflow problem.

In this article, I will highlight some REITs that sport some of these unwanted characteristics.

High tenant concentration

REITs most at risk are those with tenants that cannot pay up their rent. Having a high tenant concentration means that the loss of revenue will be massive if the major tenant defaults.

Below are some S-REITs that have relatively high tenant concentration. Do note that this is not an exhaustive list, they are just some REITs that I have studied:

  • First REIT (SGX: AW9U): The healthcare REIT derived around 82% of its rental income from PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk and its subsidiaries in 2018.
  • EC World REIT (SGX: BWCU): The E-commerce and specialised logistics REIT owns China assets and is dependent on two major tenants: Hangzhou Fu Gang Supply Chain Co Ltd and Forchn Holdings Group Ltd. Combined, the two tenants contributed 67.4% of the REIT’s total rental income in 2018.
  • Elite Commercial REIT (SGX: MXNU): The UK-focused REIT rents practically its entire portfolio to the UK government.

High tenant concentration is risky but it also depends on the type of tenant that the REIT is renting to. 

In First REIT’s case, its assets are healthcare properties such as hospitals and nursing homes. Business in healthcare properties should continue as usual during the COVID-19 pandemic, so the tenants will most likely have the means to pay its rent.

Elite Commercial REIT’s tenant is the UK government, which will almost certainly have the means to cover its obligations.

So, while it is important to think about tenant concentration, it is equally important to judge the likelihood of the main tenant defaulting.

High gearing

REITs that have high gearing will have little debt headroom to take on more borrowings if the need arises.

Below are some REITs that have gearing ratios that are close to the 45% regulatory ceiling.

  • ESR-REIT (SGX: J91U): With a gearing ratio of 41.5% at end-2019, the industrial REIT is one of the highest geared REITs in Singapore.
  • Cache Logistics Trust (SGX: K2LU): The logistics REIT has a gearing of 40.1% as of 31 December 2019.
  • Ascendas REIT (SGX: A17U): As of December 2019, the largest REIT in Singapore by market cap had a gearing ratio of 35.1%.

Again this is not an exhaustive list and not all REITs with a high gearing ratio will face default. However, REITs that have high gearing have less financial flexibility and may need to tap into the equity markets to raise money in the unlikely situation of a cashflow crisis. Tapping on the equity markets could mean dilution for a REIT’s existing unitholders.

Low interest coverage

For a simple but not exact definition, the interest coverage ratio compares a REIT’s interest expense against its net property income. A high interest coverage ratio means that the REIT is able to service its interest expense easily with its income.

In a time of crisis, it is important that a REIT’s rental income can at least cover its interest expense to tide things over. Defaulting on debt obligations can hurt a REIT’s credit rating and ability to negotiate lower interest rates in the future.

Here are some S-REITs with a low interest coverage ratio (again, it’s not an exhaustive list):

  • ESR-REIT: With its high gearing, ESR-REIT’s interest expense is naturally high compared to its rental income. As of 31 December 2019, it had an interest coverage ratio of 3.7 times.
  • EC World REIT: China-focused REITs traditionally have a higher cost of debt so its no surprise that EC World REIT has a low interest coverage ratio of just 2.5 times:
  • Ascendas India Trust (SGX: CY6U): Technically a business trust, Ascendas India Trust owns IT-related and logistics properties in India. It has an interest coverage ratio of 3.6 times.

The REITs above have low interest cover so a drop in rental income may result in their inability to pay their interest expense. 

Wait and see…

The above-mentioned REITs have some of the unwanted characteristics that make them susceptible to cash flow issues. However, it is not clear whether they will end up facing tenant defaults.

Ultimately, whether the REIT can weather the storm comes down to if their tenants can meet their rental obligations. So far, none of the REITs have made any announcements of tenant defaults, so it is best not to panic yet. As a REIT investor, I have not sold any of my positions and I believe that most of the REITs in my portfolio will be able to weather this storm. 

For the time being, I am taking a wait-and-see approach but will be keeping a close eye for any announcements or earnings updates.

*EDITORS NOTE: The article erroneously stated that Ascendas REIT had a gearing ratio of 39.9%. We have since edited to reflect the correct figure of 35.1%.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Endowus’s Fight To Give A Better Retirement For Singaporeans

We recently spoke to Singapore-based roboadvisor Endowus and learnt about its desire to solve Singapore’s retirement problem and so much more.

On 13 March 2020, Jeremy and I met Samuel Rhee and Chiam Sheng Shi from Endowus for a long, lovely chat. Sam is Endowus’s Chief Investment Officer, while Sheng Shi is the company’s Personal Finance Lead.

(From left to right in the photo above: Jeremy, myself, Sam, and Sheng Shi)

Endowus is one of the roboadvisors participating in Singapore’s burgeoning fintech landscape. I first came across Endowus about a year ago and was interested to learn more. That’s because the roboadvisor was (and still is) partnering Dimensional Fund Advisors, a fund management company I have long admired for its investing discipline and overall conduct.

Sheng Shi came across The Good Investors recently and reached out to Jeremy and I to find out more. This led to the in-person meeting on 13 March 2020.

Jeremy, Sam, Sheng Shi, and I covered a lot of ground during our conversation. We talked about Endowus’s founding, its investment philosophy, the company’s strong desire to solve the retirement problem for Singaporean investors, the obstacles it had to overcome to build low-cost investment solutions for investors, and more.

I came away from the meeting impressed by Endowus’s team as well as their passion and actions to help investors in Singapore. Jeremy did too. We are all fighting the same good fight. Below is a transcript of our conversation (edited for length and clarity). This is NOT a sponsored post by Endowus. Jeremy and I hope you will enjoy Sam and Sheng Shi’s wisdom and candid sharing as much as we did.


Introduction of Sam and Endowus

Ser Jing:
Could you please give an introduction about yourself?

Samuel:
Okay. I’m Sam. I’ve been working 25 years in the finance industry on the institutional side. I was at Morgan Stanley for 17 years. And the last job I had was at Morgan Stanley Investment Management Asia where I was CEO and CIO and I was there for 13 years. I worked in London and then Hong Kong for about seven years and I’ve now been in Singapore for 15+ years. When I was on the buyside, I did macro, asset allocation, portfolio construction in public equities and mostly Asia and emerging markets. I became the Chief Investment Officer and ran the money in Singapore. Singapore is the headquarters so we ran about 45 billion total. The portfolio that I personally managed was about US$10 billion to US$15 billion, depending on how markets were and I became the CEO for the last four years I was there.

I am the Chief Investment Officer in Endowus. We have this fancy title called Chairman that was bestowed upon me that I don’t really use but it’s there just because I’m the oldest by far.

Ser Jing:
You look really young actually.

Samuel:
Yeah, I’m turning 48. So the next youngest guy is 11 years younger than me in the office.

Ser Jing: You look 40, at most!

Samuel:
I have a babyface (laughs)! I call it the gift of immaturity. I started in ‘94. So I’ve seen many crises. ‘94 was a bad year. ‘97 was the Asian financial crisis. In ‘99 I saw the tech bubble bursting. 2008 was the financial crisis. Then the 2011 Euro crisis. Now we’ve come here and in the midst of another bear market, and we are experiencing 30% falls, which is unprecedented in nature.

Ser Jing:
In terms of the speed, right?

Samuel:
Yeah, we’re at the very early stages of the unfolding of this bear market but it’s unprecedented in speed and that’s because of the nature of the external shock we are facing. We don’t really know how this goes.

Anyway, back to the introduction! I am in charge of the investment office. I strategize the overall investment framework, the investment philosophy, how we execute on that through the best products. So we’re completely product agnostic – we use whatever product is most suitable and cost efficient for our clients, whether it’s unit trusts or ETFs. We are an independent fee-only financial advisor. That’s the constraint that we have put upon ourselves because we don’t want to be paid by anybody else other than the client.

When you define yourself as a fee-only independent financial advisor, the products that are available to you are tremendous. We went with the best passive or passive-plus product, which was Vanguard and Dimensional Fund Advisors. Vanguard was a strategic partner. We were supposed to do work together, but they pulled out of Singapore a few months before we launched. So that was the story. We were excited to launch with Dimensional as it can only be made available through the IFA (independent financial advisory) channel. On the fixed income side we did not like any existing solutions and there were no decent passive products because of the small SGD fixed income market here so we chose the best manager which was PIMCO, which is very well known by institutional clients but not readily available to retail investors. 

Ser Jing:
Not even Dimensional for the bonds portion? Because I think MoneyOwl uses them.

Samuel:
They have a short duration and short fixed income product, which is not globally diversified. We want a globally diversified core fixed income product. Dimensional products are suited for what they’re supposed to do, which is short term or short duration and they have other great products that we are trying to bring in.

Ser Jing:
Close to a money market fund?

Samuel:
I think it’s exactly what it is. Short duration and ultra high quality, you know, AA, AAA, treasuries, and sovereigns. And so I think there’s not much credit, not much high yield or emerging markets. I don’t think there’s any, and the term is just really short duration, so short fixed income products. Not global or through the duration spectrum.

We talked to Dimensional about requirements for a core fixed income product and they introduced a fund for us – a global quality bond fund. Unfortunately, their track record is really short. They just launched it last year with a Singapore dollar share class and we are looking to bring that into our portfolio so we are excited about that. 

To be honest, in fixed income, active management is not as sinful as equities. Even in equities, I’ve been an active manager so I know that if you do it well you can do well. It’s just that for the average Singaporean investor, can you do it well? If you are a really long term investor, especially with your CPF money, can you do it well and with the transaction costs and limitations involved?

That’s the elephant in the room: Are there enough guys that are delivering consistent returns over the long run net of fees, for CPF and SRS/cash investment? I have outperformed for eight consecutive years as an active manager. I know it can be done. I’ve seen many people around me do it.

We talk about Warren Buffett, Soros, Julian Robertson, and all these guys. They’ll say it’s possible but net of fees, it is difficult. And most retail investors don’t have access. Last year the top five hedge fund managers in the world got paid over a billion. Four of them underperformed the index I think. This doesn’t make sense, this kind of concept. Warren Buffett is actually supportive of the strategy of just buying an index fund. Passive low cost works over the long term. So why fix something that’s not broken?

Endowus’s investment philosophy and how Endowus is different from the rest

Ser Jing:
All good! So next question: What is your investment philosophy like and has it evolved across the years?

Samuel:
Let’s talk about the Endowus investment philosophy. We are trying to build an investment product that is suitable for 90%-plus of Singapore’s population and suitable for investors’ CPF money, long term, for their retirement goals. That’s the primary raison d’etre. The reason for our existence is to solve this generational problem, the retirement pension shortfall. And if you try to do that in Singapore, you can’t do that without CPF cause it’s such a big piece. It’s 37% of your gross monthly income. We can invest that better for Singaporeans. What we want to do is find and build an investment that is suitable for that particular problem.

We want to build a core investment product suitable to everyone, where they can invest 90-100% of their wealth conveniently, securely and in a low cost manner. When I say core, I mean the product that will build upon your long term sustainable returns based on equities and bonds, equities being the riskier growth asset class, which gives you the long term returns. And bonds being your diversifier and stable returns over time.

People compare us with other robo advisors/online platforms and they say we’re active managers and they criticize us for it. I would say that asset allocation (across different asset classes) take precedence over fund choices. The asset allocation has to be strategic and passive. That’s our philosophy. The problem with a lot of robo guys here is that they’re active asset allocators. As an institutional investor, I know that asset allocation represents 80% to 90% of your returns historically depending on the period. You need a strategic long term passive asset allocation and these guys are doing active management based on their whitepapers with backtested numbers which are not real track records. Fundamentally our asset allocation investment philosophy diverges.

The second thing is that we are really focused on the advice piece. We’re not building a product ourselves like the other Robos. We have lots of product guys (fund managers) like Dimensional or Vanguard and so many thousands of managers out there building great products and they have scale. They have expertise and they can build up much better than us.

So for us, we don’t want to focus on the product. We’re not building a product, we’re not competing with any fund managers. So later on, if those (active allocation) guys do fantastically well, they can be on the Endowus platform and they can build it into a portfolio or offer it as a DIY solution. 

It has to be strategic asset allocation. And in the execution of that asset allocation, we find the best product and we are agnostic to the structure. It can be an ETF or mutual fund. It doesn’t matter. It’s still the same funds that Vanguard has, say the S&P 500 fund, and Irish domiciled so it is tax efficient. It is the same product. The ETF and the fund are largely the same and we choose the more cost efficient and provide SGD funds as investors should match their assets and liabilities to SGD which is the home currency without taking unnecessary FX risk.

So basically ETFs are just listed and mutual funds are not but they have the same open-ended structure, same fund and cost structure. So this misunderstanding in the market that ETFs are the only way to be low cost, passive, and indexed is wrong. You can be none of those things for ETFs.

An ETF can be actively managed, high cost, and not indexed. So it doesn’t matter that it’s an ETF. You have to look at the underlying fund, what you’re investing in, right? Is it indexed? Is it passive, is it low cost? That’s what we apply. And sometimes ETFs are more expensive than accessing the mutual fund and mutual funds at institutional rates.

As an institutional investor, I know there’s access to funds at a lower cost. If you are an institution you don’t pay all the fees that people talk about. So what Endowus is doing is saying that as an institution we can group-buy for you.

How Endowus chooses the best investment products for investors

Ser Jing:
Why do you choose the funds that you do and not some of the ETFs in the US?

Samuel:
Now one of the problems with the US ETF fund is US dollars. That’s a problem for Singapore investors. Finance 101 is you need to match your assets with liabilities, including your FOREX liability. You should not be taking needless FX transactions when you invest, especially if the FX transaction cost is high like it is in Singapore for a retail investor.

When you convert SGD to USD, taking a hit there in terms of cost and then investing in USD, being exposed to that, and then later on having to bring it back at whatever exchange rate you don’t know. Then you go to the US and you have withholding tax and other things like inheritance tax issues. Bid-ask spreads on certain ETFs, you know, are another 5-10 basis points, which means you lose some when you hit the offer to buy and then again when you hit the bid to sell. This compares to mutual funds that will always be bought and sold on the same NAV [net asset value] and so no spread and no transaction cost, whereas ETFs have brokerage and transaction costs.

So we looked at all these things and concluded that US ETFs are really expensive and are not competitive for non-US investors. SGX-listed ones are in USD too and have huge bid-ask spreads. So for me after assessing the situation and products, we decided to go with Dimensional and PIMCO for our cash products. And for CPF products, we got the first passive Vanguard funds in there. Two of them exclusive to Endowus clients. Being agnostic to products is really important for us to change products if we find better, more efficient products.

We sourced for the best products most suitable for Singaporeans that are tax-efficient. It’s in SGD or in the case of fixed income, it is hedged to the SGD. For example, we are the ones that actually brought in the Dimensional World Equity product into Singapore. They didn’t have a World Equity Fund here, they didn’t have an SGD fund. We seeded and funded it. Before, it wasn’t available.

We also went to PIMCO and said, “Look, you have a global emerging market fund, but there’s no institutional share class and it is not SGD-hedged. Launch it for us and we’ll seed it and we’ll bring it our platform. We want to give it to Singaporean investors” They gave us some conditions and we know we want to do whatever it takes to bring the best product that we ourselves want to invest in. Within three, four weeks it was done. We seeded the SGD-hedged, institutional share class ourselves, and made it available to our clients on our advised portfolios.

So those are the kinds of solutions that we bring to the table, which is very different from everybody else. This is very different from trying to copy the US Robo model, which is to just buy US ETFs, pick off the list, try to get a tax refund later. In our view, this model is very, very fin-light. We pride ourselves in not only being Deep Tech, but also Deep Fin.

Endowus’s bootstrapping and employee-ownership mindset

Ser Jing:
How did Endowus gain the necessary initial capital to work with PIMCO and Dimensional Fund Advisors to seed the funds?

Samuel:
Okay. So the company is partner-funded and employee-owned. So everybody who’s an employee has the opportunity to invest in the company and they do. All of the employees are shareholders and we don’t have any external shareholders now. No VCs or PEs. The partners put up the money to begin the company. Employees put money in too. And the last round that we did, we didn’t even have room for all advisors who want to invest because employees take precedence. That’s how we structured the company. Its called bootstrapping and we’re bootstrapping not only in reality but in terms of our culture as well. That’s how we like it.

Endowus’s partnership with fund managers to bring the best products for investors to investors

Samuel:
And when we go to fund management companies, there is a language most people don’t know how to speak but I do. Fund managers actually are in a tough spot today because passive is taking over active. It’s a hugely competitive space as well. Think about the number of fund managers out there. They’re not future-proofed or prepared for the future. But if you go to them and make a proposition of what Endowus is about, why our values are aligned. We tell them that we’re going to gather assets and then we’re going to put it into the best products like theirs. Their response is immediately “Great. We’d love to work with you. What do you need?” Because for them, we are a digital asset gatherer and we’re free.

But we’re not a Fundsupermart. We’re not just going to put it on the platform. We’re actually gonna screen and go and get the best funds and provide the best-in-class funds at the lowest cost achievable by working with the fund managers directly.

Protecting investors’ interests, and Endowus’s unique cost-rebates to investors

Ser Jing:
You also direct the money into specific funds and don’t charge a trailer fee.

Samuel:
Yes. I mean the trailer fee, the fund manager doesn’t get, we don’t get it, so in our business model everyone’s interest is completely aligned. It’s the distribution guys like the traditional banks and brokers and platforms like iFast who take all of that. It should go to the client but these distribution and platform guys are taking it and lining their pocket. And the fund managers have to pitch and sell to the banks and platforms and brokers – the traditional distribution channels. It’s precisely why Vanguard gave up and left Singapore as they don’t pay trailer fees and it was impossible to get distributed.

The worst problem though is that it is in the end, the investors who get screwed because the best-in-class funds are often under the radar or not available. Vanguard’s best low cost passive funds are not available to retail investors! So the best funds are funds who are not willing to pay high or any trailer fees. Dimensional and Vanguard by philosophy would never pay trailer fees. And we as a philosophy would never take any. Unlike the iFast, Dollardex, DBSs of the world.

Ser Jing:
And I think Dimensional recently struck a deal with Finexis Advisory.

Samuel:
Actually they supply to a bunch of FAs [financial advisors] offline. They have no problem. They just distribute through financial advisors and not directly to retail or through traditional channels. So they have their own model, which is unique.

Vanguard doesn’t do the FA model. Dimensional started and really grew through FAs in the US. It works here as well although it’s not a huge pool but it’s still decent. So Dimensional is slightly different from Vanguard and that’s why they didn’t pull out.

But good fund managers, in general, are very happy to work with us. They don’t want to pay trailer fees anyway. Especially if you are the best quality or best performing. And so it’s perfectly aligned. So we go to them, we speak their language, we tell them why and we tell them there’s nothing in it for us and they just give us the best funds. We partner strategically with all the major fund managers. We have a great relationship with everybody.

We don’t carry everybody’s product. We don’t carry Aberdeen, Standard Life. You know, we don’t carry Wellington, GMO, Pinebridge. All these guys reach out to me and we keep a good relationship because we are always searching for best-in-class products, the most suitable product for Singapore. We will also provide more funds in the future through new services that we have in plan. It will really help investors with better choice, better advice and better price too! 

If someone can come up with a better product, we’ll work with them. Amundi for example. We’re doing some work, looking for products – even on the ETF side as they are a leader in ETF cost. That’s the Endowus investment philosophy. Fund due-diligence, fund manager due-diligence, that’s like a lot of the work. We have to screen for the best funds. We have to creatively think about what product is best suited to represent. So if you do an asset allocation and you allocate to a different market, geographically, Global, DM [developed markets], EM [emerging markets], then you try to find the best fit and we don’t want to do specific things like China and Malaysia funds, but more like big blocks that make sense. And you bring it up to an asset allocation that is passive and strategic.

Endowus’s efforts to lower costs for investors

Jeremy:
Is there a criteria that you use to select funds? For instance do the funds you select have a maximum management fee?

Samuel:
So we target all-in fees of 1% or less including our own advice access fee. Our fees are fixed. So for cash, it is 60 basis points [0.60%] going down to 0.25% depending on how much you invest with us. For the CPF and SRS it’s 0.4%. We said from the get-go, “Look, this is retirement, this is helping people’s future and therefore let’s try to start at the lowest possible.” And also it was influenced by the fact that CPF had already announced that their wrap fees are going to go down to 40 basis points by October 2020 and it was at 70 basis points at the moment and 1% before. So we moved way ahead of the curve last year. They delayed that announcement, but we still went with 0.4%. You don’t know if they’re going to execute, but hopefully, they will. But even if they don’t, that’s fine. Then everybody can invest through Endowus!

So 40 basis points. We started with a flat 40 basic fee and we target only an additional 60 basis points total expense ratio for the portfolio. But we couldn’t get them for CPF. There weren’t enough products because CPF has to include the funds and you have to go through a consultant, Mercer, in the process. It takes at least like six, nine months to go through that. And strict definitions of three-year track record, first quartile performance, et cetera, and bonds, even more onerous. And so there are only like 80 funds left on the CPF list and we couldn’t build a very high quality globally diversified low-cost portfolio. So we fixed the low-cost part by thinking creatively again.

Would you believe CPF doesn’t have a single passive fund or global ETF you can access?

Ser Jing:
I did not realise that.

Samuel:
You can only access the Singapore local ETF. And so it’s STI [Straits Times Index] and ABF Singapore Bond ETF and that’s it. So you can’t build a globally diverse portfolio. How do we fix this?

So we went to Vanguard and met with the CEO Charles Lin at the time, and Gerard Lee the CEO of Lion Global. I asked them to help solve the retirement problem here in Singapore together. We gotta fix the CPF issues of high cost, lack of passive product,  and we can do it together. So they already have a product. Vanguard supplies and manages the Infinity Series S&P500 and global equities and so we worked together to get it into the CPF-IS included fund list.

The problem though was that the cost of that fund was too high. The headline expense ratio was like 80 basis points and which included a trailer fee and the distribution was charging a sales charge on top of like 1% or more. We felt that that was ridiculous. We wanted to get it cheaper. They initially offered a standard rebate but we needed to get lower to achieve the lowest cost for CPF members and long term investors. So we pushed them until they agreed to get to a really low number. So in the end Vanguard gave us access at 10bps [basis points] and Lion Global’s wrap went down to just 20bps. We are so grateful for their support. They’ve been very value-aligned and tried really hard to get there with us. So total all-in management and wrap were 30 basis points and including expense ratio, gets to closer to 40bps. Compared to the 80bps and 1% sales charge, it’s a meaningful difference to give people a better chance of succeeding in investing. They denominated it in SGD, locally registered, and also put into CPF-IS. And you can’t get that with even cash ETF access, you know? If you look at it from a total all-in cost angle, it’s certainly so much cheaper than US ETFs.

Ser Jing:
This is off the track but I am actually a little bit confused. Why would Lion Global’s wrap services be needed? There seems to be a more elegant solution where Vanguard could just supply it directly?

Samuel:
Well, first of all they pulled out of Singapore. So the plan was for them to do that. In order to do that they have to be qualified for two things. One is they have to be a locally registered licensed retail fund manager, RLFMC, right? So they have to be a registered licensed fund manager. Secondly, they have to be an approved fund manager on the CPF Investment Scheme. So that’s the second step and the third step is you have to get your fund onto the CPF approved list. So there’s three steps and the moment Vanguard pulls out, they can’t do that.

So Lion Global is locally registered as a retail licensed fund manager. They’re approved by CPF as a CPF Investment Scheme fund manager. And the only thing that was left was for them to put it (the Vanguard S&P 500 fund) onto the CPF system. Because they were no longer there, so we needed to put it back and then fix the cost issue. Also, the underlying Vanguard funds do not have an SGD fund. This is the only SGD fund available.

So there was a new guideline that was introduced by CPF Board just as the first passive fund went in that there will be a cap of 50 basis points. That’s the total expense ratio. We are hoping that the total expense ratio will be a single digit fee expense ratio, so our total expense ratio (including the fund management fee) will be 40 or below 50, all in.

So now it’s in, but it’s only allowed and falls below the 50bps guideline because Endowus introduced the industry-first of giving back 100% rebate of trailer fees. So technically the product is still 57.5, but we give 27.5 rebate to get to that 30 basis point management and 40 TER. So it’s well below 50 and a second passive fund that we just put in is the Global Equities fund. So the Vanguard Global Equities. Similarly 18 basis points that Vanguard takes, 20 for Lion Global, and expense ratio of single digit, so all in its less than 48bps TER. So again below 50. So we’re the only ones who can distribute these as the official TER is higher and no one else rebates 100% of the trailer. So that’s the elegant solution. We looked into getting the institutional ones in but we couldn’t. So we tried to still solve it intelligently by putting another product in at low cost.

So those are the things that we could do to improve the product. So those two funds are passive. They are the first two passive funds in CPF and it is part of our portfolio. The only way to access it (for your CPF) is through Endowus. It (the two index funds) makes up the bulk of the equities allocation, which brings down cost dramatically from what we had before and it’s also available for Cash and SRS if you want to at that lower cost too.

Jeremy:
So for the two indexed funds, your clients are paying a 0.9% total expense ratio?

Samuel:
No, the total expense ratio is a concept that exists at the fund level. So that TER is 0.4% and 0.48% for the two funds – below 0.5%. So we’ve included both funds into our globally diversified portfolio. The whole list of funds will be allocated based on your risk appetite. Whether its 100% equity or 60% equity and 40% bonds, or whatever, we will build our globally diversified portfolio. The portfolio fund level fees (the TERs I mention above) vary depending on the risk level you choose, but effectively your all in total cost of investing in Endowus is less than 1%. For CPF and SRS it’s 0.4% to Endowus for all of our advice and access. Then the fund level underlying fee is 50~60bps. Yeah. So especially if you consider the fact that if you try to build that yourself, like right now through iFAST, everything, it’s probably closer to 2%-3% because you have the platform fee and the trailer fee that they take.

Sheng Shi:
We are definitely the lowest cost platform. Even if you get through Fund Supermart, they charge a platform fee. I looked up the cost of buying the same Infinity fund on iFast and they charge 35bps of platform fees on top of the trailer fees they receive which should be at least 27.5bps. So they are getting 62.5bps of fees for just selling a Vanguard passive fund.

Endowus’s founding and how the founders built the team

Ser Jing:
So the next question is how did you and the rest of Endowus’s founding team meet? Tell us more about the conversations that led to Endowus.

Samuel:
It was a pretty simple story. Basically I left Morgan Stanley. I retired from the firm on the condition that I don’t join a competitor, completely retired. And then I took a year out. So it was a sabbatical for me and I worked 23 years straight without a break and Morgan Stanley was 17 years of that. Within Morgan Stanley, I moved a couple of times.

So I’m very unique in the sense that I moved within the same company and any large financial institution is about joining the same department and doing it for the rest of your life. Like investment banking, research, or whatever. I was lucky that Morgan Stanley gave me the opportunity to move around. Anyway after 17 years I left and took the sabbatical. I needed to restore relationships with my wife, my kids, friends, cause I was so busy doing CEO and CIO.

It’s a role that in asset management very rarely is taken together. And it was forced upon me because of circumstances. It was supposed to be a temporary gig, but in reality it ended up being four years. I enjoyed it as it was a new challenge and made me learn a lot more about being a CEO and running a business more holistically. I think it was fun at times but very challenging at the same time as there were a lot of changes from a regulatory perspective, and we had to beef up governance and oversight and risk management. We had to revamp the whole trading team and other changes that were needed. But it was too much and I finally was able to negotiate a very amicable exit.

During my sabbatical, I went to a theological seminary to study theology, especially workplace ministry and things like the biblical interpretation of money. I find these things fascinating and that was really, really fun. And then I took a Stanford NUS International Management course to learn cutting edge management and other skills and during this time I had set up a vehicle to invest in fintech companies, so I had multiple fintech investments across the region. I stopped doing that once I joined Endowus full-time. But my idea was that I wanted to disrupt the pieces of the financial services landscape through the application of technology and innovative new services. The focus was on the biggest pools of financial assets and potential business opportunities that were not being disrupted.

One was, well it was Wealth Tech. The other one is pieces of the investment banking business. So those two verticals are by definition very relationship driven and very old school. There’s not much innovation, there’s nothing new really happening. There’s no technology being applied. And so those two were the space. I thought wealth was like true to my heart. I have a passion for solving retirement issues. The pension problem is the single biggest generational challenge. It’s like a major problem, not only in Singapore but Korea and other major aging countries.

So I was driven by this mission and I looked at all the robo guys, including the ones in Singapore at the time. There were also four guys in Korea. Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Australia, etc. I actually didn’t want to invest in any of them. And the reason is simple: They’re all product guys. They all have fund management licenses and were building product but just using ETFs instead of underlying securities so you have double layer of fees and inefficient structures. And I wanted to focus more on the value added piece, which I felt was going to be the advice piece and especially retirement related.

That is the more value-added piece and I believe long-term, advice wins. So we need to build an advice company and there are a few guys in the US that were doing robo retirement – like Bloom and some of these guys. So I wanted to do something in that space, retirement and advice. And I was thinking about starting my own company. The biggest one in Korea actually offered me to build that in Asia Pacific. They wanted to back me and give me the freedom to own it and build it. But the values and the ways you were looking at their investments just were not aligned. They will try to build algorithms to outperform. Right? So it’s product again. That was when a friend who runs a VC fund introduced me to You Ning and he said, “Oh Sam, you’re doing fintech. I have a guy who is doing fintech, you guys should meet.” That was it.

So I met You Ning first and we have common connections. So we hit it off from the get go. We were excited that we were so similar in the way we were thinking about things and how it should be different from the simple roboadvisors out there. He had incorporated the company with Greg and started Endowus and had focused on the CPF piece which was the catch for me as CPF is about retirement – or should be.

You Ning’s background was at Goldman Sachs investment banking. He did private equity, was at a hedge fund for a little bit, and then he ran the family office of Mr. Kuok, the founder of Wilmar. But a lot of it was private investments, so he thought my public market background would be a great fit. And then Greg did fund structuring and distribution at UBS, for private equity and venture cap. He also began the payment service at Grab when it was Grabtaxi and only cash!

So they didn’t have that public market expertise, which was what they needed. They wanted to get a CIO, they wanted to get my advice or mentorship kind of thing. And it kind of all came together. So my thing was, “Do I just become an investor or become an entrepreneur and join full time?” And that’s when I thought this group makes a good fit for me to be the older balance and the investment person for the team. Greg, who’s done Grab and payments and who’s actually built product was focused on the COO role. So he’s the product guy. And then You Ning brings the type of market expertise and private markets knowledge but is also meticulous, so You Ning has the CFO role. And then I was a CIO. So functionally those were the three divisions and it was a great fit to build out the company in a robust way. And I really build the investment side of the business. Whether it’s partnerships with FMCs [fund management companies], due diligence on the funds themselves, and building out portfolios to express the strategic asset allocation. So we all had like very defined contributions, very defined roles. And it was a perfect fit and personality wise and we work really well together. So that’s how we came together.

Ser Jing:
Thanks for sharing that. Because when I was looking through the founding team, I was just thinking you have these two seemingly very experienced investors, so how do you decide who gets to do what?

Samuel:
The fourth important piece of the founding team was Sin Ting. So I met them at the end of ‘17 beginning of ‘18. And I officially joined in February of ‘18. Sin Ting joined just before me in November of ‘17. Sin Ting is the other partner – I guess, cofounder as well. We came together as a team and we were licensed in January of 2018 and we started managing money from April and launched our platform in August of 2018 and our retail launch was April 2019.

She has a private banking background. So she was at Morgan Stanley in private banking and then she worked in Nomura private banking. So the other piece is the wealth piece, right? So I’m institutional, we’re all institutional. COO, CIO, so Sin Ting is the Chief Client Officer with private banking experience. Sin Ting fits that bill. Client Facing, client interaction, what clients want, how they should be served. The client experience is very important.

Ser Jing:
So she has a lot of input on how the product should be for the client.

Samuel:
Yeah, she’s the client advocate. So she faces the client and runs the client team where we have 6 registered reps and then she gives feedback to the investment product and tech product and feeds into how the product should be structured.

Obviously, it’s a group thing. You get everybody’s contributions and now Sheng Shi is also on board. He is a rep and he is client-facing, but he also reaches out to the community and videos and blogs and he’s our personal finance lead. He does a lot of wonderful grassroots work in the community and interfaces and partners with CPF Board for example. 

Sin Ting leads the more high net worth kind of private banking. We have another person, Lean Sing who was from Citi Gold, so more mass-wealth kind of expertise. And he is great with our clients at the mass wealth all the way up to high net worth clients and really provides value-added advice to clients. He worked in finance and also went for a few years to study Theology and served at a church and came back to finance with us at Endowus as he believed in our values and vision. So we have really been very purposeful in building out the team and filling the gaps.

When you’re building a tech product, you can’t just build a financial services tech product. You’ve got to have deep financial services expertise. So the domain knowledge is very deep. You have to know the trade flows, you know exactly how things are executed, what investment products actually do, how they should be. How to find the best products. Think about tax, FX, and costs and things that others don’t know or don’t think about. So you need to rely on people who’ve had experience and are capable of doing that.We all have a wealth of knowledge and experience in the field that we are in and the clients that we are serving.

So our tech team is actually, it’s like the Avengers, it’s like guys who know finance, guys who know tech, and can build products. We don’t need superfluous stuff or a humongous team. We just need a dedicated team that has the expertise, like 10 people that can do it. Execute. That’s it. We built all the technology in-house and our team has really deep expertise and experience in building out our tech team. Our CTO Joo was at Goldman Sachs Asset Management and UBS and a few other financial firms building trading systems and complex tech platforms. He also built the backend of Stashaway. He has grown into an amazing CTO now leading the team for us. John and Jay, the front and back end leads, are amazing as is our Dev Ops CY. We brought in our Chief Product Officer from Silicon Valley – Jx Lye – amazing guy with great experience and will help take our product to the next level. So we are excited about our tech and product too.

Ser Jing:
So you have your own in-house software development.

Samuel:
Completely. Yeah. That’s why they are called the A team, the Avengers team and we are the B team, the business team. We are confident we have built the most cutting edge and flexible WealthTech platform in not just Singapore but all of Asia. It’s an amazing product.

Endowus’s greatest challenge

Ser Jing:
I’m mindful of time, I’m sorry. So maybe I’ll just ask two or three more questions. I think this one can be very important for individual investors in Singapore. What do you think is Endowus’s greatest challenge in trying to become a lasting investing institute for investors?

Samuel:
There’s a purpose for why we wanted to go in specifically with the goal of trying to to help solve retirement. Helping people secure their financial future, helping people to save and invest, to prepare for their life better. All those things, right? Grand phrases and captions but hollow words unless we can really help people’s lives in a meaningful way.

The most important thing is that I think clients need to buy into the idea of investing their CPF. And that’s a tough challenge. And the reason is that historically people have been told, your CPF is for this and this and it’s not just a retirement solution. It’s really a total social security system. And OA is always for housing, right? That’s what people instinctively think. OA is for housing. You have a retirement piece (retirement account). You have SA [Special Account], MediSave (medical cover) so it solves everything.

But the problem is that housing, I mean really as an investor, and I don’t know if you agree, but housing is probably a poor asset allocation to me at this point in time in this cycle. And equities have corrected 30% but housing has not even begun. So if you look at the opportunity for capital gains, if you look at the fact that it’s a low yielding asset class, and if you look at the fact that if you use your OA, especially for an HDB 99-year lease, it is not an efficient investment.

What you should do with your OA, because your SA is giving 4% to 5%, you should think of this piece as your bond allocation. And use your OA which is giving you just 2.5% (which by the way is not really guaranteed long term) and barely above inflation. Rather than using that for a house, you should really try to invest as much of it as your long term equities allocation. Build returns over the long run and build that for retirement. And it’s perfect for that purpose as it’s locked away and you cannot touch it for 20, 30, 40 years and you save regularly into it as a regular savings plan and it’s a meaningful enough chunk of it. The recent market correction is the right time to start thinking and using this. The problem has been that the costs have been too high and so outcomes have been poor or you get suckered into terrible ILP products. But now with Endowus you can get a globally diversified portfolio for the long term at really low cost which raises your chances of success.

The other reason is that your retirement adequacy is not enough. Even the enhanced retirement sum under CPF is not enough. It’s probably gonna be around $1,500 to $2,000 a month. So it’s just basically not enough to live in Singapore with the inflation rate that exists. So you need to do more and if your retirement account is not enough, your OA (ordinary account) is basically your backup plan, right? And so you need to build it up in a meaningful way. My friend Loo Cheng Chuan talks about 1M65 alot but together with his wife, he thinks if he uses Endowus and invests his OA then he can get to 4M65, that’s 4 million by the time he is 65, which is amazing. That’s the power of investing your CPF.

But the problem is no one knows of this fact and it takes time to change long-held beliefs. That’s the education piece and that’s the biggest challenge that we face. We do a lot of financial literacy and education, and hold events and webinars, but it takes time. And the incumbent banks and platforms are not helping much. Even if we fail, if we can change the way these guys run their business so they lower fees and improve access to individual investors and provide better advice because of the competition we bring then we would have done our job. We are David and they are Goliath in this fight.

But we know it is the right thing. We’re up for the challenge and we’ll do it, but it’s a long haul and it’s going to be a tough ask and it’s going to take a long time. But we’re fine. Time is on our side and we’re patient entrepreneurs, so we’ll keep at it because we know we’re doing the right thing. 

Ser Jing:
Fantastic! I guess this is a really good point to end the conversation. Thank you for your time.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Why I Own Alteryx Shares

Alteryx has only been in my family’s portfolio for a short time, but it has not done well for us. Here’s why we continue to own Alteryx.

Alteryx (NYSE: AYX) is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s portfolio. I first bought Alteryx shares for the portfolio in September 2019 at a price of US$118 and I’ve not sold any of the shares I’ve bought.

The purchase has not worked out well for my family’s portfolio thus far, with Alteryx’s share price being around US$98 now. But we’ve not even owned the company’s shares for a year, and it is always important to think about how the company’s business will evolve going forward. What follows is my thesis for why I still continue to hold Alteryx shares.

Company description

Alteryx provides a self-service subscription-based software platform that allows organisations to easily scrub and blend data from multiple sources and perform sophisticated analysis to obtain actionable insights.

The company’s platform can interact with nearly all data sources. These include traditional databases offered by the likes of IBM, Oracle, and SAP, as well as newer offerings such as those from MongoDB, Amazon Web Services, Google Analytics, and even social media.

Once data from different sources are fed into Alteryx’s platform, it cleans and blends the data. Users can easily build configurable and sophisticated analytical workflows on the platform through drag-and-drop tools. The workflows can be easily automated and shared within the users’ organisation, and the results can be displayed through Alteryx’s integrations with data-visualisation software from companies such as Tableau Software and Qlik. Here’s a chart showing the various use cases for Alteryx’s data analytics platform:

Source: Alteryx June 2019 investor presentation

At the end of 2019, Alteryx had around 6,100 customers, of all sizes, in more than 90 countries. These customers come from a wide variety of industries and include more than 700 of the Global 2000 companies. The Global 2000 is compiled by Forbes and it’s a list of the top 2,000 public-listed companies in the world ranked according to a combination of their revenue, profits, assets, and market value. With thousands of customers, it’s no surprise that Alteryx does not have any customer concentration – no single customer accounted for more than 10% of the company’s revenue in the three years through 2019. The graphic below illustrates the diversity of Alteryx’s customer base:

Source: Alteryx 2019 fourth-quarter earnings presentation

Despite having customers in over 90 countries, Alteryx is currently still a US-centric company. In 2019, 71% of its revenue came from the US. The UK is the only other country that accounted for more than 10% of Alteryx’s revenue in 2019 (10.7%).

Investment thesis

I had previously laid out my six-criteria investment framework in The Good Investors. I will use the same framework to describe my investment thesis for Alteryx.

1. Revenues that are small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or revenues that are large in a fast-growing market

Alteryx earned US$417.9 million in revenue in 2019. This is significantly lower than the US$73 billion addressable market that the company is currently seeing. It comprises two parts:

  1. US$49 billion in the global big data and analytics software market (according to a July 2017 IDC report) which includes the US$28 billion global analytics and business intelligence market (according to a January 2019 Gartner report) 
  2. A US$24 billion slice, based on Alteryx’s estimate of the spend associated with 47 million spreadsheet users worldwide who worked on advanced data preparation and analytics in 2018 (according to an April 2019 IDC report)
Source: Alteryx 2019 fourth-quarter earnings presentation

I believe that better days are ahead for Alteryx for a few reasons:

  • I mentioned earlier that the company’s data analytics platform can interact with nearly all data sources. This interactivity is important. A 2015 Harvard Business Review study sponsored by Alteryx found that 64% of organizations use five or more sources of data for analytics.
  • Market researcher IDC predicted in late 2018 that the quantity of data in the world (generated, captured, and replicated) would compound at an astounding rate of 61% per year, from 33 zettabytes then to 175 zettabytes in 2025. That’s staggering. 1 zettabyte equals to 1012 gigabytes.
  • A 2013 survey on more than 400 companies by business consultancy group Bain found that only 4% of them had the appropriate human and technological assets to derive meaningful insights from their data. In fact, Alteryx’s primary competitors are manual processes performed on spreadsheets, or custom-built approaches. These traditional methods for data analysis involve multiple steps, require the support of technical teams, and are slow (see chart below).
  • Crucially, Alteryx’s self-service data analytics platform is scalable, efficient, and can be mastered and used by analysts with no coding skill or experience. I think this leads to a few good things for Alteryx. First, it democratises access to sophisticated data analytics for companies, and hence opens up Alteryx’s market opportunity. Second, it places Alteryx’s platform in a sweet spot of riding on a growing trend (the explosion in data generated) as well as addressing a pain-point for many organisations (the lack of resources to analyse data, and the laborious way that data analysis is traditionally done).

(Traditional way to perform data analysis)

Source: Alteryx IPO prospectus

2. A strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt

As of 31 December 2019, Alteryx held US$974.9 million in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments. This is comfortably higher than the company’s total debt of US$698.5 million (all of which are convertible notes).

3. A management team with integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset

On integrity

Alteryx was listed in March 2017, so there’s only a short history to study when it comes to management. But I do like what I see.

The company was founded in 1997. One of its co-founders, Dean Stoecker, 63, has held the roles of CEO and chairman since its establishment. Another of Alteryx’s co-founders is 57-year-old Olivia Duane Adams, the company’s current chief customer officer. The third co-founder, Ned Harding, 52, was a key technology leader in the company and left in July 2018; he remains an advisor to Alteryx’s software engineering teams. The company’s chief technology officer role is currently filled by Derek Knudsen, 46. He stepped into the position in August 2018  after Harding’s departure. Knudsen had accumulated over 20 years of experience working with technology in companies in senior leadership positions before joining Alteryx.

Stoecker and Duane Adams collectively controlled nearly 10 million Alteryx shares as of 31 March 2019. These shares are worth around US$980 million at the company’s current share price of US$98. That’s a large stake and it likely aligns the interests of Stoecker and Duane Adams’ with Alteryx’s other shareholders.

Alteryx has two share classes: (1) The publicly-traded Class A shares with 1 voting right per share; and (2) the non-traded Class B shares with 10 voting rights each. Stoecker and Duane Adams’ Alteryx shares were mostly of the Class B variety. So, they controlled 47.9% of the voting power in the company despite holding only 16% of the total shares. Collectively, Alteryx’s key leaders controlled 54.1% of the company’s voting rights as of 31 March 2019.

Source: Alteryx proxy statement

Having clear control over Alteryx means that management can easily implement compensation plans that fatten themselves at the expense of shareholders. The good thing is that the compensation structure for Alteryx’s management looks sensible to me.

In 2018, 70% to 79.7% of the compensation of Alteryx’s management team came from long-term incentives. These incentives include restricted stock units (RSUs) and stock options that vest over multi-year periods. There is room for some misalignment to creep in though – as far as I can tell, there is no clear description given by Alteryx on the performance metrics that management must meet in order to earn their compensation. But I don’t see this as a dealbreaker. Because of the multi-year vesting period for the RSUs and stock options, Alteryx’s management will do well over time only if the share price does well – and the share price will do well only if the business does well. From this perspective, the interests of management and shareholders are still well-aligned.

On capability and innovation

Alteryx’s business has changed dramatically over time since its founding. In its early days, the company was selling software for analysing demographics. Alteryx’s current core data analytics software platform was launched only in 2010, and a subscription model was introduced relatively recently in 2013. I see Alteryx’s long and winding journey to success as a sign of the founders’ ability to adapt and innovate.

I also credit Alteryx’s management with the success that the company has found in the land-and-expand strategy. The strategy starts with the company landing a customer with an initial use case, and then expanding its relationship with the customer through other use cases. The success can be illustrated through Alteryx’s impressive dollar-based net expansion rates (DBNERs). The metric is a very important gauge for the health of a SaaS (software-as-a-service) company’s business. It measures the change in revenue from all the company’s customers a year ago compared to today; it includes positive effects from upsells as well as negative effects from customers who leave or downgrade. Anything more than 100% indicates that the company’s customers, as a group, are spending more.

Alteryx’s DBNER has been more than 120% in each of the last 20 quarters – that’s five years! The chart below illustrates Alteryx’s DBNER going back to 2017’s first quarter.

Source: Alteryx 2019 fourth-quarter earnings presentation

Alteryx’s management has also led impressive customer-growth at the company. The company’s customer count has more than quadrupled from 1,398 at the end of 2015 to 6,087 at the end of 2019.

But there is a key area where Alteryx’s management falls short: The company’s culture. Alteryx has a 3.5-star rating on Glassdoor, and only 65% of reviewers will recommend Alteryx to friends. Stoecker only has an 85% approval rating as CEO. SAP, a competitor of Alteryx, has 4.5 stars on Glassdoor, and recommendation and CEO-approval ratings of 93% and 97%, respectively. Alteryx has managed to post impressive business-results despite its relatively poor culture, but I’m keeping an eye on things here.

4. Revenue streams that are recurring in nature, either through contracts or customer-behaviour

Alteryx’s business is built nearly entirely on subscriptions, which generate recurring revenue for the company. The company sells access to its data analytics platform through subscriptions, which typically range from one to three years. In 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016, more than 95% of Alteryx’s revenue in each year came from subscriptions to its platform; the rest of the revenue came from training and consulting services, among others. 

5. A proven ability to grow

There isn’t much historical financial data to study for Alteryx, since the company was listed only in March 2017. But I do like what I see.

Source: Alteryx IPO prospectus and annual reports 

A few key points to note:

  • Alteryx has compounded its revenue at an impressive annual rate of 61.6% from 2014 to 2019. The astounding revenue growth of 92.7% in 2018 was partly the result of Alteryx adopting new accounting rules in the year. Alteryx’s revenue for 2018 would have been US$204.3 million after adjusting for the impact of the accounting rule, representing slower-but-still-impressive top-line growth of 55.2% for the year. 2019 saw the company maintain breakneck growth, with its revenue up by 64.8%.
  • Alteryx started making a profit in 2018, and also generated positive operating cash flow and free cash flow in 2017, 2018, and 2019.
  • Annual growth in operating cash flow and free cash flow from 2017 to 2019 was strong at 33.8% and 21.4%, respectively.
  • The company’s balance sheet remained robust throughout the timeframe under study, with significantly more cash and investments than debt.
  • At first glance, Alteryx’s diluted share count appeared to increase sharply by 22.1% from 2017 to 2018. But the number I’m using is the weighted average diluted share count. Right after Alteryx got listed in March 2017, it had a share count of around 57 million. This means that the increase in 2018 was milder (in the mid-teens range) though still higher than I would like it to be. The good news is that the diluted share count inched up by only 6% in 2019, which is acceptable, given the company’s rapid growth. I will be keeping an eye on Alteryx’s dilution.

6. A high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future

Alteryx has already started to generate free cash flow. Right now, the company has a poor trailing free cash flow margin (free cash flow as a percentage of revenue) of just 5.4%.

But over the long run, Alteryx expects to generate a strong free cash flow margin of 30% to 35%. I think this is a realistic and achievable target. There are other larger SaaS companies such as Adobe, salesforce.com, and Veeva Systems (my family’s portfolio owns shares in all three companies too) with a free cash flow margin around that range or higher.

Source: Companies’ annual reports and earnings updates

Valuation

You should get some tissue ready… because Alteryx’s shares have a nosebleed valuation. At a share price of US$98, Alteryx carries a trailing price-to-sales (P/S) ratio of 16.1. This P/S ratio is in the middle-range of where it has been since Alteryx’s IPO in March 2017 (see chart below). But the P/S ratio of 16.1 is still considered high. For perspective, if I assume that Alteryx has a 30% free cash flow margin today, then the company would have a price-to-free cash flow ratio of 54 based on the current P/S ratio (16.1 divided by 30%). 

But Alteryx also has a few strong positives going for it. The company has: (1) a huge addressable market in relation to its revenue; (2) a large and rapidly expanding customer base; and (3) very sticky customers who have been willing to significantly increase their spending with the company over time. I believe that with these traits, there’s a high chance that Alteryx will continue posting excellent revenue growth – and in turn, excellent free cash flow growth – in the years ahead.

The current high valuation for Alteryx does mean that its share price is likely going to be more volatile than the stock market as a whole (I’m also keeping in mind that stocks have been very volatile of late because of COVID-19 fears). But the potential volatility is something I’m very comfortable with.

The risks involved

I see a few key risks in Alteryx, with the high valuation being one. Besides introducing volatility (which I don’t see as a risk), Alteryx’s high valuation means that the market has high expectations for the company’s future growth. If Alteryx stumbles along the way, its share price will be punished. With COVID-19 causing widespread slowdowns in business activity across the world, there may be a global recession in the works. Should it happen, Alteryx may find it tough to grow its business.

Competition is another important risk. I mentioned earlier that Alteryx’s primary competitors are spreadsheets, or custom-built approaches. But the company’s data analytics platform is also competing against services from other technology heavyweights with much stronger financial resources, such as International Business Machines, Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP. Providers of data visualisation software, such as Tableau, could also decide to move upstream and budge into Alteryx’s space. To date, Alteryx has dealt with competition admirably – its quarterly DBNERs and growth in customer numbers are impressive. I’m watching these two metrics to observe how the company is faring against competitors.

Two other key risks deal with hacking and downtime in Alteryx’s services. The company’s platform is important for users, since it is used to crunch data to derive actionable insights; it is also likely that Alteryx’s platform is constantly fed with sensitive information of its users. Should there be a data breach on the platform, and/or if the platform stops working for extended periods of time, Alteryx could lose the confidence of its customers.

Then there’s also succession risk with Alteryx. Dean Stoecker, the company’s co-founder and CEO, is already 63. Should he step down in the future, I will keep an eye on the leadership transition.

Lastly, the following are all yellow-to-red flags for me regarding Alteryx: (1) The company’s DBNER comes in at less than 100% for an extended period of time; (2) it fails to increase its number of customers; and (3) it’s unable to convert revenue into free cash flow at a healthy clip in the future.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

Summing up Alteryx, it has:

  1. A valuable self-service data analytics platform that addresses customers’ pain-points and is superior to legacy methods for data analysis;
  2. high levels of recurring revenue;
  3. outstanding revenue growth rates;
  4. positive profit and free cash flow, with the potential for much higher free cash flow margins in the future;
  5. a large and mostly untapped addressable market;
  6. an impressive track record of winning customers and increasing their spending; and
  7. capable leaders who are in the same boat as the company’s other shareholders

The company does have a premium valuation, so I’m taking on valuation risk. There are also other risks to note, such as tough competition and succession. But after analysing all the data on Alteryx’s pros and cons, I’m happy for my family’s portfolio to continue owning the company’s shares.

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