Category: Investing Analysis

DoucSign (NASDAQ: DOCU) is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s portfolio. I first bought DocuSign shares for the portfolio in December 2018 at a price of US$41 and I’ve not sold any of the shares I’ve bought. 

The purchase has worked out very well for my family’s portfolio thus far, with DocuSign’s share price being around US$79 now. But we’ve not even owned the company’s shares for two years, and it is always important to think about how the company’s business will evolve going forward. What follows is my thesis for why I still continue to hold DocuSign shares.

Company description

DocuSign provides DocuSign eSignature, currently the world’s leading cloud-based e-signature solution. This software service enables users to sign a document securely using almost any device from virtually anywhere in the world. It is the core part of the broader DocuSign Agreement Cloud, which is a suite of software services – again all delivered over the cloud – that automates and connects the entire agreement process. DocuSign Agreement Cloud includes:

• Automatic generation of an agreement from data in other systems; 
• Support of negotiation-workflow; 
• Collection of payment after signatures;
• Use of artificial intelligence (AI) to analyse agreement-documents for risks and opportunities; and 
• Hundreds of integrations with other systems, so that the agreement process can be seamlessly combined with other business processes and data

At the end of its fiscal year ended 31 January 2020 (FY2020), DocuSign had over 585,000 paying customers and hundreds of millions of users. From its founding in 2003 through to FY2019, the company had processed over 1 billion successful transactions (around 300 million in FY2019 alone). DocuSign defines a successful transaction as the completion of all required actions (such as signing or approving documents) by all relevant parties in an Envelope; an Envelope is, in turn, a digital container used to send one or more documents for signature or approval to the relevant recipients.

DocuSign serves customers of all sizes, from sole proprietorships to the companies that are among the top 2,000 publicly-traded enterprises. The company’s customers also come from many different industries, as the chart below illustrates.

For a geographical perspective of DocuSign’s business, its users are in over 180 countries. But in FY2020, 82% of the company’s revenue came from the US. 

Investment thesis

I had previously laid out my six-criteria investment framework in The Good Investors. I will use the same framework to describe my investment thesis for DocuSign.

1. Revenues that are small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or revenues that are large in a fast-growing market

Has it ever occured to you that the innocuous act of signing documents with pen-and-paper can actually be a significantly wasteful activity for companies? The thought struck me when I was doing research on DocuSign before I bought its shares. Think about it. Signing a paper document requires you to fax, scan, email, snail-mail, courier, and file. DocuSign’s solution can save us both time and money.

There are many use-cases for DocuSign’s software services, ranging from sales contracts to employment contracts, non-disclosure agreements, and more. In fact, DocuSign has a customer that has implemented over 300 use-cases. DocuSign documents are legally accepted and protected with cryptographic technology from tampering. The documents also have a full audit trail, including party names, email addresses, public IP addresses, and a time-stamped record of each individual’s interaction with a document.

DocuSign estimated that it had a total addressable market of US$25 billion in 2017, using (1) the number of companies in its core markets, and (2) its internal estimate of an annual contract value based on each respective company’s size, industry, and location. This estimate remains unchanged (it was mentioned in the company’s FY2020 annual report), though recent business moves may have significantly expanded its addressable market. More on this later. At just US$974.0 million, DocuSign’s revenue in FY2020 is merely a fraction of its estimated market opportunity.

I believe that DocuSign’s addressable market will likely grow over time. There are clear benefits to e-signatures. A 2015 third-party study by Intellicap (commissioned by DocuSign) found that the company’s enterprise customers derived an average incremental value of US$36 per transaction (with a range of US$5 to US$100) when using the company’s software as compared to traditional paper-processes. In FY2020, 82% of all the successful transactions that flowed through DocuSign’s platform were completed in less than 24 hours, while 50% were completed within just 15 minutes. DocuSign’s services help companies save money and time.

2. A strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt

As of 31 January 2020, DocuSign held US$895.9 million in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments. This is nearly twice the company’s total debt of US$465.3 million (all of which are convertible notes). For the sake of conservatism, I also note that DocuSign had US$183.2 million in operating lease liabilities. But the company’s cash, short-term investments and long-term investments still comfortably outweigh the sum of the company’s debt and operating lease liabilities (US$648.5 million). 

3. A management team with integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset

On integrity

Leading DocuSign as CEO is Daniel Springer, 57, who joined the company in January 2017. Among other key leaders in DocuSign are:

• Scott Olrich, Chief Operating Officer, 48
• Michael Sheridan, Chief Financial Officer, 55
• Loren Alhadeff, Chief Revenue Officer, 41
• Kirsten Wolberg, Chief Technology and Operations Officer, 52

Most of them have relatively short tenure with DocuSign, but have collectively clocked decades in senior leadership roles in other technology companies.

DocuSign has opted not to share details about its compensation structure for senior management because of its status as an “emerging growth company.” And Springer’s total compensation for FY2019 was a princely sum of US$13.4 million. But I take heart in this: 94% of Springer’s total compensation in FY2019 came from stock awards, and around 70% of the stock awards vest over a period of four years. The multi-year vesting of the stock awards means that Springer’s compensation is tied to the long run performance of DocuSign’s stock price, which is in turn governed by its business performance. So I think Springer’s interests are aligned with mine as a shareholder of the company.

Notably, Springer also controlled 2.3 million shares of DocuSign as of 31 March 2019, a stake that’s worth a sizable US$211 million at the current share price.  

On capability

From FY2013 to FY2020, DocuSign has seen its number of customers increase more than 10-fold (41% per year) from 54,000 to 585,000. So the first thing I note is that DocuSign’s management has a terrific track record of growing its customer count.

To win customers, DocuSign’s software service offers over 300 pre-built integrations with widely used business applications from other tech giants such as salesforce.com, Oracle, SAP, Google, and more. These third-party applications are mostly in the areas of CRM (customer relationship management), ERP (enterprise resource planning), and HCM (human capital management). DocuSign also has APIs (application programming interfaces) that allow its software to be easily integrated with its customers’ own apps. 

I also credit DocuSign’s management with the success that the company has found with its land-and-expand strategy. The strategy starts with the company landing a customer with an initial use case, and then expanding its relationship with the customer through other use cases. The success can be illustrated through DocuSign’s strong dollar-based net retention rates (DBNRRs). The metric is a very important gauge for the health of a SaaS (software-as-a-service) company’s business. It measures the change in revenue from all of DocuSign’s customers a year ago compared to today; it includes positive effects from upsells as well as negative effects from customers who leave or downgrade. Anything more than 100% indicates that the company’s customers, as a group, are spending more – DocuSign’s DBNRRs have been in the low-teens to mid-teens range in the past few years.

On innovation

I think DocuSign’s management scores well on the innovation front, since the company has been busy with using blockchain technology and AI to improve its services. 

Blockchain technology is the backbone of cryptocurrencies and DocuSign has been experimenting with blockchain-based smart contracts since 2015. In June 2018, DocuSign joined the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance and showed how a DocuSign agreement can be automatically written onto the Ethereum blockchain. Here’s an example of a smart contract  described by DocuSign:

“A smart contract turns a contract into something like a computer program. The Internet-connected program monitors data and triggers actions relevant to the contract’s terms. For example, a crop-insurance smart contract might use a trusted Internet feed of weather data. If the temperature goes above 85 degrees Fahrenheit in April, the smart contract will automatically trigger a crop-insurance payout, again via the Internet. This total automation eliminates ambiguity and promises large savings in time and effort for all parties involved.”

It’s early days for DocuSign’s use of blockchain, but I’m watching its moves here. DocuSign’s management acknowledges that many of the company’s customers don’t yet see the value of blockchain technology in the agreement process. But the company still believes in blockchain’s potential.  

DocuSign has been working with AI since at least 2017 when it acquired machine-learning firm Appuri during the year. In February 2020, DocuSign inked an agreement to acquire Seal Software for US$188 million. The acquisition is expected to close in the first half of DocuSign’s FY2021. Seal Software was founded in 2010 and uses AI to analyse contracts. For example, Seal Software can search for legal concepts (and not just keywords) in large collections of documents, and automatically extract and compare critical clauses and terms. Prior to the acquisition, DocuSign was already tacking Seal Software’s services onto DocuSign Agreement Cloud. The combination of Seal Software and DocuSign’s technologies have helped a “large international information-services company” reduce legal-review time by 75%. Ultimately, DocuSign thinks that Seal Software will be able to strengthen DocuSign Agreement Cloud’s AI foundation.

Speaking of DocuSign Agreement Cloud, it was released in March 2019. As mentioned earlier, it includes multiple software services. DocuSign sees DocuSign Agreement Cloud as a new category of cloud software that connects existing cloud services in the realms of marketing, sales, human resources, enterprise resource planning, and more, into agreement processes. 

I see two huge positives that come with the introduction of multi-product sales. Firstly, it will likely lead to each DocuSign customer using more of the company’s products. This means that DocuSign could be plugged into an increasing number of its customers’ business processes, resulting in stickier customers. Secondly, DocuSign thinks that covering a wider scope of the entire agreement process could roughly double its market opportunity from the current size of US$25 billion to around US$50 billion. 

4. Revenue streams that are recurring in nature, either through contracts or customer-behaviour

DocuSign’s business is built nearly entirely on subscriptions, which generate recurring revenue for the company. Customers of DocuSign gain access to the company’s software platform through a subscription, which typically ranges from one to three years.  In FY2020, FY2019, and FY2018, more than 93% of DocuSign’s revenue in each fiscal year came from subscriptions to its cloud-based software platform; the rest of the revenue came from services such as helping the company’s customers deploy its software efficiently. 

It’s worth noting too that there is no customer-concentration with DocuSign. There was no customer that accounted for more than 10% of the company’s revenue in FY2020.

5. A proven ability to grow

There isn’t much historical financial data to study for DocuSign, since the company was only listed in April 2018. But I do like what I see:

A few notable points from DocuSign’s financials:

• DocuSign has compounded its revenue at an impressive annual rate of 40.4% from FY2016 to FY2020. The rate of growth has not slowed much, coming in at a still-impressive 38.9% in FY2020.
• DocuSign is still making losses, but the good thing is that it started to generate positive operating cash flow and free cash flow in FY2018.
• Annual growth in operating cash flow from FY2018 to FY2020 was strong, at 45.1%. Free cash flow has increased at a much slower pace, but the company is investing for growth. 
• The company’s balance sheet remained robust throughout the timeframe under study, with significantly more cash and investments than debt.
• At first glance, DocuSign’s diluted share count appeared to increase sharply by 30.7% from FY2019 to FY2020. (I only started counting from FY2019 since DocuSign was listed in April 2018, which is in the first quarter of FY2019.) But the number I’m using is the weighted average diluted share count. Right after DocuSign got listed, it had a share count of around 152 million. Moreover, DocuSign’s weighted average diluted share count showed acceptable year-on-year growth rates (acceptable in the context of the company’s rapid revenue growth) in the first, second, and third quarters of FY2020.

6. A high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future

DocuSign has already started to generate free cash flow. Right now, the company has a poor trailing free cash flow margin (free cash flow as a percentage of revenue) of just 4.5%.

But over the long run, I think it’s likely that there is plenty of room for DocuSign’s free cash flow margin to expand. I showed in my recently published investment thesis for Alteryx (NYSE: AYX) that there are other larger SaaS companies such as Adobe, salesforce.com, and Veeva Systems that have much fatter free cash flow margins. Here’s the table I showed in my article on Alteryx:

Valuation

Right now, DocuSign has a market capitalisation of US$14.34 billion against trailing revenue of US$974.0 million. These numbers give rise to a price-to-sales (P/S) ratio of 14.7, which makes the company look pretty darn expensive. For perspective, if I assume that DocuSign has a 30% free cash flow margin today, then the company would have a price-to-free cash flow ratio of 49 based on the current P/S ratio (14.7 divided by 30%). 

But DocuSign also has a few strong positives going for it. The company has: (1) revenue that is low compared to a fast-growing addressable market; (2) a business that solves important pain points for customers; (3) a large and rapidly expanding customer base; and (4) sticky customers who have been willing to significantly increase their spending with the company over time. I believe that with these traits, there’s a high chance that DocuSign will continue posting excellent revenue growth – and in turn, excellent free cash flow growth – in the years ahead. 

The current high valuation for DocuSign does mean that its share price is likely going to be more volatile than the stock market as a whole. I’m also keeping in mind that stocks have been very volatile of late because of COVID-19 fears. But the potential volatility is something I’m very comfortable with.

The risks involved

DocuSign has a short history in the stock market, given that its IPO was just two years ago in April 2018. I typically stay away from young IPOs. But I’m making an exception for DocuSign because I think its business holds promise for fast-growth for a long period of time. But the company’s young age as a publicly-listed company is still a risk I’m watching.

Adobe is a much larger SaaS company with trailing revenue of US$11.7 billion. Through its Adobe Sign product, Adobe is the primary competitor of DocuSign. So far, DocuSign has defended its turf admirably. This is shown in DocuSign’s strong revenue and customer growth rates. But Adobe’s larger financial might compared to DocuSign means competition is a risk. 

Another important risk for DocuSign relates to data breaches. DocuSign handles sensitive information about its customers due to the nature of its business. If there are any serious data breaches in DocuSign’s software services, the company could lose the confidence of customers and the public, leading to growth difficulties. The signing of documents may be highly time-sensitive events. So if there is any significant downtime in DocuSign’s services, it could also lead to an erosion of trust among existing as well as prospective customers. So far, DocuSign has done a great job by providing 99.99% availability in FY2020. 

Valuation is another risk to consider. DocuSign’s high P/S ratio means that the market expects rapid growth from the company. So if the business performance disappoints subsequently, market sentiment could turn quickly on DocuSign, leading to a cratering stock price.

Earlier, I discussed the advantages that the launch of DocuSign Agreement Cloud brought to the company. But there are downsides too. For instance, multi-product sales involves higher complexity and a longer sales cycle; these factors negatively affected DocuSign’s billings growth and net dollar-based retention rate in the first quarter of FY2020. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has caused business activity around the world to slow tremendously, with many countries being in various states of lockdown. A lengthy sales cycle could hamper DocuSign’s business in the current environment. For now, DocuSign’s business does not seem to have been impacted by COVID-19. Here’s CEO Dan Springer’s comment on the matter in DocuSign’s FY2020 fourth-quarter earnings call:

“[T]he vast majority of our implementations are done remote. And of course, if you think about the perfect example of that it’s our web and mobile customers, where they never actually have to speak. Not only do they don’t have to have us in person they don’t need to speak to us to onboard. … We do find with some of our larger enterprise customers that they get more value when some of the installation is done on their premises. But we have not had the opportunity in the past to consider doing that completely remotely. And it may be in the new way of business over the next X period of time here then we’ll do more of it.”

And when DocuSign’s management was asked in the same earnings call if its growth would be affected by a recession, Springer answered:

“Yes, I don’t. Because, I think, for most of our customers, at least half of the focus is around efficiency. And people see the incredibly high ROI. And I can’t speak for all-digital transformation programs, of course, but as I think about the ones that are DocuSign-centric people are laser-focused on the ROI they get from getting rid of those manual processes, the wasted labor, getting rid of things like the transportation cost, the shipping, et cetera.

That’s a big focus. So I don’t think in a recession you would see people pull back on that. I would say that any time if you had a significant recession, you expect people to kind of shoot first ask questions later and that could lead to some delays. But, in general, we think the business case just gets stronger when people need to find those efficiencies.”

Lastly, the following are all yellow-to-red flags for me regarding DocuSign: (1) The company’s DBNRR comes in at less than 100% for an extended period of time; (2) it fails to increase its number of customers; and (3) it’s unable to convert revenue into free cash flow at a healthy clip in the future.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

Summing up DocuSign, it has:

1. Valuable cloud-based software services in the agreements space that solves customers’ pain-points;
2. high levels of recurring revenue;
3. outstanding revenue growth rates;
4. positive operating cash flow and free cash flow, with the potential for much higher free cash flow margins in the future;
5. a large, growing, and mostly untapped addressable market;
6. an impressive track record of winning customers and increasing their spending; and
7. capable leaders who are in the same boat as the company’s other shareholders

The company does have a premium valuation, so I’m taking on valuation risk. There are also other risks to note, such as strong competition and a longer sales cycle that may not be conducive for a business environment that’s struggling with COVID-19. But after weighing the pros and cons, I have to agree with the idea of having DocuSign continue to stay in my family’s investment portfolio.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

By now, you might have heard that Singapore Airlines Ltd (SGX: C6L) is being saved by Temasek who promised to inject capital into the debt-ridden company. But our flag carrier is not the only company that may need saving. 

Many local businesses in Singapore face an existential crisis in these challenging times. Companies that (1) have high fixed expenses, (2) have insufficient cash on the balance sheet, and (3) face major disruption to their business, are most at risk.

Here are some Singapore-listed companies that could be fighting for their survival in the coming weeks and months.

Neo Group (SGX: 5UJ)

Singapore’s leading food catering company is high on the list. As of 31 December 2019, Neo Group had S$20.4 million in cash and equivalents but S$34.9 million in short term bank borrowings that need to be repaid within a year. On top of that, it also had $45.7 million in long term debt. 

Neo Group’s food catering business has also likely been heavily disrupted due to the recent restrictions on gatherings of more than 10 people. The extent of the problem is made worse as Neo Group’s catering segment was its most profitable business in the financial year ended 31 March 2019.

The company also has a substantial amount of fixed costs. In the last quarter, Neo Group incurred S$14 million in employee expenses and S$1.1 million in finance costs. These are overheads that are unlikely to go away, even as orders dry up. Given Neo Group’s weak balance sheet, it could face difficulty obtaining a loan to bridge it through this challenging period.

Sembcorp Marine (SGX: S51)

Another one of Temasek’s investments, Sembcorp Marine could face a similar fate to Singapore Airlines. Sembcorp Marine is highly dependent on the health of the oil industry and faces major disruptions to its business amid tumbling oil prices (oil prices are near 20-year lows now).

Like Neo Group, Sembcorp Marine has more short-term debt than cash on its balance sheet. That’s extremely worrying given that credit may dry up during this trying times. As of 31 December 2019, Sembcorp Marine had S$389 million in cash and a staggering S$1.42 billion in short-term borrowings. In addition, the company had S$2.98 billion in long-term debt.

And let’s not forget that Sembcorp Marine also has heavy expenses. In the quarter ended 31 December 2019, Sembcorp Marine racked up S$29 million in finance costs alone and also had a negative gross margin. The company also spends heavily on capital expenditures just to maintain its current operations. Sembcorp Marine was free cash flow negative in 2019 after spending S$316 million in capital expenditures.

Sakae Holdings (SGX: 5DO)

Restaurant operator Sakae Holdings has been on the decline in recent years. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic began, revenue and earnings for the company have plunged. In the six months ended 31 December 2019, Sakae’s revenue fell 13.9% and it reported a S$1.56 million loss.

Worryingly, Sakae looks likely to run into cash flow problems in the very near future. As of 31 December 2019, Sakae had S$4.3 million in cash but near-term bank loans amounting to S$45.7 million.

I don’t see how Sakae can pay back its debtors and I doubt it can negotiate to refinance such a large sum over the next 12 months.

The COVID-19 crisis could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back for Sakae Holdings.

My conclusion

Obviously this is not an exhaustive list of companies in Singapore’s stock market that could face a liquidity crisis in these trying times. The pause in the global economy (Singapore’s included) will definitely impact many more companies than those I listed. 

Companies that are not prepared and do not have the resources to ride out this period could be in big trouble. Companies that go broke will see a steep fall in their share prices and shareholders will get very little or nothing back if a company is forced into liquidation.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

A few days ago, I received a text from a friend asking the question that is the title of this article. He knew that Booking Holdings (NASDAQ: BKNG), an online travel agent, is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s investment portfolio.

Stalled growth

On 18 February 2020, I published my investment thesis on Booking. In it, I wrote that “The world – particularly China – is currently battling COVID-19. If the situation worsens, Booking’s business could be hurt.” Little did I know how badly Booking would suffer. International travel activities have essentially grounded to a halt since the publication of my thesis for Booking, with many countries closing their borders to control the spread of COVID-19.

In particular, the businesses of hotels and airlines across the globe have been crushed. A few days ago, Arne Sorenson, CEO of hotel operator Marriott International, said that the company’s seeing revenue declines of more than 75% in the US. At home, Singapore Airlines cut 96% of its flight capacity last week. Booking, as an online travel agent focusing on accommodations, is also facing a brutal operating environment.

Confidence 

What gives me the confidence that Booking can survive? The company is the largest online travel agent in the world. The entire travel industry is awash in pain at the moment. But this also gives Booking the opportunity to win even more market share if some of its smaller/weaker competitors falter.

I believe that the COVID-19 crisis will blow over eventually (hopefully sooner rather than later, so that the incredible human suffering that’s currently happening can end as soon as possible). This will allow the travel industry to return to strength. When this happens, Booking will be in an even stronger position compared to before.

But Booking has to survive from now till then. I think the chances are very good that the company will. At the end of 2019, Booking held US$8.5 billion in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments (this sum excludes US$3.3 billion in strategic investments) against total debt of US$8.6 billion.

I would prefer Booking to have significantly more cash than debt. But Booking’s debt is mostly long-term in nature (88.5% comes due on or after 31 December 2020). Moreover, the company’s debt has well-staggered maturities as shown in the table below. The earliest due-date for Booking’s long-term debt is September 2021 and it involves a manageable sum of US$1 billion. So there’s plenty of time for Booking to maneuver, and to wait for the travel industry’s health to improve.

No guarantee

But there’s no guarantee that Booking will survive. It could eventually crumble should the travel market undergo a long winter if COVID-19 proves to be a particularly tricky disease to combat. This is where diversification is important. 

I mentioned earlier that Booking is one of the 50-plus companies in my family’s investment portfolio. Even if Booking fails to survive, my family’s portfolio will. Diversification is how I guard the portfolio against specific-company risks. With diversification, my family and I are able to stay invested in Booking and participate in its potential recovery without having to worry about a significant hit to the portfolio. 

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Singapore Airlines (SGX: C6L) recently announced a massive round of fundraising. In all, Singapore’s national carrier is looking to raise S$15 billion. The first slice of the fundraising involves a S$5.3 billion rights shares issue, and a S$3.5 billion tranche of mandatory convertible bonds (MCBs).

Temasek Holdings is one of the Singapore government’s investment arms and the current major shareholder of Singapore Airlines (SIA) with a 55% stake. It has committed to mop up all the rights shares issue and MCBs that other SIA shareholders do not want.

My blogging partner Jeremy Chia published a wonderful article yesterday. He shared his thoughts on why he’s not interested in investing in SIA despite Temasek’s promise to provide up to S$15 billion in capital. I’m not here to share my thoughts on investing in SIA. Instead, I’m here to provide you with a factual breakdown of the numbers behind SIA’s rights shares issue and MCBs.

I recognise that SIA’s latest fundraising activity is complex, and there’s a lot of confusion about it. I want to help clear the air, to the best of my abilities. The Good Investors exists to demystify investing for you – so here I am!

Details of the rights shares issue of Singapore Airlines

Here are the important numbers concerning SIA’s rights shares issue:

• Total sum: S$5.3 billion.
• Number of rights shares to be issued: Up to 1.778 billion rights shares to be issued, on the basis of 3 rights shares for every 2 shares of SIA that currently exist. There are 1.185 billion SIA shares that exist right now.
• Price per rights share: S$3.00.
• Renounceable? Yes, this rights shares issue is renounceable, so you will get to trade the rights.
• Changes in SIA’s book value per share (BVPS) and earnings per share (EPS) because of the rights issue: As of 31 December 2019, SIA’s BVPS and trailing-12-months EPS were S$10.25 and S$0.67, respectively. After the rights shares issue, the BVPS will fall to around S$5.89 while the EPS will decline to S$0.27, assuming everything else stays constant.
• What you have to effectively pay for SIA’s shares: At the time of writing (11:20 am, 30 March 2020), SIA’s share price is S$5.82. If you subscribe for your full allotment of rights shares, you’re effectively paying a price of S$4.13 per share for SIA’s shares. The math works this way: Effective price per share = [S$5.82 + (S$3.00 x 1.5)] / 2.5.
• The effective valuations you’re getting: At an effective share price of S$4.13, SIA will have a price-to-book ratio of 0.7 and a price-to-earnings ratio of 15.

Details of the MCBs of Singapore Airlines

For the MCBs, do note that the total sum SIA is looking for is S$9.7 billion. But the current tranche involves just S$3.5 billion. The key financial numbers for the current tranche of MCBs are as follows:

• Total sum: S$3.5 billion.
• Number of rights MCBs to be issued: Up to S$3.5 billion, in the denomination of S$1.00 per rights MCB, on the basis of 295 rights MCBs for every 100 shares of SIA that currently exist. As mentioned earlier, there are 1.185 billion SIA shares that exist right now.
• Issue price per rights MCB: S$1.00, meaning you’ll pay S$1.00 to purchase each rights MCB.
• Renounceable? Yes, this rights MCB issue is renounceable, so you will get to trade the rights.
• Maturity date of MCB: 10 years from the date of issue of the rights MCBs.
• Conversion terms of MCB: SIA is obliged to convert the rights MCBs into SIA shares when the MCBs mature. The conversion price is S$4.84 per SIA share. When the MCBs are converted at the maturity date (10 years from the date of issue), every S$1,000 worth of the MCBs will “grow” to S$1,806.11. This S$1,806.11 will then be converted into SIA shares at a price of S$4.84 each, giving us 373 SIA shares. The math works this way: Number of shares obtained upon conversion = S$1,806.11 / S$4.84
• Redemption terms of the MCB: SIA has the right – but not the obligation – to redeem the MCBs every six months from the date of issue at a certain price, giving you a certain yield. If the MCBs have yet to be redeemed when we hit the 10-year mark from the date of issue, SIA is obliged to convert the MCBs into SIA shares, as mentioned earlier. The redemption prices and yields are given in the table below. Note that you cannot ask for the redemption – it is entirely up to SIA to decide.

• What you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares under the MCB, assuming it is converted: As mentioned earlier, if the MCBs are converted, every S$1,000 in MCBs will be converted into 373 shares. This gives rise to an effective price of S$2.68 per SIA share under the MCB. The math works this way: Effective price paid = S$1,000 / 373 shares. 
• What you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares, in all, under the MCB, assuming it is converted: But to get hold of the MCBs, you’ll have to own SIA shares. Every 100 shares has a full allotment of 295 rights MCBs. At the time of writing, SIA’s share price is S$5.82. This works out to an overall effective price of S$3.47 per share. Here’s the math: Overall effective price paid = ([100 x S$5.82) + (295 x S$2.68)] / (100 +295). 
• Circumstances where you’ll make money on the MCBs alone (ignoring what happens to your SIA stake): There are a few scenarios where you’ll make a profit: (1) SIA redeems the MCBs before they are converted; (2) SIA allows the MCBs to convert into shares 10 years later and SIA’s share price is significantly higher than S$2.68 at that point in time. To be clear, the price of S$2.68 is the price you’re effectively paying for SIA’s shares in the event of the MCBs’ conversion. If SIA’s share price is around S$2.68 at the point of conversion, it’s very likely you’ll be losing money on the MCBs;  if SIA’s share price is lower than S$2.68 at the point of conversion, you’ll be losing money on the MCBs.
• When is it beneficial for SIA to redeem the MCBs? Redemption of the MCBs will require SIA to fork out cash, which negatively impacts SIA’s financial health. On the other hand, the conversion of the MCBs does not require SIA to dole out any cash. So from this perspective, it’s beneficial for SIA to not redeem the MCBs at all. This is important to note for the MCB holders for cash-flow-planning purposes, since SIA could very well choose not to redeem the MCBs.

Other important points to note

Shareholders of Singapore Airlines can choose to participate in the company’s fundraising activity in one of the following ways:

1. Subscribe for both the rights issue and rights MCBs
2. Subscribe for just the rights issue but not the rights MCBs
3. Subscribe for the rights MCBs but not the rights issue
4. Do not subscribe for both the rights issue and rights MCBs

If you’re a Singapore Airlines shareholder and you choose the fourth option, you can still recover some capital by selling the rights issues and rights MCBs (both are renounceable, so the rights can be actively traded). But you will face massive dilution, since the airline’s share count will increase significantly.

I hope laying out all these numbers will help you – if you’re a Singapore Airlines shareholder or are interested in its shares and/or MCBs – to make a better-informed decision.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Much ink has been spilt on the whole Singapore Airlines Ltd (SGX: C6L) fiasco. 

The latest news now is that Temasek, one of the Singapore government’s investment arms, has stepped in to provide our country’s flag carrier with much-needed capital. 

This comes as Singapore Airlines (SIA) is confronting liquidity problems due to its high debt load and fixed costs, and the disruption to its business because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The rescue

In essence, Temasek, which currently owns around 55% of SIA, has underwritten a S$5.3 billion equity fundraising by the airline. Temasek has also underwritten a $9.7 billion issuance of mandatory convertible bonds (MCBs) by SIA; the MCBs will either be converted to shares in 10 years or redeemed before then. What this means is that Temasek will not only subscribe to all the rights and relevant bonds that it’s entitled to; it will also purchase any of the rights or bonds that other SIA shareholders do not want.

But despite Temasek coming in to save the day, I’m not interested in investing in SIA, even at these seemingly low prices.

How did it get into this situation in the first place?

Much like other airline companies, SIA is heavily leveraged due to the capital-intensive nature of its business. The high cost of replacing and upgrading SIA’s fleet has also led to negative free cash flow in four of the last five years.

To keep itself afloat, our flag carrier has been increasingly making use of the debt markets for its cash flow requirements. In fact, the company issued bonds to the public just last year to raise more capital. At the end of 2019, the airline had S$1.6 billion in cash, but S$7.7 billion in total debt.

The aviation industry is highly competitive too and the emergence of low-cost carriers have led to thinner margins for airlines.

The COVID-19 pandemic was the straw that broke the camel’s back as the significant loss of revenue (SIA recently cut 96% of its flight capacity) finally led to severe cash flow problems for the company and Temasek ultimately had to step in to save the day.

Temasek saving the day but shareholders will be diluted

Let’s be clear, this is not a government bailout. It is nothing like what the American airlines got from the US government, which included a massive grant. 

SIA’s situation is simply a major shareholder promising to back the company when it sells new shares to raise capital.

The new shares will dilute existing shareholders if they don’t take up the rights issue. On top of that, the mandatory convertible bonds will also dilute shareholders in 10 years when they are converted, unless they are redeemed before then.

SIA shares seem cheap but it really is not

Under the rights issue portion of SIA’s latest fundraising exercise, existing shareholders of the airline will be given the opportunity to buy three new shares at S$3 per share for every two shares they own.

Based on SIA’s current share price of S$6.03, I will get shares for an average price of S$4.21 each if I buy in today and subscribe to the rights issue. That seems cheap – but it really is not.

As of 31 December 2019, SIA had a net asset value per share of S$10.25. But that will drop substantially after the rights issue.

The rights issue will increase shareholders’ equity from S$12.1 billion to S$17.4 billion, or an increase of 43% from 31 December 2019. At the same time, the number of shares will increase from 1.2 billion to 3 billion. After the dilution, the net asset value per share will fall to around S$5.80 per share based on SIA’s last reported financials.

I also expect SIA’s net asset value per share to fall even more than that because of the heavy losses suffered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the quarter ended 31 December 2019, Singapore Airlines incurred about S$800 million in staff costs, S$210 million in aircraft maintenance expenses, and S$522 million in depreciation. Most of these fixed costs will likely still need to be accounted for during the period of near-zero flights, despite SIA grounding its planes. These costs add up to around S$0.50 per share per quarter.

Together with the upcoming dilution and the heavy losses, Singapore Airlines’ shares could have a net asset value of close to or even less than S$5.30 per share in the future, depending on how long the pandemic lasts.

Earnings per share dilution

Earnings per share will also fall after the issuance of new shares because of the rights issue. SIA reported trailing 12 months profit of S$765 million.

Even if our flag carrier can achieve similar profit after the whole pandemic passes, its earnings per share will drop substantially because of the larger number of outstanding shares.

By my calculation, normalised earnings per share will decline from S$0.63 to just S$0.25 after the rights issue.

I’m not buying shares just yet…

The injection of cash will put SIA in a much better financial position but I’m still not convinced. 

Even if I buy shares today and subscribe to all my allotted shares in the rights issue, I don’t think I’ll be getting that great of a deal. I’ll be paying an average price of around S$4.21 per share, which translates to only a small discount to my calculated adjusted net asset value per share. It is also slightly more than 16 times SIA’s normalised earnings post-rights issue, which is not that cheap.

Moreover, if SIA is unable to redeem the mandatory convertible bonds before they get converted in 10 years time, they will potentially lead to further dilution to shareholders.

Let’s not forget too that our flag carrier (1) has a history of inconsistent free cash flow, (2) operates in an industry that is a slave to fuel prices, and (3) has strong competition from low-cost carriers. 

Given all these, despite the seemingly low share price, I still don’t think Singapore Airlines shares are cheap enough for my liking.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

While stocks markets around the world plunged over the last month, Zoom Video Communications‘s (NASDAQ: ZM) share price has defied gravity, zooming up by close to 30%.

Investors are anticipating great things for the company this year as the COVID-19 epidemic accelerates the adoption of video conferencing tools around the globe.

With the hype surrounding Zoom, I thought it would be an opportune time to share some of my thoughts on the fast-growing company and whether it is still worth investing at today’s price.

Fast growth

Zoom is one of the fastest-growing listed software-as-a-service firms in the world today. That says a lot.

In fiscal 2020 (ended 31 January), Zoom recorded revenue of US$622.7 million, up a staggering 88% from a year ago.

New customers and a net dollar expansion rate of more than 130% contributed to the sharp rise in sales. Over the course of 2019, Zoom had 641 customers contributing more than US$100,000 in trailing-12-months revenue, an increase of 86% from a year ago. 

Consistently strong performance

Last year’s growth was by no account a one-off. Zoom has been growing rapidly for the three years prior to its IPO in 2019. Annual revenue increased by 149% and 118% in fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2019, respectively.

The company’s net dollar expansion rate has also been north of 130% for seven consecutive quarters, a testament to the strength of the business platform.

COVID-19, a catalyst for greater use of Zoom’s tools

On top of the long-term tailwinds for video conferencing, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the adoption of Zoom’s video conferencing tools. Many people – from university students to work-at-home employees – have begun using Zoom’s software as they take shelter at home.

My sister who has returned home from Australia during this COVID-19 outbreak is using Zoom’s software for “long-distance” tutorials. Fortune magazine reported that teachers are even conducting piano lessons through Zoom.

Huge addressable market

Video is increasingly becoming the way that individuals communicate with each other at work and in their daily lives. And Zoom is the market leader in the space.

Zoom addresses the Hosted/Cloud Voice and Unified Communications, Collaboration Application, and IP Telephony Lines segments within the communication and collaboration market. Market researcher International Data Corporation estimates that these segments would be worth US$43.1 billion by 2022.

Remember that Zoom’s trailing-12-months revenue is just US$622.7 million. That’s a mere 1.4% of the addressable market, so there’s plenty of room for Zoom to grow into.

A cash-generating business

Unlike some of the other fast-growing SaaS (software-as-a-service) companies, Zoom is already cash-flow positive. In fiscal 2020, Zoom generated US$151.9 million and US$113.8 million in operating cash flow and free cash flow, respectively. That translates to a healthy free cash flow margin of 18.3%, with room for further margin expansion as usage of Zoom’s services grows.

In addition, even after accounting for stock-based compensation, Zoom is still profitable, with GAAP (generally-accepted accounting principles) net income of US$21.7 million in fiscal 2020, or US$0.09 per share.

Zoom’s high gross margin of more than 80% enables it to spend a large chunk of its revenue to acquire customers and grow the business while still sustaining a decent free cash flow margin and squeeze out some GAAP profit.

A robust balance sheet

A time when many businesses are being momentarily put on hold due to the COVID-19 spread highlights the importance of a company with a strong balance sheet. Companies that have enough cash to pay off their fixed costs during pauses in sales are more resilient to economic hardships.

Although Zoom is thriving in the current COVID-19 situation, there could be other incidents that may cause temporary disruptions to its business. It is hence heartening to note that Zoom has a robust balance sheet.

As of 31 January 2020, the video conferencing software company had US$283 million in cash and no debt. In fact, Zoom has been so adept at generating cash flow that it said that much of the primary capital it had raised prior to its IPO was still on its balance sheet.

Competition threat

Competition is perhaps the biggest threat to Zoom. The video conferencing company faces competition from mega tech firms such as Google, which has the free Google Hangout video conferencing service. Facebook and Amazon have also spent heavily on video communication tools.

However, Zoom’s video-first focus has propelled it to become the market leader in the video conferencing space. Unlike other companies that added video tools to their legacy communication software, Zoom built a video-conferencing tool with video at the front and centre of its architecture. This focus gives Zoom users a better video conferencing experience.

For now, Zoom remains the forefront in this space with most users preferring its software over competitors but it must consistently add features and update its software to keep users on its platform.

But is it too expensive?

There is no doubt that Zoom has all the makings of a great company. The software-as-a-service firm is growing rapidly and already boasts free cash flow margins in the mid-teens range.

I foresee Zoom’s free cash flow growing much faster than revenue in the future as margins expand due to economies of scale. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating the adoption of video conferencing software, which is great news for Zoom, being the market leader in this space.

Having said all that, Zoom’s stock has skyrocketed well above what I believe is reasonable. Zoom, which is still run by founder Eric Yuan, has a market cap of around US$38 billion currently.

That’s an astonishing 62 times fiscal 2020 revenue. Even if Zoom’s profit margin was 40% today (a level I think it can achieve in the future), its current market cap would still translate to 176 times earnings.

My conclusion

Based on its share price, the market is anticipating big things for Zoom in the coming quarters as more companies are forced to adopt video conferencing software. On top of that, Zoom, even before the COVID-19 outbreak, was already successfully riding on the coattails of a rapidly growing industry.

As an investor, I would love to participate in Zoom’s growth. However, I think Zoom’s stock is priced for perfection at the moment. Even if Zoom can deliver on all fronts over a multi-year time frame, investors who buy in at this price may still only achieve mediocre returns due to its high valuation.

As such, even though I wish I could be a shareholder of Zoom, I’ll happily wait at the sidelines until a more reasonable entry point arises.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Alteryx (NYSE: AYX) is one of the 50-plus companies that’s in my family’s portfolio. I first bought Alteryx shares for the portfolio in September 2019 at a price of US$118 and I’ve not sold any of the shares I’ve bought.

The purchase has not worked out well for my family’s portfolio thus far, with Alteryx’s share price being around US$98 now. But we’ve not even owned the company’s shares for a year, and it is always important to think about how the company’s business will evolve going forward. What follows is my thesis for why I still continue to hold Alteryx shares.

Company description

Alteryx provides a self-service subscription-based software platform that allows organisations to easily scrub and blend data from multiple sources and perform sophisticated analysis to obtain actionable insights.

The company’s platform can interact with nearly all data sources. These include traditional databases offered by the likes of IBM, Oracle, and SAP, as well as newer offerings such as those from MongoDB, Amazon Web Services, Google Analytics, and even social media.

Once data from different sources are fed into Alteryx’s platform, it cleans and blends the data. Users can easily build configurable and sophisticated analytical workflows on the platform through drag-and-drop tools. The workflows can be easily automated and shared within the users’ organisation, and the results can be displayed through Alteryx’s integrations with data-visualisation software from companies such as Tableau Software and Qlik. Here’s a chart showing the various use cases for Alteryx’s data analytics platform:

At the end of 2019, Alteryx had around 6,100 customers, of all sizes, in more than 90 countries. These customers come from a wide variety of industries and include more than 700 of the Global 2000 companies. The Global 2000 is compiled by Forbes and it’s a list of the top 2,000 public-listed companies in the world ranked according to a combination of their revenue, profits, assets, and market value. With thousands of customers, it’s no surprise that Alteryx does not have any customer concentration – no single customer accounted for more than 10% of the company’s revenue in the three years through 2019. The graphic below illustrates the diversity of Alteryx’s customer base:

Despite having customers in over 90 countries, Alteryx is currently still a US-centric company. In 2019, 71% of its revenue came from the US. The UK is the only other country that accounted for more than 10% of Alteryx’s revenue in 2019 (10.7%).

Investment thesis

I had previously laid out my six-criteria investment framework in The Good Investors. I will use the same framework to describe my investment thesis for Alteryx.

1. Revenues that are small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or revenues that are large in a fast-growing market

Alteryx earned US$417.9 million in revenue in 2019. This is significantly lower than the US$73 billion addressable market that the company is currently seeing. It comprises two parts:

1. US$49 billion in the global big data and analytics software market (according to a July 2017 IDC report) which includes the US$28 billion global analytics and business intelligence market (according to a January 2019 Gartner report) 
2. A US$24 billion slice, based on Alteryx’s estimate of the spend associated with 47 million spreadsheet users worldwide who worked on advanced data preparation and analytics in 2018 (according to an April 2019 IDC report)

I believe that better days are ahead for Alteryx for a few reasons:

• I mentioned earlier that the company’s data analytics platform can interact with nearly all data sources. This interactivity is important. A 2015 Harvard Business Review study sponsored by Alteryx found that 64% of organizations use five or more sources of data for analytics.
• Market researcher IDC predicted in late 2018 that the quantity of data in the world (generated, captured, and replicated) would compound at an astounding rate of 61% per year, from 33 zettabytes then to 175 zettabytes in 2025. That’s staggering. 1 zettabyte equals to 10¹² gigabytes.
• A 2013 survey on more than 400 companies by business consultancy group Bain found that only 4% of them had the appropriate human and technological assets to derive meaningful insights from their data. In fact, Alteryx’s primary competitors are manual processes performed on spreadsheets, or custom-built approaches. These traditional methods for data analysis involve multiple steps, require the support of technical teams, and are slow (see chart below).
• Crucially, Alteryx’s self-service data analytics platform is scalable, efficient, and can be mastered and used by analysts with no coding skill or experience. I think this leads to a few good things for Alteryx. First, it democratises access to sophisticated data analytics for companies, and hence opens up Alteryx’s market opportunity. Second, it places Alteryx’s platform in a sweet spot of riding on a growing trend (the explosion in data generated) as well as addressing a pain-point for many organisations (the lack of resources to analyse data, and the laborious way that data analysis is traditionally done).

(Traditional way to perform data analysis)

2. A strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt

As of 31 December 2019, Alteryx held US$974.9 million in cash, short-term investments, and long-term investments. This is comfortably higher than the company’s total debt of US$698.5 million (all of which are convertible notes).

3. A management team with integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset

On integrity

Alteryx was listed in March 2017, so there’s only a short history to study when it comes to management. But I do like what I see.

The company was founded in 1997. One of its co-founders, Dean Stoecker, 63, has held the roles of CEO and chairman since its establishment. Another of Alteryx’s co-founders is 57-year-old Olivia Duane Adams, the company’s current chief customer officer. The third co-founder, Ned Harding, 52, was a key technology leader in the company and left in July 2018; he remains an advisor to Alteryx’s software engineering teams. The company’s chief technology officer role is currently filled by Derek Knudsen, 46. He stepped into the position in August 2018  after Harding’s departure. Knudsen had accumulated over 20 years of experience working with technology in companies in senior leadership positions before joining Alteryx.

Stoecker and Duane Adams collectively controlled nearly 10 million Alteryx shares as of 31 March 2019. These shares are worth around US$980 million at the company’s current share price of US$98. That’s a large stake and it likely aligns the interests of Stoecker and Duane Adams’ with Alteryx’s other shareholders.

Alteryx has two share classes: (1) The publicly-traded Class A shares with 1 voting right per share; and (2) the non-traded Class B shares with 10 voting rights each. Stoecker and Duane Adams’ Alteryx shares were mostly of the Class B variety. So, they controlled 47.9% of the voting power in the company despite holding only 16% of the total shares. Collectively, Alteryx’s key leaders controlled 54.1% of the company’s voting rights as of 31 March 2019.

Having clear control over Alteryx means that management can easily implement compensation plans that fatten themselves at the expense of shareholders. The good thing is that the compensation structure for Alteryx’s management looks sensible to me.

In 2018, 70% to 79.7% of the compensation of Alteryx’s management team came from long-term incentives. These incentives include restricted stock units (RSUs) and stock options that vest over multi-year periods. There is room for some misalignment to creep in though – as far as I can tell, there is no clear description given by Alteryx on the performance metrics that management must meet in order to earn their compensation. But I don’t see this as a dealbreaker. Because of the multi-year vesting period for the RSUs and stock options, Alteryx’s management will do well over time only if the share price does well – and the share price will do well only if the business does well. From this perspective, the interests of management and shareholders are still well-aligned.

On capability and innovation

Alteryx’s business has changed dramatically over time since its founding. In its early days, the company was selling software for analysing demographics. Alteryx’s current core data analytics software platform was launched only in 2010, and a subscription model was introduced relatively recently in 2013. I see Alteryx’s long and winding journey to success as a sign of the founders’ ability to adapt and innovate.

I also credit Alteryx’s management with the success that the company has found in the land-and-expand strategy. The strategy starts with the company landing a customer with an initial use case, and then expanding its relationship with the customer through other use cases. The success can be illustrated through Alteryx’s impressive dollar-based net expansion rates (DBNERs). The metric is a very important gauge for the health of a SaaS (software-as-a-service) company’s business. It measures the change in revenue from all the company’s customers a year ago compared to today; it includes positive effects from upsells as well as negative effects from customers who leave or downgrade. Anything more than 100% indicates that the company’s customers, as a group, are spending more.

Alteryx’s DBNER has been more than 120% in each of the last 20 quarters – that’s five years! The chart below illustrates Alteryx’s DBNER going back to 2017’s first quarter.

Alteryx’s management has also led impressive customer-growth at the company. The company’s customer count has more than quadrupled from 1,398 at the end of 2015 to 6,087 at the end of 2019.

But there is a key area where Alteryx’s management falls short: The company’s culture. Alteryx has a 3.5-star rating on Glassdoor, and only 65% of reviewers will recommend Alteryx to friends. Stoecker only has an 85% approval rating as CEO. SAP, a competitor of Alteryx, has 4.5 stars on Glassdoor, and recommendation and CEO-approval ratings of 93% and 97%, respectively. Alteryx has managed to post impressive business-results despite its relatively poor culture, but I’m keeping an eye on things here.

4. Revenue streams that are recurring in nature, either through contracts or customer-behaviour

Alteryx’s business is built nearly entirely on subscriptions, which generate recurring revenue for the company. The company sells access to its data analytics platform through subscriptions, which typically range from one to three years. In 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016, more than 95% of Alteryx’s revenue in each year came from subscriptions to its platform; the rest of the revenue came from training and consulting services, among others. 

5. A proven ability to grow

There isn’t much historical financial data to study for Alteryx, since the company was listed only in March 2017. But I do like what I see.

A few key points to note:

• Alteryx has compounded its revenue at an impressive annual rate of 61.6% from 2014 to 2019. The astounding revenue growth of 92.7% in 2018 was partly the result of Alteryx adopting new accounting rules in the year. Alteryx’s revenue for 2018 would have been US$204.3 million after adjusting for the impact of the accounting rule, representing slower-but-still-impressive top-line growth of 55.2% for the year. 2019 saw the company maintain breakneck growth, with its revenue up by 64.8%.
• Alteryx started making a profit in 2018, and also generated positive operating cash flow and free cash flow in 2017, 2018, and 2019.
• Annual growth in operating cash flow and free cash flow from 2017 to 2019 was strong at 33.8% and 21.4%, respectively.
• The company’s balance sheet remained robust throughout the timeframe under study, with significantly more cash and investments than debt.
• At first glance, Alteryx’s diluted share count appeared to increase sharply by 22.1% from 2017 to 2018. But the number I’m using is the weighted average diluted share count. Right after Alteryx got listed in March 2017, it had a share count of around 57 million. This means that the increase in 2018 was milder (in the mid-teens range) though still higher than I would like it to be. The good news is that the diluted share count inched up by only 6% in 2019, which is acceptable, given the company’s rapid growth. I will be keeping an eye on Alteryx’s dilution.

6. A high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future

Alteryx has already started to generate free cash flow. Right now, the company has a poor trailing free cash flow margin (free cash flow as a percentage of revenue) of just 5.4%.

But over the long run, Alteryx expects to generate a strong free cash flow margin of 30% to 35%. I think this is a realistic and achievable target. There are other larger SaaS companies such as Adobe, salesforce.com, and Veeva Systems (my family’s portfolio owns shares in all three companies too) with a free cash flow margin around that range or higher.

Valuation

You should get some tissue ready… because Alteryx’s shares have a nosebleed valuation. At a share price of US$98, Alteryx carries a trailing price-to-sales (P/S) ratio of 16.1. This P/S ratio is in the middle-range of where it has been since Alteryx’s IPO in March 2017 (see chart below). But the P/S ratio of 16.1 is still considered high. For perspective, if I assume that Alteryx has a 30% free cash flow margin today, then the company would have a price-to-free cash flow ratio of 54 based on the current P/S ratio (16.1 divided by 30%). 

But Alteryx also has a few strong positives going for it. The company has: (1) a huge addressable market in relation to its revenue; (2) a large and rapidly expanding customer base; and (3) very sticky customers who have been willing to significantly increase their spending with the company over time. I believe that with these traits, there’s a high chance that Alteryx will continue posting excellent revenue growth – and in turn, excellent free cash flow growth – in the years ahead.

The current high valuation for Alteryx does mean that its share price is likely going to be more volatile than the stock market as a whole (I’m also keeping in mind that stocks have been very volatile of late because of COVID-19 fears). But the potential volatility is something I’m very comfortable with.

The risks involved

I see a few key risks in Alteryx, with the high valuation being one. Besides introducing volatility (which I don’t see as a risk), Alteryx’s high valuation means that the market has high expectations for the company’s future growth. If Alteryx stumbles along the way, its share price will be punished. With COVID-19 causing widespread slowdowns in business activity across the world, there may be a global recession in the works. Should it happen, Alteryx may find it tough to grow its business.

Competition is another important risk. I mentioned earlier that Alteryx’s primary competitors are spreadsheets, or custom-built approaches. But the company’s data analytics platform is also competing against services from other technology heavyweights with much stronger financial resources, such as International Business Machines, Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP. Providers of data visualisation software, such as Tableau, could also decide to move upstream and budge into Alteryx’s space. To date, Alteryx has dealt with competition admirably – its quarterly DBNERs and growth in customer numbers are impressive. I’m watching these two metrics to observe how the company is faring against competitors.

Two other key risks deal with hacking and downtime in Alteryx’s services. The company’s platform is important for users, since it is used to crunch data to derive actionable insights; it is also likely that Alteryx’s platform is constantly fed with sensitive information of its users. Should there be a data breach on the platform, and/or if the platform stops working for extended periods of time, Alteryx could lose the confidence of its customers.

Then there’s also succession risk with Alteryx. Dean Stoecker, the company’s co-founder and CEO, is already 63. Should he step down in the future, I will keep an eye on the leadership transition.

Lastly, the following are all yellow-to-red flags for me regarding Alteryx: (1) The company’s DBNER comes in at less than 100% for an extended period of time; (2) it fails to increase its number of customers; and (3) it’s unable to convert revenue into free cash flow at a healthy clip in the future.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

Summing up Alteryx, it has:

1. A valuable self-service data analytics platform that addresses customers’ pain-points and is superior to legacy methods for data analysis;
2. high levels of recurring revenue;
3. outstanding revenue growth rates;
4. positive profit and free cash flow, with the potential for much higher free cash flow margins in the future;
5. a large and mostly untapped addressable market;
6. an impressive track record of winning customers and increasing their spending; and
7. capable leaders who are in the same boat as the company’s other shareholders

The company does have a premium valuation, so I’m taking on valuation risk. There are also other risks to note, such as tough competition and succession. But after analysing all the data on Alteryx’s pros and cons, I’m happy for my family’s portfolio to continue owning the company’s shares.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Patients can be their own worst enemy. This is especially true for people who suffer from chronic conditions such as diabetes. Suboptimal lifestyle choices and poor medication compliance often lead to avoidable complications. 

A company called Livongo Health (NASDAQ: LVGO) is trying to change all that. The software-as-a-service (SaaS) company provides diabetic patients with an app that can prompt them to take their medications as well as provide feedback and coaching. Livongo also provides patients with an internet-connected blood glucose meter and unlimited test strips.

The end-result is that Livongo users are more compliant with glucose monitoring and have fewer complications. They also save on healthcare expenses over the long run. Besides diabetes, Livongo also has services for hypertension, weight management, pre-diabetes, and behavioural health.

With preventive medicine gaining greater prominence today, I thought it would be worth taking a deeper look into Livongo to see if the healthtech company makes a worthwhile investment.

As usual, I will analyse Livongo using my blogging partner Ser Jing’s, six-point investment framework.

1. Is Livongo’s revenue small in relation to a large and/or growing market, or is its revenue large in a fast-growing market?

Livongo’s member count increased by 96% in 2019 to 223,000. More impressively, its revenue for 2019 jumped 149% to US$170 million from 2018.

Despite the spike in member and revenue, Livongo still has a huge market to grow into. There are 31.4 million people in the US living with diabetes and 39.6 million people with hypertension.

Based on Livongo’s fees of US$900 per patient per year for diabetics and US$468 for patients with hypertension, its total opportunity adds up to US$46.7 billion.

As preventive health gains greater prominence, Livongo can win a greater chunk of its total addressable market. Currently, Livongo’s penetration rate is only 0.3%. Meanwhile, Livongo has ambitions to increase its software’s use case to patients with other chronic diseases and to expand internationally. 

These two initiatives could further increase its already-large addressable market substantially.

2. Does Livongo have a strong balance sheet with minimal or a reasonable amount of debt?

Livongo is still burning cash. In 2019, it used US$59 million in cash flow from operations, an acceleration from the US$33 million spent in 2018. That’s a hefty amount and certainly something to keep a close eye on.

On the bright side, Livongo has more than enough cash on its balance sheet to continue its growth plans for several years. As of December 2019, the Healthtech firm had no debt and US$390 million in cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments.

It’s also heartening to note that Livongo’s management is mindful of the way the company is spending cash. In the 2019 fourth-quarter earnings conference call, Livongo’s chief financial officer, Lee Shapiro, highlighted that the company is aiming to produce positive adjusted-EBITDA by 2021 and expects the company’s adjusted-EBITDA margin to improve in 2020.

Shapiro said:

“Adjusted EBITDA loss for 2020 will be in the range of negative $22 million to negative $20 million.

This implies adjusted EBITDA margins of negative 8% to negative 7% or an improvement of between 3.5 to 4.5 points over 2019. We plan to continue to invest in the business in 2020 while simultaneously marching toward our goal of sustained adjusted EBITDA profitability in 2021.” 

Adjusted EBITDA is roughly equal to net income after deducting interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation, and stock-based compensation and is closely related to cash flow from operations. If Livongo can hit its 2021 goal to be adjusted EBITDA positive, cash flow should not be an issue going forward.

3. Does Livongo’s management team have integrity, capability, and an innovative mindset?

In my view, management is the single most important aspect of a company. In Livongo’s case, I think management has done a good job in executing its growth plans.

Current CEO, Zane Burke has only been in his post for slightly over a year but has a strong resume. He was the president of Cerner Corporation, an American healthtech company for the seven years prior. It was under Burke’s tenure that Livongo was listed and his first year in charge saw Livongo’s revenue grow at a triple-digit rate.

He is backed by Ex-CEO Glen Tullman who is now the chairman of the board. Glenn Tullman has a long track record of managing healthcare companies and was the key man before stepping down to let Burke take over. Tullman continues to have an influence on how the company is run.

The management team has also done a great job in growing Livongo’s business so far. The acquisition of Retrofit Inc and myStrength in April 2018 seems like a good decision as it opened the door for Livongo to provide prediabetes, weight management, and behavioural health services. With its ready base of clients, Livongo can easily cross-sell these newly acquired products.

However, Livongo is still a relatively new company. It was only listed in July 2019, so it has a very short public track record.

As such, it is worth keeping an eye on how well the management team executes its growth plans and whether it makes good capital allocation decisions going forward. 

4. Are Livongo’s revenue streams recurring in nature?

Recurring income provides visibility in the years ahead, something that I want all my investments to possess.

Livongo ticks this box.

The digital health company has a unique business model that provides very predictable recurring income. Livongo bills its clients based on a per-participant, per-month subscription model. Clients include self-insured employers, health plans, government entities, and labour unions who then offer Livongo’s service to their employees, insurees, or members. 

There are a few things to like about Livongo’s model: 

Product intensity

First, the average revenue per existing client increases as more members eligible to use Livongo’s software per client increases. This is what Livongo describes as product intensity.

At the end of 12 months, the average enrollment rate for Livongo for Diabetes clients who launched enrollment in 2018 was 34%. The average enrollment rate after 12 months for fully-optimized clients who began enrollment in 2018 is over 47%.

Livongo also believes product intensity can increase further as more members warm up to the idea of using cloud-based tools to track and manage their medical conditions.

Product density

Livongo has also been successful in cross-selling its products to existing clients. High product intensity and density contributed to Livongo’s dollar-based net expansion rate of 113.8% in 2018. 

Anything above 100% means that all of Livongo’s customers from a year ago are collectively spending more today.

Very low churn rate

In its IPO prospectus, Livongo said that its retention rate for clients who had been with them since 31 December 2017, was 95.9%. That’s high, even for a SaaS company.

Another important thing to note is that the member churn rate in 2018 was also very low at just 2%. Most of the dropouts were also due to the members becoming ineligible for the service, likely because they changed employers.

5. Does Livongo have a proven ability to grow?

Livongo is a newly listed company but it has a solid track record of growth as a private firm. The chart below shows the rate of growth in the number of clients and members.

Livongo grew from just 5 clients and 614 members in 2014 to 679 clients and 164,000 members in the first quarter of 2019. At the end of 2019, Livongo had 223,000 members.

There is also a strong pipeline for 2020 as Livongo had signed agreements with multiple new clients in 2019. Based on an estimated take-up rate of 25%, the estimated value of the agreements Livongo signed in 2019 is around US$285 million, up from US$155 million in 2018.

Management expects revenue growth of 65% to 71% in 2020. Due to the contracts signed in 2019, management has clear visibility on where that growth will come from.

6. Does Livongo have a high likelihood of generating a strong and growing stream of free cash flow in the future?

Ultimately, a company’s worth is determined by how much free cash flow it can generate in the future. Livongo is not yet free cash flow positive but I think the healthtech firm’s business model would allow it to generate strong free cash flow in the future.

Due to the high lifetime value of its clients, Livongo can afford to spend more on customer acquisition now and be rewarded later. The chart below illustrates this point.

From the chart, we can see that the revenue (blue bar) earned from the 2016 cohort steadily increased from 2016 to 2018. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the higher product intensity and density.

Consequently, the contribution margin from the cohort steadily increased to 60% with room to grow in the years ahead.

Currently, Livongo is spending heavily on marketing and R&D which is the main reason for its hefty losses. In 2019, sales and marketing was 45% of revenue, while R&D made up 29%. 

I think the sales and marketing spend is validated due to the large lifetime value of Livongo’s clients. However, both marketing and R&D spend will slowly become a smaller percentage of revenue as revenue growth outpaces them.

Management’s target of adjusted EBITDA profitability by 2020 is also reassuring for shareholders.

Risks

Livongo is a fairly new company with a very new business model. I think there is a clear path to profitability but the healthtech firm needs to execute its growth strategy. Its profitability is dependent on scaling as there are some fixed costs like R&D expenses that are unlikely to drop.

As such, execution risk is something that could derail the company’s growth and profitability.

As mentioned earlier, Livongo is also burning cash at a pretty fast rate. That cannot go on forever. The tech-powered health firm needs to watch its cash position and cash burn rate. Although its balance sheet is still strong now, if the rate of cash burn continues or accelerates, Livongo could see itself in a precarious position and may need a new round of funding that could hurt existing shareholders.

Healthtech is a highly dynamic field with new technologies consistently disrupting incumbents. Livongo could face competition in the future that could erode its margins and hinder growth.

Another thing to note is that while Livongo has more than 600 clients, a large amount of its revenue still comes from a limited number of channel partners and resellers. In 2018, its top five channel partners represented 50% of revenue. 

Stock-based compensation is another risk factor. In 2019, the company issued US$32 million worth of new stock as employee compensation. That translates to 18% of revenue, a large amount even for a fast-growing tech company. Ideally, I want to see stock-based compensation grow at a much slower pace than revenue going forward.

Valuation

Using traditional valuation techniques, Livongo seems richly valued. Even after the recent broad market sell-off, Livongo still has a market cap of around US$2.4 billion, or 14 times trailing revenue. The company is not even free cash flow positive or profitable, so the price-to-earnings and price-to-free-cash-flow metrics are not even appropriate.

However, if you take into account Livongo’s pace of growth and total addressable market, its current valuation does not seem too expensive.

Livongo’s addressable market is US$46.7 billion in the US. If we assume that the healthtech firm can grow into just 10% of that market, it will have a revenue run rate of US$4.6 billion, more than two times its current market cap.

The Good Investors’ take

Livongo has the makings of a solid investment to. It is growing fast, has a huge addressable market and has a clear path to profitability and free cash flow generation. There are likely going to bumps along the road but if the health SaaS company can deliver just a fraction of its potential, I think the company could be worth much more in the future.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

Most of us don’t go a day without using Facebook or Instagram. But despite its prominence, social media is still a relatively new concept.

The rise of Facebook and social media as an industry has been so swift that regulatory bodies have not been able to properly regulate it.

However, things are starting to change. 

Last year, Facebook (NASDAQ: FB) incurred a US$5 billion fine from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) due to a privacy breach. The company also recently agreed to pay a US$550 million settlement for collecting users’ facial recognition data.

There have also been a few threats from European regulatory bodies and Facebook may even face retrospective fines in the future.

That brings me to my next question: Should Facebook shareholders be worried about regulations?

What are the possible regulatory measures that Facebook faces?

Although fines are painful, they are one-off expenses. The biggest risk is therefore not fines, but regulators forcing Facebook to change the way it operates.

Regulations that could hurt Facebook include prohibiting the kind of advertisements it can offer, or controlling Facebook’s content. Regulators could also force Facebook to spin-off or sell some of its assets. Currently, Facebook owns Instagram, Messenger, and Whatsapp.

Facebook reported in its 2019 fourth-quarter earnings conference call that there are now 2.9 billion people who use Facebook (the social media site), Instagram, Messenger, or Whastapp each month. A recent article from Verge showed that Whatsapp currently has 2 billion users while Instagram has 1 billion (as of June 2018).

The likelihood of extreme regulation

Although regulation is likely to hit Facebook, I think the odds of such extreme regulation are low.

After facing criticism in 2019, Facebook started taking privacy and regulation very seriously.

Facebook’s co-founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, is outspoken about the need for regulation on social media companies. In a 30 March 2019 blog post, Zuckerberg wrote:

“I believe we need a more active role for governments and regulators. By updating the rules for the internet, we can preserve what’s best about it — the freedom for people to express themselves and for entrepreneurs to build new things — while also protecting society from broader harms.”

His willingness to cooperate with regulators should put Facebook in a better position to negotiate.

Moreover, despite all the negativity surrounding Facebook, it’s my opinion that Facebook has done more good than harm to society. Facebook not only provides humans with the ability to connect – it’s also a platform to express ourselves to a wide audience at relatively low cost.

Completely controlling the way Facebook is run will, therefore, have a net negative impact.

As such, I think the risk of extreme regulation is very low.

But what will happen if Facebook is forced to break up

Perhaps the biggest risk is competition law. Facebook is by far the biggest social media company in the world. To promote greater competition in the social media space, regulators could force Facebook to spin-off Whatsapp, Messenger, and Instagram into separate entities. 

Such a move will likely erode margins as the separate entities compete for advertising dollars. However, I think the impact of this will not be that bad for shareholders due to the huge and growing addressable market for social media advertising. Zenith estimated in late 2019 that global social media ad spending was US$84 billion for the year, and is expected to increase by 17% in 2020 and 13% in 2021.

A break-up could even be a good thing. It will force Whatsapp and Messenger to find ways to monetise their huge user bases. Currently, Whatsapp is a free platform and does not have any advertisements. If Whatsapp is spun off, investors will want to see it generate some form of revenue either through payments or advertising.

In addition, the separate entities could even command a higher valuation multiple and might even be a net gain for Facebook shareholders prior to the spin-off.

The Good Investors’ conclusion

As social media grows, scrutiny and regulation will inevitably follow. It happens in all industries.

But as a Facebook shareholder, I am not that concerned over regulations. For one, given Facebook’s own stance on regulation, its net positive impact as a platform and its willingness to cooperate with regulators, the odds of extremely unfavourable regulation is very low.

Facebook has also spent big on privacy protection and removing harmful content from its platform. These initiatives should put it in a much better position to negotiate with regulators.

On top of that, anti-competition laws that may force Facebook to break up could even be a good thing for shareholders.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.

I try not to let short-term factors affect my long-term investing decisions. The COVID-19 outbreak is one such short-term factor. It is most definitely going to impact economic growth and corporate earnings this year for many countries. But it will likely have no economic impact five years from now.

So despite the huge drop in the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average in the US stock market last week, I am still resolutely holding on to all my stocks. I believe that the economic impact will be short-lived and companies with strong balance sheets, recurring income, and steady free cash flow will be able to weather this storm.

At the same time, I am not hopping on the bandwagon of overly-hyped companies that could benefit from the coronavirus situation over the short-term, such as mask and glove producers. These manufacturers may see a sharp spike in revenue over the next few quarters, but the jump in sales will likely only be a one-off event.

All that being said, I think this latest global virus outbreak could still potentially throw up some unique long-term opportunities. One company I see benefiting long term from the outbreak is Teladoc Health Inc (NYSE: TDOC).

Why COVID-19 could benefit Teladoc

Teladoc is the leading telemedicine company in the US. It provides video consultations for primary care, dermatology, and behavioural health. The company’s app makes getting professional healthcare advice so much easier. Patients simply need to open the app and start a video consulting session with a doctor. Best of all, this can be done in the comfort of your own home, which is all the more important when you are suffering from an illness and don’t want the hassle of travelling to your local clinic.

The COVID-19 outbreak in the US could be the catalyst that Teladoc needs for faster adoption of its technology. Video consultations will reduce the spread of infections, enable patients to get real-time advice, and increase the consultation-efficiency for doctors. All of these advantages are important at a time when the virus is rampant and patients need access to quick and effective advice.

CEO Jason Gorevic also said in the company’s latest earnings conference call, “We also see that once members use our services for the first time, they are much more likely to use us again.” As such, if COVID-19 does increase adoption of Teladoc during this time, the likely impact will be that patients who use the technology for the first time will continue using it in the future.

Strong growth even before the outbreak

Although the COVID-19 epidemic will likely increase the rate of adoption of video consultations around the world, Teladoc has already seen rapid growth even without this catalyst.

Teladoc reported a 32% increase in revenue in 2019. The total number of visits increased by 57% to 4.1 million, exceeding the company’s own projections.

And the leading telehealth company is expecting more growth in 2020. Even before factoring the spread of COVID-19 in the US, Teladoc reported in its latest earnings update that 2020 revenue will increase by 25% at the low-end. Over the longer term, Teladoc expects to grow between 20% to 30% a year.

Huge addressable market

Back in 2015, Teladoc said in its IPO prospectus that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the US estimated that there were 1.25 billion ambulatory care visits in the United States per year. Of which, 417 million could be treated by telehealth. And that figure should be much larger today. 

Teladoc, therefore, has plenty of room to grow into. In 2019, despite the 57% spike in the number of visits, total visits were still only 4.1 million. That is less than 1% of its addressable market in the US alone.

The international market provides another avenue of growth. Online consultations could be an even greater value-add in countries with lower doctor-to-patient ratios and where access to doctors is even more prohibitive. Right now, international markets only contribute less than 20% of Teladoc’s revenue. 

Recurring revenue model

Another thing I like about Teladoc is its revenue model. The telemedicine company has recurring subscription revenue that it derives from employers, health plans, health systems, and other entities. These clients purchase access to Teladoc services for their members or employees. 

The revenue from these clients is on a contractually recurring, per-member-per-month, subscription access fee basis, hence providing Teladoc with visible recurring revenue streams.

Importantly, the subscription revenue is not based on the number of visits and hence should have a huge gross profit margin for the company.

Teladoc ended 2019 with 36.7 million US paid members, a 61% increase from 2018. In 2019, this subscription access revenue increased 32% from a year ago and represented 84% of Teladoc’s total revenue.

Other significant catalysts

Besides the COVID-19 outbreak, there are possible catalysts that could drive greater adoption of Teladoc services in the near future.

• Mental health services driving B2B adoption: As mental health continues to become an increasingly important health issue, Teladoc’s mental health product has been a significant contributor to its B2B adoption.
• Expanding its product offering: Teladoc launched Teladoc Nutrition in the fourth quarter of 2019, offering personalised nutrition counselling. Nutrition is becoming an increasingly important aspect of preventive medicine and the new service could add significant value to existing and new clients.
• Regulatory shifts in the US: In April 2019, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services finalised policies that could potentially benefit Teladoc. Its new policies increase plan choices and benefits and allow Medicare Advantage plans to include additional telehealth benefits. Jason Gorevic, Teladoc’s CEO, commented on this: “We view this as further evidence of CMS encouraging the adoption of virtual care in the Medicare population, and we continue to see a significant avenue for growth within the Medicare program.”
• Acquisition of InTouch Health: Besides organic growth drivers, Teladoc is expected to complete the acquisition of InTouch Health in the near futue. InTouch Health is a leading provider of enterprise telehealth solutions for hospitals and health systems. 

The Good Investors’ Take

The COVID-19 situation is likely going to hinder the growth of many companies in the near term at least. However, Teladoc looks like one that will buck the trend and will instead benefit in both the short and long run from the epidemic.

Besides the COVID-19 catalyst, the long-term tailwinds surrounding the truly disruptive service and Teladoc’s first-mover advantage in this space gives it an enormous opportunity to grow into.

There are, however, risks to note. Competition, execution risk, and the company’s inability to generate consistent free cash flow are all potential risks. Moreover, the telehealth provider’s stock trades at more than 16 times trailing revenue, a large premium to pay. Any hiccups in its growth could cause significant volatility to its share price.

Nevertheless, I think the reasons to believe it can grow in the long-term are compelling. Its addressable market is also big enough for multiple players to split the pie. If Teladoc can even service just 20% of its total addressable market, it will likely be worth many times more by then.

Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life.