My Favourite Warren Buffett Comments From The 2020 Berkshire Hathaway AGM

On 2 May 2020, Warren Buffett presided over the 2020 Berkshire Hathaway AGM (annual general meeting). Here are my favourite comments from him.

Warren Buffett is one of my investment heroes. I’ve been a shareholder of the company that he runs, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-A)(NYSE: BRK-B), since August 2011. On 2 May 2020, Buffett held court at the 2020 Berkshire Hathaway AGM (annual general meeting). 

For many years, I’ve anticipated the AGM to hear his latest thoughts. This year was no exception for me. In fact, the 2020 Berkshire Hathaway AGM held even more importance, given the uncertainty that the global economy is currently facing because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

I got up at 4am on the morning of 3 May 2020 (I live in Singapore) to watch the live-stream of the entire event. It was surreal, seeing shots of a completely empty stadium that would in normal times hold tens of thousands of people. Moreover, the meeting did not have Charlie Munger, Buffett’s long-time sidekick. Berkshire thought that it did not make sense for Munger to fly from California to Omaha for the meeting. Instead, Greg Abel – who runs Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses – sat at the podium with Buffett.

But I wasn’t disappointed by this year’s AGM. The whole event lasted for over four hours. Buffett kicked it off with a tour-de-force presentation on the history and future of the US economy. He then tackled a whole host of questions – collated from the public and asked by CNBC host Becky Quick – together with Abel.  

I thought it would be worth sharing my favourite comments from Buffett and Abel.


Betting on the future of the US

Warren Buffett: “In 2008 and 2009, our economic train went off the tracks, and there were some reasons why the road-bed was weak in terms of the banks and all of that sort of thing. But this time, we just pulled the train off the tracks and put it on the side.

And I don’t really know of any parallel of one of the most important countries in the world – the most productive, with a huge population – in effect, sidelining its economy and its workforce. And obviously and unavoidably, creating a huge amount of anxiety and changing people’s psyche and causing them to somewhat lose their bearings, in many cases understandably. 

This is quite an experiment, and we may know the answer to most of the questions reasonably soon, but we may not know the answers to some very important questions for many years. So it still has this enormous range of possibilities.

But even facing that, I would like to talk to you about the economic future of the country because I remain convinced as I have. I was convinced of this in World War II, I was convinced of this during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 9/11, the financial crisis – that nothing can basically stop America. And we faced great problems in the past. We haven’t faced this exact problem. In fact, we haven’t really faced any that quite resembles this problem. But we faced tougher problems. And the American miracle, the American magic has always prevailed, and it will do so again.”

The importance of deposit insurance

Warren Buffett: “And one of the things as I look back on that period [referring to the Great Depression] – and I don’t think the economists generally like to give it that much of a point of importance – but if we had the FDIC [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] 10 years earlier…  The FDIC started on January 1, 1934. It was part of the sweeping legislation that took place when Roosevelt came in. If we had the FDIC, we would have had a much, much different experience, I believe, in the Great Depression. 

There was Smoot-Hawley – I mean, there’s all kinds of things and the margin requirements in ’29 and all of those things entered into creating a recession. But if you have over 4,000 banks fail, that’s 4,000 local experiences where people save and save and save and put their money away, and then someday, they reach for it and it’s gone. And that happens in all 48 states, and it happens to your neighbors, and it happens to your relatives. It has an effect on the psyche that’s incredible.

So one very, very, very good thing that came out of the Depression, in my view, is the FDIC. And it would have been a somewhat different world, I’m sure, if the bank failures hadn’t just rolled across this country – and with people who thought that they were savers, find out that they had nothing when they went there and there was a sign that said “Closed.” 

Incidentally, the FDIC – I think very few people know this, or at least, they don’t appreciate it. But the FDIC has not cost the American taxpayer a dime. I mean its expenses have been paid, its losses have been paid, all through assessments on banks. It’s been a mutual insurance company of the banks backed by the federal government, associated with the federal government. But now it holds [US]$100 billion, and it consists of premiums that were paid in and investment income on the premium less the expenses and paying off all the losses. And think of the incredible amount of peace of mind that’s given to people that were not similarly situated when the Great Depression hit.”

The US stock market and economy’s incredible rise

Warren Buffett: “I remember 1954 because it was the best year I ever had in the stock market. And the Dow went from essentially 280 or thereabouts at the start of the year to a little over 400 at the end of the year. 

And when it went to 400 – as soon as it crossed 381, that famous figure from 1929 – and this will be hard for some of you to believe, but everybody wondered: Is this 1929 all over again? And that seemed a little far-fetched because it was a different country in 1954. But that was the common question.

It actually achieved such a level of worry about whether we were about to jump off another cliff because the 381 [high] of 1929 had been exceeded that they had Senator Fulbright – Will Fulbright of Arkansas, who became very famous later in the Foreign Relations Committee. But he had set up a Banking Committee, and he called for a special investigation – if you read through it, he really was questioning whether we had built another house of cards again. And on this committee, one of the members was Prescott Bush, the father of George H. W. Bush, and grandfather of George W. Bush. It had some illustrious names. 

And his committee in March of 1955, with the Dow at 405, assembled 20 of the best minds in the United States to testify as to whether we were going crazy again because the market was at 400, the Dow was at 400, and we’ve gotten in this incredible trouble before. But that was the mindset of the country. It’s incredible. We didn’t really believe America was what it was.

The reason I’m familiar with this thousand-page book that I have here – they found it last night in the library – was that I was working in New York for 1 of the 20 people who was called down to testify before Senator Fulbright. And he testified right before Bill Martin (who was running the Federal Reserve) testified and right after General Wood (who was running Sears) testified. And Bill Martin, of course, is the longest-running Chairman in the history of the Fed, and he’s the one who gave the famous quote that “The function of the Fed was to take away the punch bowls just when the party starts to get really warmed up.” But Ben Graham, my boss, sent me over to the public library in New York to gather some information, something you could do in 5 minutes with the computer now. I dug out something, and he went to testify. 

And on Page 545 of this book — I knew where to look. I didn’t have to go through it all. But he had the quote, which I remember. And I remember because Ben Graham was 1 of the 3 smartest people I’ve met in my life. He was the Dean of the people in the securities business. He wrote the classic Security Analysis book in 1934. He wrote the book that changed my life, The Intelligent Investor, in 1949. He was unbelievably smart. And when he testified with the Dow at 404, he had one line in there toward the start in his written testimony. He said, “The stock market is high. Looks high. It is high, but it’s not as high as it looks.” But he said it is high. 

And since that time, of course, we felt the American tailwind at full force. And the Dow is about 24,000. So you’re looking at a market today that has produced $100 for every dollar. All you did was you had to believe in America – just buy a cross section of America. You didn’t have to read the Wall Street Journal. You didn’t have to look up the price of your stock. You didn’t have to pay a lot of money in fees to anybody. You just had to believe that the American miracle was intact. 

But you had this testing period between 1929 and 1954 as indicated by what happened when it got back up to 380. You had this testing period. And people – they’d lost faith to some degree. They just didn’t see the potential of what America could do. And we found that nothing can stop America when you get right down to it. And it’s been true all along. They have been interrupted. One of the scariest of scenarios was when you had a war with one group of states fighting another group of states, and it may have been tested again in the Great Depression, and it may be tested now to some degree. But in the end, the answer is never bet against America, and that in my view is true today as it was in 1789 and even was true during the Civil War and in the depths of the Depression.”

The right way to approach stocks

Warren Buffett: “Imagine for a moment that you decided to invest money now and you bought a farm. Let’s say about 160 acres, and you bought it $X per acre. And the farmer next to you has 160 identical acres – same contour, same quality of soil. So it was identical. But that farmer next door to you is a very peculiar character. Every day that farmer with the identical farm says “I’ll sell you my farm or I’ll buy your farm at a certain price,” which he would name.

Now that’s a very obliging neighbor. I mean that’s got to be a plus to have a fellow like that in the next farm. You don’t get that with farms. You get it with stocks. You want 100 shares of General Motors on Monday morning, somebody will buy your 100 shares or sell you another 100 shares at exactly the same price, and that goes on 5 days a week. But just imagine if you had a farmer doing that.

When you bought the farm, you looked at what the farm would produce. That was what went through your mind. You were saying to yourself, “I’m paying $X per acre, I think I’ll get so many bushels of corn or soybeans. On average, some years, good; some years, bad; some years, the price will be good; some years, the price will be bad; etc.” But you think about the potential of the farm. 

And now you get this idiot that buys a farm next to you. And on top of that, he’s sort of manic depressive. And he drinks, maybe smokes a little pot. So his numbers just go all over the place. Now the only thing you have to do is to remember that this guy next door is there to serve you and not to instruct you. You bought the farm because you thought the farm had the potential. You don’t really need a quote on it. If you bought in with John D. Rockefeller or Andrew Carnegie, there were never any quotes, although there were quotes later on. But basically, you bought into the business.

That’s what you’re doing when you buy stocks, but you get this added advantage. You have this neighbor who you’re not obliged to listen to at all, but who is going to give you a price every day. And he’s going to have his ups and downs, and maybe he’ll name his selling price that he’ll buy at, in which case you sell if you want to; or maybe he’ll name a very low price, and you’ll buy his farm from him. But you don’t have to, and you don’t want to put yourself in a position where you have to. So stocks have this enormous inherent advantage of people yelling out prices all the time to you, and many people turn that into a disadvantage.

And of course, many people profit in one way or another from telling you that they can tell you what your neighboring farmer’s going to yell out tomorrow or next week or next month. There’s huge money in it. So people tell you that it’s important and they know and that you should pay a lot of attention to their thoughts about what price changes should be, or you tell yourself that there should be this great difference.

But the truth is if you own the businesses you liked prior to the virus arriving – it changes prices, but nobody is forcing you to sell. And if you really like the business and you like the management you’re in with, and the business hasn’t fundamentally changed – and I’ll get to that little one report on Berkshire, which I will soon, I promise – the stocks have an enormous advantage.

And you still can bet on America. But you can’t do that, unless you’re willing and have an outlook to independently decide that you want to own a cross section of America because I don’t think most people are in a position to pick single stocks. A few maybe. But on balance, I think people are much better off buying a cross section of America and just forgetting about it. If you’ve done that – if I’d done that when I got out of college, it’s all I had to do to make 100 on 1 and then collect dividends on top of it, which increased substantially over time.”

More on the right approach to stocks

Warren Buffett: “The American tailwind is marvelous. But it’s going to have interruptions and you’re not going to foresee the interruptions. And you do not want to get yourself in a position where those interruptions can affect you, either because you’re leveraged or because you’re psychologically unable to handle looking at a bunch of numbers.

If you really had a farm and you had this neighbor. And Monday, he offered you $2,000 an acre. And the next day, he offers you $1,200 an acre. And maybe the day after that, he offers you $800 an acre. Are you really going to – at $2,000 an acre when you had evaluated what the farm would produce – going to let this guy drive you into thinking “I better sell because his number keeps coming in lower all the time”? It’s a very, very, very important matter to bring the right psychological approach to owning common stocks.

But I will tell you, if you bet on America and sustain that position for decades, you’re going to do – in my view – far better than owning Treasury securities, or far better than following people who tell you what the farmer is going to yell out next. There’re huge amounts of money that people pay for advice they really don’t need. And for the person giving it, it can be very well-meaning and they believe their own line. But the truth is that you can’t deliver superior results to everybody by just having them trade around a business. A business is going to deliver what the business produces. And the idea that you can outsmart the person next to you or the person advising you can outsmart the person sitting next to you – well, it’s really the wrong approach.”

Even more on the right way to approach stocks

Warren Buffett: “I’m not saying that this is the right time to buy stocks – if you mean by “right” that they’re going to go up instead of down. I don’t know where they’re going to go in the next day or week or month or year, but I hope I know enough to know.

Well, I think I can buy a cross section and do fine over 20 or 30 years, and I think that’s kind of an optimistic viewpoint. But I hope that really, everybody would buy stocks with the idea that they’re buying partnerships and businesses and they wouldn’t look at them as chips to move around up or down.”

On integrity

Warren Buffett: “I would never take real chances with other people’s money under any circumstances. Both Charlie [Munger] and I come from a background where we ran partnerships. I started mine in 1956 for seven either actual family members or the equivalent. And Charlie did the same thing 6 years later.

And neither one of us, I think — I know I didn’t and I’m virtually certain the same is true of Charlie – neither one of us ever had a single institution investment with us. The money we managed for other people was from individuals, people with faces attached to them, or entities’ money with faces attached to them.

We’ve always felt that our job is basically that of a trustee, and hopefully a reasonably smart trustee in terms of what we were trying to accomplish. But the trustee aspect has been very important. It’s true for the people with the structured settlements. It’s true for up and down the line, but it’s true for the owners very much, too. So we always operate from a position of strength.”

Why Buffett thinks he holds a lot more investments than people generally think, and why he keeps a lot of cash

Warren Buffett: “I show our cash and Treasury bills, positioned on March 31. And you might look at that and say, well, you’ve got [US]$125 billion or so in cash and treasury bills, and you’ve got — at least at that point, [US]$180 billion or so in equities. And you can say, well, that’s a huge position having Treasury bills versus just [US]$180 billion in equities. But we really have far more than that in equities because we own a lot of businesses. We own 100% of the stock of a great many businesses, which to us are very similar to the marketable stocks we own – we just don’t own them all. We don’t have a quote on them. But we have hundreds of billions of wholly owned businesses. 

So there are [US]$124 billion – it’s not some 40% or so cash position. It’s far less than that. And we will always keep plenty of cash on hand for any circumstances. When the 9/11 comes along, if the stock market is closed as it was in World War I – it’s not going to be, but I didn’t think we were going to be having a pandemic when I watched that Creighton-Villanova game in January either.

So we want to be in a position at Berkshire where – you remember Blanche DuBois in A Streetcar Named Desire that goes back before many of you. In Blanche’s case, she said that she’s dependent on the kindness of strangers. And we don’t want to be dependent on the kindness of friends even, because there are times when money almost stops. And we had one of those, interestingly enough. We had it, of course, in 2008 and ’09 but right around the day or two leading up to March 23rd, we came very close. But fortunately, we had a Federal Reserve that knew what to do. But investment-grade companies were essentially going to be frozen out of the market.”

It’s a bad idea to borrow to juice returns

Warren Buffett: “CFOs all over the country have been taught to sort of maximize returns on equity capital, so they would finance themselves – to some extent – with commercial paper because that was very cheap. And it was backed up by bank lines and all of that. And they let the debt creep up quite a bit in many companies. 

And then, of course, they all were scared by what was happening in markets [in March 2020], particularly the equity markets. And so they rushed to draw down lines of credit, and that surprised the people who had extended those lines of credit. They got very nervous. And the capacity of Wall Street to absorb a rush to liquidity that was taking place in mid-March was strained to the point where the Federal Reserve, observing these markets, decided they had to move in a very big way.

We got to the point where the US treasury market, the deepest of all markets, got somewhat disorganized. And when that happens, believe me, every bank and CFO in the country knows it. And they react with fear, and fear is the most contagious disease you can imagine. It makes the virus look like a piker [a North American term referring to a gambler who makes only small bets].”

Praise for the Federal Reserve

Warren Buffett: “We came very close [in March 2020] to having a total freeze of credit to the largest companies in the world who were depending on it. To the great credit of Jay Powell. 

 I’ve always had Paul Volcker up on a special place, a special pedestal in terms of Federal Reserve chairmen over the years. We’ve had a lot of very good Fed Chairman. But Paul Volcker, I had him at the top of the list. And I’ll recommend another book. Paul Volcker died about less than maybe a year ago, or a little less. But not much before he died, he wrote a book called Keeping At It. And if you call my friends at The Bookworm, I think you’ll enjoy reading that book. Paul Volcker was a giant in many ways, and he was a big guy, too. He and Jay Powell couldn’t see more in temperament or anything.

But Jay Powell, in my view, and the Fed board – I put him up there on that pedestal because with him, they acted in the middle of March, probably somewhat instructed by what they had seen in 2008 and ’09. They reacted in a huge way and essentially allowed what’s happened since that time to play out the way it has. 

In March, the market had essentially frozen. But in a little after mid-month, it ended up – because the Fed took these actions on March 23 – it ended up being the largest month for corporate debt issuance, I believe, in history. And then April followed through with an even larger month. And you saw all kinds of companies grabbing everything coming to market. And spreads actually narrowed. 

Every one of those people that issued bonds in late March and April should send a thank you letter to the Fed because it would not have happened if they hadn’t operated with really unprecedented speed and determination.”

Unknown consequences from the Fed’s actions

Warren Buffett: “We’ll know the consequences of swelling the Fed’s balance sheet. You can look at the Fed’s balance sheet. They put it out every Thursday. It’s kind of interesting reading, if you’re sort of a nut like me. But it’s up there on the Internet every Thursday, and you’ll see some extraordinary changes there in the last 6 or 7 weeks.

And like I say, we don’t know the consequences of that, and nobody does exactly. We don’t know the consequences of what undoubtedly we’ll have to do – but we do know the consequences of doing nothing. That would have been the tendency of the Fed in many years past – not doing nothing, but doing something inadequate. But Mario Draghi brought the “whatever it takes” to Europe. And the Fed in mid-March sort of did “whatever it takes squared”, and we owe them a huge thank you.

But we’re prepared at Berkshire. We always prepare on the basis that maybe the Fed will not have a Chairman that acts like that. And we really want to be prepared for anything. So that explains some of the [US]$124 billion in cash and bills. We don’t need it all. But we do never want to be dependent on not only the kindness of strangers, but the kindness of friends.”

Why Buffett thought his airline investments were a mistake

Warren Buffett: “You’ll see in the month of April that we net sold [US]$6 billion or so of securities. That isn’t because we thought the stock market was going to go down or because somebody changed their target price or they changed this year’s earnings forecast. I just decided that I’d made a mistake in evaluating – that was an understandable mistake, it was a probability-weighted decision when we bought. 

We were getting an attractive amount for our money when investing across the airlines business. So we bought roughly 10% of the four largest airlines, and – this is not 100% of what we did in April – but we probably paid somewhere between [US]$7 billion and [US]$8 billion to own 10% of the four large companies in the airline business [in the US]. And we felt for that, we were roughly getting [US]$1 billion of earnings. Now, we weren’t getting [US]$1 billion of dividends, but we felt our share of the underlying earnings was [US]$1 billion. And we felt that that number was more likely to go up than down over a period of time. It would be cyclical, obviously. But it was as if we bought the whole company, but we bought it through the New York Stock Exchange. We can only effectively buy 10%, roughly, of the four. We treat it mentally exactly as if we were buying a business. 

It turned out I was wrong about that business because of something that was not in any way the fault of four excellent CEOs. Believe me, there’s no joy being a CEO of an airline. But the companies we bought were well managed. They did a lot of things right. That’s a very, very, very difficult business because you’re dealing with millions of people every day. And if something goes wrong for 1% of them, they are very unhappy. So I don’t envy anybody the job of being CEO of an airline. But I particularly don’t enjoy them being in a period like this where people have been told basically not to fly. I’ve been told not to fly for a while. I’m looking forward to flying – I may not fly commercial, but that’s another question. 

The airline business – I may be wrong, and I hope I’m wrong – but I think it changed in a very major way. And it’s obviously changed in the fact that the four companies are each going to borrow perhaps an average of at least [US]$10 billion or [US]$12 billion each. Well, you have to pay that back out of earnings over some period of time. I mean you’re [US]$10 billion or [US]$12 billion worse off if that happens. And of course, in some cases, they’re having to sell stock or sell the right to buy a stock at these prices, and that takes away from them the upside. 

And I don’t know whether 2 or 3 years from now that as many people will fly as many passenger miles as they did last year. They may and they may not. The future is much less clear to me about how the business will turn out through absolutely no fault of the airlines themselves. A low-probability event happened, and it happened to hurt the travel business, the hotel business, cruise business, theme park business, but particularly the airline business. And of course, the airline business has the problem that if the business comes back 70% or 80%, the aircraft don’t disappear. So you’ve got too many planes. And it didn’t look that way when the orders were placed a few months ago and arrangements were made. But the world changed for airlines and I wish them well.”

Preparing for the worst

Becky Quick: ”Okay. The next question comes from Robert Tomas from Toronto, Canada. And he says, “Warren, why are you recommending listeners to buy now, yet you’re not comfortable buying now as evidenced by your huge cash position?”

Warren Buffett: “Well, (A) as I explained, the position isn’t that huge when I look at worst-case possibilities. I would say that there are things that I think are quite improbable. And I hope they don’t happen, but that doesn’t mean they won’t happen. For example, in our insurance business, we could have the world’s or the country’s Number 1 hurricane that it’s ever had – but that doesn’t preclude the fact we’re going to have the biggest earthquake a month later. So we don’t prepare ourselves for a single problem. We prepare ourselves for problems that sometimes create their own momentum. 

In 2008 and ’09, you didn’t see all the problems the first day. What really kicked it off was when Freddie and Fannie – the GSEs [government-sponsored enterprises] – went into conservatorship in early September and then when money market funds broke the buck. I mean there are things to trip other things, and we take very much a worst-case scenario into mind that probably is considerably worse than most people do. So I don’t look at it as huge.”

Thoughts on capital allocation

Becky Quick: “Greg, let me ask you one of these capital allocation questions. This one comes from Matt Libel. And he says, Berkshire directed 46% of capital expenditure in 2019 to Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Can you walk us through with round numbers how you think differences in capex spending versus economic depreciation versus GAAP depreciation and help explain the time frame over which we should recognize the contracted return on equity from these large investments as we as shareholders are making in Berkshire Hathaway Energy?”

Greg Abel: “Right. So when we look at Berkshire Hathaway Energy and their capital programs, we try to really look at — look at it in a couple of different packages.

One, what does it actually require to maintain the existing assets for the next 10, 20, 30 years, i.e. it’s not incremental. It’s effectively maintaining the asset, the reflection of depreciation. And our goal is always to clearly understand across our businesses, do we have businesses that require more than our depreciation or equal or less? And I’m happy to say with the assets we have in place and how we’ve maintained the energy assets, we generally look at our depreciation as being more than adequate if we deploy it back into capital to maintain the asset.

Now the unique thing in the lion’s share of our energy businesses that are regulated, and that exceeds 85% of them – 83% of them – we still earn on that capital we deploy back into that business. So it’s not a traditional model where you’re putting it in, but you’re effectively putting it in to maintain your existing earnings stream. So it’s not drastically different, but we do earn on that capital.

But what we do spend a lot of time on – when Warren and I think about the substantial amounts of opportunities, that’s incremental capital that is truly needed within new opportunities. So it’s to build incremental wind, incremental transmission that services the wind, or other types of renewable solar. That’s all incremental to the business and drives incremental, both growth in the business – it does require capital – but it does drive growth within the energy business. So there’s really the 2 buckets. I think we would use a number a little bit lower than the depreciation. We’re comfortable the business can be maintained at that level. And as we deploy amounts above that, we really do view that as “incremental or growth capex”.”

Warren Buffett: “Yes, we have what, [US]$40 billion or something? What do we have kind of in the works?” 

Greg Abel: “Well, yes. So we have basically, as Warren is highlighting, [US]$40 billion in the works of capital. That’s over the next, effectively, 9-year, 10-year period. Approximately half of that, we would view as maintaining our assets. A little more than half of it is truly incremental. But those are known projects we’re going to move forward with. And I would be happy to report, we probably have another [US]$30 billion that aren’t far off of becoming real opportunities in that business.

So as Warren said, that takes a long time. It’s a lot of work. The transmission projects, for example, that we’re finishing in 2020 were initiated in 2008 when we bought PacifiCorp. I remember working on that transmission plant, putting it together, thinking 6 to 8 years from now, we’ll have them in operation. 12 years later – and over that period of time, we earn on that capital we have invested and then when it comes into service, we earn on the whole amount. So we’re very pleased with the opportunity. We plant a lot of seeds, put it that way.” 

Warren Buffett: “Yes. And it’s not like they’re super high-return, but they’re decent returns over time. And we’re almost uniquely situated to deploy the capital – I mean you could have government entities do it too, but in terms of the private enterprise. They take a long time. They earn decent returns. I’ve always said about the energy business: It’s not a way to get real rich, but it’s a way to stay real rich.

We will deploy a lot of money at decent returns, not super returns. You shouldn’t earn super returns on that sort of thing. You are getting rights to do certain things that governmental authorities are authorizing and they should protect consumers – but they also should protect people that put up the capital. It’s worked now for 20 years and it’s got a long runway ahead.”

The risks of investing in oil & gas companies

Becky Quick: “Let me follow-up with this one, and this one comes in from Amish Bal, who says, “Is there a risk of permanent loss of capital in the oil equity investment?”” 

Warren Buffett: “Well, there certainly is. There’s no question. If oil stays at these prices, there’s going to be a whole lot of money – and it will extend to bank loans and it will affect the banking industry to some degree. It doesn’t destroy them or anything, but there’s a lot of money that’s been invested that was not invested based on a [US]$17 or [US]$20 or [US]$25 price for WTI, West Texas Intermediate oil. But you can do the same thing in copper and you can do the same thing in some of the things we manufacture. But with commodities, it’s particularly dramatic. Farmers have been getting lousy prices, but to some extent, the government subsidized them. I’m all for it, actually.

But if you’re an oil producer, you take your chances on future prices unless you want to sell a lot of futures forward. OXY [Occidental Petroleum] actually did sell 300,000 barrels a day of puts in effect – or they bought puts and sold calls in effect to match it. And they were protected for a layer of [US]$10 a barrel on 300,000 barrels a day. But when you buy oil, you’re betting on oil prices over time and over a long time. And there’s risk, and the risk is being realized by oil producers as we speak. If these prices prevail, there will be a lot of bad loans and bad debts in energy loans. And if there are bad debts in energy loans, you can imagine what happens to the equity holders. So yes, there’s a risk.”

Effects of negative interest rates on Berkshire’s insurance business

Becky Quick: “All right. This question comes from Rob Grandish in Washington, D.C. He says “Interest rates are negative in much of Europe, also in Japan. Warren has written many times that the value of Berkshire’s insurance companies derived from the fact that policyholders pay upfront, creating insurance float on which Berkshire gets to earn interest.

If interest rates are negative, then collecting money upfront will be costly rather than profitable. If interest rates are negative, then the insurance float is no longer a benefit but a liability. Can you please discuss how Berkshire’s insurance companies would respond if interest rates became negative in the United States?””

Warren Buffett: “Well, if they were going to be negative for a long time, you better own equities. You better own something other than debt. I mean it’s remarkable what’s happened in the last 10 years. I’ve been wrong in thinking that – you could really have had the developments we’ve had without inflation taking hold.

But we have [US]$120-odd billion — well, we have a very high percentage in treasury bills — in cash. Those treasury bills are paying us virtually nothing. They’re a terrible investment over time. But they are the one thing that when opportunity arises – it will arise at the time and it may be the only thing you can look to, to pay for those opportunities, is the treasury bills you have. I mean, the rest of the world may have stopped. And we also need them to be sure that we can pay the liabilities we have in terms of policyholders over time. And we take that very seriously. 

So if the world turns into a world where you can issue more and more money and have negative interest rates over time, I’d have to see it to believe it. But I’ve seen a little bit of it and I’ve been surprised, so I’ve been wrong so far. I would say this, if you can have negative interest rates and pour out money and incur more and more debt relative to productive capacity, you’d think the world would have discovered it in the first couple of thousand years rather than just coming onto it now. But we will see.

 It’s probably the most interesting question I’ve ever seen in economics: Can you keep doing what we’re doing now? And we’ve been able to do it. The world has been able to do it for now, a dozen years or so. But we may be facing a period where we’re testing that hypothesis that you can continue it with a lot more force than we’ve tested it before. Greg, do you have any thoughts on that? I wish I knew the answer, maybe you do.”

Greg Abel: “No, I think as you articulated – I think it was in the annual report too – we don’t know the answer. But as you said, some of the fundamentals right now are very interesting relative to having a negative interest rate. But no, I hate to say it, but I don’t have anything to add.” 

Warren Buffett: “I’d love to be Secretary of Treasury, if I knew I can keep raising money at negative interest rates. That makes life pretty simple. We’re doing things that we really don’t know the ultimate outcome. And I think in general, they’re the right things, but I don’t think they’re without consequences. And I think they could be kind of extreme consequences if pushed far enough, but there would be kind of extreme consequences if we didn’t do it as well. So somebody has to balance those questions.”

The risk of the US government defaulting on its debt

Becky Quick: “All right. This question comes from Charlie Wang. He’s a shareholder in San Francisco. He says, “Given the unprecedented time of the economy and the debt level, could there be any risks and consequences of the U.S. government defaulting on its bonds?””

Warren Buffett: “No. If you print bonds in your own currency, what happens to the currency is that it can be a question because you don’t default. And the United States has been smart enough – and people have trusted us enough – to issue its debt in its own currency. And Argentina is now having a problem because the debt isn’t in their own currency and lots of countries have had that problem, and lots of countries will have that problem in the future. It’s very painful to owe money in somebody else’s currency. 

Listen, if I could issue a currency – Buffett bucks – and I had a printing press, and I could borrow money in that, I would never default. So what you end up getting in terms of purchasing power can be in doubt. But in terms of the US government.. When Standard & Poor’s downgraded the United States government – I think it was Standard & Poor’s, some years back – that, to me, did not make sense. How you can regard any corporation as stronger than the person who can print the money to pay you, I just don’t understand. So don’t worry about the government defaulting.

I think it’s kind of crazy incidentally. This should be said. To have these limits on the debt and all of that sort of thing, and then stopped-government arguing about whether it’s going to increase the limits – we’re going to increase the limits on the debt. The debt isn’t going to be paid, it’s going to be refinanced. And anybody that thinks they’re going to bring down the national debt.. I mean there’s been brief periods and I think it’s in the late ’90s or thereabouts, when it has come down a little bit. The country is going to grow in terms of its debt-paying capacity. But the trick is to keep borrowing in your own currency.”

How to detect malfeasance in banks, and the current state of the banking industry in the US

Becky Quick: “This is one that comes from Thomas Lin in Taiwan. He says, “Warren once said that banking is a good business if you don’t do dumb things on the asset side. Given that the pandemic might put a lot of pressure on the loans, dumb things that got done in the past few years are likely to explode. Through reading annual reports, 10-Qs and other public information, what clues are you looking for to decide whether a bank is run by a true banker who avoids doing dumb things?”” 

Warren Buffett: “That’s a very good question. But I would say that the one thing that made Chairman Powell’s job a little easier this time than it was in 2008-09 is that the banks are in far better shape. So in terms of thinking about what was good for the economy, he wasn’t at the same time worrying about what he was going to do with Bank A or Bank B, to merge them with somebody else, or put added strains on the system or anything.

The banks were very involved with a problem in 2008 and ’09. They had done some things they shouldn’t have done in some of them. And they were certainly in far different financial condition. So the banking system is not the problem in this particular — I mean, we decided as a people to shut down part of the economy in a big way. And it was not the fault of anyone that it happened. Things do happen in this word. Earthquakes happen. Huge hurricanes happen. This was something different.

But the banks need regulation. I mean they benefit from the FDIC. But part of having the government standing behind your deposits is to behave well, and I think that the banks have behaved very well. And I think they’re in very good shape. That’s how the FDIC has built up the [US]$100 billion that I’ve talked about. They’ve assessed the banks in recent years at accelerated amounts in certain periods, and they even differentiated against the big banks. So they built up great reserves there. And they built their own balance sheets, and they are not presently part of Chairman Powell’s problem, whereas they were very much part of Chairman Bernanke’s problem back in 2008 and ’09.

How will you spot the people that are doing the dumb things? It’s not easy – well, sometimes it’s easy. But I don’t see a lot that bothers me. But banks are, in the end, institutions that operate with significant amounts of other people’s money. And if problems become severe enough in an economy, even strong banks can be under a lot of stress and we’ll be very glad we’ve got the Federal Reserve system standing behind them. I don’t see special problems in the banking industry.

Now I could think of possibilities, and Jamie Dimon referred to this a little bit in the JPMorgan report. You can dream of scenarios that put a lot of strain on banks. They’re not totally impossible – that’s why we have the Fed. I think overall, the banking system is not going to be the problem. But I wouldn’t say that with 100% certainty because there are certain possibilities that exist in this world where banks can have problems. They’re going to have problems with energy loans. They’re going to have extra problems with consumer credit. But they know it, and they’re well reserved – well, they’re well capitalized for it. They were reserve-building in the first quarter, and they may need to build more reserves, but they are not a primary worry of mine at all. We own a lot of banks, or we own a lot of bank stocks.”

Recognising heroes and making sure no one’s left behind

Becky Quick: “Warren, this question comes from Bill Murray, the actor, who is also a shareholder in Berkshire. He says “This pandemic will graduate a new class of war veterans, health care, food supply, deliveries, community services. So many owe so much to these few. How might this great country take our turn and care for all of them?” 

Warren Buffett: “Well, we won’t be able to pay actually – it’s like people that landed at Normandy or something. The poor, the disadvantaged, they suffer – there’s an unimaginable suffering. And at the same time, they’re doing all these things – they’re working 24-hour days and we don’t even know their names. So we ought to – if we go overboard on something, we ought to do things that can help those people.

This country – I’ve said this a lot of times before – we are a rich, rich, rich country. And the people that are doing the kind of work that Bill talks about, they’re contributing a whole lot more than some of the people that came out of the right womb, or got lucky and things, or know how to arbitrage bonds or whatever it may be. In a large part, I’m one of those guys. So you really try to create a society that under normal conditions with more than [US]$60,000 of GDP per capita, that anybody that works 40 hours a week can have a decent life without a second job and with a couple of kids. They can’t live like kings, I don’t mean that, but nobody should be left behind.

It’s like a rich family. You find rich families and they have 5 heirs or 6 heirs. They try and pick maybe the most able one to run the business. But they don’t forget about the kid that actually may be a better citizen in some ways than even the one that does the best at business, but they just don’t happen to have market-value skills. So I do not think a very rich company ought to totally abide by what the market dishes out in 18th-Century style or something of the sort.

So I welcome ideas that go in that direction. We’ve gone in that direction. We did come up with social security in the ’30s. We’ve made some progress. But we ought to – we have become very, very, very rich as a country. Things have improved for the bottom 20%. You see various statistics on that. I’d rather be in the bottom 20% now than be in the bottom 20% 100 years ago or 50 years ago. But what’s really improved is the top 1% – and I hope we, as a country, move in a direction where people Bill’s talking about get treated better. And it isn’t going to hurt the country’s growth and it’s overdue. A lot of things are overdue.

I will still say we’re a better society than we were 100 years ago. But you would think with our prosperity, we would hold ourselves to even higher standards of taking care of our fellow man, particularly when you see a situation like you’ve got today where it’s the people whose names you don’t know that are watching the people come in and watching the bodies go out. Greg?”

Greg Abel: “Yes. The only other group that I would highlight – I think it will be very interesting how it plays out – is with the number of home schooling and the children that are home. We’ve always had so much respect for teachers, but we all talk about how we don’t take care of them. And it is remarkable to hear how many people comment that, clearly, we don’t recognize – I have a little 8-year old back at home and plenty of challenges for Mom – but all of a sudden, you respect the institution, the school, the teachers and everything around it. 

And then when I think of our companies and the delivery employees we have, it’s absolutely amazing what they’re doing. They’re truly on the front line. That’s where we have our challenges around keeping their health and safety. And then you go all the way to the rail. The best videos you see out of our companies are when we have folks that are actively engaged in moving supplies, food, medical products – and they’re so proud of it. They recognize they’re making a difference. So a lot of it is we just owe them a great thanks.

And Warren, you touched on it, we can, in some way, maybe, hopefully longer-term, compensate them. But there’s a great deal of thanks, and I probably just think an immense amount of new appreciation for a variety of folks.”

Warren Buffett: “We’re going in the right direction all around the country but it’s been awfully slow.”

Is capitalism broken?

Becky Quick: “Gentlemen, I’ll make this the last question. It comes from Phil King. He says “Many people in the press and politics are questioning the validity of capitalism. What can you say to them that might prompt them to take a look at capitalism more favorably?”

Warren Buffett: “Well, the market system works wonders, but it’s also brutal if left entirely to itself. We wouldn’t be the country we are, if the market system hadn’t been allowed to function. And you can say that other countries around the world that have improved their way of life dramatically, to some extent, have copied us. 

So the market system is marvelous in many respects. But it needs government. It is creative destruction. But for the ones who are destroyed, it can be a very brutal game, for the people who work in the industries and all that sort of thing. So I do not want to come up with anything different than capitalism, but I certainly do not want unfettered capitalism.I don’t think we’ll move away from it, but I think… Capitalists, I’m one of them. I think there’s a lot of thought that should be given to what would happen if we all draw straws again for particular market-based skills.

Somewhere way back, somebody invented television, I don’t know who it was. And then they invented cable, then they invented pay systems and all of that. And so a fellow who could bat 0.406 in 1941 was worth [US]$20,000 a year. And now a marginal Big Leaguer will make vastly greater sums because in effect, the stadium size was increased from 30,000 or 40,000 or 50,000 people, to the country. The market system – capitalism – took over. And it’s very uneven, and in same way – I think that Ted Williams is worth a lot more money than I’ve ever should make. But the market system can work toward a winner-takes-all type situation. And we don’t want to discourage people from working hard and thinking.

But that alone doesn’t do it, there’s a lot of randomness in the capitalist system, including inherited wealth. I think we can keep the best parts of a market system and capitalism and we can do a better job of making sure that everybody participates in the prosperity that that produces. Greg?” 

Greg Abel: “I think it’s always keeping the best parts of it. I even think if we look at the current environment we’re in – the pandemic – and we have to do it only when we can do it properly and reemerge. But in some ways, the best opportunity for people is when we’re back working clearly and that the system is functioning again. But that’s the obvious. And Warren, you’ve highlighted, there’s a lot of imperfections, but it’s definitely the best model out there that just needs some fine tuning.”

The amazing Ben Graham

Becky Quick: “Can I just slip in one more quick question? I forgot this one, someone sent it in earlier. Anderson Hexton wrote in. He said: “Warren mentioned that Ben Graham is one of the three smartest people he’s ever met. I’d like to ask him the names of the other two.”” 

Warren Buffett: “[Laughs] Well, I may not be one of the smartest, but I’m smart enough not to name the other two. I make only two people happy. 

Ben Graham is one of the smartest people, and I know some really smart people. Smartness does not necessarily equate to wisdom, either. And Ben Graham, one of the things he said he liked to do every day was he wanted to do something creative, something generous, and something foolish. And he said he was pretty good at the latter, but he was pretty good. He was amazing, actually.”

Closing remark: Never bet against America

Warren Buffett: “And Becky, I would just say again that – I hope we don’t – but we may get some unpleasant surprises. And we are dealing with a virus that spreads its wings in a certain way, in very unpredictable ways and how all Americans react to it. There’s all kinds of possibilities, but I definitely come to the conclusion after weighing all that, sort of – never bet against America. So thanks.”


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

The Changes I’ve Made To My Portfolio During This Crisis

During times of uncertainty, it may be tempting to sell your stocks to cut your losses. But I’ve not done anything to my portfolio. Here’s why.

Markets are volatile, parts of the world are in lockdown, and oil prices have plunged. This is indeed an uncertain time for investors. So what should we do now?

I can’t answer for everyone but I thought it would be useful to discuss the changes to my portfolio I’ve made since the crisis started.

Absolutely nothing

This may be anti-climatic but I’ve done absolutely nothing to my portfolio. I’ve not added any stocks nor sold any positions.

The reason is quite simple. I’ve not added any stocks to my portfolio because I am saving the cash I have now to invest in my own business.

And I’ve not sold any stocks because my portfolio of stocks is resilient.

Most of the stocks in my portfolio have more cash than debt. This means that these companies can pay off any fixed expenses while business is down and can still borrow more due to their strong financial position. As such, they are in a great position to survive this crisis.

In addition, most of the stocks in my portfolio also have resilient businesses that either are less impacted by Black Swan events or are likely to thrive when business resumes to normal.

But stocks may fall further so why don’t I sell now and buy back later?

I’ve read multiple reports suggesting that we are in a “dead cat bounce” and that the current uptrend of stocks will not last. 

I don’t like to speculate on how stock prices will gyrate in the short-term but I believe that what we are seeing in the stock market is quite reflective of the expectation of the real economic impact on companies.

Financial experts point to the fact that the S&P 500 has rebounded strongly in the last couple of weeks but the truth is that the S&P 500 is not reflective of the entire economy. Financial blogger and investor Michael Batnick wrote in a recent article: 

“The S&P 500 is doing well, but many stocks are not.

The pain that retail companies are experiencing is being reflected in their stocks. Nordstrom and The Gap are both down 60%, Macy’s and Bed & Bath are both down 70%. That’s year-to-date, and to remind you it’s only the second quarter.

The pain that hotels are experiencing is being reflected in their stocks. Marriott and Hyatt are both down more than 40%.

The pain that casinos are experiencing is being reflected in their stocks. MGM and Wynn are both down more than 50%.

The pain that energy companies are experiencing is being reflected in their stocks. Halliburton and Apache are both down more than 60%.

The pain that home builders are experiencing is being reflected in their stocks. PulteGroup is down 47% and Toll Brothers is down 57%.”

There are stocks that are still down a lot despite the recent rally in the S&P 500. This suggests that the market is pricing in the economic impact for the companies that will be hurt the most. 

The S&P 500 is heavily weighted towards mega-cap stocks such as Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Alphabet. They have lots of cash and will likely survive and even thrive in this crisis. For perspective, these four companies collectively hold US$353 billion in cash and short-term investments, according to data from Ycharts (based on their last-reported financials as of 29 April 2020). As such, the S&P 500’s performance is positively skewed by their performance.

Focusing on what I do know

That said, we never know. Even fundamentally sound stocks may yet fall in the coming weeks and months. But I can’t be certain and I don’t want to bet on it. I prefer focusing on the outcomes that I know will happen.

We don’t know how long it will take for the world to return to normal, but what we know is things will return to normal, eventually.

The economy will reopen, the COVID-19 curve will flatten, and consumer sentiment will improve. It may take months or years but eventually, it will happen.

When that occurs, consumer confidence will return, businesses will expand, and the economy will grow. Investor confidence will make a comeback and stocks will rebound.

Knowing this, I much rather hold on to the stocks I own, and let them ride out the current volatility. When economic growth returns, I want my portfolio to be well-positioned to succeed.

Final words

“In investing, what is comfortable is rarely profitable.”

Robert Arnott

Seeing your stocks fall is painful. No one likes to see their hard-earned money vanish into thin air. Unfortunately, volatility is part of investing. Recessions are normal. Bear markets are normal and investors have to live with it.

In times of massive volatility, it is often tempting to take action to reduce your losses or to try to time the market to make a quick gain. However, timing the market is extremely difficult. It’s simpler to wait out the volatility and give your investments time to grow.

Charlie Munger perhaps summed it up best when he said:

“If you’re not willing to react with equanimity to a market price decline of 50 percent two or three times a century, you’re not fit to be a common shareholder.”

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

The Simple Secret To Investing That This Unique Retail Company Holds

Costco is an example of a simple secret to investing: A competitive advantage can come from simply doing what others are unable or unwilling to do.

One of the things that many long-term investors like to do is to find companies with strong and lasting economic moats. The term “economic moat” was popularised by Warren Buffett and he uses it to refer to the characteristics a company has that protects its profits from competitors.

I recently published This is Berkshire Hathaway’s Simple But Unreplicable Competitive Advantage In The Insurance Industry. In it, I discussed the unique mindset that Buffett has that gives Berkshire (he’s the leader of the company) an unassailable edge over its insurance industry peers:

“What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate.” This is the simple but unreplicable competitive advantage that Buffett and Berkshire has in the insurance industry. It is simple. You just have to be willing to tolerate a huge decline in business volume – potentially for a long time – if the pricing for business does not make sense. But it is unreplicable because it goes directly against our natural human tendency to be greedy for more.

If we spot similar simple but unreplicable competitive advantages in companies, it could lead us to fantastic long-term investment opportunities.“

After reading my article, a friend prompted me to also discuss Costco (NASDAQ: COST). The US-based warehouse retailer happens to also have a simple but unreplicable competitive advantage: A fanatical focus on lowering costs for customers, even at the expense of its short-term gain. Below are four few telling examples of the unique mindset that Costco’s leaders have

Uncommon

1. Inc. published an article in August 2019 about Costco and it said (emphases are mine):

“Unlike the typical 25 to 50 percent or more markups at most retailers, Costco caps its mark-ups at 14 percent for outside brands and 15 percent for Kirkland (in-house) brands.

But in many cases the markup is significantly lower,
which is why the average mark-up across all Costco products is 11 percent.

2. According to a June 2019 article from The Hustle (emphasis is mine): 

“Not long ago, Costco was selling Calvin Klein jeans for $29 a pop — already $20 less than almost anywhere else — when a change in its purchasing deal meant Costco could get them for even less from the vendor. Instead of keeping the extra profit from the improved deal, it lowered the jeans’ price to $22.”

3. From the same article from The Hustle (emphases are mine):

“In the 2012 CNBC doc “Costco Craze,” a Costco buyer related one tale about a toy he found that retailed for $100. The company had the option of buying the unit for $50 wholesale and selling it for around $60 — but this wasn’t good enough.

Over a period of months,
Costco ended up working with the vendor and its factory to redesign the toy from the ground up, analyzing every part of the process for ways to cut costs. In the end, Costco got the vendor to reduce the price by 50%, and sold it for $30.

The profit margin Costco made from the toy at $30 was the same it would’ve made at $60:
The time and resources the company invested to lower the price were strictly for the benefit of their shoppers.”

4. Here’s an excerpt from a 2007 Wall Street Journal article (emphasis is mine):

“When the company signed a new contract in 2005 with a supplier for Brooks Brothers-style men’s cotton, button-down shirts, and got a significant price reduction for a massive two-year order, it immediately cut the price of the shirts to $12.99 from $17.99, notes Richard Galanti, Costco’s chief financial officer. Other retailers might have phased in the reduction and captured added profits, but that’s not the Costco way. The shirts now cost $14.99 because they are made with better-quality cotton.”

A market beater

So Costco has been relentless at lowering costs for its customers, often at the expense of its own short-term benefit. How has Costco’s business and share price done over time? Here’s a chart showing the growth in the company’s share price, earnings per share (EPS), and revenue since the start of 2007 – I chose 2007 as the start to remove the “rebound-effects” from the bottom of the Great Financial Crisis of 08/09.

Turns out, there has been solid growth in all three metrics! Costco’s management could have easily juiced the company’s revenues in the short run. But they held off, thinking that the long-term gains are even better. They have been right.

The table below shows Costco’s revenue and EPS from its fiscal year ended August (FY2007) to FY2019. It also shows the same numbers for Walmart (NYSE: WMT) over roughly the same period – for Walmart, it is the fiscal year ended January 2008 (WFY2008) to WFY2020. It’s definitely not an apples-to-apples comparison, but I think it’s instructive to compare Costco’s results with those of Walmart. That’s because Walmart is also a US-based bricks-and-mortar retailer – and one of the largest retailers in the world.

Source: Ycharts

Costco has grown at a much faster pace than Walmart over a similar time period. Again, it’s not apples-to-apples. Walmart is much bigger than Costco, and size does create a drag on growth. But I can’t help but think that Costco’s faster growth over Walmart – in the face of the rise of online retail too, I need to add – is partly a result of the unique mindset that its leaders have.

A simple secret

In This is Berkshire Hathaway’s Simple But Unreplicable Competitive Advantage In The Insurance Industry, I wrote:

“Competitive advantages need not be complex. They can be simple. And sometimes the really simple ones end up being the hardest, or impossible, to copy. And that’s a beautiful thing for long-term investors.”

I want to expand on that. Costco is an example of a simple secret to long-term investing: A lasting competitive advantage can come from simply doing what others are unable or unwilling to do. Costco is willing to voluntarily lower the prices of its products to give customers the best deals. And it does this consistently. How many retailers are willing to do what Costco does? Not many, is my guess. And this is what gives Costco a lasting competitive advantage.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

A Collection of Quotes From Legendary Investor Seth Klarman’s Letters

The annual shareholder letters from Seth Klarman provides us with insight to his thought process and invaluable wisdom to approaching investing.

Seth Klarman is a legendary investor. The Baupost Group, led by Klarman, has a reputation as one of the top-performing hedge funds in the world. In 2012, Bloomberg ranked it as the fourth best hedge fund in terms of net gains since inception (Baupost was established in 1982). Baupost is also reported to have earned an annual return of around 19% since inception as of 2010.

I recently got my hands on Baupost’s shareholder letters from 1995 to 2001 that are written by the low-profile Klarman. In it are insightful quotes that I think are worth sharing.

On the relationships between the past and the future

“Any contrarian knows that just as a grim present is usually a precursor to a better future, a rosy present may be a precursor to a bleaker tomorrow. Without me listing all the things that could go wrong, simply consider that none of these virtuous factors are cast in stone. Just as seeds are sown during the seven lean years that allow the seven fat years to ensue, so does the reverse hold true.”

In his 1995 letter, Seth Klarman rightly pointed out that the past is the past. A couple of good years in the past does not always indicate good years in the future and vice versa. We are now living at a time when these words ring louder than ever.

As investors, we should be aware that things can change rapidly when we least expect it.

Predicting the Dotcom bubble

“Even the slightest association with the Internet is cause for an upward thrust in a company’s share price. This is reminiscent of so many similar episodes over the last few decades, where everything from technology stocks to gambling shares to gold mines had their moment in the sun. We know the current mania will end badly; we do not know when.”

In a letter to shareholders in June 1996, Seth Klarman warned of the bubble emerging in internet stocks. Looking back, it seems obvious to us that Internet stocks were vastly overpriced and the bubble would soon burst. But hindsight is 20-20 and Klarman was one of the few investors who could see it at that time.

We all know by now what happened. In 1999, the dotcom bubble finally burst with the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite Index subsequently falling by 78% from its peak.

On being adaptable

“Investors who find an overly narrow niche to inhabit prosper for a time but then usually stagnate. Those who move on when the world changes at least have the chance to adapt successfully.”

The investing environment has changed significantly over the past three decades.

For instance, investing in loss-making companies used to be frowned upon. But today, some of the best-performing stocks have been loss-making for numerous year. Netflix and Amazon are two prime examples of stocks whose values have skyrocketed despite them incurring losses in the last few years (Netflix is still making losses). But both these companies are increasingly worth more because of their sizeable market opportunity and their ability to easily turn a profit after reaching enough scale.

Investors who are able to adapt and use different investment approaches can maximise the opportunities afforded to them in the market.

On investing

“We regard investing as an arrogant act; an investor who buys is effectively saying that he or she knows more than the seller and the same or more than other prospective buyers. We counter this necessary arrogance with an offsetting dose of humility, always asking for whether we have an apparent advantage over other market participants in any potential investment. If the answer is negative, we do not invest.”

In his shareholder letter in December 1996, Klarman describes how he and the fund makes investment decisions. I believe this is a great analogy and applies to all investors. 

On how value investing works

“Value investors should buy assets at a discount, not because a business trading below its obvious liquidation value will actually be liquidated, but because if you have limited downside risk from your purchase price, you have what is effectively a free option on the recovery of that business and/or the restoration of that stock to investor favour.”

As a proponent of value investing, Seth Klarman describes brilliantly how value investing works. If investors are able to purchase a stock that is trading well below its liquidation value, the stock is unlikely to fall much further. The investor, hence, can get the upside potential without the downside risk.

On the challenges of investing in a bear market

“In investing, nothing is certain. The best investments we have ever made, that in retrospect seem like free money, seemed not at all that way when we made them. When the markets are dropping hard and investment you believe is attractive, even compelling, keeps falling in price, you aren’t human if you aren’t scared that you have made a gigantic mistake.”

In his 1997 shareholder letter, Seth Klarman remarked how challenging it is to buy stocks in a falling market.

I believe many investors may have felt the same way when many REITs in Singapore fell by more than 50% in March this year. Even if we knew that REITs looked like attractive bargains after the fall, how many of us managed to pull the trigger to buy them at those discounted prices? Today, REITs have climbed steadily and investors who bought in just a few weeks ago would be sitting on some meaty gains. 

Final words

Seth Klarman’s words in his shareholder letters contain an arsenal of insights and advice. If you want to read more of his letters you can head here.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

My Quick Thoughts On Oil Falling To A Negative Price

With oil falling to a negative price, investors may be tempted to invest in oil & gas stocks such as Sembcorp Marine. But there are important risks to note.

I’m writing this article on the morning of 21 April 2020 (Tuesday) in Singapore. On the night of 20 April 2020, the price of oil fell to negative territory. I’m referring specifically to contracts for deliveries of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil in early May. 

Here are some quick thoughts I have on this development…

1. Scott Sagan, a professor of political science, once wrote that “things that have never happened before, happen all the time in history.” Last night was the first time ever that oil prices became negative. Historic and fascinating? Yes. Surprising? It shouldn’t be. Crazy things happen all the time in the world of finance.  

2. I hope investors are not lured to invest in oil & gas stocks simply because the price of oil is now so low. There are two important things to note: 

  • Predicting the future of oil prices is practically impossible. In 2007, Peter Davies gave a presentation titled What’s the Value of an Energy Economist? He said in the presentation that “we cannot forecast oil prices with any degree of accuracy over any period whether short or long.” Back then, Davies was the chief economist of British Petroleum (LSE: BP), one of the largest oil & gas companies in the world.
  • Oil & gas stocks need not follow the movement of oil prices. In mid-2014, oil prices started falling from around US$100 per barrel. WTI reached a low of US$26.61 in February 2016 before doubling to US$53.53 just 10 months later (on 21 December 2016). I tracked the share prices of a group of 50 oil & gas stocks in Singapore’s stock market and found that over the same period, 34 of them saw their share prices fall. The average decline for all the 50 companies was 11.9%.

3. Investing in an oil & gas stock also means the need to study its financials and – especially in today’s climate – its balance sheet. Even before the historic slump in oil prices on Monday night, there have already been oil & gas companies in the US effectively going bankrupt (see here and here). And speaking of financial trouble…

4. I fear for Singapore’s oil & gas giant Sembcorp Marine (SGX: S51). As of 31 December 2019, Sembcorp Marine, which builds oil rigs and other types of vessels, had S$389 million in cash but S$1.4 billion in short-term debt and S$3.0 billion in long-term debt. The company had S$2.9 billion in short-term liabilities but just S$2.5 billion in short-term assets. Of the short-term assets, only S$389 million is in cash; the bulk of it are in “contract assets” worth S$1.5 billion. Unfortunately, “contract assets” consist of recognised revenue for ongoing projects and don’t represent real cash until the projects are delivered. In crisis situations – and we are in a crisis situation – all liabilities become real and most assets except cash have to be heavily discounted. 

5. Given the rapid deterioration in global economic conditions since end-2019, it’s likely that Sembcorp Marine’s financial health has weakened significantly from an already poor condition from what I just described in Point Four. The good thing is that Sembcorp Marine’s majority shareholder is Sembcorp Industries (SGX: U96), which is controlled by Temasek Holdings, one of the Singapore government’s investment arms. So it’s likely that financial support for Sembcorp Marine will be strong, if push comes to shove. That said, financial support for Sembcorp Marine does not necessarily mean that its shareholders will end up fine on the other side of this crisis.

6. I’ve stopped having an interest in investing in oil & gas companies for many years because I know my limitations. Investing in oil & gas companies, in my opinion, requires skills that I don’t – and will never – have. I just hope that investors who are tempted to invest in oil & gas stocks because of the historical fall in oil prices on Monday night are fully aware of the risks involved and go in with their eyes wide open.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.   

This Is Berkshire Hathaway’s Simple But Unreplicable Competitive Advantage In The Insurance Industry

Berkshire Hathaway is the brainchild of Warren Buffett. He has a unique mindset that gives the company an unassailable edge in the insurance industry.

One of my heroes in the investment industry is Warren Buffett. His brainchild, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-A)(NYSE: BRK-B), is one of the 50-plus companies in my family’s investment portfolio. We’ve owned Berkshire shares since August 2011, and I shared my investment thesis on the company recently in The Good Investors.

In my Berkshire thesis, I discussed the fantastic track record of profitability that the company’s insurance subsidiaries have produced over the years. I shared that the track record is the result of Buffett’s unique mindset in managing the insurance subsidiaries:

“Next, Buffett also does not push for short-term gains at the expense of Berkshire’s long-term business health. A great example can be seen in Berkshire’s excellent track record in the insurance industry: Its property and casualty (P/C) insurance business has recorded an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years through to 2018. In contrast, the P/C industry as a whole often operates at a significant underwriting loss; in the decade ended 2018, the industry suffered an underwriting loss in five separate years.”    

A missing piece

Years ago, I read a document from Buffett suggesting that Berkshire does not pay its insurance employees based on the policy-premiums they bring in. That’s because Buffett does not want to incentivise his insurance employees to chase unprofitable insurance deals when premiums across the industry do not make sense.

I wanted to include Buffet’s unique remuneration structure for his insurance employees in my Berkshire investment thesis. I thought it was a beautiful illustration of a simple but unreplicable competitive advantage that Berkshire has in the insurance industry. But when I was writing the thesis, I forgot where I came across the information and I could not find it after a long search. So I decided to leave it out.

Found again

As luck would have it, I finally found it again. All thanks goes to my friends Loh Wei and Stanley Lim! Stanley runs the excellent investment education website, Value Invest Asia. He recently interviewed Loh Wei, who talked about Berkshire and Buffett’s unique mindset for remunerating his insurance employees.

After watching the interview, I asked Loh Wei where he found the information and was guided toward the source that I came across years ago: Buffett’s 2004 Berkshire shareholders’ letter.

Wisdom from the Oracle of Omaha

Here’s what Buffett wrote (emphases are mine):

“What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate. Take a look at the facing page. Can you imagine any public company embracing a business model that would lead to the decline in revenue that we experienced from 1986 through 1999? That colossal slide, it should be emphasized, did not occur because business was unobtainable. Many billions of premium dollars were readily available to NICO [National Indemnity Company] had we only been willing to cut prices. But we instead consistently priced to make a profit, not to match our most optimistic competitor. We never left customers – but they left us.

Most American businesses harbor an “institutional imperative” that rejects extended decreases in volume. What CEO wants to report to his shareholders that not only did business contract last year but that it will continue to drop? In insurance, the urge to keep writing business is also intensified because the consequences of foolishly-priced policies may not become apparent for some time. If an insurer is optimistic in its reserving, reported earnings will be overstated, and years may pass before true loss costs are revealed (a form of self-deception that nearly destroyed GEICO in the early 1970s).

Finally, there is a fear factor at work, in that a shrinking business usually leads to layoffs. To avoid pink slips, employees will rationalize inadequate pricing, telling themselves that poorly-priced business must be tolerated in order to keep the organization intact and the distribution system happy. If this course isn’t followed, these employees will argue, the company will not participate in the recovery that they invariably feel is just around the corner.

To combat employees’ natural tendency to save their own skins, we have always promised NICO’s workforce that no one will be fired because of declining volume, however severe the contraction. (This is not Donald Trump’s sort of place.) NICO is not labor-intensive, and, as the table suggests, can live with excess overhead. It can’t live, however, with underpriced business and the breakdown in underwriting discipline that accompanies it. An insurance organization that doesn’t care deeply about underwriting at a profit this year is unlikely to care next year either.

Naturally, a business that follows a no-layoff policy must be especially careful to avoid overstaffing when times are good. Thirty years ago Tom Murphy, then CEO of Cap Cities, drove this point home to me with a hypothetical tale about an employee who asked his boss for permission to hire an assistant. The employee assumed that adding $20,000 to the annual payroll would be inconsequential. But his boss told him the proposal should be evaluated as a $3 million decision, given that an additional person would probably cost at least that amount over his lifetime, factoring in raises, benefits and other expenses (more people, more toilet paper). And unless the company fell on very hard times, the employee added would be unlikely to be dismissed, however marginal his contribution to the business.

It takes real fortitude – embedded deep within a company’s culture – to operate as NICO does. Anyone examining the table can scan the years from 1986 to 1999 quickly. But living day after day with dwindling volume – while competitors are boasting of growth and reaping Wall Street’s applause – is an experience few managers can tolerate. NICO, however, has had four CEOs since its formation in 1940 and none have bent. (It should be noted that only one of the four graduated from college. Our experience tells us that extraordinary business ability is largely innate.)

The current managerial star – make that superstar – at NICO is Don Wurster (yes, he’s “the graduate”), who has been running things since 1989. His slugging percentage is right up there with Barry Bonds’ because, like Barry, Don will accept a walk rather than swing at a bad pitch. Don has now amassed $950 million of float at NICO that over time is almost certain to be proved the negative-cost kind. Because insurance prices are falling, Don’s volume will soon decline very significantly and, as it does, Charlie and I will applaud him ever more loudly.” 

In the quotes above, Buffett referenced a table of financials for NICO. The table is shown below. Note the red box, which highlights the massive decline in NICO’s revenue (written premium) from 1986 to 1999. 

Source: Berkshire Hathaway 2004 shareholders’ letter

Can you do it?

What we’ve had going for us is a managerial mindset that most insurers find impossible to replicate.” This is the simple but unreplicable competitive advantage that Buffett and Berkshire has in the insurance industry. It is simple. You just have to be willing to tolerate a huge decline in business volume – potentially for a long time – if the pricing for business does not make sense. But it is unreplicable because it goes directly against our natural human tendency to be greedy for more. 

If we spot similar simple but unreplicable competitive advantages in companies, it could lead us to fantastic long-term investment opportunities. Jeff Bezos, the founder and CEO of Amazon.com (NASDAQ: AMZN), shared the following in his 2003 Amazon shareholders’ letter (emphasis is mine):

“Another example is our Instant Order Update feature, which reminds you that you’ve already bought a particular item. Customers lead busy lives and cannot always remember if they’ve already purchased a particular item, say a DVD or CD they bought a year earlier.

When we launched Instant Order Update, we were able to measure with statistical significance that the feature slightly reduced sales. Good for customers? Definitely. Good for shareowners? Yes, in the long run.”

Bezos was able to cut through short-term greediness and focus on long-term value. I also shared Bezos’s quote above in my recent investment thesis for Amazon. My family’s investment portfolio has owned Amazon shares for a few years. Here’s a chart showing much a $10,000 investment in Amazon shares would have grown to since the company’s 1997 listing:

Competitive advantages need not be complex. They can be simple. And sometimes the really simple ones end up being the hardest, or impossible, to copy. And that’s a beautiful thing for long-term investors.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Why It’s So Difficult To Short Stocks

We run the risk of losing more than we can afford when we’re shorting stocks. So going short in the stock market can be far riskier than going long.

Shorting is the act of investing in stocks in a way that allows you to profit when stock prices fall. It is the opposite of going long, which is investing in a way that allows you to profit when stock prices rise. 

I’ve been investing for nearly a decade now and have done fairly well. But I’ve never shorted stocks. That’s because I recognise that shorting requires different skills from going long. In the financial markets, I only want to do things that I’m sure I know well. In this article, I want to share two real-life examples on why it’s so difficult to short stocks.

My investment club

The first example starts with an informal investment club I belong to named Kairos Research. It was founded by Stanley Lim, Cheong Mun Hong, and Willie Keng. They are also the founders of the excellent Asia-focused investment education website, Value Invest Asia

I’ve been a part of Kairos for many years and have benefited greatly. I’ve made life-long friends and met countless thoughtful, kind, humble, and whip-smart people who have a deep passion for investing and knowledge. Being in Kairos Research greatly accelerated my learning curve as both an investor and human being.

To join the club and remain in it requires a membership “fee” of just one stock market investment idea per year. It’s a price I’ve gladly paid for many years and I will continue to do so in the years ahead. 

Riding all the way up

In one of our gatherings in June 2019, a well-respected member and deeply accomplished investor in the club gave a presentation on Luckin Coffee (NASDAQ: LK). 

Luckin is a company that runs coffee stores in China. Its stores mainly cater for to-go orders and the company was expanding its store count at a blistering pace. Within a year or so from its founding near the end of 2017, it already had more than 2,000 stores in China. Luckin is considered a formidable competitor to US-based Starbucks in China; Starbucks counts the Middle Kingdom as its largest international growth market. 

At the time of my club mate’s presentation, Luckin’s share price was around US$20, roughly the same level from the close of its IPO in May 2019. He sold his Luckin shares in January 2020, around the time when Luckin’s share price peaked at US$50. Today, Luckin’s share price is around US$4. The coffee chain’s share price tanked by 76% from US$26 in one day on 2 April 2020 and continued falling before stock exchange operator NASDAQ ordered a trading halt for Luckin shares. 

Not the first time…

In January 2020, Muddy Waters Research said that it believes Luckin is a fraud. Muddy Waters Research is an investment research firm. Luckin denied the accusations and its share price only had a relatively minor reaction. There was a gradual slide that occurred in Luckin’s share price since then, but it happened with the backdrop of stock markets around the world falling because of fears related to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The wheels came off the bus only on 2 April 2020. On that day, Luckin announced that the company’s board of directors is conducting an internal investigation. There are fraudulent transactions – occurring from the second quarter of 2019 to the fourth quarter of 2019 – that are believed to amount to RMB 2.2 billion (around US$300 million). For perspective, Luckin’s reported revenue for the 12 months ended 30 September 2019 was US$470 million, according to Ycharts. The exact extent of the fraudulent transactions has yet to be finalised. 

Luckin also said that investors can no longer rely on its previous financial statements for the nine months ended 30 September 2019. The company’s chief operating officer, Liu Jian, was named as the primary culprit for the misconduct. He has been suspended from his role. 

Given the announcement, there could potentially be other misdeeds happening at Luckin. After all, Warren Buffett once said that “What you find is there’s never just one cockroach in the kitchen when you start looking around.”

It’s tough being short

Here’s a chart showing Luckin’s share price from its listing to 2 April 2020:

The first serious allegations of Luckin committing fraud appeared only in January 2020, thanks to Muddy Waters Research. But it turns out that fraudulent transactions at Luckin could have happened as early as April 2019. From 1 April 2019 to 31 January 2020, Luckin’s share price actually increased by 59%. At one point, it was even up by nearly 150%.

If you had shorted Luckin’s shares back in April 2019, you would have faced a massive loss – more than what you had put in – even if you had been right on Luckin committing fraud. This shows how tough it is to short stocks. Not only must your analysis on the fundamentals of the business be right, but your timing must also be right because you could easily lose more than you have if you’re shorting. 

Going long though is much less worrisome. If you’re not using leverage, poor timing is not an issue because you can easily ride out any short-term decline.

Even the legend fails

The other example I want to highlight in this article is one of the most fascinating pieces of information on shorting stocks that I’ve ever come across. It involves Jim Chanos, who has a stellar reputation as a short seller. A September 2018 article from finance publication Institutional Investor mentioned this about Chanos:

“Chanos, of course, is already a legend. He will go down in Wall Street history for predicting the demise of Enron Corp., whose collapse resulted in a wave of prosecutions and the imprisonment of top executives — the kind of harsh penalties that have not been seen since.”

The same Institutional Investor article also had the following paragraphs (emphasis is mine): 

The secret to Chanos’s longevity as a short-seller is Kynikos’s flagship fund, the vehicle where Kynikos partners invest, which was launched alongside Ursus in 1985. Kynikos Capital Partners is 190 percent long and 90 percent short, making it net long. Unlike most long/short hedge funds, however, the longs are primarily passive, using such instruments as exchange-traded funds, as the intellectual effort goes into the short side.

Chanos argues that by protecting the downside with his shorts, an investor can actually double his risk — and over time that has proved a winning strategy.
Through the end of 2017, Kynikos Capital Partners has a net annualized gain of 28.6 percent since launch in October 1985, more than double the S&P 500. That has happened even though the short book — as represented by Ursus — has lost 0.7 percent annually during the same time frame, according to a recent Kynikos document Institutional Investor has obtained.”

It turns out that Chanos’s main fund that shorts stocks – Ursus – had lost 0.7% annually from October 1985 to end-2017! That’s Jim Chanos, a legendary short-seller, losing money shorting stocks over a 32-year period! 

My conclusion  

Stocks with weak balance sheets, inability to generate free cash flow, and businesses in rapidly declining industries are likely to falter over the long run. But it’s far easier to identify such stocks and simply avoid them than it is to short them. 

Besides, the math doesn’t work in my favour. The most I can make going short is 100% while my potential loss is unlimited. On the flipside, the gain I can earn going long is theoretically unlimited, while my potential loss is capped at what I’ve invested.

When we go short, we run the risk of losing more than we can afford – that’s true even for fraud cases. As a result, I’ve always invested with the mentality that going short in the stock market is far riskier than going long.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

How to Invest During This COVID-19 Period

Markets are volatile and earnings are likely to sink. Nobody knows when the economy will return to normal. How can we approach investing during COVID-19?

“Fear incites human action far more urgently than does the impressive weight of historical evidence.”

Jeremy Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run

The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown markets into a frenzy. The month of March was likely the most volatile period in stock market history. Traders were zig-zagging in and out of the markets, causing daily swings of up to 10% in the S&P 500. 

COVID-19 is indeed a black swan event. No one really knows what will happen and how the market will pan out in the short-term. With so much uncertainty, what should long-term investors do now?

Focus on things that you can predict

There are many things we can’t predict in the stock market. But investing is not about accurately predicting everything that will affect stock prices. Instead, it’s about focusing on stuff that you can predict. It’s about investing in companies that are likely to succeed in the long-term.

Terry Smith is the founder of Fundsmith, the manager of the UK’s largest fund, Fundsmith Equity Fund. Here’s what Smith wrote in a recent letter to his investors:

“What will emerge from the current apocalyptic state? How many of us will become sick or worse? When will we be allowed out again? Will we travel as much as we have in the past? Will the extreme measures taken by governments to maintain the economy lead to inflation? I haven’t a clue. Rather like some of the companies we most admire, I try to spend very little time considering matters which I can neither predict nor control and focus instead on those which I can affect.”

Don’t forget that the stock market is the best place to invest for the long term

In times such as this, it is easy to forget that the stock market is actually the best place to invest your money for long-term returns.

According to data from NYU finance professor Aswath Damodaran, US stocks have outperformed bonds and cash by a wide margin over the long run. From 1928 to 2019, US stocks produced an annual return of 9.7%, while bonds (10-year treasuries) had a 4.9% return per year.

In a recent video, Motley Fool co-founder David Gardner shared:

“From day one, when we started the Motley Fool 27 years ago, we said three things. Number one, the stock market is the best place to be for your long-term money. Number two, the stock market tends to rise 9 to 10% a year. That includes every bad week, quarter, month, year, bear market… and number three, make sure that you are invested in a way that you can sleep well at night.”

Don’t try to time the bottom

One of the most-asked questions among investors today is “Have we reached the bottom?”

I think that nobody really knows the answer to that. But it should not stop us from investing.

If you insist on only buying at the trough, you might miss a few good opportunities. In fact, I’ve heard of stories of investors who planned to enter the market at the bottom but missed out when their preferred-bottom never came. As stocks rose and got more expensive, they couldn’t bring themselves to buy and missed out on years of gains.

Billionaire investor Howard Marks mentioned in his latest memo:

“The old saying goes, “The perfect is the enemy of the good.”  Likewise, waiting for the bottom can keep investors from making good purchases.  The investor’s goal should be to make a large number of good buys, not just a few perfect ones.”

But remember to pick the right stocks

If you intend to invest in individual companies rather than an index-tracking fund, then it is important to remember that not all companies are created equal.

The well-followed S&P 500 index in the US has risen steadily over the long-term but a lot of its return can be attributed to only a handful of outperforming companies.

In fact, my blogging partner Ser Jing reported an interesting statistic in an earlier article. He wrote:

“ A 2014 study by JP Morgan showed that 40% of all stocks that were part of the Russell 3000 index in the US since 1980 produced negative returns across their entire lifetime.”

That’s an astounding statistic and goes to show that simply investing in any random stock will not guarantee you positive returns, even if you hold for the long run.

Picking the right companies is as important as choosing the right asset class to invest in. It is perhaps even more important for times such as today, where poorly-managed companies with weak balance sheets are fighting for their survival. As Warren Buffett once said, “Only when the tide goes out do you discover who’s been swimming naked.”

Stay calm and keep investing…

It is an understatement that markets are volatile. We are also likely going to see sharp drops in earnings from many companies in the next few quarters. Already Starbucks has guided for a 46% fall in earnings for the first quarter of 2020 and I expect to see many more companies reporting similar if not worse figures than this.

However, over the long-term, I expect earnings for well-run companies to return and for life to eventually return to normal. 

Instead of focusing on the next few quarter results, I am keeping my eye on long-term results and which companies can survive the current economic standstill.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Why Don’t Stocks Fall as Fast as Earnings?

Company earnings in the US are expected to fall drastically. Shouldn’t the S&P 500’s price go much lower then? Not if earnings normalise in the future.

Some investors may be wondering why stocks have not fallen more. The S&P 500 in the US has rebounded sharply in recent days and is now down by just 15% year-to-date.

Yet US companies are expected to see their earnings decline much more than 15% in the next few quarters. This will make their price-to-earnings ratios seem disproportionately higher than they were last year.

So why is there this gap between stock prices and earnings?

Discounted cash flow

The answer is that stock prices are not a reflection of a single year of earnings. Instead, it is the accumulation of the future free cash flow or earnings that a company will produce over its entire lifetime discounted back to today.

This economic concept is known as the discounted cash flow model. Investor Ben Carlson wrote a brilliant article on this recently.

For example, let’s assume Company ABC is expected to earn $10 per share per year for the next 10 years. After discounting future cash flows back to the present day, at an 8% discount rate, the company’s shares are worth $67.10.

But let’s assume that because of the COVID-19 crisis, ABC’s earnings in the first year is wiped out. But it still can generate $10 a year in the remaining nine years after that. Using the discounted cash flow model, ABC’s shares are still worth $57.84

Despite a 100% decline in earnings in the coming year, ABC’s share price is worth just 14% less.

Other bad case scenarios

There are worse scenarios that can play out, but as long as a company’s long term future cash flow or earnings remains somewhat stable, its share price should not fall as much as its near-term earnings.

For instance, let’s assume that instead of earning $10 per share in the coming year, Company ABC now makes a loss of $10 per share. But in year 2 onwards, business returns to normal and it can generate its usual $10 per share for the next nine years. In this case, Company ABC’s shares are now worth $48.58, or 28% less than before.

Let’s make the situation worse. Let’s assume Company ABC has a $10 per share loss in year 1 and has zero cash flow in year 2. Let’s also assume that business only returns to normal in year 3. Its shares, in this case, are still worth $40.01, a 40% decline.

History shows that stocks fall less than earnings

This is the reason why stocks tend to fall far less than short-term earnings declines. We can look at the Great Financial Crisis as a reference. 

According to data from Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Shiller, the S&P 500’s earnings per share fell 77.5% from $81.51 in 2007 to $18.31 in 2008.

But the price fell much less. The S&P 500 closed at 1520.71 in July 2007 and reached a low of 757.13 in March of 2009. That translated to a 50% decline in stock prices.

Simply put, a 77.5% decline in earnings translated to ‘only’ a 50% decline in stock price. 

Not only did the S&P 500’s price fall much less than earnings, but the subsequent years have also shown that stocks may have fallen too low. Investors who bought in at the troughs of 2009 enjoyed better-than-normal returns over the next 10-plus years.

Assuming stock prices fall in tandem with one-year forward earnings is short-sighted and does not take into account all the future cash flows of a company.

Last words on the price-to-earnings ratio

I guess the takeaway for this post is that you should not be scared off stocks by the high price-to-earnings ratio of companies that will likely appear in the coming months (a high price-to-earnings ratio because of a large decline in earnings but less drastic fall in share price).  

The fall in earnings, if only temporary, should logically only cause a small decline in the value of the company, especially if it can continue to make profits consistently over the extended future.

It is natural that the PE ratio will be high if a company’s earnings disappear in the coming year. But the disappearance of the earnings could be temporary. When COVID-19 blows over, some companies – not all – will see business resume.

For now, the PE ratio is a useless metric as earnings are battered down temporarily, making the figure appear disproportionately high. We should instead focus on normalised earnings and whether a company can continue to generate free cash flow in the future.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Why You Should Never Follow Famous Investors Blindly

Blindly following famous investors is incredibly dangerous. “I’m buying because Warren Buffett is buying” is not a valid investment thesis.

Financial markets all over the world have been in a state of turmoil in recent weeks because of the COVID-19 crisis. In uncertain times like these, you may look up to famous investors to emulate their actions. That’s understandable. After all, following authoritative figures can provide a sense of security.

But I’m here to tell you that following famous investors blindly is incredibly dangerous. 

Blind faith

A few weeks ago, I recorded a video chat with Reshveen Rajendran. During our conversation, Resh shared the story of his friend’s investment in Occidental Petroleum (NYSE: OXY), an oil & gas company. Resh’s friend had invested in Occidental’s shares at around US$40 each, only to see the share price fall sharply. At the time of recording, Occidental’s share price was around US$16 (it is around US$14 now). Resh’s friend did not know what to do with his/her Occidental investment.

After we finished recording, I had a further discussion with Resh. I thought there could be a really good educational element in the story of his friend’s investment in Occidental.

I found out that the friend’s investment thesis for Occidental was to simply follow Warren Buffett. But here’s the thing: Buffett’s investment in Occidental is radically different from what we as individual investors can participate in.

Buffett’s bet

In August 2019, Buffett invested in Occidental through his investment conglomerate, Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-A)(NYSE: BRK-B). What Buffett bought was US$10 billion worth of preferred shares in Occidental. He wanted to provide Occidental with capital to finance its planned US$38 billion acquisition of Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, a peer in the oil & gas industry.

Occidental’s preferred shares that Buffett invested in are not publicly-traded. So individual investors like you and I can’t invest in them. The preferred shares come with an 8% annual dividend that Occidental is obliged to pay until they are redeemed; the dividend means that Occidental has to pay Berkshire US$800 million every year (8% of Berkshire’s US$10 billion investment) in perpetuity or until redemption of the preferred shares happen. Occidental has the option to redeem the preferred shares at US$10.5 billion any time after August 2029. In other words, Berkshire is guaranteed to make a return of at least 8% per year from its Occidental preferred shares as long as the oil & gas company does not go bust. 

Investing in Occidental’s preferred shares the way that Buffett did is very different from buying Occidental shares in the stock market. The normal Occidental shares we can purchase (technically known as common shares or ordinary shares) don’t come with any dividend-guarantees. Occidental is also not obliged to redeem our shares at a small premium to what we paid. If we buy Occidental shares, how well our investment will do over a multi-year period will depend solely on the business performance of the company. Buffett’s investment in the preferred shares comes with protection that we can’t get with the ordinary shares.

No cover

To the point about protection, consider the following. In March 2020, Occidental slashed the quarterly dividend on its ordinary shares by 86% – from US$0.79 per share to just US$0.11 per share – to save around US$2.2 billion in cash. That was the company’s first dividend reduction in 30 years. Occidental needed to take extreme measures to protect its financial health in the face of a sharp decline in oil prices. Meanwhile, there’s nothing Occidental can do about the 8% dividend on Buffett’s US$10 billion preferred shares investment – Occidental has to continue paying the preferred dividends. To add salt to the wound, Occidental’s US$0.11 per share in quarterly dividend works out to just US$392 million per year, which is less than half of the US$800 million that Buffett’s preferred shares are getting in dividends annually. 

Yes, Buffett did buy some ordinary Occidental shares after his August 2019 investment in the oil & gas company’s preferred shares. But the total invested sum in the ordinary shares is tiny (around US$780 million at the end of 2019, or an average share price of US$41.21) compared to his investment in the preferred shares. 

We can end up in disaster if we follow Buffett blindly into an investment without understanding his idea’s key traits. Buffett’s reputation and Berkshire’s actual financial clout gives him access to deals that we will never have. 

Following authority into disaster

Resh’s story about his friend’s investment in Occidental shares reminded me of something that Morgan Housel once shared. Housel is currently a partner with the venture capital firm Collaborative Fund. Prior to this, he was a writer for The Motley Fool for many years. Here’s what Housel wrote in a 2014 article for the Fool:

“I made my worst investment seven years ago.

The housing market was crumbling, and a smart value investor I idolized began purchasing shares in a small, battered specialty lender. I didn’t know anything about the company, but I followed him anyway, buying shares myself. It became my largest holding — which was unfortunate when the company went bankrupt less than a year later.

Only later did I learn the full story. As part of his investment, the guru I followed also controlled a large portion of the company’s debt and and preferred stock, purchased at special terms that effectively gave him control over its assets when it went out of business. The company’s stock also made up one-fifth the weighting in his portfolio as it did in mine. I lost everything. He made a decent investment.”

Housel also committed the mistake of blindly following a famous investor without fully understanding the real rationale behind the investor’s investments.

In conclusion

It’s understandable if you want to follow the ideas of famous investors. That’s especially so during uncertain times, like the situation we’re in today. But before you do, please note that a blind adherence can be dangerous. Famous investors can invest in financial instruments in the same company that we can’t get access to. Or, their investment motives may be completely different to ours even for the same shares.

It’s always important to know why we’re investing in something. “I’m buying because Buffett or [insert name of famous investor] is buying” is not a valid investment thesis. 

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.