Category: Investing Analysis

Veeva Systems (NYSE: VEEV) is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s portfolio. I first bought Veeva shares for the portfolio in November 2017 at a price of US$61 and subsequently made three more purchases (in September 2018 at US$100, in November 2018 at US$98, and in June 2019 at US$165). I’ve not sold any of the shares I’ve bought. 

The purchases have mostly worked out well for my family’s portfolio, with Veeva’s share price being around US$181 now. But it is always important to think about how a company’s business will evolve going forward. What follows is my thesis for why I still continue to invest in Veeva shares.

Company description

The process to develop medical devices and drugs is highly complex and time consuming for the life sciences industry, which includes pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies. For instance, clinical studies for drug development can take anywhere from six months to several years. Proper documentation is also necessary all the way from drug development to commercialisation and there are easily hundreds if not thousands of documents involved. Veeva provides cloud-based software to help pharma, biotech, and medical device companies better handle all that complexity. 

Here’s a graphic from Veeva showing all the software products it has that support the commercial and research & development (R&D) activities of the life sciences industry:

There are a lot of software products that Veeva has, but the company groups them into three categories:

• Veeva Commercial Cloud: It supports a life sciences company’s sales & marketing activities. Some of the products within Veeva Commercial Cloud include a commercial data warehouse, customer relationship management (CRM) apps, data management apps, and key opinion leader data.
• Veeva Vault: It houses software that helps life sciences companies to manage content and data from R&D through to commercialisation.    
• Veeva Data Cloud: A new service introduced in March 2020 that is scheduled for launch in December 2020. Veeva Data Cloud is a patient and prescriber data service and will initially focus on patient and prescriber data solutions for the US specialty drugs distribution market. Veeva Data Cloud will be built on existing technology from Crossix, a privacy-safe patient data and analytics company that Veeva acquired in late 2019.

In FY2020 (fiscal year ended 31 January 2020), 49% of Veeva’s total revenue of US$1.1 billion came from Veeva Commercial Cloud while the remaining 51% came from Veeva Vault. The table below gives an overview of the geographical breakdown of Veeva’s revenue in FY2020:

At the end of FY2020, Veeva had 861 customers in total. These customers range from the largest pharma and biotech companies in the world (such as Bayer, Eli Lilly, Novartis, and more) to small players in the same space (such as Alkermes, Ironwood Pharmaceuticals, and more). 

In recent years, Veeva has started selling content and data management software services to companies outside of the life sciences industries. Veeva is targeting three regulated industries: Consumer goods, chemicals, and cosmetics. I don’t have data on the exact split for Veeva in terms of revenue from life sciences and outside life sciences. But the lion’s share of the company’s revenue is still derived from the life sciences industry. 

Investment thesis

I had previously laid out my six-criteria investment framework in The Good Investors. I will use the same framework to describe my investment thesis for Veeva.

1. Revenues that are small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or revenues that are large in a fast-growing market

The total market opportunity for Veeva is currently over US$10 billion, which is around 10 times the company’s current revenue of US$1.1 billion in the last 12 months. The chart below shows the breakdown of Veeva’s market opportunity:

I also think it’s likely that Veeva’s market opportunity will grow over time. In Veeva’s September 2016 Investor Day presentation, management shared the charts below, which illustrate the company’s market opportunity back then. Management showed that Veeva’s market had expanded from US$5 billion in September 2015 to US$6 billion in September 2016 because of software innovation at the company. (More on Veeva’s innovation later!)

2. A strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt

As of 31 January 2020, Veeva held zero debt and US$1.1 billion in cash and short-term investments. That’s a rock solid balance sheet.

For the sake of conservatism, I also note that Veeva had US$54.8 million in lease liabilities. But that’s a tiny sum compared to the cash and short-term investments that the company had on hand.

3. A management team with integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset

On integrity

Leading Veeva as CEO is Peter Gassner, 55. Gassner is a co-founder of the company, and has served as Veeva’s CEO since the company’s founding in 2007. From 1995 to 2003, he was Chief Architect and General Manager at PeopleSoft. And from 2003 to 2005, Gassner was Senior Vice President of Technology at salesforce.com, one of the pioneering software-as-a-service companies. In my view, the relatively young age of Gassner, his years of experience in leadership roles in other tech companies, and his long tenure with Veeva, are positives.

The other important leaders in Veeva, most of whom have multi-year tenures and relatively young ages (both are good things in my eyes), include: 

Veeva’s compensation structure for management makes me think that my interests as a shareholder of the company are well-aligned with management’s. Here are the key points:

• From Veeva’s IPO in October 2013 to FY2019, the company (1) was paying its key leaders cash compensation that were below market rates; (2) never offered any short-term cash-incentives to management; and (3) placed heavy emphasis on long-term stock awards, in the form of stock options and restricted stock units that vest over multiple years.
• In FY2019, all of the aforementioned leaders of Veeva were paid the same base salary of US$322,917, and nothing else – they were not given any equity awards. Management instead derived more compensation from vesting of stock awards that were given in previous years. The base salaries paid in FY2019 to Veeva’s management are rounding errors when compared with the company’s profit and free cash flow of US$230 million and US$301 million, respectively, for the same year.
• Gassner’s base salary also increased by only 0.7% in FY2018 and 7.6% in FY2019 despite much faster growth in Veeva’s business in both years (I will be sharing a table of Veeva’s financials later).
• In FY2018, Gassner was given US$87.8 million in stock options, which started vesting in February 2020 and will only finish vesting in February 2025, provided that Gassner continues to serve as CEO.
• A new compensation structure was implemented in March 2019 for Veeva’s management. There are positives and a negative with the changes, though I think the pros outweigh the con. The positives: (1) The base salary is going to be US$325,000; and (2) there will be long-term equity incentives (in the form of stock options) that will form the lion’s share of each leader’s annual compensation and that vest over four years. The negative: There will now be a short-term incentive program made up of restricted stock awards that will vest over one year.  

I also note that Gassner controlled 16.0 million Veeva shares as of 31 March 2019. These shares are worth around US$2.9 billion at the moment. This high stake lends further weight to my view that Veeva’s key leaders are in the same boat as me. 

I want to highlight too that Gassner’s shares are all of the Class B type. Veeva has two share classes: (1) Class B, which are not traded and hold 10 votes per share; and (2) Class A, which are publicly traded and hold 1 vote per share. As a result of holding Veeva Class B shares, Gassner alone held 46.1% of the company’s voting power as of 31 March 2019. In fact, all of Veeva’s senior leaders and directors combined controlled 57.6% of Veeva’s voting rights (this percentage dipped only slightly to 53.2% as of 31 January 2020). This concentration of Veeva’s voting power in the hands of management (in particular Gassner) means that I need to be comfortable with the company’s current leadership. I am.

On capability 

Over the years, Veeva’s management has done a great job in growing the company’s customer count (up 31.7% per year from 95 in FY2012 to 861 in FY2020). This is illustrated in the table below:

But there’s more. Management has also been adept at driving more spending over time from the company’s customer base. This can be seen in Veeva’s strong subscription services revenue retention rate. It essentially measures the change in subscription revenue from all of Veeva’s customers a year ago compared to today; it includes the positive effects of upsells as well as the negative effects from customers who leave or downgrade. Anything more than 100% indicates that Veeva’s customers, as a group, are spending more. The table below shows Veeva’s subscription services revenue retention rate over the past few years. There has been a noticeable downward trend in the metric, but the figure of 121% in FY2020 is still remarkable.

Impressively, Veeva has produced subscription services revenue retention rates of significantly more than 100% for many years because the company has succeeded at (1) getting its customers to adopt more products over time, and/or (2) winning more users at a customer for the same product; the strong subscription services revenue retention rates did not come from Veeva raising prices for its software solutions.

For another perspective, we can look at the growth in the average number of products that a Veeva Commercial Cloud and Veeva Vault customer is using:

But there is a key area where Veeva’s management falls short: The company’s culture. Veeva has a 3.3-star rating on Glassdoor, and only 57% of reviewers will recommend the company to friends. Gassner has an approval rating as CEO of only 74%. Veeva has managed to post impressive business results despite its relatively poor culture, but I’m keeping an eye on things here. 

On innovation

Peter Gassner co-founded Veeva in 2007 with the view that “industry-specific cloud solutions could best address the operating challenges and regulatory requirements of life sciences companies.” He saw the market opportunity and grasped it with both arms, leading Veeva to become the first company to introduce a cloud-based CRM app – Veeva CRM – that caters to the global life sciences industry. It was not an easy ride for Gassner. Here’s a comment he gave in a 2017 interview with TechCrunch:

“Starting Veeva, I had the idea or vision you could make very industry-specific software in the cloud and it would be bigger than anyone would have thought. In 2007, [most] people thought that was incorrect.”

To me, the founding stories of Veeva are a great sign of an innovative management team.

Over time, Gassner and his team have also continued to lead successful product-innovation at Veeva. There are three examples I want to point to.

First, Veeva Vault was introduced in 2011, and has grown rapidly from around 5% of Veeva’s revenue in FY2014 to 51% of total revenue in FY2020. 

Second, Veeva has been relentless in creating new products. Here’s a chart showing the growth in the number of applications within Veeva Vault from 2011 to 2016:

Third, the company is now selling content and data management cloud-based software to regulated industries outside of life sciences, as mentioned earlier. It’s early days for this recent foray, but the signs are promising. Here’s a comment from Gassner in Veeva’s FY2020 fourth-quarter earnings conference call:

“Outside life sciences for CPG [consumer packaged goods], chemicals and cosmetics, we had a number of expansions and added some big wins with new companies, including a top 10 CPG company, who will adopt QualityOne, and a top 10 cosmetics company to standardizing on RegulatoryOne. In reflecting on the year for this business and looking ahead, we set the right course in the Veeva Way. We kept our focus on customer success and doing the right things for our early adopters, which is helping establish Veeva as a trusted provider in these new industries.”

I also want to point out the presence of Gordon Ritter as Veeva’s Chairman. Ritter is a founder of Emergence Capital, a venture capital firm that is one of the earliest backers of salesforce.com (Ritter was a driving force behind Emergence Capital’s decision to invest in salesforce.com). Emergence Capital is also one of the early investors in Veeva. Having Ritter as a director allows Veeva’s management to tap on a valuable source of knowledge. Ritter has been a director of Veeva since 2008 and he controlled nearly 3 million Veeva shares as of 31 March 2019, a stake that’s worth around US$485 million right now.

4. Revenue streams that are recurring in nature, either through contracts or customer-behaviour

Veeva generates the lion’s share of its revenue through subscriptions to its software services, which are recurring in nature. In FY2020, 81% of Veeva’s total revenue of US$1.1 billion came from subscriptions. The majority of the company’s subscriptions with customers are for a term of 1 year. The remaining 19% of Veeva’s revenue in FY2020 was from professional services, where the company earns fees from helping its customers implement and optimise the use of its software suite.

There’s some form of customer concentration in Veeva – 36% of its revenue in FY2020 came from its top 10 customers. That’s a risk. But I’m comforted by the high likelihood that Veeva’s software services are mission-critical in nature for the company’s customers. 

For instance, the distribution of marketing and promotional material for the life sciences industry is highly regulated. This is where Veeva CRM can help through one of its applications, which enables the management, delivery, and tracking of emails from life sciences sales representatives to healthcare professionals, while maintaining regulatory compliance. In another example, the US FDA (Food & Drug Administration) requires life sciences companies to maintain full audit trails for the handling of electronic records; in fact, changes in data cannot overwrite previous records. Veeva Vault’s suite of apps helps life sciences companies meet the strict regulatory requirements for documentation.

5. A proven ability to grow

The table below shows Veeva’s important financial figures from FY2011 to FY2020. I like what I’m seeing:

A few key points about Veeva’s financials:

• Revenue has compounded impressively at 49.8% per year from FY2011 to FY2020. The rate of growth has slowed in recent years, but was still really strong at 28.7% from FY2015 to FY2020, and at 28.1% in FY2020.
• Net profit has surged tremendously since FY2011. Growth from FY2015 to FY2020 has been excellent at 49.6%; in FY2020, profit was up by a solid 31.0% too.
• Operating cash flow has consistently been positive for the timeframe I’m looking at, and has also increased significantly over time. The growth rate for operating cash flow from FY2015 to FY2020 was impressive, at 45.3% annually; in FY2020, operating cash flow climbed 40.7%. 
• Free cash flow has also (1) been consistently positive for the time period I’m studying, and (2) stepped up strongly. Veeva’s free cash flow was up by 60.5% per year from FY2015 to FY2020, and was up by 43.9% in FY2020 – these are eye-catching numbers. 
• The company’s balance sheet remained robust throughout the timeframe under study, with zero debt the entire way.
• At first glance, Veeva’s diluted share count appeared to increase sharply by 111.4% from FY2014 to FY2015. (I only started counting from FY2014 since Veeva was listed in October 2013, which is in the second half of FY2014.) But the number I’m using is the weighted average diluted share count. Right after Veeva got listed, it had a share count of around 122 million. Moreover, Veeva’s weighted average diluted share count showed a negligible growth rate of just 1.9% per year from FY2015 to FY2020.

6. A high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future

There are two reasons why I think Veeva excels in this criterion. 

First, the company has done very well in producing free cash flow from its business for a long time. Its free cash flow margin (free cash flow as a percentage of revenue) has also increased steadily from an already strong level of 18.5% in the year of its IPO. In FY2020, Veeva’s free cash flow margin was an incredible 39.2%. As a cloud-based software company, I don’t see any reason why Veeva cannot maintain a fat free cash flow margin in the future.

Second, there’s still plenty of room to grow for Veeva. Over time, I expect Veeva to significantly increase both its customer count and the average number of products used per customer. These assumptions mean that Veeva should see robust growth in revenue in the years ahead. If the free cash flow margin stays fat – and I don’t see any reason why it shouldn’t, as I mentioned earlier – that will mean even more free cash flow for Veeva in the future. 

Valuation

I like to keep things simple in the valuation process. In Veeva’s case, I think the price-to-free cash flow (P/FCF) ratio is an appropriate metric to value the company. That’s because the SaaS company has a strong history of producing positive and growing free cash flow. 

Veeva carries a trailing P/FCF ratio of around 66 at a share price of US$181. That’s a pretty darn high valuation at first glance. But as the chart below shows, Veeva’s P/FCF ratio has been much higher in the past. Moreover, the P/FCF ratio has averaged at 54 since the company’s listing, according to Ycharts, and that is not too far from where it is now.

In addition, there are strong positives in Veeva’s favour too. The company has: (1) Revenue that is low compared to a large and possibly fast-growing market; (2) a software product that is mission-critical for users; (3) a large and rapidly expanding customer base; and (4) sticky customers who have been willing to significantly increase their spending with the company over time. I believe that with these traits, there’s a high chance that Veeva will continue posting excellent revenue growth – and in turn, excellent free cash flow growth – in time to come. 

The risks involved

I see seven big risks with Veeva. In no particular order…

First, I think there’s key-man risk with the company. Peter Gassner – and his co-founder Matt Wallach – were the ones with the vision. And over time, I think Gassner has been instrumental in leading Veeva to success. Wallach relinquished an active management role at the company in 2019. Should Gassner leave for any reason, I will be concerned.

Second, there’s customer-concentration, as I already mentioned.

Veeva’s relationship with salesforce.com is the third risk I’m watching. The two companies have a long-standing contract that ends on 1 September 2025. Based on the agreement, salesforce.com provides hosting infrastructure and data centers for portions of Veeva’s CRM applications. There is also a non-compete arrangement, where salesforce.com will not compete directly with Veeva’s CRM applications within the pharma or biotech industry. In return, Veeva has to pay salesforce.com a fee of at least US$500 million by the end of the contract. This agreement is important as parts of Veeva Commercial Cloud are built on salesforce.com’s Salesforce1 platform. (Veeva Vault is built on Veeva’s own proprietary platform.) 

Based on the change in language used in Veeva’s annual reports for FY2020, FY2019, and FY2018 to describe Veeva’s partnership with saleforce.com, there appears to be a deterioration in the two companies’ relationship in recent years. I’m watching what happens if and when Veeva’s contract with salesforce.com is terminated. Veeva has already clocked 13 years of experience in providing CRM software that is focused on the life sciences industry. This gives me confidence that Veeva will be able to stand on its own even if salesforce.com pulls the plug on the existing CRM-partnership. But only time will tell.

The fourth risk I have an eye on relates to legal wrangles between Veeva and IQVIA. Veeva named IQVIA as its most significant competitor in the CRM software market for the life sciences industry in its FY2020 annual report. It’s worth noting that IQVIA’s CRM software is also built on the Salesforce1 Platform. IQVIA competes against certain applications within Veeva Vault too. For some background, here are excerpts from a February 2020 announcement by Veeva: 

“Veeva Systems (NYSE: VEEV) today announced it is gaining widespread customer support for its antitrust lawsuit against IQVIA (NYSE: IQV). Six of the largest global pharmaceutical companies were among more than 70 depositions gathered as part of the fact discovery phase of the case. As its initial lawsuit successfully advances, Veeva filed a motion this week to expand its legal action to include additional Veeva software applications that IQVIA is excluding customers from using with IQVIA data…

…IQVIA has a long history of abusing its monopoly position to limit customers and competition. Since 2014, IQVIA has prevented companies from using OneKey reference data with Veeva’s master data management software, Veeva Network Customer Master. Over the past two years, IQVIA also began restricting the use of all IQVIA data with Veeva Nitro, a next-generation commercial data warehouse, Veeva Andi, an artificial intelligence (AI) application, and other Veeva software applications.

After three years of trying to work with IQVIA in good faith toward a resolution regarding Veeva’s master data management software to no avail, Veeva filed its first antitrust lawsuit in 2017 to end IQVIA’s long history of anti-competitive behavior. IQVIA’s motion to dismiss that case failed and fact discovery is now substantially complete. Trial is expected to take place in late 2021.”

Despite IQVIA’s fiercely anti-competitive behaviour in the past few years, Veeva has still managed to grow its business significantly. Veeva’s management commented in the company’s recent FY2020 fourth-quarter earnings conference call:

“IQVIA is our primary competitor, as you know, there’s certainly regional competitors that we have, but they’re the ones that are primary in terms of global kind of scope there. IQVIA has continued to be aggressive in terms of how they approach the market in of pricing and bundling. Some of their projects have been a bit more services oriented, instead of standard product. And I think over the short-term that sort of thing could work out. I think over the long-term custom projects are not great.

From Veeva’s perspective, we had really great success last year. I’m really proud of what we’ve accomplished. Peter highlighted that we had 63 net new CRM customers, compared with the year before, where it was 46. So we’ve grown and we’ve actually expanded our share last year. And of those wins, most of them came — most of them were head to head with IQVIA, and many of them were IQVIA replacements. So I’m really proud of what we’ve accomplished. That’s the results. The results, I think, speak for themselves in terms of what we’re doing, where — we think our strategy is the right one, which is focus on product innovation and focus on customer success. So we’re innovating within core CRM in many different ways.”

It’s hard to predict the result of the legal battle between the two companies. But even if IQVIA wins, my bet is that Veeva will still be able to continue growing, since Veeva was able to grow even though IQVIA had already been behaving aggressively for some time. Again, only time will tell.

The fifth important risk I’m seeing relates to competition in general. As Veeva expands, it’s likely that Veeva Commercial Cloud and Veeva Vault could increasingly butt heads with services from tech giants such as Oracle, Microsoft, and Amazon. These companies have substantially stronger financial might than Veeva.

Veeva’s high valuation is the sixth risk. The high valuation adds pressure on the company to continue executing well; any missteps could result in a painful fall in its stock price. This is a risk I’m comfortable taking.

Lastly, I’m watching potential impacts to Veeva’s growth from COVID-19. The outbreak of the respiratory virus has resulted in severe negative impacts to the global economy because of measures to fight the disease, such as the closing of businesses and the restriction of human movement. I think that the mission-critical nature of Veeva’s service means that its business is less likely to be harmed significantly by any coronavirus-driven recession. But there could be headwinds.    

The Good Investors’ conclusion

In summary, Veeva has:

1. A valuable cloud-based CRM and content and data management software platform that is mission-critical for companies in the life sciences industry;
2. High levels of recurring revenue;
3. Outstanding revenue growth rates;
4. Positive and growing operating cash flow and free cash flow, and fat free cash flow margins;
5. A large, mostly untapped addressable market that could potentially grow in the years ahead;
6. An impressive track record of winning customers and increasing their spending; and
7. Capable and innovative leaders who are in the same boat as the company’s other shareholders

Veeva does have a rich valuation, so I’m taking on valuation risk. There are also other risks to note, such as the company’s complicated relationship with salesforce.com, and its legal battles with IQVIA. COVID-19 could also place a dampener on Veeva’s growth. But after weighing the pros and cons, I’m happy to continue having Veeva be in my family’s investment portfolio.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Okta (NASDAQ: OKTA) is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s portfolio. I first bought Okta shares for the portfolio in March 2019 at a price of US$79. I’ve not sold any of the shares I’ve bought. 

The purchase has worked out well for my family’s portfolio, with Okta’s share price being around US$128 now. But we’ve only owned the company’s shares for slightly more than a year, and it is always important to think about how the company’s business will evolve going forward. What follows is my thesis for why I still continue to invest in Okta shares.

Company description

Okta’s vision is to enable any organisation to use any technology. To fulfill its vision, Okta provides the Okta Identity Cloud software platform where all its products live. Okta’s cloud-based software products help other companies manage and secure access to applications for their employees, contractors, partners, and customers.

The internal use-cases, where Okta’s solutions are used by organisations to manage and secure software-access among their employees, contractors, and partners, are referred to as workforce identity by Okta. An example of a workforce identity customer is 20th Century Fox. The external-facing use cases are known as customer identity, and it is where Okta’s solutions are used by its customers to manage and secure the identities and service/product access of their customers. Adobe is one of the many customers of Okta’s customer identity platform.

There’s a rough 80:20 split in Okta’s revenue between the workforce identity and customer identity solutions.

At the end of FY2020 (fiscal year ended 31 January 2020), Okta had more than 7,950 customers. These customers come from nearly every industry and range from small organisations with less than 100 employees to the largest companies in the world.

For a geographical perspective, Okta sourced 84% of its revenue in FY2020 from the US. 

Investment thesis

I had previously laid out my six-criteria investment framework in The Good Investors. I will use the same framework to describe my investment thesis for Okta.

1. Revenues that are small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or revenues that are large in a fast-growing market

Okta estimates that its market opportunity for workforce identity is U$30 billion today. This is up from US$18 billion around three years ago. The company arrived at its current workforce identity market size of US$30 billion in this way: “50,000 US businesses with more than 250 employees (per 2019 US.Bureau of Labor Statistics) multiplied by 12-month ARR [annual recurring revenue] assuming adoption of all our current products, which implies a market of [US]$15 billion domestically, then multiplied by two to account for international opportunity.”

For customer identity, Okta estimates the addressable market to be US$25 billion. Here’s Okta’s description of the method behind its estimate: “Based on 4.4 billion combined Facebook users and service employees worldwide multiplied by internal application usage and pricing assumptions.” I am taking Okta’s estimate of its customer identity market with a pinch of salt. But I’m still confident that the opportunity is huge, given the growth and size of the entire SaaS (software-as-a-service) market. A November 2019 forecast from market research firm Gartner sees global SaaS spending growing by 15% annually from US$$86 billion in 2018 to US$151 billion in 2022.

In FY2020, Okta’s revenue was just US$586.1 million, which barely scratches the surface of its total estimated market opportunity of US$55 billion. I also think it’s likely that Okta’s market is poised for growth. Based on Okta’s studies, the average number of apps that companies are using has increased by 52% from 58 in 2015 to 88 in 2019. Earlier this month, Okta’s co-founder and CEO, Todd McKinnon, was interviewed by Ben Thompson for the latter’s excellent tech newsletter, Stratechery. During the interview, McKinnon revealed that large companies (those with over 5,000 employees) typically use thousands of apps.

The high and growing level of app-usage among companies means it can be a massive pain for an organisation to manage software-access for its employees, contractors, partners, and customers. This pain-point is what Okta Identity Cloud is trying to address. By using Okta’s software, an organisation does not need to build custom identity management software –  software developers from the organisation can thus become more productive. The organisation would also be able to scale more efficiently.

2. A strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt

As of 31 January 2020, Okta held US$1.4 billion in cash and short-term investments. This is significantly higher than the company’s total debt of US$937.7 million (all of which are convertible notes that are due in 2023 or 2025).

For the sake of conservatism, I also note that Okta had US$154.5 million in operating lease liabilities. But the company’s cash, short-term investments and long-term investments still comfortably outweigh the sum of its debt and operating lease liabilities (US$1.1 billion)

3. A management team with integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset

On integrity

Todd McKinnon cofounded Okta in 2009 with Frederic Kerrest. McKinnon, who’s 48 years old, has served as Okta’s CEO since the company’s founding. He has a strong pedigree in leading software companies, having been with salesforce.com from 2003 to 2009, and serving as its Head of Engineering prior to founding Okta. salesforce.com is one of the pioneering software-as-a-service companies. Kerrest, 43, is Okta’s COO (chief operating officer) and has been in the role since the year of the company’s founding. Kerrest is also a salesforce.com alumni; he joined in 2002 and stayed till 2007, serving as a senior executive. In my view, the young ages of McKinnon and Kerrest, as well as their long tenures with Okta, are positives.

The other important leaders in Okta include:

In FY2019, Okta’s senior leaders (McKinnon, Kerrest, Losch, Race, and Runyan) each received total compensation that ranged from US$2.3 million to US$5.1 million. These are reasonable sums. Furthermore, 72% to 88% of their total compensation was in the form of stock awards and stock options that vest over multi-year periods. This means that the compensation of Okta’s senior leaders are tied to the long run performance of the company’s stock price, which is in turn driven by the company’s business performance. So I think that my interests as a shareholder of Okta are well-aligned with the company’s management.

Moreover, both McKinnon and Kerrest own significant stakes in Okta. As of 1 April 2019, McKinnon and Kerrest controlled 7.98 million and 3.65 million shares of the company, respectively. These shares have a collective value of roughly US$1.5 billion right now. The high stakes that Okta’s two key leaders have lend further weight to my view that management’s interests are aligned with the company’s other shareholders.

I note that the shares held by McKinnon and Kerrest are mostly of the Class B variety. Okta has two stock classes: (1) Class B, which are not traded and hold 10 voting rights per share; and (2)  Class A, which are publicly traded and hold just 1 vote per share. McKinnon and Kerrest only controlled 10.1% of Okta’s total shares as of 1 April 2019, but they collectively held 50.7% of the company’s voting power. In fact, all of Okta’s senior leaders and directors together controlled 54.7% of Okta’s voting rights as of 1 April 2019 (this percentage dipped only slightly to 53.1% as of 31 January 2020). The concentration of Okta’s voting power in the hands of management (in particular McKinnon and Kerrest) means that I need to be comfortable with the company’s current leadership. I am.

On capability

From FY2015 to FY2020, Okta has seen its number of customers increase six-fold (43% per year) from 1,320 to 7,950. So the first thing I note is that Okta’s management has a terrific track record of growing its customer count.

To win customers, Okta currently offers over 6,500 integrations with IT (information technology) infrastructure providers, and cloud, mobile, and web apps. This is up from over 5,000 integrations as of 31 January 2017. The companies that are part of Okta’s integration network include services from tech giants such as Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon.com, salesforce.com and more. Impressively, software providers are increasingly being told by their customers that they have to be integrated with Okta before the software can be accepted. 

In my view, the integration also creates a potentially powerful network effect where more integration on Okta’s network leads to more customers, and more customers leads to even more integration. During the aforementioned Stratechery interview, McKinnon shared about the competitive edge that Okta enjoys because of its efforts in integrating thousands of apps: 

“[Question]: The average enterprise — maybe it’s hard to say because it varies so widely — how many SaaS services does a typical enterprise subscribe to?

[Todd McKinnon] TM: Especially for any company with over 5,000 employees, it’s thousands of apps. Apps that they’ve purchased commercially, the big ones you’ve heard of, the ones that are in niche industries or verticals you haven’t heard of, and then the ones built themselves, it’s thousands.

[Question]: And then Okta has to build an integration with all of those

[Todd McKinnon] TM: Yeah. One of the big things we did very early on was we got really good at a metadata-driven integration infrastructure, which allowed us to have this burgeoning catalog of pre-packaged integrations, which was really unique in the industry because it is a hundreds or for a big company, it’s thousands of applications.

[Question] And it ends up being a bit of a moat, right? It’s a traditional moat where you dig it up with hard work where you actually went in and you built all of these thousands of integrations, and anyone that wants to come along, if they have a choice of either recreating all the work you did or, we should just use Okta and it’s already sort of all taken care of.

[Todd McKinnon] TM: Yeah, and it’s one of the things people misunderstand on a couple of different levels. The first level is they just get the number wrong. “I think there’s ten, right?” Or I’ve heard of ten big applications, so I think if I connected the ten, that would be enough, which is just off by multiple orders of magnitude.

And then the second thing they get wrong is they think that, especially back in the day it was like, “Oh, there it’s going to be standards that do this.” It’s going to be SAML as a standard. There’s this standard called Open ID. And what we’ve found is that the standards were very thin, meaning they didn’t cover enough of the surface area of what the customers needed, so it might do simple login but it didn’t do directory replication, or not enough of the applications adhere to the standard. So there’s a lot more heterogeneity than people thought of so that moat was a lot wider, a lot faster than people expected.

[Question] Is it fair to say that it’s your goal or maybe it has happened that people thought there would be a standard like SAML that would take care of all of this, but it’s going to end up being that Okta as the standard?

[Todd McKinnon] TM: That is the goal and I think it’s evolving to where there are de facto standards. A big shift is that we have big companies that tell software vendors that if you want to sell to us, you have to integrate to Okta and they have to go to our platform, build the integration, have it be certified. So that’s not a technical standard per se, but it’s a de facto standard of an application that can be sold to a large enterprise.”

I also credit Okta’s management with the success that the company has found with its land-and-expand strategy. The strategy starts with the company landing a customer with an initial use case, and then expanding its relationship with the customer through more users or more use cases. The success can be illustrated through Okta’s strong dollar-based net retention rates (DBNRRs). The metric is a very important gauge for the health of a SaaS company’s business. It measures the change in revenue from all of Okta’s customers a year ago compared to today; it includes positive effects from upsells as well as negative effects from customers who leave or downgrade. Anything more than 100% indicates that the company’s customers, as a group, are spending more – Okta’s DBNRRs have been in the high-teens to high-twenties range over the past few years. There has been a noticeable downward trend in Okta’s DBNRR, but the figure of 119% in FY2020 is still impressive.

I also want to point out the presence of Ben Horowitz on Okta’s board of directors. Horowitz is a co-founder and partner in a venture capital firm I admire and that was partly named after him, Andreessen Horowitz (the firm, popularly known as a16z, is an early investor in Okta). Having Horowitz as a director allows Okta’s management to tap on a valuable source of knowledge.

On innovation

Okta is a pioneer in its field. It was one of the first companies that realised that a really important business could be built on the premise of a cloud-based software that secures and manages an individual’s digital identity for cloud-based applications. To me, that is fantastic proof of the innovative ability of Okta’s management. Stratechery’s interview of Todd McKinnon provided a great window on the thinking of him and his team in the early days of Okta’s founding:

“[Question] When Okta first came on the scene, it was Single Sign-on, so you could sign on in one place and then you’d be logged into other places, now it’s an Identity Cloud. Is that an actual shift in the product or strategy or is that just a shift in a marketing term?

[Todd McKinnon] TM: It’s interesting. When we started the company, you could see that cloud was going to be the future. We started 11 years ago, so in 2009, Amazon Web Services was out, Google Apps for Domains was out. So you could kind of see that infrastructure was going to go to the cloud, you could see that collaboration apps were going to go to the cloud. I was working at Salesforce at the time, so it was really clear that the apps stack was going to be in the cloud and we got really excited about what could be possible or what new types of platforms could be built to enable all this.

When we started, it’s funny, we called the first product, which was going to be a cloud single sign-on, we called it Wedge One. So not only was it the wedge, but it was like the first, first wedge. Now it turns out that in order to build cloud single sign on you had to build a lot of pretty advanced stuff behind the scenes to make that simple and seamless, you had to build a directory, you had to build a federation server, you had to build multi-factor authentication, and after we were into it for two or three or four years, we realized that there’s a whole identity system here so it’s much more than a wedge. In fact, it really can be a big part in doing all that enablement we set out to do.

[Question] That’s very interesting, so are you still on Wedge One? Did you ever make it to Wedge Two?

[Todd McKinnon] TM: (laughs) The Wedge keeps getting fatter. The Identity Cloud is pretty broad these days. It’s directory service, it’s reporting analytics, it’s multi-factor authentication, it does API Access Management. It’s very flexible, very extensible, so really the Identity Cloud now is an Identity Platform, it’s striving to really address any kind of identity use cases a customer has, both on the customer side, customer identity, and on the workforce side.

What’s interesting about it is that at the same time over the last eleven years, identity has gone from being something that’s really important maybe for Windows networks or around your Oracle applications to there are so different applications connected from so many types of devices and so many networks that identity is really critical, and we’re in this world now where ten years ago people were telling me “Hey, I’m not sure if it’s possible to build an independent identity company” to now it’s like everyone says, “Oh, it’s such an obvious category that the biggest technology companies in the world want to own it.” So it has been quite a shift.”

4. Revenue streams that are recurring in nature, either through contracts or customer-behaviour

Okta runs its business on a SaaS model and generates most of its revenue through multi-year subscriptions, which are recurring in nature. In FY2020, 94% of Okta’s total revenue of US$586.1 million came from subscriptions. The company’s average subscription term was 2.6 years as of 31 January 2020 and iInterestingly, Okta’s contracts are non-cancelable. The remaining 6% of Okta’s revenue in FY2020 was from professional services, where the company earns fees from helping its customers implement and optimise the use of its products.  

It’s important to me too that there’s no customer concentration in Okta’s business. No single customer accounted for more than 10% of the company’s revenue in each year from FY2018 to FY2020.

5. A proven ability to grow

There isn’t much historical financial data to study for Okta, since the company was only listed in April 2017. But I do like what I see:

A few key points to note about Okta’s financials:

• Okta has compounded its revenue at an impressive annual rate of 70.2% from FY2015 to FY2020. The rate of growth has slowed in recent years, but was still really strong at 46.7% in FY2020.
• Okta is still making losses, but the good thing is that it started to generate positive operating cash flow in FY2019 and positive free cash flow in FY2020.. 
• The company’s balance sheet remained robust throughout the timeframe under study, with significantly more cash and investments than debt.
• At first glance, Okta’s diluted share count appeared to increase sharply by 29.5% from FY2018 to FY2019. (I only started counting from FY2018 since Okta was listed in April 2017, which is in the first quarter of FY2018.) But the number I’m using is the weighted average diluted share count. Right after Okta got listed, it had a share count of around 91 million. Moreover, Okta’s weighted average diluted share count showed an acceptable growth rate (acceptable in the context of the company’s rapid revenue growth) of 9% in FY2020.

6. A high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future

Okta has already started to generate positive free cash flow and positive operating cash flow. Right now, the company has a poor trailing free cash flow margin (free cash flow as a percentage of revenue) of just 4.7%.

But over the long run, I think it’s likely that there is plenty of room for Okta’s free cash flow margin to expand. I showed in my recently published investment thesis for Alteryx (NYSE: AYX) that there are other larger SaaS companies such as Adobe, salesforce.com, and Veeva Systems that have much fatter free cash flow margins. Here’s the table I showed in my article on Alteryx:

Valuation

Okta has a target to grow its revenue by 30% to 35% annually from now till FY2024, and to have a free cash flow margin of between 20% and 25% at the end of that period. These goals were communicated by management just earlier this month during Okta’s Investor Day event. For perspective, Okta is projecting total revenue growth of 31% to 33% in FY2021.

Right now, Okta has a market capitalisation of US$16.08 billion against trailing revenue of US$586.1 million, which gives rise to a pretty darn high price-to-sales (PS) ratio of 27.4. 

For perspective, if I assume that Okta has a 25% free cash flow margin today, then the company would have a price-to-free cash flow ratio of 110 based on the current P/S ratio (27.4 divided by 25%).

But there are strong positives in Okta’s favour. The company has: (1) Revenue that is low compared to a large and possibly fast-growing market; (2) a software product that is mission-critical for users; (3) a large and rapidly expanding customer base; and (4) sticky customers who have been willing to significantly increase their spending with the company over time. I believe that with these traits, there’s a high chance that Okta will continue posting excellent revenue growth – and in turn, excellent free cash flow growth – in time to come. 

The risks involved

Okta has a short history in the stock market, given that its IPO was just three years ago in April 2017. I typically stay away from young IPOs. But I am willing to back Okta because I think its business holds promise for fast-growth for a long period of time (the company’s identity-as-a-service business is very important for the digital transformation that so many companies are currently undergoing). But Okta’s young age as a publicly-listed company is still a risk I’m keeping tabs on.

Competition is a risk I’m watching too. In its FY2018 and FY2019 annual reports, Okta named technology heavyweights such as Alphabet, Amazon, IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle as competitors. In its FY2020 annual report, Okta singled out Microsoft as its “principal competitor.” All of them have significantly stronger financial might compared to Okta. But I’m comforted by Okta’s admirable defense of its turf – the proof is in Okta’s strong DBNRRs and impressive growth in customer-numbers over the years. Moreover, in late 2019, market researchers Gartner and Forrester also separately named Okta as a leader in its field. 

Okta’s high valuation is another risk. The high valuation adds pressure on the company to continue executing well; any missteps could result in a painful fall in its stock price. This is a risk I’m comfortable taking.

Hacking is also a risk I’m keeping an eye on. Logging into applications is often a time-sensitive and mission-critical part of an employee’s work. Okta’s growth and reputation could be severely diminished if the company’s service is disrupted, leading to customers being locked out of the software they require to run their business for an extended period of time.

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in severe disruptions to economic activity in many parts of the world, the US included. I think that the mission-critical nature of Okta’s service means that its business is less likely to be harmed significantly by any coronavirus-driven recession. But there are still headwinds. In an April 2020 statement, Okta’s CFO William Losch said:

“We continue to closely monitor the business environment and impacts related to COVID-19. We remain optimistic about the demand for our solutions. Our highly recurring business model enables a high degree of predictability and allows us to maintain confidence in our revenue outlook for the first quarter and fiscal year 2021, which we are reaffirming.

We do, however, expect some near-term billings headwinds as customers adjust to the current business environment. Conversely, we expect our operating loss and loss per share to be better than expected as a result of reduced spend. This is primarily related to lower sales and marketing costs, driven in part by temporary travel restrictions, lower employee-related costs, and moving Oktane and other events to virtual formats. We have the ability to further adjust spend depending on the market environment and will be flexible in how and when we invest to extend our market leadership.”

Lastly, the following are all yellow-to-red flags for me regarding Okta: (1) The company’s DBNRR comes in at less than 100% for an extended period of time; (2) it fails to increase its number of customers; and (3) it’s unable to convert revenue into free cash flow at a healthy clip in the future.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

In summary, Okta has:

1. A valuable cloud-based identity-as-a-service software platform that is often mission-critical for customers;
2. high levels of recurring revenue;
3. outstanding revenue growth rates;
4. positive operating cash flow and free cash flow, with the potential for much higher free cash flow margins in the future;
5. a large, mostly untapped addressable market that could potentially grow in the years ahead;
6. an impressive track record of winning customers and increasing their spending; and
7. capable leaders who are in the same boat as the company’s other shareholders

Okta does have a rich valuation, so I’m taking on valuation risk. There are also other risks to note, such as competitors with heavy financial muscle, and headwinds due to COVID-19. But after weighing the pros and cons, I’m happy to continue having Okta be in my family’s investment portfolio.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

DoucSign (NASDAQ: DOCU) is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s portfolio. I first bought DocuSign shares for the portfolio in December 2018 at a price of US$41 and I’ve not sold any of the shares I’ve bought. 

The purchase has worked out very well for my family’s portfolio thus far, with DocuSign’s share price being around US$79 now. But we’ve not even owned the company’s shares for two years, and it is always important to think about how the company’s business will evolve going forward. What follows is my thesis for why I still continue to hold DocuSign shares.

Company description

DocuSign provides DocuSign eSignature, currently the world’s leading cloud-based e-signature solution. This software service enables users to sign a document securely using almost any device from virtually anywhere in the world. It is the core part of the broader DocuSign Agreement Cloud, which is a suite of software services – again all delivered over the cloud – that automates and connects the entire agreement process. DocuSign Agreement Cloud includes:

• Automatic generation of an agreement from data in other systems; 
• Support of negotiation-workflow; 
• Collection of payment after signatures;
• Use of artificial intelligence (AI) to analyse agreement-documents for risks and opportunities; and 
• Hundreds of integrations with other systems, so that the agreement process can be seamlessly combined with other business processes and data

At the end of its fiscal year ended 31 January 2020 (FY2020), DocuSign had over 585,000 paying customers and hundreds of millions of users. From its founding in 2003 through to FY2019, the company had processed over 1 billion successful transactions (around 300 million in FY2019 alone). DocuSign defines a successful transaction as the completion of all required actions (such as signing or approving documents) by all relevant parties in an Envelope; an Envelope is, in turn, a digital container used to send one or more documents for signature or approval to the relevant recipients.

DocuSign serves customers of all sizes, from sole proprietorships to the companies that are among the top 2,000 publicly-traded enterprises. The company’s customers also come from many different industries, as the chart below illustrates.

For a geographical perspective of DocuSign’s business, its users are in over 180 countries. But in FY2020, 82% of the company’s revenue came from the US. 

Investment thesis

I had previously laid out my six-criteria investment framework in The Good Investors. I will use the same framework to describe my investment thesis for DocuSign.

1. Revenues that are small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or revenues that are large in a fast-growing market

Has it ever occured to you that the innocuous act of signing documents with pen-and-paper can actually be a significantly wasteful activity for companies? The thought struck me when I was doing research on DocuSign before I bought its shares. Think about it. Signing a paper document requires you to fax, scan, email, snail-mail, courier, and file. DocuSign’s solution can save us both time and money.

There are many use-cases for DocuSign’s software services, ranging from sales contracts to employment contracts, non-disclosure agreements, and more. In fact, DocuSign has a customer that has implemented over 300 use-cases. DocuSign documents are legally accepted and protected with cryptographic technology from tampering. The documents also have a full audit trail, including party names, email addresses, public IP addresses, and a time-stamped record of each individual’s interaction with a document.

DocuSign estimated that it had a total addressable market of US$25 billion in 2017, using (1) the number of companies in its core markets, and (2) its internal estimate of an annual contract value based on each respective company’s size, industry, and location. This estimate remains unchanged (it was mentioned in the company’s FY2020 annual report), though recent business moves may have significantly expanded its addressable market. More on this later. At just US$974.0 million, DocuSign’s revenue in FY2020 is merely a fraction of its estimated market opportunity.

I believe that DocuSign’s addressable market will likely grow over time. There are clear benefits to e-signatures. A 2015 third-party study by Intellicap (commissioned by DocuSign) found that the company’s enterprise customers derived an average incremental value of US$36 per transaction (with a range of US$5 to US$100) when using the company’s software as compared to traditional paper-processes. In FY2020, 82% of all the successful transactions that flowed through DocuSign’s platform were completed in less than 24 hours, while 50% were completed within just 15 minutes. DocuSign’s services help companies save money and time.

2. A strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt

As of 31 January 2020, DocuSign held US$895.9 million in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments. This is nearly twice the company’s total debt of US$465.3 million (all of which are convertible notes). For the sake of conservatism, I also note that DocuSign had US$183.2 million in operating lease liabilities. But the company’s cash, short-term investments and long-term investments still comfortably outweigh the sum of the company’s debt and operating lease liabilities (US$648.5 million). 

3. A management team with integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset

On integrity

Leading DocuSign as CEO is Daniel Springer, 57, who joined the company in January 2017. Among other key leaders in DocuSign are:

• Scott Olrich, Chief Operating Officer, 48
• Michael Sheridan, Chief Financial Officer, 55
• Loren Alhadeff, Chief Revenue Officer, 41
• Kirsten Wolberg, Chief Technology and Operations Officer, 52

Most of them have relatively short tenure with DocuSign, but have collectively clocked decades in senior leadership roles in other technology companies.

DocuSign has opted not to share details about its compensation structure for senior management because of its status as an “emerging growth company.” And Springer’s total compensation for FY2019 was a princely sum of US$13.4 million. But I take heart in this: 94% of Springer’s total compensation in FY2019 came from stock awards, and around 70% of the stock awards vest over a period of four years. The multi-year vesting of the stock awards means that Springer’s compensation is tied to the long run performance of DocuSign’s stock price, which is in turn governed by its business performance. So I think Springer’s interests are aligned with mine as a shareholder of the company.

Notably, Springer also controlled 2.3 million shares of DocuSign as of 31 March 2019, a stake that’s worth a sizable US$211 million at the current share price.  

On capability

From FY2013 to FY2020, DocuSign has seen its number of customers increase more than 10-fold (41% per year) from 54,000 to 585,000. So the first thing I note is that DocuSign’s management has a terrific track record of growing its customer count.

To win customers, DocuSign’s software service offers over 300 pre-built integrations with widely used business applications from other tech giants such as salesforce.com, Oracle, SAP, Google, and more. These third-party applications are mostly in the areas of CRM (customer relationship management), ERP (enterprise resource planning), and HCM (human capital management). DocuSign also has APIs (application programming interfaces) that allow its software to be easily integrated with its customers’ own apps. 

I also credit DocuSign’s management with the success that the company has found with its land-and-expand strategy. The strategy starts with the company landing a customer with an initial use case, and then expanding its relationship with the customer through other use cases. The success can be illustrated through DocuSign’s strong dollar-based net retention rates (DBNRRs). The metric is a very important gauge for the health of a SaaS (software-as-a-service) company’s business. It measures the change in revenue from all of DocuSign’s customers a year ago compared to today; it includes positive effects from upsells as well as negative effects from customers who leave or downgrade. Anything more than 100% indicates that the company’s customers, as a group, are spending more – DocuSign’s DBNRRs have been in the low-teens to mid-teens range in the past few years.

On innovation

I think DocuSign’s management scores well on the innovation front, since the company has been busy with using blockchain technology and AI to improve its services. 

Blockchain technology is the backbone of cryptocurrencies and DocuSign has been experimenting with blockchain-based smart contracts since 2015. In June 2018, DocuSign joined the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance and showed how a DocuSign agreement can be automatically written onto the Ethereum blockchain. Here’s an example of a smart contract  described by DocuSign:

“A smart contract turns a contract into something like a computer program. The Internet-connected program monitors data and triggers actions relevant to the contract’s terms. For example, a crop-insurance smart contract might use a trusted Internet feed of weather data. If the temperature goes above 85 degrees Fahrenheit in April, the smart contract will automatically trigger a crop-insurance payout, again via the Internet. This total automation eliminates ambiguity and promises large savings in time and effort for all parties involved.”

It’s early days for DocuSign’s use of blockchain, but I’m watching its moves here. DocuSign’s management acknowledges that many of the company’s customers don’t yet see the value of blockchain technology in the agreement process. But the company still believes in blockchain’s potential.  

DocuSign has been working with AI since at least 2017 when it acquired machine-learning firm Appuri during the year. In February 2020, DocuSign inked an agreement to acquire Seal Software for US$188 million. The acquisition is expected to close in the first half of DocuSign’s FY2021. Seal Software was founded in 2010 and uses AI to analyse contracts. For example, Seal Software can search for legal concepts (and not just keywords) in large collections of documents, and automatically extract and compare critical clauses and terms. Prior to the acquisition, DocuSign was already tacking Seal Software’s services onto DocuSign Agreement Cloud. The combination of Seal Software and DocuSign’s technologies have helped a “large international information-services company” reduce legal-review time by 75%. Ultimately, DocuSign thinks that Seal Software will be able to strengthen DocuSign Agreement Cloud’s AI foundation.

Speaking of DocuSign Agreement Cloud, it was released in March 2019. As mentioned earlier, it includes multiple software services. DocuSign sees DocuSign Agreement Cloud as a new category of cloud software that connects existing cloud services in the realms of marketing, sales, human resources, enterprise resource planning, and more, into agreement processes. 

I see two huge positives that come with the introduction of multi-product sales. Firstly, it will likely lead to each DocuSign customer using more of the company’s products. This means that DocuSign could be plugged into an increasing number of its customers’ business processes, resulting in stickier customers. Secondly, DocuSign thinks that covering a wider scope of the entire agreement process could roughly double its market opportunity from the current size of US$25 billion to around US$50 billion. 

4. Revenue streams that are recurring in nature, either through contracts or customer-behaviour

DocuSign’s business is built nearly entirely on subscriptions, which generate recurring revenue for the company. Customers of DocuSign gain access to the company’s software platform through a subscription, which typically ranges from one to three years.  In FY2020, FY2019, and FY2018, more than 93% of DocuSign’s revenue in each fiscal year came from subscriptions to its cloud-based software platform; the rest of the revenue came from services such as helping the company’s customers deploy its software efficiently. 

It’s worth noting too that there is no customer-concentration with DocuSign. There was no customer that accounted for more than 10% of the company’s revenue in FY2020.

5. A proven ability to grow

There isn’t much historical financial data to study for DocuSign, since the company was only listed in April 2018. But I do like what I see:

A few notable points from DocuSign’s financials:

• DocuSign has compounded its revenue at an impressive annual rate of 40.4% from FY2016 to FY2020. The rate of growth has not slowed much, coming in at a still-impressive 38.9% in FY2020.
• DocuSign is still making losses, but the good thing is that it started to generate positive operating cash flow and free cash flow in FY2018.
• Annual growth in operating cash flow from FY2018 to FY2020 was strong, at 45.1%. Free cash flow has increased at a much slower pace, but the company is investing for growth. 
• The company’s balance sheet remained robust throughout the timeframe under study, with significantly more cash and investments than debt.
• At first glance, DocuSign’s diluted share count appeared to increase sharply by 30.7% from FY2019 to FY2020. (I only started counting from FY2019 since DocuSign was listed in April 2018, which is in the first quarter of FY2019.) But the number I’m using is the weighted average diluted share count. Right after DocuSign got listed, it had a share count of around 152 million. Moreover, DocuSign’s weighted average diluted share count showed acceptable year-on-year growth rates (acceptable in the context of the company’s rapid revenue growth) in the first, second, and third quarters of FY2020.

6. A high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future

DocuSign has already started to generate free cash flow. Right now, the company has a poor trailing free cash flow margin (free cash flow as a percentage of revenue) of just 4.5%.

But over the long run, I think it’s likely that there is plenty of room for DocuSign’s free cash flow margin to expand. I showed in my recently published investment thesis for Alteryx (NYSE: AYX) that there are other larger SaaS companies such as Adobe, salesforce.com, and Veeva Systems that have much fatter free cash flow margins. Here’s the table I showed in my article on Alteryx:

Valuation

Right now, DocuSign has a market capitalisation of US$14.34 billion against trailing revenue of US$974.0 million. These numbers give rise to a price-to-sales (P/S) ratio of 14.7, which makes the company look pretty darn expensive. For perspective, if I assume that DocuSign has a 30% free cash flow margin today, then the company would have a price-to-free cash flow ratio of 49 based on the current P/S ratio (14.7 divided by 30%). 

But DocuSign also has a few strong positives going for it. The company has: (1) revenue that is low compared to a fast-growing addressable market; (2) a business that solves important pain points for customers; (3) a large and rapidly expanding customer base; and (4) sticky customers who have been willing to significantly increase their spending with the company over time. I believe that with these traits, there’s a high chance that DocuSign will continue posting excellent revenue growth – and in turn, excellent free cash flow growth – in the years ahead. 

The current high valuation for DocuSign does mean that its share price is likely going to be more volatile than the stock market as a whole. I’m also keeping in mind that stocks have been very volatile of late because of COVID-19 fears. But the potential volatility is something I’m very comfortable with.

The risks involved

DocuSign has a short history in the stock market, given that its IPO was just two years ago in April 2018. I typically stay away from young IPOs. But I’m making an exception for DocuSign because I think its business holds promise for fast-growth for a long period of time. But the company’s young age as a publicly-listed company is still a risk I’m watching.

Adobe is a much larger SaaS company with trailing revenue of US$11.7 billion. Through its Adobe Sign product, Adobe is the primary competitor of DocuSign. So far, DocuSign has defended its turf admirably. This is shown in DocuSign’s strong revenue and customer growth rates. But Adobe’s larger financial might compared to DocuSign means competition is a risk. 

Another important risk for DocuSign relates to data breaches. DocuSign handles sensitive information about its customers due to the nature of its business. If there are any serious data breaches in DocuSign’s software services, the company could lose the confidence of customers and the public, leading to growth difficulties. The signing of documents may be highly time-sensitive events. So if there is any significant downtime in DocuSign’s services, it could also lead to an erosion of trust among existing as well as prospective customers. So far, DocuSign has done a great job by providing 99.99% availability in FY2020. 

Valuation is another risk to consider. DocuSign’s high P/S ratio means that the market expects rapid growth from the company. So if the business performance disappoints subsequently, market sentiment could turn quickly on DocuSign, leading to a cratering stock price.

Earlier, I discussed the advantages that the launch of DocuSign Agreement Cloud brought to the company. But there are downsides too. For instance, multi-product sales involves higher complexity and a longer sales cycle; these factors negatively affected DocuSign’s billings growth and net dollar-based retention rate in the first quarter of FY2020. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has caused business activity around the world to slow tremendously, with many countries being in various states of lockdown. A lengthy sales cycle could hamper DocuSign’s business in the current environment. For now, DocuSign’s business does not seem to have been impacted by COVID-19. Here’s CEO Dan Springer’s comment on the matter in DocuSign’s FY2020 fourth-quarter earnings call:

“[T]he vast majority of our implementations are done remote. And of course, if you think about the perfect example of that it’s our web and mobile customers, where they never actually have to speak. Not only do they don’t have to have us in person they don’t need to speak to us to onboard. … We do find with some of our larger enterprise customers that they get more value when some of the installation is done on their premises. But we have not had the opportunity in the past to consider doing that completely remotely. And it may be in the new way of business over the next X period of time here then we’ll do more of it.”

And when DocuSign’s management was asked in the same earnings call if its growth would be affected by a recession, Springer answered:

“Yes, I don’t. Because, I think, for most of our customers, at least half of the focus is around efficiency. And people see the incredibly high ROI. And I can’t speak for all-digital transformation programs, of course, but as I think about the ones that are DocuSign-centric people are laser-focused on the ROI they get from getting rid of those manual processes, the wasted labor, getting rid of things like the transportation cost, the shipping, et cetera.

That’s a big focus. So I don’t think in a recession you would see people pull back on that. I would say that any time if you had a significant recession, you expect people to kind of shoot first ask questions later and that could lead to some delays. But, in general, we think the business case just gets stronger when people need to find those efficiencies.”

Lastly, the following are all yellow-to-red flags for me regarding DocuSign: (1) The company’s DBNRR comes in at less than 100% for an extended period of time; (2) it fails to increase its number of customers; and (3) it’s unable to convert revenue into free cash flow at a healthy clip in the future.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

Summing up DocuSign, it has:

1. Valuable cloud-based software services in the agreements space that solves customers’ pain-points;
2. high levels of recurring revenue;
3. outstanding revenue growth rates;
4. positive operating cash flow and free cash flow, with the potential for much higher free cash flow margins in the future;
5. a large, growing, and mostly untapped addressable market;
6. an impressive track record of winning customers and increasing their spending; and
7. capable leaders who are in the same boat as the company’s other shareholders

The company does have a premium valuation, so I’m taking on valuation risk. There are also other risks to note, such as strong competition and a longer sales cycle that may not be conducive for a business environment that’s struggling with COVID-19. But after weighing the pros and cons, I have to agree with the idea of having DocuSign continue to stay in my family’s investment portfolio.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

By now, you might have heard that Singapore Airlines Ltd (SGX: C6L) is being saved by Temasek who promised to inject capital into the debt-ridden company. But our flag carrier is not the only company that may need saving. 

Many local businesses in Singapore face an existential crisis in these challenging times. Companies that (1) have high fixed expenses, (2) have insufficient cash on the balance sheet, and (3) face major disruption to their business, are most at risk.

Here are some Singapore-listed companies that could be fighting for their survival in the coming weeks and months.

Neo Group (SGX: 5UJ)

Singapore’s leading food catering company is high on the list. As of 31 December 2019, Neo Group had S$20.4 million in cash and equivalents but S$34.9 million in short term bank borrowings that need to be repaid within a year. On top of that, it also had $45.7 million in long term debt. 

Neo Group’s food catering business has also likely been heavily disrupted due to the recent restrictions on gatherings of more than 10 people. The extent of the problem is made worse as Neo Group’s catering segment was its most profitable business in the financial year ended 31 March 2019.

The company also has a substantial amount of fixed costs. In the last quarter, Neo Group incurred S$14 million in employee expenses and S$1.1 million in finance costs. These are overheads that are unlikely to go away, even as orders dry up. Given Neo Group’s weak balance sheet, it could face difficulty obtaining a loan to bridge it through this challenging period.

Sembcorp Marine (SGX: S51)

Another one of Temasek’s investments, Sembcorp Marine could face a similar fate to Singapore Airlines. Sembcorp Marine is highly dependent on the health of the oil industry and faces major disruptions to its business amid tumbling oil prices (oil prices are near 20-year lows now).

Like Neo Group, Sembcorp Marine has more short-term debt than cash on its balance sheet. That’s extremely worrying given that credit may dry up during this trying times. As of 31 December 2019, Sembcorp Marine had S$389 million in cash and a staggering S$1.42 billion in short-term borrowings. In addition, the company had S$2.98 billion in long-term debt.

And let’s not forget that Sembcorp Marine also has heavy expenses. In the quarter ended 31 December 2019, Sembcorp Marine racked up S$29 million in finance costs alone and also had a negative gross margin. The company also spends heavily on capital expenditures just to maintain its current operations. Sembcorp Marine was free cash flow negative in 2019 after spending S$316 million in capital expenditures.

Sakae Holdings (SGX: 5DO)

Restaurant operator Sakae Holdings has been on the decline in recent years. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic began, revenue and earnings for the company have plunged. In the six months ended 31 December 2019, Sakae’s revenue fell 13.9% and it reported a S$1.56 million loss.

Worryingly, Sakae looks likely to run into cash flow problems in the very near future. As of 31 December 2019, Sakae had S$4.3 million in cash but near-term bank loans amounting to S$45.7 million.

I don’t see how Sakae can pay back its debtors and I doubt it can negotiate to refinance such a large sum over the next 12 months.

The COVID-19 crisis could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back for Sakae Holdings.

My conclusion

Obviously this is not an exhaustive list of companies in Singapore’s stock market that could face a liquidity crisis in these trying times. The pause in the global economy (Singapore’s included) will definitely impact many more companies than those I listed. 

Companies that are not prepared and do not have the resources to ride out this period could be in big trouble. Companies that go broke will see a steep fall in their share prices and shareholders will get very little or nothing back if a company is forced into liquidation.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

A few days ago, I received a text from a friend asking the question that is the title of this article. He knew that Booking Holdings (NASDAQ: BKNG), an online travel agent, is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s investment portfolio.

Stalled growth

On 18 February 2020, I published my investment thesis on Booking. In it, I wrote that “The world – particularly China – is currently battling COVID-19. If the situation worsens, Booking’s business could be hurt.” Little did I know how badly Booking would suffer. International travel activities have essentially grounded to a halt since the publication of my thesis for Booking, with many countries closing their borders to control the spread of COVID-19.

In particular, the businesses of hotels and airlines across the globe have been crushed. A few days ago, Arne Sorenson, CEO of hotel operator Marriott International, said that the company’s seeing revenue declines of more than 75% in the US. At home, Singapore Airlines cut 96% of its flight capacity last week. Booking, as an online travel agent focusing on accommodations, is also facing a brutal operating environment.

Confidence 

What gives me the confidence that Booking can survive? The company is the largest online travel agent in the world. The entire travel industry is awash in pain at the moment. But this also gives Booking the opportunity to win even more market share if some of its smaller/weaker competitors falter.

I believe that the COVID-19 crisis will blow over eventually (hopefully sooner rather than later, so that the incredible human suffering that’s currently happening can end as soon as possible). This will allow the travel industry to return to strength. When this happens, Booking will be in an even stronger position compared to before.

But Booking has to survive from now till then. I think the chances are very good that the company will. At the end of 2019, Booking held US$8.5 billion in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments (this sum excludes US$3.3 billion in strategic investments) against total debt of US$8.6 billion.

I would prefer Booking to have significantly more cash than debt. But Booking’s debt is mostly long-term in nature (88.5% comes due on or after 31 December 2020). Moreover, the company’s debt has well-staggered maturities as shown in the table below. The earliest due-date for Booking’s long-term debt is September 2021 and it involves a manageable sum of US$1 billion. So there’s plenty of time for Booking to maneuver, and to wait for the travel industry’s health to improve.

No guarantee

But there’s no guarantee that Booking will survive. It could eventually crumble should the travel market undergo a long winter if COVID-19 proves to be a particularly tricky disease to combat. This is where diversification is important. 

I mentioned earlier that Booking is one of the 50-plus companies in my family’s investment portfolio. Even if Booking fails to survive, my family’s portfolio will. Diversification is how I guard the portfolio against specific-company risks. With diversification, my family and I are able to stay invested in Booking and participate in its potential recovery without having to worry about a significant hit to the portfolio. 

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Singapore Airlines (SGX: C6L) recently announced a massive round of fundraising. In all, Singapore’s national carrier is looking to raise S$15 billion. The first slice of the fundraising involves a S$5.3 billion rights shares issue, and a S$3.5 billion tranche of mandatory convertible bonds (MCBs).

Temasek Holdings is one of the Singapore government’s investment arms and the current major shareholder of Singapore Airlines (SIA) with a 55% stake. It has committed to mop up all the rights shares issue and MCBs that other SIA shareholders do not want.

My blogging partner Jeremy Chia published a wonderful article yesterday. He shared his thoughts on why he’s not interested in investing in SIA despite Temasek’s promise to provide up to S$15 billion in capital. I’m not here to share my thoughts on investing in SIA. Instead, I’m here to provide you with a factual breakdown of the numbers behind SIA’s rights shares issue and MCBs.

I recognise that SIA’s latest fundraising activity is complex, and there’s a lot of confusion about it. I want to help clear the air, to the best of my abilities. The Good Investors exists to demystify investing for you – so here I am!

Details of the rights shares issue of Singapore Airlines

Here are the important numbers concerning SIA’s rights shares issue:

• Total sum: S$5.3 billion.
• Number of rights shares to be issued: Up to 1.778 billion rights shares to be issued, on the basis of 3 rights shares for every 2 shares of SIA that currently exist. There are 1.185 billion SIA shares that exist right now.
• Price per rights share: S$3.00.
• Renounceable? Yes, this rights shares issue is renounceable, so you will get to trade the rights.
• Changes in SIA’s book value per share (BVPS) and earnings per share (EPS) because of the rights issue: As of 31 December 2019, SIA’s BVPS and trailing-12-months EPS were S$10.25 and S$0.67, respectively. After the rights shares issue, the BVPS will fall to around S$5.89 while the EPS will decline to S$0.27, assuming everything else stays constant.
• What you have to effectively pay for SIA’s shares: At the time of writing (11:20 am, 30 March 2020), SIA’s share price is S$5.82. If you subscribe for your full allotment of rights shares, you’re effectively paying a price of S$4.13 per share for SIA’s shares. The math works this way: Effective price per share = [S$5.82 + (S$3.00 x 1.5)] / 2.5.
• The effective valuations you’re getting: At an effective share price of S$4.13, SIA will have a price-to-book ratio of 0.7 and a price-to-earnings ratio of 15.

Details of the MCBs of Singapore Airlines

For the MCBs, do note that the total sum SIA is looking for is S$9.7 billion. But the current tranche involves just S$3.5 billion. The key financial numbers for the current tranche of MCBs are as follows:

• Total sum: S$3.5 billion.
• Number of rights MCBs to be issued: Up to S$3.5 billion, in the denomination of S$1.00 per rights MCB, on the basis of 295 rights MCBs for every 100 shares of SIA that currently exist. As mentioned earlier, there are 1.185 billion SIA shares that exist right now.
• Issue price per rights MCB: S$1.00, meaning you’ll pay S$1.00 to purchase each rights MCB.
• Renounceable? Yes, this rights MCB issue is renounceable, so you will get to trade the rights.
• Maturity date of MCB: 10 years from the date of issue of the rights MCBs.
• Conversion terms of MCB: SIA is obliged to convert the rights MCBs into SIA shares when the MCBs mature. The conversion price is S$4.84 per SIA share. When the MCBs are converted at the maturity date (10 years from the date of issue), every S$1,000 worth of the MCBs will “grow” to S$1,806.11. This S$1,806.11 will then be converted into SIA shares at a price of S$4.84 each, giving us 373 SIA shares. The math works this way: Number of shares obtained upon conversion = S$1,806.11 / S$4.84
• Redemption terms of the MCB: SIA has the right – but not the obligation – to redeem the MCBs every six months from the date of issue at a certain price, giving you a certain yield. If the MCBs have yet to be redeemed when we hit the 10-year mark from the date of issue, SIA is obliged to convert the MCBs into SIA shares, as mentioned earlier. The redemption prices and yields are given in the table below. Note that you cannot ask for the redemption – it is entirely up to SIA to decide.

• What you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares under the MCB, assuming it is converted: As mentioned earlier, if the MCBs are converted, every S$1,000 in MCBs will be converted into 373 shares. This gives rise to an effective price of S$2.68 per SIA share under the MCB. The math works this way: Effective price paid = S$1,000 / 373 shares. 
• What you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares, in all, under the MCB, assuming it is converted: But to get hold of the MCBs, you’ll have to own SIA shares. Every 100 shares has a full allotment of 295 rights MCBs. At the time of writing, SIA’s share price is S$5.82. This works out to an overall effective price of S$3.47 per share. Here’s the math: Overall effective price paid = ([100 x S$5.82) + (295 x S$2.68)] / (100 +295). 
• Circumstances where you’ll make money on the MCBs alone (ignoring what happens to your SIA stake): There are a few scenarios where you’ll make a profit: (1) SIA redeems the MCBs before they are converted; (2) SIA allows the MCBs to convert into shares 10 years later and SIA’s share price is significantly higher than S$2.68 at that point in time. To be clear, the price of S$2.68 is the price you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares in the event of the MCBs’ conversion. If SIA’s share price is around S$2.68 at the point of conversion, it’s very likely you’ll be losing money on the MCBs;  if SIA’s share price is lower than S$2.68 at the point of conversion, you’ll be losing money on the MCBs.
• When is it beneficial for SIA to redeem the MCBs? Redemption of the MCBs will require SIA to fork out cash, which negatively impacts SIA’s financial health. On the other hand, the conversion of the MCBs does not require SIA to dole out any cash. So from this perspective, it’s beneficial for SIA to not redeem the MCBs at all. This is important to note for the MCB holders for cash-flow-planning purposes, since SIA could very well choose not to redeem the MCBs.

Other important points to note

Shareholders of Singapore Airlines can choose to participate in the company’s fundraising activity in one of the following ways:

1. Subscribe for both the rights issue and rights MCBs
2. Subscribe for just the rights issue but not the rights MCBs
3. Subscribe for the rights MCBs but not the rights issue
4. Do not subscribe for both the rights issue and rights MCBs

If you’re a Singapore Airlines shareholder and you choose the fourth option, you can still recover some capital by selling the rights issues and rights MCBs (both are renounceable, so the rights can be actively traded). But you will face massive dilution, since the airline’s share count will increase significantly.

I hope laying out all these numbers will help you – if you’re a Singapore Airlines shareholder or are interested in its shares and/or MCBs – to make a better-informed decision.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Much ink has been spilt on the whole Singapore Airlines Ltd (SGX: C6L) fiasco. 

The latest news now is that Temasek, one of the Singapore government’s investment arms, has stepped in to provide our country’s flag carrier with much-needed capital. 

This comes as Singapore Airlines (SIA) is confronting liquidity problems due to its high debt load and fixed costs, and the disruption to its business because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The rescue

In essence, Temasek, which currently owns around 55% of SIA, has underwritten a S$5.3 billion equity fundraising by the airline. Temasek has also underwritten a $9.7 billion issuance of mandatory convertible bonds (MCBs) by SIA; the MCBs will either be converted to shares in 10 years or redeemed before then. What this means is that Temasek will not only subscribe to all the rights and relevant bonds that it’s entitled to; it will also purchase any of the rights or bonds that other SIA shareholders do not want.

But despite Temasek coming in to save the day, I’m not interested in investing in SIA, even at these seemingly low prices.

How did it get into this situation in the first place?

Much like other airline companies, SIA is heavily leveraged due to the capital-intensive nature of its business. The high cost of replacing and upgrading SIA’s fleet has also led to negative free cash flow in four of the last five years.

To keep itself afloat, our flag carrier has been increasingly making use of the debt markets for its cash flow requirements. In fact, the company issued bonds to the public just last year to raise more capital. At the end of 2019, the airline had S$1.6 billion in cash, but S$7.7 billion in total debt.

The aviation industry is highly competitive too and the emergence of low-cost carriers have led to thinner margins for airlines.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the straw that broke the camel’s back as the significant loss of revenue (SIA recently cut 96% of its flight capacity) finally led to severe cash flow problems for the company and Temasek ultimately had to step in to save the day.

Temasek saving the day but shareholders will be diluted

Let’s be clear, this is not a government bailout. It is nothing like what the American airlines got from the US government, which included a massive grant. 

SIA’s situation is simply a major shareholder promising to back the company when it sells new shares to raise capital.

The new shares will dilute existing shareholders if they don’t take up the rights issue. On top of that, the mandatory convertible bonds will also dilute shareholders in 10 years when they are converted, unless they are redeemed before then.

SIA shares seem cheap but it really is not

Under the rights issue portion of SIA’s latest fundraising exercise, existing shareholders of the airline will be given the opportunity to buy three new shares at S$3 per share for every two shares they own.

Based on SIA’s current share price of S$6.03, I will get shares for an average price of S$4.21 each if I buy in today and subscribe to the rights issue. That seems cheap – but it really is not.

As of 31 December 2019, SIA had a net asset value per share of S$10.25. But that will drop substantially after the rights issue.

The rights issue will increase shareholders’ equity from S$12.1 billion to S$17.4 billion, or an increase of 43% from 31 December 2019. At the same time, the number of shares will increase from 1.2 billion to 3 billion. After the dilution, the net asset value per share will fall to around S$5.80 per share based on SIA’s last reported financials.

I also expect SIA’s net asset value per share to fall even more than that because of the heavy losses suffered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the quarter ended 31 December 2019, Singapore Airlines incurred about S$800 million in staff costs, S$210 million in aircraft maintenance expenses, and S$522 million in depreciation. Most of these fixed costs will likely still need to be accounted for during the period of near-zero flights, despite SIA grounding its planes. These costs add up to around S$0.50 per share per quarter.

Together with the upcoming dilution and the heavy losses, Singapore Airlines’ shares could have a net asset value of close to or even less than S$5.30 per share in the future, depending on how long the pandemic lasts.

Earnings per share dilution

Earnings per share will also fall after the issuance of new shares because of the rights issue. SIA reported trailing 12 months profit of S$765 million.

Even if our flag carrier can achieve similar profit after the whole pandemic passes, its earnings per share will drop substantially because of the larger number of outstanding shares.

By my calculation, normalised earnings per share will decline from S$0.63 to just S$0.25 after the rights issue.

I’m not buying shares just yet…

The injection of cash will put SIA in a much better financial position but I’m still not convinced. 

Even if I buy shares today and subscribe to all my allotted shares in the rights issue, I don’t think I’ll be getting that great of a deal. I’ll be paying an average price of around S$4.21 per share, which translates to only a small discount to my calculated adjusted net asset value per share. It is also slightly more than 16 times SIA’s normalised earnings post-rights issue, which is not that cheap.

Moreover, if SIA is unable to redeem the mandatory convertible bonds before they get converted in 10 years time, they will potentially lead to further dilution to shareholders.

Let’s not forget too that our flag carrier (1) has a history of inconsistent free cash flow, (2) operates in an industry that is a slave to fuel prices, and (3) has strong competition from low-cost carriers. 

Given all these, despite the seemingly low share price, I still don’t think Singapore Airlines shares are cheap enough for my liking.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

While stocks markets around the world plunged over the last month, Zoom Video Communications‘s (NASDAQ: ZM) share price has defied gravity, zooming up by close to 30%.

Investors are anticipating great things for the company this year as the COVID-19 epidemic accelerates the adoption of video conferencing tools around the globe.

With the hype surrounding Zoom, I thought it would be an opportune time to share some of my thoughts on the fast-growing company and whether it is still worth investing at today’s price.

Fast growth

Zoom is one of the fastest-growing listed software-as-a-service firms in the world today. That says a lot.

In fiscal 2020 (ended 31 January), Zoom recorded revenue of US$622.7 million, up a staggering 88% from a year ago.

New customers and a net dollar expansion rate of more than 130% contributed to the sharp rise in sales. Over the course of 2019, Zoom had 641 customers contributing more than US$100,000 in trailing-12-months revenue, an increase of 86% from a year ago. 

Consistently strong performance

Last year’s growth was by no account a one-off. Zoom has been growing rapidly for the three years prior to its IPO in 2019. Annual revenue increased by 149% and 118% in fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2019, respectively.

The company’s net dollar expansion rate has also been north of 130% for seven consecutive quarters, a testament to the strength of the business platform.

COVID-19, a catalyst for greater use of Zoom’s tools

On top of the long-term tailwinds for video conferencing, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the adoption of Zoom’s video conferencing tools. Many people – from university students to work-at-home employees – have begun using Zoom’s software as they take shelter at home.

My sister who has returned home from Australia during this COVID-19 outbreak is using Zoom’s software for “long-distance” tutorials. Fortune magazine reported that teachers are even conducting piano lessons through Zoom.

Huge addressable market

Video is increasingly becoming the way that individuals communicate with each other at work and in their daily lives. And Zoom is the market leader in the space.

Zoom addresses the Hosted/Cloud Voice and Unified Communications, Collaboration Application, and IP Telephony Lines segments within the communication and collaboration market. Market researcher International Data Corporation estimates that these segments would be worth US$43.1 billion by 2022.

Remember that Zoom’s trailing-12-months revenue is just US$622.7 million. That’s a mere 1.4% of the addressable market, so there’s plenty of room for Zoom to grow into.

A cash-generating business

Unlike some of the other fast-growing SaaS (software-as-a-service) companies, Zoom is already cash-flow positive. In fiscal 2020, Zoom generated US$151.9 million and US$113.8 million in operating cash flow and free cash flow, respectively. That translates to a healthy free cash flow margin of 18.3%, with room for further margin expansion as usage of Zoom’s services grows.

In addition, even after accounting for stock-based compensation, Zoom is still profitable, with GAAP (generally-accepted accounting principles) net income of US$21.7 million in fiscal 2020, or US$0.09 per share.

Zoom’s high gross margin of more than 80% enables it to spend a large chunk of its revenue to acquire customers and grow the business while still sustaining a decent free cash flow margin and squeeze out some GAAP profit.

A robust balance sheet

A time when many businesses are being momentarily put on hold due to the COVID-19 spread highlights the importance of a company with a strong balance sheet. Companies that have enough cash to pay off their fixed costs during pauses in sales are more resilient to economic hardships.

Although Zoom is thriving in the current COVID-19 situation, there could be other incidents that may cause temporary disruptions to its business. It is hence heartening to note that Zoom has a robust balance sheet.

As of 31 January 2020, the video conferencing software company had US$283 million in cash and no debt. In fact, Zoom has been so adept at generating cash flow that it said that much of the primary capital it had raised prior to its IPO was still on its balance sheet.

Competition threat

Competition is perhaps the biggest threat to Zoom. The video conferencing company faces competition from mega tech firms such as Google, which has the free Google Hangout video conferencing service. Facebook and Amazon have also spent heavily on video communication tools.

However, Zoom’s video-first focus has propelled it to become the market leader in the video conferencing space. Unlike other companies that added video tools to their legacy communication software, Zoom built a video-conferencing tool with video at the front and centre of its architecture. This focus gives Zoom users a better video conferencing experience.

For now, Zoom remains the forefront in this space with most users preferring its software over competitors but it must consistently add features and update its software to keep users on its platform.

But is it too expensive?

There is no doubt that Zoom has all the makings of a great company. The software-as-a-service firm is growing rapidly and already boasts free cash flow margins in the mid-teens range.

I foresee Zoom’s free cash flow growing much faster than revenue in the future as margins expand due to economies of scale. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating the adoption of video conferencing software, which is great news for Zoom, being the market leader in this space.

Having said all that, Zoom’s stock has skyrocketed well above what I believe is reasonable. Zoom, which is still run by founder Eric Yuan, has a market cap of around US$38 billion currently.

That’s an astonishing 62 times fiscal 2020 revenue. Even if Zoom’s profit margin was 40% today (a level I think it can achieve in the future), its current market cap would still translate to 176 times earnings.

My conclusion

Based on its share price, the market is anticipating big things for Zoom in the coming quarters as more companies are forced to adopt video conferencing software. On top of that, Zoom, even before the COVID-19 outbreak, was already successfully riding on the coattails of a rapidly growing industry.

As an investor, I would love to participate in Zoom’s growth. However, I think Zoom’s stock is priced for perfection at the moment. Even if Zoom can deliver on all fronts over a multi-year time frame, investors who buy in at this price may still only achieve mediocre returns due to its high valuation.

As such, even though I wish I could be a shareholder of Zoom, I’ll happily wait at the sidelines until a more reasonable entry point arises.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Alteryx (NYSE: AYX) is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s portfolio. I first bought Alteryx shares for the portfolio in September 2019 at a price of US$118 and I’ve not sold any of the shares I’ve bought.

The purchase has not worked out well for my family’s portfolio thus far, with Alteryx’s share price being around US$98 now. But we’ve not even owned the company’s shares for a year, and it is always important to think about how the company’s business will evolve going forward. What follows is my thesis for why I still continue to hold Alteryx shares.

Company description

Alteryx provides a self-service subscription-based software platform that allows organisations to easily scrub and blend data from multiple sources and perform sophisticated analysis to obtain actionable insights.

The company’s platform can interact with nearly all data sources. These include traditional databases offered by the likes of IBM, Oracle, and SAP, as well as newer offerings such as those from MongoDB, Amazon Web Services, Google Analytics, and even social media.

Once data from different sources are fed into Alteryx’s platform, it cleans and blends the data. Users can easily build configurable and sophisticated analytical workflows on the platform through drag-and-drop tools. The workflows can be easily automated and shared within the users’ organisation, and the results can be displayed through Alteryx’s integrations with data-visualisation software from companies such as Tableau Software and Qlik. Here’s a chart showing the various use cases for Alteryx’s data analytics platform:

At the end of 2019, Alteryx had around 6,100 customers, of all sizes, in more than 90 countries. These customers come from a wide variety of industries and include more than 700 of the Global 2000 companies. The Global 2000 is compiled by Forbes and it’s a list of the top 2,000 public-listed companies in the world ranked according to a combination of their revenue, profits, assets, and market value. With thousands of customers, it’s no surprise that Alteryx does not have any customer concentration – no single customer accounted for more than 10% of the company’s revenue in the three years through 2019. The graphic below illustrates the diversity of Alteryx’s customer base:

Despite having customers in over 90 countries, Alteryx is currently still a US-centric company. In 2019, 71% of its revenue came from the US. The UK is the only other country that accounted for more than 10% of Alteryx’s revenue in 2019 (10.7%).

Investment thesis

I had previously laid out my six-criteria investment framework in The Good Investors. I will use the same framework to describe my investment thesis for Alteryx.

1. Revenues that are small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or revenues that are large in a fast-growing market

Alteryx earned US$417.9 million in revenue in 2019. This is significantly lower than the US$73 billion addressable market that the company is currently seeing. It comprises two parts:

1. US$49 billion in the global big data and analytics software market (according to a July 2017 IDC report) which includes the US$28 billion global analytics and business intelligence market (according to a January 2019 Gartner report) 
2. A US$24 billion slice, based on Alteryx’s estimate of the spend associated with 47 million spreadsheet users worldwide who worked on advanced data preparation and analytics in 2018 (according to an April 2019 IDC report)

I believe that better days are ahead for Alteryx for a few reasons:

• I mentioned earlier that the company’s data analytics platform can interact with nearly all data sources. This interactivity is important. A 2015 Harvard Business Review study sponsored by Alteryx found that 64% of organizations use five or more sources of data for analytics.
• Market researcher IDC predicted in late 2018 that the quantity of data in the world (generated, captured, and replicated) would compound at an astounding rate of 61% per year, from 33 zettabytes then to 175 zettabytes in 2025. That’s staggering. 1 zettabyte equals to 10¹² gigabytes.
• A 2013 survey on more than 400 companies by business consultancy group Bain found that only 4% of them had the appropriate human and technological assets to derive meaningful insights from their data. In fact, Alteryx’s primary competitors are manual processes performed on spreadsheets, or custom-built approaches. These traditional methods for data analysis involve multiple steps, require the support of technical teams, and are slow (see chart below).
• Crucially, Alteryx’s self-service data analytics platform is scalable, efficient, and can be mastered and used by analysts with no coding skill or experience. I think this leads to a few good things for Alteryx. First, it democratises access to sophisticated data analytics for companies, and hence opens up Alteryx’s market opportunity. Second, it places Alteryx’s platform in a sweet spot of riding on a growing trend (the explosion in data generated) as well as addressing a pain-point for many organisations (the lack of resources to analyse data, and the laborious way that data analysis is traditionally done).

(Traditional way to perform data analysis)

2. A strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt

As of 31 December 2019, Alteryx held US$974.9 million in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments. This is comfortably higher than the company’s total debt of US$698.5 million (all of which are convertible notes).

3. A management team with integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset

On integrity

Alteryx was listed in March 2017, so there’s only a short history to study when it comes to management. But I do like what I see.

The company was founded in 1997. One of its co-founders, Dean Stoecker, 63, has held the roles of CEO and chairman since its establishment. Another of Alteryx’s co-founders is 57-year-old Olivia Duane Adams, the company’s current chief customer officer. The third co-founder, Ned Harding, 52, was a key technology leader in the company and left in July 2018; he remains an advisor to Alteryx’s software engineering teams. The company’s chief technology officer role is currently filled by Derek Knudsen, 46. He stepped into the position in August 2018  after Harding’s departure. Knudsen had accumulated over 20 years of experience working with technology in companies in senior leadership positions before joining Alteryx.

Stoecker and Duane Adams collectively controlled nearly 10 million Alteryx shares as of 31 March 2019. These shares are worth around US$980 million at the company’s current share price of US$98. That’s a large stake and it likely aligns the interests of Stoecker and Duane Adams’ with Alteryx’s other shareholders.

Alteryx has two share classes: (1) The publicly-traded Class A shares with 1 voting right per share; and (2) the non-traded Class B shares with 10 voting rights each. Stoecker and Duane Adams’ Alteryx shares were mostly of the Class B variety. So, they controlled 47.9% of the voting power in the company despite holding only 16% of the total shares. Collectively, Alteryx’s key leaders controlled 54.1% of the company’s voting rights as of 31 March 2019.

Having clear control over Alteryx means that management can easily implement compensation plans that fatten themselves at the expense of shareholders. The good thing is that the compensation structure for Alteryx’s management looks sensible to me.

In 2018, 70% to 79.7% of the compensation of Alteryx’s management team came from long-term incentives. These incentives include restricted stock units (RSUs) and stock options that vest over multi-year periods. There is room for some misalignment to creep in though – as far as I can tell, there is no clear description given by Alteryx on the performance metrics that management must meet in order to earn their compensation. But I don’t see this as a dealbreaker. Because of the multi-year vesting period for the RSUs and stock options, Alteryx’s management will do well over time only if the share price does well – and the share price will do well only if the business does well. From this perspective, the interests of management and shareholders are still well-aligned.

On capability and innovation

Alteryx’s business has changed dramatically over time since its founding. In its early days, the company was selling software for analysing demographics. Alteryx’s current core data analytics software platform was launched only in 2010, and a subscription model was introduced relatively recently in 2013. I see Alteryx’s long and winding journey to success as a sign of the founders’ ability to adapt and innovate.

I also credit Alteryx’s management with the success that the company has found in the land-and-expand strategy. The strategy starts with the company landing a customer with an initial use case, and then expanding its relationship with the customer through other use cases. The success can be illustrated through Alteryx’s impressive dollar-based net expansion rates (DBNERs). The metric is a very important gauge for the health of a SaaS (software-as-a-service) company’s business. It measures the change in revenue from all the company’s customers a year ago compared to today; it includes positive effects from upsells as well as negative effects from customers who leave or downgrade. Anything more than 100% indicates that the company’s customers, as a group, are spending more.

Alteryx’s DBNER has been more than 120% in each of the last 20 quarters – that’s five years! The chart below illustrates Alteryx’s DBNER going back to 2017’s first quarter.

Alteryx’s management has also led impressive customer-growth at the company. The company’s customer count has more than quadrupled from 1,398 at the end of 2015 to 6,087 at the end of 2019.

But there is a key area where Alteryx’s management falls short: The company’s culture. Alteryx has a 3.5-star rating on Glassdoor, and only 65% of reviewers will recommend Alteryx to friends. Stoecker only has an 85% approval rating as CEO. SAP, a competitor of Alteryx, has 4.5 stars on Glassdoor, and recommendation and CEO-approval ratings of 93% and 97%, respectively. Alteryx has managed to post impressive business-results despite its relatively poor culture, but I’m keeping an eye on things here.

4. Revenue streams that are recurring in nature, either through contracts or customer-behaviour

Alteryx’s business is built nearly entirely on subscriptions, which generate recurring revenue for the company. The company sells access to its data analytics platform through subscriptions, which typically range from one to three years. In 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016, more than 95% of Alteryx’s revenue in each year came from subscriptions to its platform; the rest of the revenue came from training and consulting services, among others. 

5. A proven ability to grow

There isn’t much historical financial data to study for Alteryx, since the company was listed only in March 2017. But I do like what I see.

A few key points to note:

• Alteryx has compounded its revenue at an impressive annual rate of 61.6% from 2014 to 2019. The astounding revenue growth of 92.7% in 2018 was partly the result of Alteryx adopting new accounting rules in the year. Alteryx’s revenue for 2018 would have been US$204.3 million after adjusting for the impact of the accounting rule, representing slower-but-still-impressive top-line growth of 55.2% for the year. 2019 saw the company maintain breakneck growth, with its revenue up by 64.8%.
• Alteryx started making a profit in 2018, and also generated positive operating cash flow and free cash flow in 2017, 2018, and 2019.
• Annual growth in operating cash flow and free cash flow from 2017 to 2019 was strong at 33.8% and 21.4%, respectively.
• The company’s balance sheet remained robust throughout the timeframe under study, with significantly more cash and investments than debt.
• At first glance, Alteryx’s diluted share count appeared to increase sharply by 22.1% from 2017 to 2018. But the number I’m using is the weighted average diluted share count. Right after Alteryx got listed in March 2017, it had a share count of around 57 million. This means that the increase in 2018 was milder (in the mid-teens range) though still higher than I would like it to be. The good news is that the diluted share count inched up by only 6% in 2019, which is acceptable, given the company’s rapid growth. I will be keeping an eye on Alteryx’s dilution.

6. A high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future

Alteryx has already started to generate free cash flow. Right now, the company has a poor trailing free cash flow margin (free cash flow as a percentage of revenue) of just 5.4%.

But over the long run, Alteryx expects to generate a strong free cash flow margin of 30% to 35%. I think this is a realistic and achievable target. There are other larger SaaS companies such as Adobe, salesforce.com, and Veeva Systems (my family’s portfolio owns shares in all three companies too) with a free cash flow margin around that range or higher.

Valuation

You should get some tissue ready… because Alteryx’s shares have a nosebleed valuation. At a share price of US$98, Alteryx carries a trailing price-to-sales (P/S) ratio of 16.1. This P/S ratio is in the middle-range of where it has been since Alteryx’s IPO in March 2017 (see chart below). But the P/S ratio of 16.1 is still considered high. For perspective, if I assume that Alteryx has a 30% free cash flow margin today, then the company would have a price-to-free cash flow ratio of 54 based on the current P/S ratio (16.1 divided by 30%). 

But Alteryx also has a few strong positives going for it. The company has: (1) a huge addressable market in relation to its revenue; (2) a large and rapidly expanding customer base; and (3) very sticky customers who have been willing to significantly increase their spending with the company over time. I believe that with these traits, there’s a high chance that Alteryx will continue posting excellent revenue growth – and in turn, excellent free cash flow growth – in the years ahead.

The current high valuation for Alteryx does mean that its share price is likely going to be more volatile than the stock market as a whole (I’m also keeping in mind that stocks have been very volatile of late because of COVID-19 fears). But the potential volatility is something I’m very comfortable with.

The risks involved

I see a few key risks in Alteryx, with the high valuation being one. Besides introducing volatility (which I don’t see as a risk), Alteryx’s high valuation means that the market has high expectations for the company’s future growth. If Alteryx stumbles along the way, its share price will be punished. With COVID-19 causing widespread slowdowns in business activity across the world, there may be a global recession in the works. Should it happen, Alteryx may find it tough to grow its business.

Competition is another important risk. I mentioned earlier that Alteryx’s primary competitors are spreadsheets, or custom-built approaches. But the company’s data analytics platform is also competing against services from other technology heavyweights with much stronger financial resources, such as International Business Machines, Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP. Providers of data visualisation software, such as Tableau, could also decide to move upstream and budge into Alteryx’s space. To date, Alteryx has dealt with competition admirably – its quarterly DBNERs and growth in customer numbers are impressive. I’m watching these two metrics to observe how the company is faring against competitors.

Two other key risks deal with hacking and downtime in Alteryx’s services. The company’s platform is important for users, since it is used to crunch data to derive actionable insights; it is also likely that Alteryx’s platform is constantly fed with sensitive information of its users. Should there be a data breach on the platform, and/or if the platform stops working for extended periods of time, Alteryx could lose the confidence of its customers.

Then there’s also succession risk with Alteryx. Dean Stoecker, the company’s co-founder and CEO, is already 63. Should he step down in the future, I will keep an eye on the leadership transition.

Lastly, the following are all yellow-to-red flags for me regarding Alteryx: (1) The company’s DBNER comes in at less than 100% for an extended period of time; (2) it fails to increase its number of customers; and (3) it’s unable to convert revenue into free cash flow at a healthy clip in the future.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

Summing up Alteryx, it has:

1. A valuable self-service data analytics platform that addresses customers’ pain-points and is superior to legacy methods for data analysis;
2. high levels of recurring revenue;
3. outstanding revenue growth rates;
4. positive profit and free cash flow, with the potential for much higher free cash flow margins in the future;
5. a large and mostly untapped addressable market;
6. an impressive track record of winning customers and increasing their spending; and
7. capable leaders who are in the same boat as the company’s other shareholders

The company does have a premium valuation, so I’m taking on valuation risk. There are also other risks to note, such as tough competition and succession. But after analysing all the data on Alteryx’s pros and cons, I’m happy for my family’s portfolio to continue owning the company’s shares.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Patients can be their own worst enemy. This is especially true for people who suffer from chronic conditions such as diabetes. Suboptimal lifestyle choices and poor medication compliance often lead to avoidable complications. 

A company called Livongo Health (NASDAQ: LVGO) is trying to change all that. The software-as-a-service (SaaS) company provides diabetic patients with an app that can prompt them to take their medications as well as provide feedback and coaching. Livongo also provides patients with an internet-connected blood glucose meter and unlimited test strips.

The end-result is that Livongo users are more compliant with glucose monitoring and have fewer complications. They also save on healthcare expenses over the long run. Besides diabetes, Livongo also has services for hypertension, weight management, pre-diabetes, and behavioural health.

With preventive medicine gaining greater prominence today, I thought it would be worth taking a deeper look into Livongo to see if the healthtech company makes a worthwhile investment.

As usual, I will analyse Livongo using my blogging partner Ser Jing’s, six-point investment framework.

1. Is Livongo’s revenue small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or is its revenue large in a fast-growing market?

Livongo’s member count increased by 96% in 2019 to 223,000. More impressively, its revenue for 2019 jumped 149% to US$170 million from 2018.

Despite the spike in member and revenue, Livongo still has a huge market to grow into. There are 31.4 million people in the US living with diabetes and 39.6 million people with hypertension.

Based on Livongo’s fees of US$900 per patient per year for diabetics and US$468 for patients with hypertension, its total opportunity adds up to US$46.7 billion.

As preventive health gains greater prominence, Livongo can win a greater chunk of its total addressable market. Currently, Livongo’s penetration rate is only 0.3%. Meanwhile, Livongo has ambitions to increase its software’s use case to patients with other chronic diseases and to expand internationally. 

These two initiatives could further increase its already-large addressable market substantially.

2. Does Livongo have a strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt?

Livongo is still burning cash. In 2019, it used US$59 million in cash flow from operations, an acceleration from the US$33 million spent in 2018. That’s a hefty amount and certainly something to keep a close eye on.

On the bright side, Livongo has more than enough cash on its balance sheet to continue its growth plans for several years. As of December 2019, the Healthtech firm had no debt and US$390 million in cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments.

It’s also heartening to note that Livongo’s management is mindful of the way the company is spending cash. In the 2019 fourth-quarter earnings conference call, Livongo’s chief financial officer, Lee Shapiro, highlighted that the company is aiming to produce positive adjusted-EBITDA by 2021 and expects the company’s adjusted-EBITDA margin to improve in 2020.

Shapiro said:

“Adjusted EBITDA loss for 2020 will be in the range of negative $22 million to negative $20 million.

This implies adjusted EBITDA margins of negative 8% to negative 7% or an improvement of between 3.5 to 4.5 points over 2019. We plan to continue to invest in the business in 2020 while simultaneously marching toward our goal of sustained adjusted EBITDA profitability in 2021.” 

Adjusted EBITDA is roughly equal to net income after deducting interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation, and stock-based compensation and is closely related to cash flow from operations. If Livongo can hit its 2021 goal to be adjusted EBITDA positive, cash flow should not be an issue going forward.

3. Does Livongo’s management team have integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset?

In my view, management is the single most important aspect of a company. In Livongo’s case, I think management has done a good job in executing its growth plans.

Current CEO, Zane Burke has only been in his post for slightly over a year but has a strong resume. He was the president of Cerner Corporation, an American healthtech company for the seven years prior. It was under Burke’s tenure that Livongo was listed and his first year in charge saw Livongo’s revenue grow at a triple-digit rate.

He is backed by Ex-CEO Glen Tullman who is now the chairman of the board. Glenn Tullman has a long track record of managing healthcare companies and was the key man before stepping down to let Burke take over. Tullman continues to have an influence on how the company is run.

The management team has also done a great job in growing Livongo’s business so far. The acquisition of Retrofit Inc and myStrength in April 2018 seems like a good decision as it opened the door for Livongo to provide prediabetes, weight management, and behavioural health services. With its ready base of clients, Livongo can easily cross-sell these newly acquired products.

However, Livongo is still a relatively new company. It was only listed in July 2019, so it has a very short public track record.

As such, it is worth keeping an eye on how well the management team executes its growth plans and whether it makes good capital allocation decisions going forward. 

4. Are Livongo’s revenue streams recurring in nature?

Recurring income provides visibility in the years ahead, something that I want all my investments to possess.

Livongo ticks this box.

The digital health company has a unique business model that provides very predictable recurring income. Livongo bills its clients based on a per-participant, per-month subscription model. Clients include self-insured employers, health plans, government entities, and labour unions who then offer Livongo’s service to their employees, insurees, or members. 

There are a few things to like about Livongo’s model: 

Product intensity

First, the average revenue per existing client increases as more members eligible to use Livongo’s software per client increases. This is what Livongo describes as product intensity.

At the end of 12 months, the average enrollment rate for Livongo for Diabetes clients who launched enrollment in 2018 was 34%. The average enrollment rate after 12 months for fully-optimized clients who began enrollment in 2018 is over 47%.

Livongo also believes product intensity can increase further as more members warm up to the idea of using cloud-based tools to track and manage their medical conditions.

Product density

Livongo has also been successful in cross-selling its products to existing clients. High product intensity and density contributed to Livongo’s dollar-based net expansion rate of 113.8% in 2018. 

Anything above 100% means that all of Livongo’s customers from a year ago are collectively spending more today.

Very low churn rate

In its IPO prospectus, Livongo said that its retention rate for clients who had been with them since 31 December 2017, was 95.9%. That’s high, even for a SaaS company.

Another important thing to note is that the member churn rate in 2018 was also very low at just 2%. Most of the dropouts were also due to the members becoming ineligible for the service, likely because they changed employers.

5. Does Livongo have a proven ability to grow?

Livongo is a newly listed company but it has a solid track record of growth as a private firm. The chart below shows the rate of growth in the number of clients and members.

Livongo grew from just 5 clients and 614 members in 2014 to 679 clients and 164,000 members in the first quarter of 2019. At the end of 2019, Livongo had 223,000 members.

There is also a strong pipeline for 2020 as Livongo had signed agreements with multiple new clients in 2019. Based on an estimated take-up rate of 25%, the estimated value of the agreements Livongo signed in 2019 is around US$285 million, up from US$155 million in 2018.

Management expects revenue growth of 65% to 71% in 2020. Due to the contracts signed in 2019, management has clear visibility on where that growth will come from.

6. Does Livongo have a high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future?

Ultimately, a company’s worth is determined by how much free cash flow it can generate in the future. Livongo is not yet free cash flow positive but I think the healthtech firm’s business model would allow it to generate strong free cash flow in the future.

Due to the high lifetime value of its clients, Livongo can afford to spend more on customer acquisition now and be rewarded later. The chart below illustrates this point.

From the chart, we can see that the revenue (blue bar) earned from the 2016 cohort steadily increased from 2016 to 2018. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the higher product intensity and density.

Consequently, the contribution margin from the cohort steadily increased to 60% with room to grow in the years ahead.

Currently, Livongo is spending heavily on marketing and R&D which is the main reason for its hefty losses. In 2019, sales and marketing was 45% of revenue, while R&D made up 29%. 

I think the sales and marketing spend is validated due to the large lifetime value of Livongo’s clients. However, both marketing and R&D spend will slowly become a smaller percentage of revenue as revenue growth outpaces them.

Management’s target of adjusted EBITDA profitability by 2020 is also reassuring for shareholders.

Risks

Livongo is a fairly new company with a very new business model. I think there is a clear path to profitability but the healthtech firm needs to execute its growth strategy. Its profitability is dependent on scaling as there are some fixed costs like R&D expenses that are unlikely to drop.

As such, execution risk is something that could derail the company’s growth and profitability.

As mentioned earlier, Livongo is also burning cash at a pretty fast rate. That cannot go on forever. The tech-powered health firm needs to watch its cash position and cash burn rate. Although its balance sheet is still strong now, if the rate of cash burn continues or accelerates, Livongo could see itself in a precarious position and may need a new round of funding that could hurt existing shareholders.

Healthtech is a highly dynamic field with new technologies consistently disrupting incumbents. Livongo could face competition in the future that could erode its margins and hinder growth.

Another thing to note is that while Livongo has more than 600 clients, a large amount of its revenue still comes from a limited number of channel partners and resellers. In 2018, its top five channel partners represented 50% of revenue. 

Stock-based compensation is another risk factor. In 2019, the company issued US$32 million worth of new stock as employee compensation. That translates to 18% of revenue, a large amount even for a fast-growing tech company. Ideally, I want to see stock-based compensation grow at a much slower pace than revenue going forward.

Valuation

Using traditional valuation techniques, Livongo seems richly valued. Even after the recent broad market sell-off, Livongo still has a market cap of around US$2.4 billion, or 14 times trailing revenue. The company is not even free cash flow positive or profitable, so the price-to-earnings and price-to-free-cash-flow metrics are not even appropriate.

However, if you take into account Livongo’s pace of growth and total addressable market, its current valuation does not seem too expensive.

Livongo’s addressable market is US$46.7 billion in the US. If we assume that the healthtech firm can grow into just 10% of that market, it will have a revenue run rate of US$4.6 billion, more than two times its current market cap.

The Good Investors’ take

Livongo has the makings of a solid investment to. It is growing fast, has a huge addressable market and has a clear path to profitability and free cash flow generation. There are likely going to bumps along the road but if the health SaaS company can deliver just a fraction of its potential, I think the company could be worth much more in the future.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.