Category: What We’re Reading

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 04 September 2022:

1. David Senra – Passion & Pain – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and David Senra

[00:27:10] Patrick: What about the people underneath these leaders? I probably listened to 50 episodes or something of founders. If I had to summarize one of the interesting lessons, is the dramatic importance of the individual. Which I think runs a little counter to maybe how a lot of people wish the world was, where if it was more communal and Steve Jobs was going to emerge if Steve Jobs particularly wasn’t him, or I think the great individual theory or thesis, a lot of people don’t like. But as I listen to a lot of your episodes and these stories, it strikes me that the person matters a lot. And I’m curious what you’ve learned about the layer of leadership underneath the founders, and if there’s any common stories, themes, traits that you’ve sussed out there.

[00:27:57] David: I want to start with a quote, because you just nailed it. And I’m a Edwin Land fanboy. I am on a mission, because I meet a ton of smart people who don’t even know who he is. So maybe people listening just don’t know it, that he was Steve Jobs before Steve Jobs. Steve Jobs met him when he was in his 20s, Edwin was 70 years old. And Steve came over from the meeting saying, meeting Edwin Land was like visiting a shrine.” These ideas that you’ve undoubtedly heard from Steve Jobs, did not originate with him. He literally took them from Edwin Land. The idea of building a technology company at the intersection of technology and liberal arts. That’s not Steve. That was on every single presentation that he made on Apple. He got that idea from Edwin Land. He literally talked about him over and over again. He said, “This is my hero.”

And Steve also had this deep historical knowledge, which all these founders definitely have, all of them. I have not come across a founder that was not curious about what the great people before them did. I actually made a 30 minute, in between episode. It’s called Steve Jobs and His Heroes. And I break down 39 podcasts on either Steve Jobs or the people that he talked about influencing him. Even when he was young, he was in his 20’s, and he could tell you how he felt the invention of the Macintosh was similar to Alexander Graham Bell’s invention of the telephone. It’s like, how the hell do you know that at that age? That’s remarkable. But Edwin said that there’s no such thing as group originality or group creativity. He goes, “I do believe wholeheartedly in the individual capacity for greatness.” And he says, “Originality are attributes of a single mind, not a group.”

What happens is, even if you have a bunch of co-founders, there’s usually one. A lot of these people had co-founders. You could say one A, one B, whatever the case is, but it’s always singular. It’s never a joint thing. And what’s good is, they find people that can play the role of the second or third. It’s not like, “Hey, I want to be the smartest person in a company.” They all obsess. This is in Warren buffet, David Ogilvy, Enzo Ferrari, Steve Jobs. They only surround themselves with A players. There’s a great book called In the Company of Giants. It’s on the floor next to me right now. What’s fascinating about that is, it’s two Stanford MBA students in 1997, go and interview all these technology founders. If you think about the growth of technology industry from ’97 until now, they were clearly ahead of time.

And what’s fascinating is, Steve Jobs, young Steve Jobs, he just came back to Apple, sits for the interview. They start the interview. They’re like, “Hey, startup founder doesn’t have that much time to recruit.” And I forgot the exact terminology, but he cuts off. He’s like, “I disagree completely.” Recruiting talent is the most important job as a founder. Think about the first 10 people in your company. Every individual is 10% of the company. You don’t transition from a startup, a nascent idea, to a super successful company that creates a great product, if you fuck up that part. That was his point that he was making there. And he knows that because, this is the crazy thing. So you mentioned Mike Moritz earlier, Mike Moritz wrote this fantastic book, the little kingdom. I read the updated version called the Return to the Little Kingdom. And what’s fascinating about that is, that’s way before Mike was an investor.

It’s the first, I think six years of the history of Apple. And when the book ends, the Apple 2’s doing really well. Steve Jobs is still at the company, but we don’t know how the story’s going to end. So then I would read that book, and then what you need to jump into right after that, there’s another book called Steve Jobs and the Next Big Thing. I think it was written by Randall Strauss. That book is about the 13 years between, he left Apple and then he returned. I call it bizzaro Steve Jobs, because it’s a gifted, intelligent entrepreneur, making every wrong decision in the book. That book ends in ’97, he gives this interview. Think about this, how crazy this is. He starts NeXT. One of his first 10 hires at NeXT is an interior designer for the office. What the hell is happening here?

You’re reading that book and you’re like, “I know Steve Jobs is smart. I know he is talented. How the hell did he do this?” We talked a little bit about ego before we started recording, where it’s very prone to let your ego get the best of you. People admire you because the work. What happens is, you usually isolate yourself. You’ll work really hard. You’ll do a lot of work. That work draws the attention of other people because it adds value to their life. And then suddenly, over time, you confuse us. It’s like, “Oh, they don’t like the work. They like me. And then I could just show up without having to do the work and everything will be fine.” And at NeXT, he just showed up. He’s like, “I’m Steve Jobs.

[00:31:51] Patrick: Ego’s such an interesting one. That lesson is fascinating. Confusing people liking the work for liking you. I’ve never heard it phrased that way. And that is so damn interesting. Where else do you see ego rear its head, good or bad? It strikes me that ego’s a negative connotation. You don’t want to have an ego, but you do want to be confident. You do want to be charismatic. You do want to be a good salesperson, some of the things that high ego people might be good at. What other things have you learned about ego? That phrasing is so helpful.

[00:32:21] David: I actually don’t think that you build a great company with a giant ego. I don’t think that exists. Sam Walton has a good idea about that. He’s like, “Listen, your ego should use to drive you, but you should not be on public display.” And he’s like, “I hire people at Walmart with big egos, that know how to hide it, because there is some weird thing where it drives you.” What’s the problem is, when you make it apparent that you think that you’re better than everybody else. In almost every story, you have a young entrepreneur that needs some help. They’re usually helped by people that are older, have a lot more access to resources. So think about how people are funding private companies now. You have super smart and determined founders, a lot of potential. Who knows what a person like that is going to be in 10 or 20 years, but they need assistance.

Whether it’s they need resources, they need personnel, they need money. What I realized this morning is, there’s this guy named Thomas Mellon and Thomas Mellon is one of the most important people in American business history, because he’s the patriarch of the Mellon Family Dynasty. What he did is, he made a lot of money before and after the American Civil War. He’s maybe 50 years old, super rich, owns a bunch of banks and stuff like that. He comes across a 21 year old Henry Clay Frick. Henry Clay Frick shows a lot of potential at this time. What Mellon can’t possibly know yet, 40 years in the future, Frick is going to be considered one of the best entrepreneurs to ever do it. So much so that Andrew Carnegie sees him and is like, “I need this guy on my team.” And then they have a falling out. There’s a fantastic book called Meet You in Hell.

I recommend everybody reads if you want to learn about Andrew Carnegie and Frick. It’s about what Frick told him. They had a falling out. Later, when Andrew’s about to die, he sends a letter to Frick. It’s like, “Hey, let’s reconcile. We’re living in the same city. We live a few blocks away. Let’s get together.” And he writes back. He’s like, “I’ll meet you in hell.” What was fascinating is, Mellon sees Frick. Frick is at the very beginning of building this Coke empire, that’s eventually going to be acquired by Carnegie’s company. And Mellon sees him. He’s like, “Oh, this is another me. This is me when I was younger.” He approves the loan. Then Frick takes that money, immediately deploys it, starts scaling up because he’s like, “Hey, I got an opportunity. I need to do this as fast as possible.” Goes back to Mellon, I think he borrowed $1000, this is in 1800.

So it’s a lot more money than $100 today. So he borrowed $100, goes back almost immediately, says, “Give me $10,000.” Mellon’s like, “Yo, what the hell are you doing kid?” So he sends one of his partners. He says, “Go check out this Frick guy. He seems to have potential to me, but I need to make sure this guy’s not full of crap.” So Mellon’s partner goes and shadows Frick, and he writes back to Mellon and he’s like, “The guy works in the Coke plants all day long. Studies his books at night, knows his business down to the ground.” Make the loan. And that is the first hand up that he gets, that causes him to build a monopoly in his industry. There was no one B to Frick’s Coke empire. It was clearly him. What was fascinating is, I didn’t put this together the first time I read that book, because I probably read 150 books, 150 biography since I read it the first time.

But I had just recently been rereading books on John D Rockefeller. And this guy named Jay Gold pops up in Rockefeller’s biography, every single one, which is really weird. Everybody’s read Titan, the most famous biography of johnny Rockefeller. What I did is, I went in the bibliography of Titan, found a book that the author, Ron Chernow, used as research and ordered it. It’s a very old book. It’s 40 something years old. It’s very hard to find. I read that book and I’m like, “Wait, this is a biography of Rockefeller, and this is an entire chapter is based on Jay Gold. What the hell is happening here?” And then you see when people would ask, and Rockefeller is probably the most famous entrepreneur in history. And they asked him, “Who’s the best businessman you know?” And he said, without hesitation, “Jay Gold.” Without hesitation. Then you have Cornelius Vanderbilt. This is another thing we should talk about, is how all these people wind up knowing each other.

There is something to be talking to other A players, and then you have cornea Vanderbilt who’s the richest person in America at the time. 40 or 50 years older than Jay Gold. And he’s like, “Jay, Gold’s the smartest person in America.” So I was like, “Okay, what the hell happened?” So the author actually sent me the book, a biography of Jay Gold, came in 15 years ago and I think it’s called Dark Genius of Wall Street or something like that. These are formidable people saying, “This is the one.” You got to pay attention to that. Why is that happening? So I’m reading Jay Gold’s biography, same situation. He’s 20 years old, 21, needs a leg up, meets this older, more successful businessman. But where Mellon did is I’m successful, but he didn’t know his ego get in the way. He’s like, “I want to be this guy’s partner. His success does not threaten me at all.”

The difference between Jay Gold’s life is, Jay Gold winds up taking on an older partner, this guy named Zadock Pratt, I think is his name. I’m going off memory here. So I might get his name wrong. But that guy was super rich, owned a ton of land in the Northeast at the time, owned 30 different factories that would produce leather goods. And all the different factories would have different partners. So he winds up doing a partnership. Jay winds up doing some surveying work for him on some of his land. And Zadock’s like, “Oh, this guy’s smart. I’ll partner with him. I’ll put up the money. I’ll give you the expertise. And then you run with it.” Well, Jay Gold is a straight up genius, way smarter than Ill ever be. And he runs with it. He’ll hit you up for advice and money, but eventually he’s like, “Oh, I got this. I can figure it out.”

He’s coming up with ideas. The crazy thing about Jay is, this guy’s been in the leather business for 40 years. I’m coming up with ideas that he doesn’t see. That threatens Zadock’s ego. How do I know it’s Zadock’s ego? Because the guy was so rich, he started his own bank, printed his own currency. Guess whose face he put on his currency? His face. You know Mount Rushmore, in this town is a big granite wall or a big rock formation. So Mount Rushmore, you got all the presidents on there. He hired somebody to carve his own face. Think about how egotistical you have to be. I want people to come through my town and see my giant head hovering above everybody. They started partnering. He didn’t like that Jay stopped asking him for advice. He thought his success and Jay was managing his leather factory, they call him tanneries, better than his other partners.

He didn’t like that. He felt threatened. So he tried to maneuver and he said, “Hey, we’re going to end the partnership. You have to either buy me out for $60,000, which is the money I put in. Or I buy you out for $10,000, which is the money you put in. “He did that because he’s like, “This guy doesn’t have $60,000.” Didn’t know that Jay has a brain. He knew this was coming and he had secretly set up financing and he was waiting for that to happen. Rockefeller is the exact same story, for his first partners in the oil industry. He had older partners who to try to screw them, and he says a great line. He’s like, “While they were talking so loud, my mind was running.” What happens is, “Okay, I’m hitting this provision in our contract. You have to come up with $60,00.”. Jay’s like, “Here it is.” And he takes off running. You had the opportunity to partner with one of the greatest entrepreneurs to ever do it, and you fumbled it because of ego…

…[00:58:38] Patrick: It reminds me of a conversation I had with Tony Xu who started DoorDash. Tony’s a very mild mannered, very humble, almost quiet person, which is why this quote from him stands out in my memory so strongly, which is I asked him something about culture. How do you think about constructing the culture of a company? His answer is basically, “I think a culture of a company should be like 80 or 90% just the personality of the founder. That’s it. It should be the extreme characteristics of the personality of the founder. Because if you try to make it generic, nothing stands out and there’s no progress and there’s your dominates.” I think that’s basically what you’re saying. These stories are fundamentally the stories of individuals replicating themselves in some interesting way like you mentioned with Jobs. And the marketing thing is such an interesting angle that I don’t think you and I have ever really talked about. Because so much of the time we think about the products and that’s mostly what we’ve talked about, the phone, the Polaroid, the airplane, the whatever, and we don’t think about as much the story and the marketing. What have you learned about all of these people as it relates to marketing? Did they all tend to be good at it? Was it just a means to an end for them? What have you learned about how these people distributed or got the word out about their products over time?

[00:59:48] David: I’m a collector of maxims and aphorisms. I think my favorite one might be actions express priority. I don’t look at what you say. Just look at what you do. They’re marketing geniuses, all of them. What do you call a person that’s gifted at customer acquisition or distribution? A founder. There’s a ton of people that have great products and no one knows about, so you’ve failed that aspect of it. I’ve read a book called Insanely Simple which is written by one of the guys that worked at the ad agency that Apple used. He compares and contrast in the book Dell’s approach to marketing when he worked for them and Apple’s.

He’s like, Steve told you with his actions that marketing was important. How do he do that? Every Wednesday we had a three hour meeting. This is maybe post-iPod and before iPhone. Somewhere in there. But after, they were already having a lot more success, when he came back. He goes, we had a three hour meeting and Steve would review every single marketing ad. Every single thing. There was not a fucking billboard that was going to go up until Steve said that was okay. The reason it is important is because there’s a lot of people that preach in their companies, “Marketing’s important and it just works.” Steve showed with his actions.

Then you have Enzo Ferrari’s just on top of mind because I read three biographies of him and I just read all of my highlights again yesterday. But he was a marketing genius too, because he’s winning Le Mans. That’s how he jumpstarted his company. And because of Ferrari stands for victory, you have all these rich Americans flying to Italy and they’d want to meet Enzo Ferrari.

Ferrari is very mysterious. He wouldn’t let you see his eyes. He’d wear sunglasses in every meeting. He did that on purpose. He thought they were like the windows of the soul and he didn’t want you reading his soul. What he’d do is his employees would catch him giving a tour of this rich guy. The guy’s like, “Oh, my God, Enzo, these cars are fantastic. I must have one.” He goes, “I appreciate that. I’ll see what I can do. I might be able to get you one maybe six months, maybe 12 months from now.” Then the guy would leave and the employee would go up and be like, “Enzo, we have a parking lot full of unsold Ferraris.” He’s like, “A Ferrari has to be desired.” He knew it. It’s very similar to that fantastic podcast you just did with Rolex, with Ben Clymer. You see that same idea with a purposely limit production or don’t even tell you how much they’re making. There is a secrecy element to it.

Edwin Land, same thing. When we think of how much Steve Jobs would practice for his presentations, he got that from Edwin Land. Edwin Land would do all kinds of crazy stuff. Way before he invented a camera, he invented polarization. So one of his main inventions was when you were driving at night, you would be blinded by the oncoming headlights of the other car. So he has that film they put over it. He was trying to sell it to a bunch of other car companies. There’s a story in one of his biographies where he rents a hotel room. He figures out where the sun is going to be at what specific time, which hotel room that he needs to get that has a window that faces it. He puts a fishbowl there and then he invites the people he was trying to sell. Then at the perfect time, it shows the light emanating through the windows with the fishbowl, with and without the polarization. That’s how he sold them. It’s that thought process.

Walt Disney, fantastic, fantastic book. Enzo Ferrari and Walt Disney have one thing in common. Both their first companies went bankrupt. That’s a lot people don’t know. Walt Disney, everybody’s like, “Oh, one of the best founders ever.” How could he not be, right? Everybody thinks he was a cartoonist. Yes, he invented animation, first successful full-length animation movie. But if you ask, “Well, Disney, what is he most proud of?” He’s most proud of two things. One, starting his company and keeping control of it, because he lost control of his first company. And two, Disneyland. He did not mention animation. When he was dying. He’s in the hospital dying, his brother is his partner, Roy. They’re looking on the ceiling-

He’s in the hospital, dying. His brother is his partner, Roy. They’re looking at the ceiling of his hospital room and they’re going over the plans for EPCOT. He never got to see it, because he was dying. This is very common. Coco Chanel? It’s a thing. They work to the day they die. Enzo Ferrari? Day they die. There’s no retirement. There’s not going to be a retirement for James Dyson. There wasn’t a retirement for Steve Jobs.

What Walt Disney was gifted at is also the amusement park. It’s like, “Hey, why are you making an amusement park?” What people don’t understand is that back then, amusement parks were seen as lowlife stuff. They were dirty, full of scam artists, more like a circus kind of thing. Walt Disney said something that was genius. They’re like, “Why are you building an amusement park? They’re dirty, low-class places.” He goes, “Exactly. Mine won’t be.” The way I frame that in my mind is, “Their mediocrity is my opportunity. There is not a great amusement park. I will be the first.”

He’s like, “Okay, I need to raise money to fund Disneyland.” He borrowed against his house, borrowed against his life insurance. He was crazy. He didn’t give a shit about money. He should have been way more wealthier than he was. He packaged the financing and the marketing together. He’s like, “ABC, I’ll do this weekly show. I’ll be the one hosting it.” The founder is the guardian of the company’s soul. They would show some things from his animation, but then they would also show, “Hey, this is what we’re doing in the park,” essentially like a weekly ad that people were watching willingly.

As a result, he gets money from that. He gets perfect marketing and advertising for that, maybe the best ever, and ABC puts up a large percentage of the money needed to make the park. What happens? As a result of people watching this … it was one of the highest-rated shows on television for a year … the day he opens the park, it’s the biggest traffic jam in Orange County history. It’s not just, “I’m going to make the very best product.” He considered the amusement park like a cast. It’s just a physical movie. “I’m building a physical movie, so I’m going to make the very best amusement park ever, and it’s going to have the very best marketing.”

[01:04:38] Patrick: It sounds like a common theme in all these stories, is process as art by revealing the process behind the product, because they’re so obsessed with that. That is a common marketing story. Is that right? Do you see that over and over?

[01:04:49] David: I read Warren Buffett’s shareholder letters. To me it’s like how many people have studied more founders and more businesses than Warren? He says in there, “David Ogilvy is a genius.” I’m like, “Who’s David Ogilvy?” This is years ago. I find David Ogilvy, and he’s now one of my personal heroes. I read five books on him. What did he do? He did exactly what every single other entrepreneur did. Figured out what was the best shit that happened before I was alive. “Hey, those are good ideas. Human nature doesn’t change. Let’s use them.”

David Ogilvy winds up, in the very last chapter of Ogilvy on Advertising, he talks about the six people, the six advertising giants that came before him, that he studied, that if they were alive, he’d befriend. That’s another thing Bill Gurley’s talked about that’s important, is going out and actually meeting these people if you can. Then he would just take all these ideas and build on it. His point was there’s no such thing as a business that is boring. It’s only boring advertising. He says, “Listen, it’s boring to you because you do it every day. If you explain to the customer the process, they’ll find it interesting.”

He did this for explaining the brewery process for one of the beer accounts he had. The person that owned the beer company was like, “I don’t want to do this. Every other brewery does it this way too.” He goes, “Yeah, but we’re the only one telling the story.” He spends three weeks … or three months, can’t remember … researching the hell out of Rolls-Royce, talking to the engineers, reading all the material. He winds up reading a 50-page document. There’s one line in it that says, “The loudest thing in the car at 50 miles an hour was the clock inside.” He used that as a tagline, and then put a couple thousand words of copy.

Walt Disney too. Maybe the best, if you want to call it a media company. I can’t think of another company that has the assets that Disney has. It started with a huge fight with Roy Disney, who is the brother, the business aspect of that, and Walt Disney. They were having this fight in one of their books where it was just like, “How much is this going to cost?” Walt says, “We’re innovating. I’ll tell you when I’m done.”

To go into the process behind it, that book, Disneyland, goes into it. To your point, it’s almost like opening the kimono. He shared, with the entire country, all the work and effort and detail that went into it. I shopped at Trader Joe’s for a long time. It’s a weird place. Interesting. I liked it. Okay. Reading the biography of the guy that started it, you have to understand why they’re doing what they’re doing.

The example I would use is one I talk about sometimes on the podcast, because people are like, “It sounds like you have really good recall or you can remember this stuff. You must have a really good memory.” Absolutely not. The way I make the podcast, I read a book, make the highlight. That’s the first time I read the highlight. The book is done. The night before I record … I usually record in the morning … the night before, I’ll reread all the highlights. That’s the second time I’ve read the highlights now. I record the podcast. That is the third time I’ve read the highlights. I edit the podcast. That is the fourth time I’ve heard the highlights. Then the fifth time is I have to take pictures with the Readwise app and literally input them physically, one by one. It usually take hours to do this. That’s the fifth time.

People knowing that, when they feel comfortable pressing Play when they listen to Founders … because like, “first of all, this dude, every single episode, he’s got to read an entire book to prepare. That’s kind of crazy. Then second of all, he’s not just reading it casually, doing it once. He’s read these words five times,” and then I’ll reference them in future episodes. The only reason I’m able to reference them in future episodes is because I did that five times.

If there’s any part of your product that seems banal or ordinary to you, I promise you, no one is thinking about your business as much as you. The favorite business of mine in the world, you think about it less than probably five minutes a week. Nobody is thinking about it. You have shit in your brain that is interesting to customers, and then you could package that up and use that as marketing to get more customers.

2. ‘Gama- Gaeru’: The Most Celebrated Ceramic Toad in Stock Market History – O-Tone 

This little post will neatly encapsulate the popular delusions and sheer madness of crowds brought forth by the Japanese stock market bubble of the late 1980’s.

The genesis of this story? The fourth floor of an awfully exclusive “Ryotei” restaurant in Osaka, which accommodated, prominently positioned, an ugly ceramic toad.

Within Osaka, the toad is known as “Gama-Gaeru” or “toad-frog” and is regarded as a minor deity, which possesses a good luck charm and has the power to attract wealth to its owner.

The restaurant was owned by Nui Onoue, a grandmotherly lady in her 60’s. She was a fervent disciple of bizarre rituals and her toad was one of a kind: An amphibian Warren Buffett. It was incredibly successful in its role as a money magnet. At the peak of the Japanese stock market bubble, the toad would control a 20bn US Dollar stock portfolio, make Mrs. Onoue the largest individual shareholder in three of the world’s biggest companies and the wealthiest woman in Japan…

…As word about Mrs. Onoue’s Midas touch spread, she was also visited by senior executives from the most prominent Japanese investment banks in the late 1980’s. According to the author Alex Kerr, by 1991 the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) alone had passed Y240bn over to her, and 29 other banks and financial institutions had advanced her the staggering sum of Y2,800bn for her spiritual endeavor.

Unfortunately, the toad lost its divine touch shortly after. At the beginning of 1990, the biggest stock market boom in modern history had come to a grinding halt and was slowly morphing into a giant crash.

As Mrs. Onoue’s portfolio collapsed in synchrony with the Nikkei 225, she was forced to borrow massively to cover losses and to back loans. She would leave the spiritual path to riches and start a criminal career forging deposit documents. Helped by a branch manager of a small Osaka credit association she faked certificates worth a Y460 billion, almost as much as the entire deposit base held by the tiny bank, in order to obtain loans from other banks and non-bank financiers worth a 172 billion Yen.

Slowly, the public started to question how on earth a restaurant owner was able to amass such a fortune, and leading banks handing over to her ungodly amounts of money. Doubts were also raised about whose voice she was really listening to before she made her investment decisions.

Although in the past “Gama- Gaeru” got all the credit, more and more it dawned on the public that maybe her sugar daddy, and later a senior executive from Yamaichi Securities, a broker house that was already up to its neck involved in scandals surrounding stock loss compensation and Yakuza connections, had also been whispering into Mrs. Onoue’s ear.

Mrs. Onoue was  arrested in 1991 and eventually sentenced to 12 years in jail in 1998 for involvement in Japan’s largest loan fraud. But there was further collateral damage. The most infamous being the chairman of the International Bank of Japan, the predominant man of the Japanese business elite. He was forced to resign in shame because of his strong ties with Mrs. Onoue.

3. TIP370: Inflation Masterclass w/ Cullen Roche – Stig Brodersen and Cullen Roche

Cullen Roche (00:02:46):

And I’ll tell you why I don’t find this to be a terribly useful definition. Because in the type of monetary system that we have, we actually experience the growth of the quantity of money over any sustained period of time due to, mainly, because of economic growth. And so, people have this view that money necessarily causes inflation. And this is old-school monetarist thinking or some Austrian School thinking that leads people to believe that the more money you create, the more inflation we’ll have and the worse off we’ll be.

Cullen Roche (00:03:22):

And the reality is that the way that the modern monetary system works is that most of the money supply is in existence, basically, because money in today’s economy is mostly deposits. And deposits come into existence through the lending process. And so, what ends up happening is from an accounting perspective, money is just a really simple credit agreement. It is both an asset for the lender and liability for the borrower. And that, in and of itself, is never necessarily a good or a bad thing.

Cullen Roche (00:03:58):

People like to talk about the liability side of balance sheets but they often neglect that there’s an asset side of a balance sheet. And so, from a deposit creation perspective, when a bank makes a loan and that has become the dominant form of money in the modern monetary system, the deposit is an asset for the borrower and liability for the bank. And so, from a pure just balance sheet perspective, from an accounting perspective, when a loan is made, no one is necessarily better or worse off and it depends on all sorts of other factors.

Cullen Roche (00:04:32):

And the fact that the money supply increases because of this, it really doesn’t tell you much about anything. It just tells you that balance sheets have expanded. And over the course of very long periods of economic growth, we actually want balance sheets to expand. And so, even though people like to focus on the liability aspect of this, the reality is that the asset aspect is just as important. And whether or not that has a positive or negative impact on the economy, in the long run, depends on all sorts of different variables.

Cullen Roche (00:05:04):

I mean, to cherry-pick an example, for instance, I mean, if somebody borrows a million dollars and creates some world-changing invention that makes all of our lives fantastically better, well, yeah, technically, there’s a million dollars more of money that is in supply. But this invention, whatever it may be, will dramatically improve our living standards across time. And so, it’s a lot more complex than money and the sheer quantity of it.

Cullen Roche (00:05:35):

And I think that a lot of people have a tendency to fall into a political bias with a lot of these conversations, where you think of the government primarily as being a money creator. And the reality is that most of the money today is created in, really, a fairly market-based type of system where it’s almost a meritocracy in terms of who can borrow and who cannot. And the banks are mostly assessing your lending capabilities, your borrowing capacity based on, really, how valuable they think those loans might end up being, or what the collateral is that exists.

Cullen Roche (00:06:11):

And so, it’s a really complex issue. And narrowing it down to purely the money supply just doesn’t tell you anything because, frankly, the money supply pretty much always increases over any long period of time…

…Cullen Roche (00:19:12):

I mean, the ’70s were really more so an oil crisis than anything else. But I don’t think we’re in an environment where we’re likely to see very high sustained to say 10% inflation or something like that just because I think that the secular headwinds are… they’re so big. They’re so much different this time around where you have not necessarily a Japanese type of demographic issue in the developed world, but it’s much more similar to Japan than it is, say, like a baby boom situation or something like that, where the population is growing pretty significantly, meaningfully.

Cullen Roche (00:19:47):

But in addition, you have all these other factors like the technological factor, the globalization factor is one of the biggest. I mean, you could argue that the world has never had so much accessible, cheap labor in its existence. And so, globalization puts a huge secular downward trend on inflation. And so, a lot of these big macro trends, I think, they don’t necessarily put a ceiling on inflation, but they make it very, very difficult especially for policymakers to create a lot of inflation.

Cullen Roche (00:20:18):

And I think that the thing that is most interesting about the last 18 months is that you had this big, huge policy response. It wasn’t really the Fed so much, it was mostly the US Treasury, I would argue, that really caused a lot of the inflation because the government… the Treasury spend six and a half-trillion dollars in the last 12 to 18 months. The numbers are colossal. And so, it’s interesting because mainly going forward, those numbers are not going to continue.

Cullen Roche (00:20:51):

We’re likely to run trillion-dollar deficits going forward, but we’re not likely to run six and a half-trillion dollars of spending year after year after year. And so, you don’t have the sustained fiscal tailwind that caused a lot of the inflation that we’re experiencing right now. And I think as a lot of these things taper off, you are likely to see prices that look what the Fed would call transitory but that will end up probably not being as transitory as the Fed, I think, expects…

…Cullen Roche (00:33:11):

But I think we tend to have this view that the central bank is the money printing entity, and that the central bank has the big bazooka. And I think what we’ve learned in the post-COVID period is that it’s actually the treasuries that have the big bazookas. And a lot of what the central banks do, and I discussed this in a lot of my papers on the operational dynamics of things like the monetary system and quantitative easing, that the central bank, to a large degree, is a secondary actor in all this.

Cullen Roche (00:33:43):

That the real money printing, if you want to call it that, is done by the Treasury. And so, to use a concrete example, when the Treasury runs a deficit, meaning that they spend more than they actually take in in tax revenue and they end up having to borrow, you could call those bonds. They’re printed from thin air. They’re completely net financial assets. If the government was to finance their spending by dumping cash on the ground, for instance, rather than dumping bonds on the public sector or the private sector, they would literally be printing cash.

Cullen Roche (00:34:18):

They would literally be printing money. And so, of course, we don’t do that in the modern era. We finance spending by printing bonds, basically. But those bonds are net financial assets. And what the Federal Reserve does, to a large degree, is they come in after the fact. And when they implement something like quantitative easing, they’re just changing the composition of the financial assets that the private sector then holds. So, they’re printing a reserve deposit and they’re exchanging it with the bond.

Cullen Roche (00:34:49):

And if you think about this from the order of operations, well, they’re just exchanging the different types of financial assets. They’re adding a deposit and they’re taking the Treasury bond out of the market. So, where did the real money printing occur in this order of operations? Well, it occurred at the Treasury level. The Treasury’s deficit was the net financial asset. It was the balance sheet expansion that really matters. The Fed technically expands its balance sheet.

Cullen Roche (00:35:13):

But in the process of doing so, the way to think of it is that, yeah, they expand their balance sheets to create reserves and they buy the bonds with them, but then they remove the bond from the private sector. And so, what impact does that have? From a consumers’ perspective, it’s a lot like swapping a savings account, which is basically what a treasury bond is for a checking account. And ask yourself, how does your financial situation change when you swap a checking account with a savings account?

Cullen Roche (00:35:44):

It doesn’t really meaningfully change at all, except for the fact that you actually have a lower income now. So, I think you could make an argument that something like quantitative easing is marginally deflationary because it reduces the private sectors’ income. But that’s the big lesson from the post-COVID period versus the post-financial crisis period is that fiscal policy has a much, much bigger impact. You have to look at it comprehensively.

Cullen Roche (00:36:12):

You can’t just look at the Fed’s balance sheet and say, “Oh, look, we’ve printed all this money because”… let’s say we were Europe in the post-financial crisis period and we were running basically budget surpluses or negative or flat balance sheet expansion from the Treasury level. Well, who cares if you’re doing quantitative easing in that environment, because then, there really is no meaningful balance sheet expansion at the Treasury level. And the Fed or the European Central Bank is just swapping those bonds for deposits.

Cullen Roche (00:36:48):

And so, you’ve got to look at things comprehensively. And to make all of this even more confusing in the case of something like Japan, you have to consider all these other factors like demographics. And so, all else equal, fiscal policy is hugely, hugely important. And the degree to which those policies are implemented and then sustained will have a meaningful impact on aggregate demand and future inflation…

…Cullen Roche (00:56:42):

But the reality is that I think that those boring inflationary environments are much more important to protect yourself against because they’re just so much more likely to occur. I mean, the likelihood of the Weimar Republic occurring in the United States or something like that, or Zimbabwe, in my mind, it’s just super low. And so, if you’re going out planning for some environment and you’re building your whole portfolio around something like that, you’re building your portfolio around a really low probability, asymmetric bet that, yeah, it might have a huge potential upside.

Cullen Roche (00:57:17):

But the likelihood of it actually coming to fruition is just not very high. And so, it’s a lot more important to build your portfolio around the more likely outcomes, which is just that inflation, yeah, it’s always going to go up from the bottom left of that chart to the top right, and you have to protect yourself from that. And that means that the risk of a two and a half percent or 3% inflation is much higher. It has a much bigger impact on your overall quality of life than sitting around worrying about a Weimer Republic or a Zimbabwe.

Cullen Roche (00:57:49):

And so, the equity market as a whole has been a fantastic way to protect yourself and generate a real return, regardless of whether or not there was ever going to be hyperinflation. And so, from a pure purchasing power protection perspective, stocks as a whole are a wonderful way to protect yourself from inflation. And so, you’ve got to get really comprehensive about it. But from just a very boring macro perspective, thinking of stocks as a continual purchasing power protector is, I think, a useful mental model, a good framework to start with when you’re considering your purchasing power protection.

Stig Brodersen (00:58:34):

Let’s talk a bit more about it. Very practical about it because it’s often said that we should invest in real assets and not financial assets in a time of inflation. And so, your real assets, that could be precious metals, commodities, real estate, land equipment, natural resources. And to some people, including myself, some of that can sound quite intimidating because you want to have the actual physical asset. Do you want to store gold in your own home?

Stig Brodersen (00:59:02):

What do you do with those 100 barrels of oil, or whatnot, that you’re going to put somewhere in your garage, right? So, many investors, therefore, prefer to buy paper assets due to the convenience of not having to go through transactions with real assets. And this might sound confusing, since you can have paper assets, for instance, stocks where you own a company with many real assets. And so, could you clear that up for us, Cullen? What is the relationship between a paper asset and then this hedge against inflation through real assets?

Cullen Roche (00:59:38):

We call what we do investing. And a lot of what people do in the financial markets, it’s not from an economic perspective, it’s not technically investing. It’s really, we’re just reallocating our savings. And so, what I mean by that is that when a firm goes out, when an oil company goes out and they buy a million barrels of oil, well, they’re not going to do what you just described. They’re not going to take those barrels of oil and just stick them in their backyard and hope that the price changes.

Cullen Roche (01:00:07):

No, they’re typically going to do something with that oil. They’re going to literally spend for investment on it. So, they’re buying the barrels of oil, and then they’re doing something. Who knows, they’re turning it into gasoline or they’re reselling it to someone who is going to be able to purchase it to turn it into, who knows, tires or some other product that is actually useful in the long run. And so, what they’re doing is spending for future production.

Cullen Roche (01:00:36):

And that’s one of the things that, I think, people have to be cognizant of when they’re analyzing all this. And it’s one of the reasons why I generally if you’re going to apply like a macro rule of thumb to inflation protection, it’s nice to own the financial assets in large part because the financial assets reflect what the underlying spending for future production is actually resulting in. So, for instance, when you buy Exxon Mobil, you’re not just buying some piece of paper that reflects the craziness of what people think on Robin Hood.

Cullen Roche (01:01:16):

To a large degree, you’re buying a piece of paper that reflects the underlying value of what Exxon Corporation does with their spending for future production. And so, you’re getting embedded inflation protection in there, not because of just the underlying commodity, but really, you’re making a bet, to some degree, on how innovative Exxon Mobil is able to be with their barrels of oil and what they end up ultimately doing with those barrels of oil. Corporation is really… it is a real entity.

4. TIP472: Inflation Masterclass Continued w/ Cullen Roche – Stig Brodersen and Cullen Roche

Cullen Roche (00:02:46):

I’m sort of relatively well known for having been sort of a disinflationist or deflationist coming out of the financial crisis, because basically I understood that from studying Japan and their bouts with deflation and implementing quantitative easing, that when you look at it from an operational level, quantitative easing is essentially just an asset swap. It’s the central bank comes in after the treasury deficit spends, and then they exchange types of assets essentially. So the private sector ends up… losing a treasury bond and gaining a reserve deposit. And from a monetary perspective, you can have this big sort of boring debate about what is money, and is a treasury bond money-like. And in my view, a treasury bond is essentially like a savings account. And so, the private sector from QE, it gets a savings account and loses a checking account. So people don’t feel wealthier, even though from a very technical sort of economic perspective, the government has printed money, people would say, because people consider reserve deposits obviously to be more money-like than a treasury bond.

Cullen Roche (00:03:57):

And so in a traditional economic model, QE looks like it should be inflationary or even hyperinflationary when they’re doing trillions and trillions of dollars of it. But from a really, I think basic household perspective, all the household did was exchange the composition of its assets. And so the Fed’s response to… COVID was very, very similar. They had this huge balance sheet ramp up, they cut rates, they did all the same sort of stuff that they did during the financial crisis. But the difference between the financial crisis and COVID was that the treasury was the one that really ramped up their balance sheet and had this huge explosion. And so that’s why I was much more worried about inflation coming out of COVID than I was with the financial crisis, because of the treasuries humongous response.

Cullen Roche (00:04:49):

And so while I got the direction of inflation right, I think the tricky thing with all of this has obviously been the magnitude and the longer lasting effect of it. And I think a lot of that is just that I didn’t think there’d be… God, I didn’t think we’d still be talking about this thing at this point. Who could have predicted the Ukraine war, which Russia basically shuts down one of the largest commodity producing countries in the whole world. So there’s been all these sort of weird impacts that have, I think elongated the impact of inflation and made it a much trickier environment to navigate.

Cullen Roche (00:05:30):

But to me that’s the big lesson coming out of this, is the treasury and fiscal policy is really, really important. And that’s really important to understand going forward, because again, let’s put this in perspective. In 2021, as of the end of June at this time last year, the treasury had run a deficit of $1,7 trillion. These are huge, huge numbers again. So at this time last year, we’re still in the throes of really heavy duty fiscal stimulus responding to COVID. So far this year, through June of this year, the treasury has run a deficit of $137 billion. I mean, in terms of the way the US government usually spends and runs a deficit, this is almost a surplus, which is very, very unusual. So on a relative basis, there has been a huge fiscal tightening. So people talk about the Fed and how the Fed has raised interest rates. And a lot of that has caused this sort of retrenchment in demand and tightening of the economy. And the thing that’s lesser talked about is this huge decline in the relative size of the government’s deficit.

Cullen Roche (00:06:50):

I think when you combine these two things, raising interest rates is a very, very powerful mechanism, because especially in a time right now, it can cause a lot of turmoil in the housing market. We’re starting to see that already. And if you adhere to the theory that the US economy basically is a housing economy, well that’s troublesome from a demand perspective. So high mortgage rates have snuffed out demand for mortgages, made it basically unaffordable for… they’ve locked out another 40 million people with the rate increases from the last few months. So huge, huge numbers. So demand is coming way back, and that has this huge knock-on effect through the whole economy, because when you think about everything that goes into a house, think about the demand for how furniture now goes down, and refrigerators and appliances and all these other things that have a knock-on effect through housing.

Cullen Roche (00:07:45):

But then when you combine that with the fiscal retrenchment, there’s been a big, big government tightening. So we had this big explosion in government spending, in government stimulus in general, and now we’re having a big, big give back. And if the government had continued to do these big programs in perpetuity, that would’ve worried me. I hesitate to say anything like hyperinflation, but a much more prolonged, a 1970s style rate of inflation, where you had double digit inflation that lasted for basically 10 years, that’s a much more plausible scenario under those circumstances. But right now the opposite is happening. And so, how fast will it come down? I think it’s going to come down relatively slow, but I think that we’re now… I think disinflation, meaning a falling rate of positive inflation is going to become fairly well entrenched in the economy over the course of the next 18 to 24 months.

Stig Brodersen (00:08:44):

On your wonderful blog pragcap.com, you said, and I quote, “There is no chance of hyperinflation. I would argue that the risk of deflation is substantially higher at this point than the risk of hyperinflation.” Could I please ask you to elaborate on that?

Cullen Roche (00:09:00):

Yeah, so I think going back to that forward-looking expectation of a recent trend in the fiscal retrenchment, and the Fed’s big attempt to really snuff out inflation, I think that the risk of deflation now becomes greater, because I think that these are both very, very outlier events. So we’re talking about pretty unusual things to begin with, but the risk of a mini 2008 repeat, where let’s say housing prices. I expect housing prices to fall 5% to 10% over the course of the next 18 months, and that’s kind of my base case. So housing is going to be relatively weak I think over the course of the next year at a minimum. There is a chance that I’m wrong about that, that the Fed response is much bigger than we expect, that they’re much more aggressive and much more prolonged with it than we expect. And that housing falls more than I expect.

Cullen Roche (00:09:59):

I mean, housing boomed so much during the pre-COVID period and then the COVID period that you could easily get a 20% retracement in house prices. It wouldn’t surprise me at all if something like that happened, and that would have a very big negative impact on the economy. I think that if that happened, by the time that plays out, let’s say it’s 2024 and housing prices have fallen 20% from their peak, I think at that point, there’s a very good chance that CPI readings and the Fed’s preferred measure core PCE, Personal Consumption Expenditures is negative at that point. And that’s just going to be a function of demand just falling off of a cliff, and this huge knock-on effect from the negative housing market.

Cullen Roche (00:10:46):

So to me, that’s a much, much more likely scenario than a hyperinflation, because in large part, because if you’ve read my research in past years, you know that hyperinflation generally occurs under very, very unusual specific scenarios, usually scenarios such as very corrupt regimes, a government losing a war, a complete regime change in the government, these sort of really seismic events that are very disruptive at a government level. And the government usually responds to that by then printing huge amounts of money. So while we’ve technically printed a lot of money in the last two, three years, you haven’t had this big sort of disruptive geopolitical event at a government level that I think has caused a complete collapse in the faith in the currency. And in fact, I would argue that if anything, what we’ve seen in the last, especially the last 12 months is, if anything, we’ve seen increasing demand for the dollar in a relative sense.

Cullen Roche (00:11:50):

So to me, it’s very hard to envision… yeah, if we were having this discussion and we were sitting in Nigeria or something, it would be a totally different discussion. But when you’re talking about the world’s reserve currency, you’re still talking about on a relative basis. And even if you believe all fiat currencies are trash, the US dollar is the least trashy of the trashy currencies. So it’s very hard for me to envision a scenario where you get this huge collapse in demand for the currency in large part, just because the US economy’s important role in the global economy, and combine that with just the fact that you don’t have the environment for this sort of seismic shift in faith in the currency…

…Stig Brodersen (00:47:42):

Cullen, let’s continue with this thought experiment. Let’s say that we would go into a prolonged period of not only disinflation, but for example, two decades of deflation. And I just wanted to clarify, disinflation is a lower but still positive inflation rate, whereas deflation is a negative inflation rate. So how would consumers and investors need to adjust to this prolonged deflationary period?

Cullen Roche (00:48:06):

Man, one of the most interesting charts I’ve ever seen is Japanese real estate in the last 20 to 30 years. I mean, we’re so used to, in developed world, real estate prices just always going up pretty much. That was a part of what everyone kind of knows. That was part of what caused the financial crisis to be so bad, was that in the economic models, all these investment banks assume that real estate prices just either wouldn’t go down or wouldn’t go down very much. And so when real estate prices went down 20%, 30%, obviously that caused… it threw a wrench in everything. And in Japan though, real estate prices have been going down for 20, 30 years, which is sort of unfathomable in the United States. But it’s something that… that sort of a scenario, I mean, it keeps me up at night to be honest, because again, the real estate market is such an impactful instrument in the entire US economy. You’d have very, very low rates of growth.

Cullen Roche (00:49:11):

I mean, in that sort of a scenario, if that’s something that you expected or if you thought it was a risk, counterintuitively you’d want to own a ton of bonds. So bonds in Japan were the thing that hedged people from… people talk about how the Japanese equity market has been down over this lost decade or whatever. Well, the thing that people don’t always point out is that if you owned a 60/40 portfolio denominated in yen, where you own the Nikkei for instance, and Japanese government bonds, well, you actually did okay, because the government bonds performed so well that your relative performance was okay. So diversification actually worked out in Japan, because of the bond component.

Cullen Roche (00:49:59):

But the same sort of scenario would play out in the United States, where people are worried about inflation now. And they’re worried that, oh, bonds are dead. But if you got prolonged entrenched deflation, the bonds are the things that would perform really well in that in terms of an asset allocation. So again, going back to that all-duration or all-weather sort of perspective, it’s why I always advocate, I always tell people, you always need to hold some cash and short-term bonds, and even some intermediate potentially long-term bonds. Treasury bonds, they’re sort that deflation insurance product, super long duration instrument.

Cullen Roche (00:50:37):

But yet, in terms of an economic outcome, it’s hard for me to imagine that wouldn’t be a disastrous scenario, that it wouldn’t be coinciding with something much more negative in terms of what’s occurring, just because in order to get the 20-year period of entrenched deflation, you’d have to have not just negative probably demographic growth, you’d have to have declines in productivity, and really almost like 0% GDP probably for decades, which would not be… obviously would not be great.

Cullen Roche (00:51:14):

So is that going to happen? Personally, I think that’s a low probability, just because the demographic trends, even as bad as they are in the United States and some of the developed world, they’re not necessarily going to be negative. And I think productivity will continue to be relatively strong. And it’s hard for me, united States is still such a real estate based economy that when you look at it in the long run, I mean, God, looking at it from a supply perspective, one of the problems in housing is there’s a huge shortage of housing. And so in the long run, are we going to stop building homes in the United States? Using a crude “housing is the economy” sort of model, it’s hard for me to imagine that even with the ebbs and flows in the long run, there is a lot of building to be done in the United States in terms of building out the real estate market.

Stig Brodersen (00:52:09):

Well said. Now Cullen, let’s transition into the next topic of today, which is the concept of the Fed put, which dates back to the era of Alan Greenspan, the former chair of the Fed. Starting with the stock crash of 1987, the Fed cut rates whenever share price is plunged. If you are an investor, it resembles the benefit of a put option where your downside is getting cut. Some argue that we’re now heading for a time with a Fed call, which is exactly the opposite, meaning capping the investors’ upside. We know from studies of the Wealth Effect that the wealthier people feel they are from their stock holdings, the more they spend. One study from Howard University shows 3 cents of increased spending of each dollar an increased stock wealth, plus increased employment and wages. All of this adds to inflation, which currently seems to counter the main objective of the Fed. So with all of that being said, do you think Cullen that we’re heading into a period of the Fed call?

Cullen Roche (00:53:03):

There’s a lot of different transmission mechanisms for monetary policy. And to me, interest rates are a very powerful policy lever. I do not think… people tend to think, when people talk about the Fed put, they often talk about quantitative easing and the balance sheet expansion. And I don’t think quantitative easing is as powerful as a lot of other people tend to think. And I think that drawing these correlations between the Fed’s balance sheet and the stock market, to me is just sort of silly. I mean the Bank of Japan increased their balance sheet for decades, and the Nikkei had a marginal correlation to these changes. Or ECB also, the European stock markets performed, on a relative basis, horribly compared to the US stock market, and the ECB was ramping up their balance sheet. It seems like there’s very mixed evidence on whether or not the balance sheet expansion really is the… is that the Fed put?

5. Milan lab man brings unorthodox science to Premier League – Sean Ingle

The patient is lying half naked on the treatment table in a clinic not far from Harley Street watching his feet being pressed together, rotated, tested. His pelvis is checked and he is asked to open his mouth. Finally Jean-Pierre Meersseman, founder of the world-renowned Milan Lab and special advisor to Milan, speaks. “Your pelvis is tilted, one leg is shorter than the other and you have suffered from groin injuries,” he says, correctly. He then applies local anaesthetic to an impacted wisdom tooth and suddenly the range of movement in the right leg significantly widens. “Ah, just like Clarence Seedorf!” he exclaims.

“When Seedorf came to see me he had continuous groin pain which had been bugging him for a year and a half,” Meersseman says. “He couldn’t practise properly and was on a downward spiral. I remember the first day he was at Milan I had his wisdom teeth pulled out. The pain in his groin went away immediately and that helped rebuild his career.”

It is an anecdote that short-circuits the senses. It sounds too fantastical to be true. But this is Meersseman’s forte: doing the unusual with the unorthodox, combining his specialisms of kinesiology and chiropractic with traditional approaches. Still the question needs to be asked: what would the sceptics make of how he treated Seedorf?

“It’s not accepted in evidence-based medicine but I don’t give a damn about that,” he says, genially but firmly. “I’ve seen it work. We’ve done over one million tests at Milan. And our mathematicians and engineers have developed a formula which has a high success rate of predicting and managing injuries.”

Meersseman backs up his case by citing the steep decline in days lost to injury after Milan Lab was set up in 2002 thanks to a programme that also helped enabled Paolo Maldini and Alessandro Costacurta to play into their 40s, with Serginho and Cafu not far behind.

“Paolo Maldini was written off at 32 and he played another nine years,” Meersseman says. “And I remember when Cafu came in, somebody called me up – I won’t say who – and said I know for sure he is gone. He played another four years at a very high level.”…

…Meersseman was given the task of reducing injury rates at Milan after Fernando Redondo, the brilliant Argentina midfielder, suffered an injury that was to end his career shortly after joining from Real Madrid in 2000. The club asked itself: why did we not see that? They started to talk about prevention. And Meersseman starting looking for answers.

“With Redondo we did a complete medical examination when he signed – and I mean complete as it involved 10-12 different specialists, from the tip of his head to his toes,” Meersseman says. “He was in perfect condition. And then he was walking on the treadmill and he tore a muscle. I’d never heard of anyone doing that. He never really came back.”

So what changed? “Just by using kinesiology we are able to see better what is going on but that was my opinion against someone else’s,” he says. “That was one of the reasons why I started measuring everything. All the top clubs have cardiologists, knee specialists and so on – but sometimes it’s difficult to look at the whole and that’s what we are trying to do.”

6. RWH012: Fear The Fed w/ Jim Grant – William Green and Jim Grant 

William Green (00:18:35):

Then you went to Barron’s, right? From something like ’75 to ’83? And you originated the current yield column. And I wanted to ask you about that period because it must have been an incredibly formative period, because for those of us who… I was born in 1968. So I wasn’t really aware of what was going on at the time, but this great inflation that ran from 1965 to 1981 was forming the backdrop of your career in those days as a financial writer. And I wondered if you could describe for us for those of us who didn’t experience it firsthand, what you saw and how it shaped your views about the importance of sound money, fiscal discipline and the like. Because it must have been kind of a rude awakening to see. I think, didn’t inflation hit something like 15% in 1980? I mean it was a terrifying time.

Jim Grant (00:19:26):

Yes. Although it became rather… One became rather acclimated to it. I think never wholly adapted to it. But my goodness. Inflation rate had been tripping up since 1965. And the authorities then as today said, first of all, “Not us. Oh, we didn’t do it.” And then, “This’ll pass.” And then actually before very many years had gone by, William McChesney Martin, who was then the Fed chairman and a great rhetorical foe of inflation, would give these speeches say condemning it and vowing to slay it like a beast. But towards the end of 1967, in close confines of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, he said, “The horse of inflation is out the barn.” So he was about ready to give up.

Jim Grant (00:20:21):

I said, “Most we can do is make sure this steed does not gallop too far, too fast.” So then ensued, year upon year, the deteriorating purchasing power of the dollar, of rising interest rates, of contracting, what we call valuations for stocks and the price you pay in relation to what the company can earn. Is valuation. Where we express this as a ratio of stock price to profits. Call it a price earnings ratio.

Jim Grant (00:20:53):

And during the good times the stock prices go up and people are going to pay a higher and higher price for a given dollar of profit. And when inflation hits and when interest rates go up, the opposite happens and people pull back and they’re willing to pay less and less per dollar of profit. And that was the story of this great inflation. There were of course ebbs and peaks and undulations. And one of the things that happened then, that I think is very great relevance today, is people were all too ready to declare an end to things when inflation receded. Now nothing says that today is going to repeat the experience of yesteryear. In fact, rather the odds are against that just simply because history is never… It’s never so helpful as to repeat itself literally, otherwise imagine how rich the historians would be. They say, and what they say is true, that one’s first experience in markets and with money is deeply formative, imprints itself on you. And the best investors, the nimblest and most successful are the ones who can put that formative experience aside, or at least put it into perspective and not imagine that they must repeat the experiences of their youth in their middle years. And perhaps that experience was too deeply imprinted on [inaudible 00:22:18]. I have, I guess, have seen inflation under rather too many bedposts, under too many mattresses as the years have gone by…

…William Green (00:45:07):

… No, it’s really good. And I’ll include a link to it in the show notes here. You said at one point the Federal Reserve is the most dangerous financial institution on the face of the earth, and then you described them as the handsiest people in finance, which I liked. So you were saying how they’re always meddling and having to improve and intervene and interject. Before we get to the current problem, is there just this illusion that it’s helpful to intervene and interject? Why … where’s the philosophical difference that you have and that someone like Jerome Powell, the Fed chief, has, in terms of believing that it’s worth meddling, or actually dangerous to meddle?

Jim Grant (00:45:49):

Well, I think that the Fed believes … I know the Fed believes, because they do this stuff, the Fed believes that they can select a rate of interest, a policy rate of interest, that will at once encourage maximum employment, minimize the rate of inflation, and keep the financial markets percolating. And I say, many of us say, that that rate is known not to God, but to individuals operating in a free and untrammeled market, and discovering, that word is price discovery, the phrase is price discovery, discovering a rate of interest. And what makes the discovered rate of interest better than the artificial or the imposed one, is the discovered rate of interest is the product of decisions taken by people who have no idea what their counterparties are doing, but they are all trying to maximize their own welfare, and the world. They all go to work in the morning, wanting to do better. They make decisions, so the conflation of these million decisions is going to give us a better outcome than the somewhat arbitrary and necessarily ill-informed pronouncements of the former college economics professors who populate the halls of the Federal Reserve.

Jim Grant (00:47:08):

We call this … we call the current standard, we call it PhD standard, a stigma from the gold standard or other standards of yesteryear, and ages ago, in 1930s, so that’s ages ago, a while ago, there was an economist named I think Henry Simons, University of Chicago, who said that business enterprise ought not to be a speculation on the future of monetary policy. That’s kind of what it’s become. Everyone has to know what the Fed is doing. The Fed has become ubiquitous, or handsy, as some politicians we know. It has become like the referee in the football game, or a soccer game. Or cricket or baseball. I’m trying to help you.

William Green (00:47:56):

Proper game. Cricket.

Jim Grant (00:47:59):

So when you get to know the name of the umpire or referee, you know that umpire or referee is not doing a job, not doing his or her job right. That person is supposed to be invisible. The game is the thing, right, and not the rules. When the rules are paramount, and the arbitrary decisions of the referees are paramount, that is not a game, it is a … I don’t know, Kabuki theater, whatever it is, it’s not the game we came to play. And I think that we’re not playing the game of enterprise as we ought, because the Fed is too much with us.

William Green (00:48:35):

So now we’ve explained to some degree the causes, the backdrop that led to this mess. Let’s talk in some detail about what can or should be done to fix it. So yesterday … this podcast will be coming out in a couple of weeks, but yesterday the Labor Department announced that inflation has been rising at a rate of 9.1%, cost of food was up, I think, 12%, in the last 12 months, electricity up nearly 14%, gasoline up about 60%. So first of all, I mean the most obvious question, it sounds so mundane, but I actually like to ask it, why is inflation so fearsome? Why is this thing that we’d kind of forgotten, this looming Loch Ness monster, beneath the surface of the financial waters, so terrifying? Why suddenly is everyone sitting up and saying, “Oh God, there’s a real problem here”?

Jim Grant (00:49:24):

Well Nessie, I think, might not exist. I don’t know for sure. But inflation was consigned to the status of Nessie by a generation of economists who, like preceding generations of economists, 1960s, believed that they had found the philosopher’s stone. And they, through their dextrous manipulation of this and that lever of policy, could forestall and ameliorate, as I said in the case of … Okay, so that was the conceit, but I think, to go back to a sporting metaphor, I think that muscle memory played a great part in conditioning everyone to expect everything except inflation. Now, if you were to simply ask the following question, the answer is going to be, yeah, inflation. And the question is this. What will happen when the government pays people not to work, when indeed it subsidizes the lack of production through various rules and regulations, when it materializes money as it has never materialized those dollar bills before, and as it borrows and spends in the space of 18 months as it has never done before. What is likely to be the outcome? And any schoolboy of yours would say, “Yeah, inflation.”

Jim Grant (00:50:47):

Notice that no one said, “Of course, inflation.” There’s a baseball story, 1968, Bob Gibson was the reigning pitcher in baseball. Imperious, majestic, dominating and domineering figure, was Bob Gibson, St. Louis Cardinals. He played with an infielder named Ducky Schofield. Ducky was very good in the field, not much of a batsman. Batsman, that’s cricket term.

William Green (00:51:15):

Yeah.

Jim Grant (00:51:16):

And one day Ducky strikes out, storms back to the bench and curses up a blue streak, smashes the water cooler, and Gibson can’t stand him. He summons Ducky to the end of the bench and points to his batting average, which was .226. He says, “Ducky, what did you expect?” So similarly, today, with inflation, what did they expect? Well what they did not expect was the obvious [inaudible 00:51:47] piece it together by all of us, but the fact that it was not obvious speaks to muscle memory and speaks to the conceit of the economic forecasting fraternity, and it speaks simply to, I guess, to the foibles of human perception…

…Jim Grant (00:52:19):

Ah, okay, I want to digress with a story. Years ago there was a bunch of medical scientists, got together to examine a cadaver discovered in the melting ice in the Italian Alps. This thing was called the Iceman, right? So the greatest heart specialist and physiologist, I mean, anatomist, people with a scientific interest in the human form, came to the relevant hospital in Italy to examine this Iceman, right? And they spent weeks going over it with the advanced tools then available to them, x-rays and things that I can’t know. And it wasn’t until the very end that someone said, “Yeah, there’s the arrowhead right there.” And the relevance of this is that … and the ones who missed it were so embarrassed and so humbled. And we wrote a piece about this and headline was Perils of Perception, and our story wound up that the scientists who missed this were not … they didn’t have financial … they weren’t leveraged in the market betting on some outcome. They didn’t have an options position open. They had no financial interest in the outcome. They were studying this as disinterested academics. They missed it. So we wound up saying, [inaudible 00:53:41], So how is it that with people through force of financial interest, client interest, how are any of us solvent, given all of the impediments to clear perception of finance?

Jim Grant (00:53:59):

So that’s why things periodically get so messed up. Everyone has a different set of perceptions, but the population of people who are paid to have a disinterested perception, it’s a very small population. And of course they are human, right?…

…William Green (01:03:04):

Is your bet that the US economy can escape a recession, or is your bet that it’s going to get pretty ugly? I mean, I know that-

Jim Grant (01:03:14):

Well, here we come face-to-face with personality and character and vested interest, right? So, what would be better for Grant’s than calling another disaster? I can imagine the motion pictures. I can imagine … a parade is probably a trope, but I can imagine our circulation going up a lot, so I-

William Green (01:03:38):

The Big Short Part 2.

Jim Grant (01:03:39):

Right? So, without obsessing on interior dialogue and motivation, what I try to do is to reserve mind share, mind space, for the not impossible outcome that things work out. The United States economy is something that has demonstrated the greatest resiliency over the years. And I mean, I think one hears rather too much about American … What is it called? American … not singularity, but exceptionalism, right? But America is exceptional in many ways. Certainly, its economic history is exceptional. There’s a can-do spirit here, there’s a spirit of enterprise that not even the Fed can extinguish through its maladroit policy maneuvers, or President Biden extinguish through recent elections, from the pulpit. So yeah, it’s possible that through luck, and maybe the Fed’s learned something.

Jim Grant (01:04:37):

So I think that the question then becomes, where do the risks lie, and where do the opportunities lie, given that the outcome is indeterminate? Are you being paid well to think one thing that is possible, indeed probably? Are there bargains, in other words, are there bargains that people are neglecting because the world was so single-mindedly focused on- And I don’t see many just yet, but we have a very good equity analyst here, who does other things well, but his name’s Evan Lorenz. He’s the deputy editor for Grant’s, and he does fabulous work in analyzing individual stocks. So, we had been very bearish on Facebook. But the current issue came out, and Evan did this fine work, and he says that Facebook is now buy. It’s cheap on its merits, on its earning power. It has been unduly punished for its foibles and its managerial errors. And now, we ought to pay attention, because it is now a value-laded stock. There’s a margin of safety.

Jim Grant (01:05:37):

So there are these opportunities cropping up. The risk is, I see this a lot in people who manage what’s called valued portfolios, is that the cheap stocks do go down with ones that are too expensive. I know of value investors who have suffered losses this year on the order of 20% or more, although they thought the stocks they owned were so cheap that they were inured to such things, but no. So it’s been a brutal year for many people. But in answer to your question, what we try to do is keep scouting for opportunities. We don’t see it in the bottom market, although if there’s a recession, bonds will go up in price, and down, and interest rates will fall, likely. We see opportunity in gold stocks, which are almost universally ignored and scorned. They’re about as cheap as they’re ever been in relation to the metal. But if the Fed is seen not to have the great answer, if the Fed is seen to be the institution you must protect yourself against rather than to trust in, in that case, this is an area, especially for as long as I’ve been alive, almost, in that case, gold’s going to do very well.

7. It’s OK to Be Bearish But It’s Not OK to Stay Bearish – Ben Carlson

Things don’t seem great at the moment.

The Federal Reserve is actively trying to push the stock market down. Inflation is the highest its been in four decades. Interest rates are rising. Both stocks and bonds are down double-digits from the highs.

There is a good chance the Fed will try to push the U.S. economy off a cliff right into a recession.

“Don’t fight the Fed” has taken on a new meaning when they’re openly rooting against the stock market.

It’s easy to be bearish right now.

Plus you have the fact that this is the first prolonged bear market since the Great Financial Crisis:..

…There have been a handful of corrections and bear markets since early 2009 but the only one that came close to matching the length of the current iteration was in 2011.

But the 2011 bear market (-19.4%…close enough) at this point was already in the midst of a recovery. We’re not back at the lows but the stock market has been heading back down yet again. And we’re now heading into month 9 of this drawdown.

It’s easy to be negative right now but it’s always easy to be negative during a bear market…

…Instead of going back and forth between being bullish or bearish, I prefer to remain calm-ish.

We already know stocks are going to be volatile. Why should you care about market fluctuations if you know they’re not going to last forever?

This bear market could last longer. Stocks could go down more. Or we could see new highs in a matter of months.

I honestly don’t know.

But successful long-term investing comes from letting go of the desire to pretend like you know what’s going to happen all of the time.

If you don’t need the spend the money in the near-term, you’re going to have to become comfortable with seeing the value of your portfolio go down at times.

And if you do need to spend the money in the near-term, why is it invested in the stock market in the first place?

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Apple. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 28 August 2022:

1. Once Science Fiction, Gene Editing Is Now a Looming Reality – Katie Hafner

Ask any expectant couple what they hope their baby will be, and one answer is likely to be “healthy.”

But one gene gone awry can imperil a child’s health, causing serious disease or a disability that leaves one more susceptible to health issues. With advances in gene-editing technology, though, biomedicine is entering an uncharted era in which a genetic mutation can be reversed, not only for one person but also for subsequent generations.

Public debate has swirled around genetic engineering since the first experiments in gene splicing in the 1970s. But the debate has taken on new urgency in recent years as gene modification has been simplified with CRISPR (short for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats) technology.

Scientists have compared the technology to word processing software: It acts like a cursor placed next to a typo, capable of editing a gene at a level so granular it can change a single letter in a long genetic sequence.

While still highly theoretical when it comes to eliminating disabilities, gene editing has drawn the attention of the disability community. The prospect of erasing some disabilities and perceived deficiencies hovers at the margins of what people consider ethically acceptable.

“People are understandably very scared of it, of the many different roads it could take us down as a society,” said Meghan Halley, a bioethics researcher at Stanford University and mother of three children, including a 5-year-old with a disability. “Broadly speaking, this is always going to be problematic because of the many things that disability means.”

CRISPR is widely seen as holding great promise for treating diseases that until now have been intractable.

There are two main types of CRISPR-based editing. One is the correction of a gene in an individual living with a condition or disease. This is known as somatic cell editing (“somatic” refers to the body). In June, NPR reported that Victoria Gray, a woman with sickle cell disease, experienced a significant decrease in her episodes of painful sickle crises in the first year after gene-editing treatment.

In the future, Ms. Gray’s children or grandchildren may be able to take advantage of the other type of CRISPR “fix”: an edit to the human germ line. This involves making changes to a fertilized egg that not only last  through the life of an individual but also are passed on to future generations.

This type of “inheritable” gene editing is inapplicable to conditions like autism or diabetes, in which the hereditary component is caused by many different genes. But it is suited to disorders caused by variation in a single gene. Sickle cell disease fits into that category, as do cystic fibrosis and Duchenne muscular dystrophy.

Yet bioethicists point out that inheritable gene editing raises large societal questions, given the dire consequences of an error, as well as the ethical questions that arise at the prospect of erasing disability from human existence. There is also concern that gene editing for health reasons will be out of reach for many because of its cost…

…The debate grew more heated in 2018, after a scientist in China announced the birth of the world’s first gene-edited babies — twin girls — using CRISPR to give them immunity to H.I.V. The announcement generated outrage around the world. In December 2019, a court in China sentenced the scientist to three years in prison for carrying out “illegal medical practices.”

Last year, a group of scientists from seven countries called for a global moratorium on changing inheritable DNA to make genetically modified children.

Professor Halley’s middle child, Philip, was born with multiple anomalies of his gastrointestinal system. In addition, Philip has had a succession of health complications, including a stroke just before age 2, leading his doctors to suspect a still-unidentified genetic disorder.

Families like hers, Professor Halley said, offer good examples of “very ripe cognitive dissonance” around the topic of inheritable gene editing. As a mother, she said, she would do anything to prevent the pain her son has been through.

Yet she is aware of the inconsistency between that desire and her unwillingness to “do anything that would take away him, take away who he is,” she said. “And he is who he is partly because of the challenges he has faced.”…

…That ambivalence toward gene editing was reflected in a 2018 Pew Research Center survey, which found that a majority of Americans approved of gene editing that would result in direct health benefits while they considered the use of such techniques to bolster a baby’s intelligence to be going “too far.”

The survey also found that the biggest worry was that gene editing would be available only to those who could afford it.

“That’s a critical ethical issue,” Dr. Marson said. “We have a real responsibility when we develop these technologies to think about how to make them scalable and accessible.”

2. Mark Tomasovic – ChargePoint: Leading the EV Charge – Jesse Pujji and Mark Tomasovic

[00:06:27] Jesse: Talk about how they evolved with the industry. It’s somewhat of an obvious business model, electric cars on the road. Something needs to charge them. Let’s make the stuff that’s going to allow them to be charged all over. But how has the industry evolved? What are sort of the important pieces to understand, if you’re going to get into a business like this?

[00:06:43] Mark: If we go back to that 1% number, 1% of the total number of cars on the road today are electric. What that means is there’s 2 million electric vehicles in the US. And what that means is one in every 15 cars sold in the US is an electric vehicle. So about 7% of all cars sold today in the US are electric vehicles. But what we’ve seen historically in other countries, for instance, in Norway, when a country reaches 5% adoption of electric vehicle adoption in new sales, a tipping point occurs and the adoption becomes exponential. And we think today we’re at that tipping point. And just to put it in context, in 2018, there were 12 car commercials that ran during the Super Bowl. None of them were for an electric vehicle, but this year there were nine car commercials that ran during the Super Bowl, and seven of those nine commercials featured an EV.

So it’s still pretty early and overall relative market share of EVs versus combustion engine vehicles. But we think over the next five years, the US EV growth rate will be a 40% CAGR. And we’re going to four X the total number of EVs on the road by 2027, as there are today. So a lot of those kind of going back to your question on what’s causing EV charging infrastructure adoption. A lot of that adoption is based on the improvement of battery technologies, which is decreasing the cost of electric vehicles and increasing their range and making them broadly more affordable and more attractive to the average consumer.

[00:08:19] Jesse: And the infrastructure, who are the players in all of this? Not just competitors, but even the value chain a bit. It seems like ChargePoint has the vast majority of market share, but help us break it down a little bit to better understand it.

[00:08:30] Mark: There’s about four main players across the whole EV charging infrastructure layer. And the first is the equipment supplier itself. So the first is people like ChargePoint, that are the hardware OEMs, or the OEMs at the physical charging infrastructure. Their role involves engineering and manufacturing of the chargers. And we think of this space as a pretty competitive space. So we expect over time that margins in the hardware OEM category will decrease, as the hardware becomes more commoditized. And so these suppliers will have to find some way to differentiate, which could involve having yet unique, go to market motion, or unique partnerships, or involve selling proprietary software systems to run their chargers. And they’ll have to figure out ways to be cost efficient in how they source and manufacture their products. The second important part in the value chain is that software layer. As I mentioned, one way that the equipment suppliers could differentiate, is by offering software systems to run their chargers. And these software systems provide capabilities like payments and the ability to lock and unlock charge points and see into ChargePoint performance and even manage electrical load on the chargers themselves.

And so a lot of the hardware providers, the OEMs of the equipment are really good at building hardware, but they’re not really good at building software. So there’s this whole second ecosystem of just software providers that can work with certain types of hardware, or across all different hardware types.They’ve really established themselves as software only capital like businesses, that are just the operating system for hardware, for the charging infrastructure itself. The third player in the value chain is the installer and the installer is, think of them as mid to large scale electrician shops. Some of them are specialized charger installation companies, or engineering and procurement firms that offer turnkey solutions, this super fragmented, low barriers to entry. They actually do the physical construction installation. And then finally the last players are the site owners and the ChargePoint operators. And the site owners typically the one that owns the physical real estate and sells the electricity. And if they don’t want to operate the actual charger itself, then they’ll hire a ChargePoint operator that can monitor the charging status and coordinate maintenance.

[00:10:47] Jesse: How do the auto manufacturers play into this? How do they have relationships with ChargePoint, or what’s their relationship to this world?

[00:10:55] Mark: Yeah, well, auto manufacturers like to stay agnostic, because the goal of the auto manufacturer is decrease range anxiety across potential customers. And what I mean by range anxiety is, the inability to find a charger when you’re traveling across the state or traveling to work. It’s one of the major reasons why people are hesitant to purchase an EV, is because they feel like, “Hey, if I need to travel a couple hundred miles, I won’t be able to fill up, like I do a traditional gas station.” The auto OEMs like to stay agnostic to the different types of hardware players, because they want to minimize range anxiety and they want to sell more cars. What’s interesting is, ChargePoint has actually been able to capitalize on this by partnering with a couple auto OEMs. So ChargePoint has what’s called an open-wall network. And so, any auto OEM can charge on ChargePoint chargers, and ChargePoint has partnered with a couple of these OEMs so that you can have the ChargePoint app as part of your car’s dashboard. And so, you can control things like payments, reserving parking spots, from the ChargePoint app in your car.

[00:12:07] Jesse: Whenever I’m with my dad in his Tesla, he’s searching in Tesla, and is he finding ChargePoint things or they have their own system? And how do you view that?

[00:12:14] Mark: So Tesla is a closed-wall network. So if you want to use a Tesla charger, you can find Tesla chargers that only work with Tesla vehicles, to do things like super fast charging, where you can charge your vehicle within 30 minutes. But you can also use Teslas on ChargePoints. For instance, because ChargePoint likes to stay agnostic to the type of auto OEM brand.

[00:12:37] Jesse: They say at Switzerland they’re like, “We’ll charge anyone. We don’t care.” And obviously if you’re a gas station or whoever wants to buy these things, you want it to be open to as many people as possible.

[00:12:46] Mark: Exactly, because the gas station will make a margin on the electricity that they sell. And also, in certain instances, if you have a charger at your location, then it becomes a strategic advantage because the folks that are charging can come in and buy your products, whether it’s at a grocery store or a retail location or something like a gas station.

[00:13:07] Jesse: You guys expect this market to be very competitive over time. What do people compete on? What are the big areas and why is ChargePoint winning so far? And why do you think they’ll probably continue to keep winning?

[00:13:19] Mark: When we look across just the overall EV charging infrastructure and landscape, it is a land grab. It’s a physical land grab, because you’re out there and you’re trying to secure these parking lots or these locations before anyone else does. So ChargePoint definitely has the first mover advantage in this land grab. They were the first to market for all intents and purposes. They’re the first public company in this space and they developed significant first mover advantage before many of their competitors. So I would say overall, first mover advantage is a clear advantage in the space because the hardware is getting commoditized. The second advantage are things like, being able to offer services that make these ChargePoints relatively simple and easy to maintain with high uptime. So if I’m a ChargePoint owner and I want to have ChargePoints at my apartment complex, for instance, I don’t know how to operate a ChargePoint.

I don’t want to deal with it. I don’t want to schedule maintenance. I want someone else to do that for me and ChargePoint, because they offer their proprietary app and they also offer other services, like ChargePoint Assure or even one called ChargePoint as a Service. They can be this fully integrated, hands off solution, where they say, “Hey, buy our hardware and buy our services, and we’ll take care of it all for you.” So that becomes an advantage, because it becomes relatively low touch for the actual ChargePoint owner themselves. I would say the third is actually partnerships too. So if I’m ChargePoint and I need to acquire site-by-site retail locations, there’s not very much distribution leverage in that. And it becomes really difficult and high customer acquisition costs, if I need to go around to individual shopping malls or whatever it may be, apartment complexes and acquire these individual customers.

But if I can form relationships with the installers, the local electricians, the engineering and procurement firms, for example, and I can have those installers recommend ChargePoint to their networks. Well, then I just gained a whole bunch of distribution leverage. So I can have one partnership with one installer, and then let the installer recommend the hardware and recommend the ChargePoint software on top of that. And so, ChargePoint has done a really good job of forming these partnerships within the industry, whether it’s with the auto OEM themselves or with the installers, or within real estate owners that own massive amounts of real estate across the US…

…[00:19:36] Jesse: How much does one of these things cost?

[00:19:37] Mark: They can be expensive. Let me use this quickly to get into the difference between level one, level two and level three chargers, because they all have various degree of costs. Level one chargers are, what are called trickle charge chargers. And what they’re used for is, primarily charging your EV at home, overnight. So they plug into your standard 120 volt household outlet. They usually require no installation costs, and actually most EVs are sold with one of these level one chargers. They charge at a rate of one to two kilowatts, which means it can often take several days to charge a full car battery. The second type of charger is a level two charger, and these chargers can be found in the home, the workplace or public settings. And if you want to install a level two charger at home, they require a 240 volt outlet, which is typically what you would need for your washer and dryer.

The level two chargers are more expensive. They’re about 10 to $30,000, but they can charge significantly faster than those level one chargers. So the level two chargers can fully charge an EV between four to 10 hours and over 80% of public charge points in the US are level two chargers. So they’re great for places where your car is stationary for a while, which is workplaces or parking garages, things of that nature. And then finally, ChargePoint also sells level three chargers, and level three chargers are also known as DC fast chargers. These can charge your car in about 20 to 30 minutes, but the downside is, they’re significantly more expensive. So a level three charger can cost over $150,000. And a site upgrade for a level three charger could be over a million dollars for a site. So currently, they only make up about 20% of overall chargers available in the US, but they work well with fleets and they work well in locations where you need a quick charge. So in highway corridors, for example…

…[00:33:14] Jesse: Can you speak a little bit to the regulatory environment?

[00:33:17] Mark: We’ll, mainly focus on the US here, but first there’s obviously the infrastructure bill. So in November of last year, the infrastructure bill was passed in the house with $75 billion of investment in EV charging over the next five years, which includes $5 billion of corridor charging for highway corridors and then $2.5 billion for alternative fueling infrastructure to support Biden’s executive order. But actually, there’s also electric vehicle tax credits, which we expect to contribute to the overall adoption of EVs in general. And certain EVs can get up to a $7,500 tax credit. If they’re currently purchased from companies who have sold less than 200,000 electric vehicles.

So this will change with the inflation reduction act, but currently it doesn’t apply to Tesla, GM or Toyota, but there are EV tax credits available for these other brands where you can get up to $7,500 if you are to purchase an EV brand. And then finally the LCFS. So LCFS is the low carbon fuel standard. It’s an emission tradings act enacted in California and 2007. And if a fuel has a carbon intensity lower than certain guidelines, that asset can create an LCFS credit. So ChargePoint can actually create these credits by selling electricity in California, and then those credits can be sold to other regulated parties under LCFS.

3. Meditations: A Requiem for Descartes Labs – Mark Johnson

Descartes Labs was on a mission to better understand our planet through satellite imagery. To enable such a lofty mission, we built a data refinery, a petabyte scale repository of satellite and other geospatial data combined with petaflop scale supercomputing power. Because of our platform, we attracted some of the best scientists from around the world, often fleeing universities and government institutions, looking for an intellectual island to do impactful science. Our Cartesians built some of the most remarkable demonstrations of technology I’ve ever seen in my career.

Even with almost $100m of invested capital (strangely, Crunchbase doesn’t list the last two rounds), >$200m in total going into the company (revenue+investment), ending 2021 with over $17m in revenue, and multiple 8-figure government contracts, the company was sold in a fire sale.

Writing that sentence is absolutely shocking to me. How is it possible that a company with an incredible team, so many successes, so much revenue, and so much invested into the underlying technology could possibly be worth close to nothing?

Given the wild ride of Covid and the economic rollercoaster ride we’re currently on, it’s easy to dismiss Descartes Labs as a victim of macroeconomic circumstances. I don’t believe that to be the case and will make the argument that there were two main reasons for the mismatch in the actual value of the company versus the price that was paid:

1. The company was burning too much cash.
2. The sales process was run poorly. (i.e., the process of selling the company)

At fault is the management team, who executed poorly, and especially the board, who knew these facts and chose to do nothing…

…Though I, too, was extremely skeptical of their business plan, I hopped on a plane to New Mexico on Bastille Day 2014 because I had been obsessed with The Manhattan Project since I was a little kid. When I met the cofounders, I was blown away by their brilliance and humility. Immediately after that first meeting, I knew we needed to start a company.

By the end of 2014, we had settled on satellite imagery instead of media search, we created a company, gave it a “temporary” name of Descartes Labs, raised $275k in angel capital by October, signed a deal with LANL, and closed a $3m seed funding with Crosslink Capital in December of 2014…

…And did we ever! After releasing our predictions ahead of a very important US Department of Agriculture (USDA) forecast, we singlehandedly moved the market 3%, thanks to a well-timed Bloomberg article. Even though we moved the price in the wrong direction (2015 wasn’t our most accurate prediction), it didn’t matter. Big agricultural companies who weren’t returning our phone calls started answering and we were able to raise another $5m from AgTech VC Cultivian-Sandbox.

In 2016, we focused on selling our global agricultural yield forecasts. Cargill, the largest agricultural company in the world and largest privately-held company in the US by revenue (~$130b), approached us with a challenge: could we combine our data with their proprietary data to create better models for their agricultural supply chain business. After many months of hard work, Cargill decided to partner with us, becoming both a customer and an investor.

It’s hard to understate the importance of Cargill to Descartes Labs. Not only did the relationship provide revenue to the company, allowing us to raise a Series B and hire a lot more people, but the thought partnership between Cargill and our team helped us to figure out who we were. They realized before we did that the magic of Descartes Labs wasn’t in a SaaS product to democratize satellite imagery. No, we were a modern AI consulting company (cf., Palantir) who had assembled brilliant minds, built an internal set of tools that gave our scientists access to huge amounts of data, and created a collaborative internal environment to solve complex problems…

…By the end of 2016, we were feeling pretty good about defying the odds of being a New Mexico spinout of a National Lab. We were even profitable in Q4 2016, unheard of for a science startup.

Descartes Labs had become the Miracle on the Mesa.

All the while, a debate was brewing within the company, known as the Descartes Labs Dialectic: are we building a product or a services company?

Descartes Labs crossed $10m of revenue in 2017, typically a massive milestone for software startups. The problem was that 90% of our revenue was in just a handful of accounts. Thanks to a brilliant cofounder in sales and a technical team to back up whatever custom deal was sold, we scored some really big wins for ourselves and for our customers.

The problem was that we hadn’t built any products yet.

Our corn (and eventually soy) forecast was a product of sorts, but we had trouble selling it. Proving that it had “alpha” (i.e., an edge that gives a trader an information advantage) was difficult and the value of a straight forecast was limited. I came to believe that selling data products was the wrong business model for AI startups. (A post from a16z penned by two of their partners in early 2020 is an even better statement of the sentiment.)

Another potential product was the underlying data refinery. Perhaps we were building a platform? We used it to great effect with our customers in building custom models for them. But, the companies that could derive the most value out of our platform were typically in commodities like agriculture, shipping, metals & mining, and forestry. They didn’t have the technical expertise to extract the full value out of the data or computing power within our platform.

We, like many AI companies like Palantir, were a hybrid consulting company: we built a robust platform that we were the best in the world at using and charged our clients lots of money for building unique, extremely valuable, proprietary (read: cannot be sold to others) models. Even if we structured the revenue cleverly by selling our customers a platform subscription and subscriptions to the models we built for them, we still weren’t a SaaS company.

If I could go back and change just one thing, it would be the resolution of the Descartes Labs Dialectic. I would have shut down internal debate in the company from the crowd that thought we should be building a software company. I would have been much clearer in our fundraising decks about what strategy we were pursuing: AI companies can build an enormous amount of enterprise value though specialized consulting contracts.

I succumbed to the market narrative, pushing startup founders to pursue a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) business model.

To “solve” the Dialectic and package Descartes Labs as a software company, we separated the team into the Platform Team and the Applied Science team. The Platform Team built the tools and the Applied Science team built the models. Our typical customer engagement started off with a pilot project, usually around $100k, and our theory was “land-and-expand” (another popular SaaS trope): grow the small account into a much larger account, paying >$1m / year. Even though we were taking consulting contracts in the short term, in the long term, a product would emerge from the engineering team.

Or, at least that’s the theory on which we raised our $30m series B from March Capital in the Summer of 2017. Series B was another pre-emptive round, raised without me having to go through a full process and shake the money trees on Sand Hill Road. This new capital was intended to grow our sales & marketing team, build out our “product,” and move into a growth stage so we could raise a healthy series C.

Looking back on Series B, I’m conflicted. On one hand, I absolutely believe in taking money when it’s available. In 2017, we were 8 years into a bull run and we wondered how long the gravy train would keep running. On the other hand, when you take a big round, it’s important to be prudent with the cash and expand only when you believe that there is a viable business model. This requires investors and the company to be aligned around what constitutes product-market fit and what signals indicate that the business model is ready to be scaled.

In 2018, we scored a few minor wins, which kept our revenue up and to the right, close to $20m. Thanks to superior performance against our original DARPA contract, we were able to translate that contract into a much larger deal to build a geospatial data refinery for the government, in a contract worth up to $7.2m. We also made a considerable amount of progress booking pilot contracts from $50-$150k, not bad for initial projects. For 2019, our plan was to continue that pipeline of pilots and translate some of those pilots into large, multi-year 7-figure contracts and we’d be flying high.

However, by the end of 2018, we realized that our land-and-expand thesis was encountering roadblocks. We were losing money on pilots (read: negative gross margins) and translating those pilots into larger deals was difficult. Predicting revenue was nearly impossible (read: not a repeatable business model), driven by long lead times and uncertainty around how much value our pilot projects would deliver to the customer.

Things got dicey around our Q4 2018 board meeting, where we presented our 2019 plan. We projected that 2019 would be a 50% increase in revenue year-over-year, given that we hadn’t quite figured out our sales process or product . The board was not pleased, they wanted to see a much steeper growth curve.

Now the Descartes Labs Dialectic reared its head. Our investors wanted us to be a SaaS company with SaaS metrics and SaaS growth. We simply were not. We should have structured our entire business around being a high-end consulting company. Perhaps we wouldn’t have gotten SaaS multiples. Perhaps. Or perhaps we would have focused our energy on what we did best. I’d rather have $100m / year of long-term consulting contracts than burning expensive venture capital on a fantasy SaaS product.

Ultimately we capitulated to the board’s desire for an unrealistic revenue expectation because, in my mind, isn’t that what I signed up for when I raised the money? Unfortunately, it caused the company to focus on improbable but high-value deals instead of getting our product philosophy and sales strategy in order. By pushing us into unreasonable growth expectations, the board drove us to hit our numbers in the short term, not build a long-term engine for growth.

4. Robert F. Smith – Investing in Enterprise Software – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and Robert F. Smith

So Robert, I was toying with where to begin our discussion. And because we’re in such an interesting market for software companies, let’s say, if you just looked at public equities where multiples have come way down, my first question is one of perspective. You’ve been investing in software, maybe more specifically enterprise software, for a very long time. I think if you have to find the right pond to fish in, you found this pond earlier than most. Maybe just lend some perspective to us on what this market looks and feels like to you versus your long history backing these sorts of businesses.

Robert [00:03:03] The whole reason I even got into this space, I started my career as a chemical engineer. It was at a time when we were really doing some interesting things in that area. And part of it was we were digitizing the operational elements of what we call unit operations, i.e., running plants and facilities, et cetera. And we were going from an analog model, where you’re, what I call, observing an event, might be a reaction, a state of reaction, and then making the adjustment, adjusting various inputs to modulate that reaction.

Well, when you introduce computing technology into that environment, you go from an observation being episodic or periodic, depending upon who’s the operator and what they happen to be thinking about at that moment in time or human foibles, yes, exactly, literally, to you’re actually measuring the output of a system thousands of times a second, which gives you the ability to then make changes to the inputs at a similar rate. The nature of that is it actually eliminated a tremendous amount of waste in process industries.

And then once Moore’s Law kicked in and computing capacity became more readily available and the insights and the skill sets of people like myself and others expanded to our colleges and university systems, we’re able to bring that productivity into the broader industrial environment and then, of course, the office environment, where we went from doing things quite manually in the office environment to automated, things as simple as Word processing and calculations and spreadsheets and ultimately utilizing things like artificial intelligence to aid in decision-making, created massive efficiency and productivity in our economy. The insight around all of this was, well, at the end of all of this, that is enterprise software, business software that ultimately has now been identified as the most productive tool introduced in our business economy over the last 50 years and likely for the next 50…

...Patrick [00:05:53] If you think about the percent of the time that a given person that’s a professional working somewhere or spends in some form of software, it’s crazy high. I don’t know what the percentage is, but it’s really, really high. And I think about it almost like an oil well or something, how much is there left to mine or extract of people’s time and their workflow? And my question is how mature it feels to you in the world of enterprise software. Like in the one sense, we’re all using software all the time, so it seems like it’s a penetrated story. Like lots of people use software in their daily work all the time. When you got started, that probably was much less the case. As you think about the next 50 years, what drives that? Do you share that sense that there is some saturation in this market? We’ll talk about the business model and a million other things in a minute. But just at a high level, how far into this does it feel to you?

Robert [00:06:41] Not to be too much of a cliche, but we are in the early innings of this. You have to remember, in the early days, the access to computing power was the rate-limiting step. It was like who could afford a computer? Governments and large corporations and ultimately, universities, et cetera, and then you went through the micros and the minis and now the next generation of this, the superscalers, even the hosted computing systems, cloud computing is how people really think about it.

What that has done, in many cases, you look at some of these businesses that have multibillion-dollar valuations, all they really did, in some cases, was to digitize a manual workflow. There’s some that you can think about now for managing sales flows. Before, you had a bunch of salespeople sitting around, and they put together their information about, “Oh, yes. All right. Here’s what I think I’m going to do, and here’s my prospect list.”And they’d send it to the regional manager, and that person kind of moved their Ouija board around and say, “Here’s what I think it is.” They’d go to the national manager and then they report to the CEO and the Head of Finance and, “Okay, here’s what we think our sales are going to be for this month, this quarter, this year,” whatever it might be.

And a lot of big companies, actually what they’ll do is they digitize that. But did they really bring any insights or start to create predictive analysis? That is just now starting. That’s why I talk about the data that now has been digitized across these systems is now accessible. And then you can start to implement algorithmic systems on those to now make it predictive and a little more accurate and, in some cases, now reach forward and saying, “Here’s where you ought to spend your time.” Or how do you now bring in 2 or 3 of those systems and platforms together so that it’s not just one system of record, i.e., what your salesperson put in, but also starts to evaluate what your customers are actually doing every day. What are their buying and spending patterns? And that confluence brings some insights into that.

If you think about it, I call it the second order effect of enterprise software, which is data. The analytics of that data is in its infancy. And that is where the actual true expansion of productivity will now come. I do think there’s a lot of opportunity set there. I think it is orders of magnitude bigger than what we’ve seen in the productivity to date but is going to continue to require the adoption, I’ll call it, of the platforms and then, of course, the application of the analytics on top of those platforms.

And frankly, there are constraints still around how we do that. One of the biggest constraints, of course, is finding capable people. We always talk about this war for talent in our space. 7.5 billion people on the planet, there’s only 29 million of us who write code for a living. I mean it’s the most productive tool out there. It impacts every business. During the time of COVID, we all “went home” or went to some place I wasn’t working. We’re accessing our work through these systems, but there’s only 29 million of us who actually write the code for those systems…

…Patrick [00:14:33] If you think about the landscape, if I had every single eligible, let’s say, enterprise software business in the world together and I wanted to arrange them in a room from lowest quality to highest quality, they’re not all created equal, right? Everyone seems to have come to accept that software businesses can be the best businesses in the world based on just some economic features of them, but some are very bad. So if you think about that spectrum from bad to great, how is the spectrum itself defined? What’s a Vista company? What are the qualities boiled down that are most critical to you when evaluating one of these businesses?

Robert [00:15:07] Sure. And I’ll give you some of the things that are critically important to have and some of the things we really do, I’ll call it, in a differentiated way versus anyone else out there. So look, everybody knows the nature of enterprise software lends itself to what we call these mission-critical, business-critical type of businesses. And if you run them well, you’ll have high retention rates with your customers. You’ll be able to have businesses that have visible recurring revenue components to the business. Those are things that we look at, not surprisingly, and understanding the quality of all of those elements and what are the quality of the relationships and the quality of the product. Where are they in the stages of what I call product superiority? And then what are the elements of execution excellence that the company needs to emphasize or support?

But on the other side, and this is when people get it wrong, they get it wrong here most of the time, of the businesses, the enterprise software companies that have failed and gone bankrupt or had all sorts of financial challenges, it’s because, typically, they have too much technical debt. Most people don’t really understand what that is. They think about debt in terms of financial debt. But technical debt is compounding. And as you write code over a year, 5 years or 10 years or 20 years, often, if you don’t take the right product development approach to it, you create a tremendous amount of code that has some flaws. It has some bugs. It has some architectural idiosyncrasies that might work for 8 customers or 200 but not for the other 5,000, that every time you make an upgrade in the code, you have to go back and make those adjustments, so that your customers’ products continue to work with their solutions, how they use and continue to work. And that is often an oversight for almost every investor that I know of outside of Vista that they don’t really spend enough time on that.

And if and when you do, this is when we take a pass on a company, it’s often because they have too much technical debt relative to the pace of the market that they are in. We have a whole set of best practices around reducing and then ultimately eliminating technical debt. To me, that is one of the more liberating elements that one can do in managing these businesses. And it’s not something that you just naturally know how to do as an investor. A lot of investors think, “Oh, let me just buy a good company and hope the management team can figure it out.” But you’d be surprised at how many management teams I know that we spend time with in due diligence evaluating businesses that actually don’t really have a sense for the amount of technical debt that they currently have and never thought of that, yet they provide increasing levels of resources against managing their existing code base and not really realizing that they’re losing ground every day because they actually haven’t taken the right approach to eliminating technical debt. They just figure it’s just the cost of doing business…

…Patrick [00:20:32] And in terms of just now software has become so proliferated, there’s lots of subcategories. There’s cyber software, there’s critical market, operating system-type software. Are there categories that you’ve gravitated to or away from that you feel most lend themselves to this sort of engineered approach that you’ve outlined to managing them?

Robert [00:20:51] There are some industries where the participants, the software providers have relinquished or given up a lot of their intellectual property to their customers. You think about pharmaceuticals, those are sort of areas, for instance, where, often, the end user environment is so concentrated, they actually have the market power in how that software and that code advances. We look for more broadly distributed customer bases, where you don’t have high concentration risk in your customers, and we look for where there’s actually still a high ROI, return on investment, of the products that you were selling to your customer base. I mean this is just an internal statistic. But we measure every year what’s the average return on investment for the products that we sell to our customers.

Think about we have 80-plus software companies, 300 million users of our software over, I think, it’s now 2.2 million customers, I think 800,000-plus enterprise, 1.4 million small to medium businesses. But we look for what is the value of the software that we’re selling. The average ROI of the products that we sell to our average customer is 640% ROI. Now think about it. There’s very little business investment that you can make that gives you that level of ROI. So a small to medium business, actually typically higher, more like 900% enterprise, depending upon what it is in terms of the product, again the average is 640%, maybe a little lower. But what that says is your next incremental dollar, as almost any business in any industry, is best spent on buying more software.

Patrick [00:22:24] How do you measure that? That seems like a hard thing to measure and capture.

Robert [00:22:27] Not really. It’s as simple as if I implement, pick it, a solution for payroll, okay, if I implement — this is old school, but just how many payroll clerks do I no longer need if I implement a payroll software system? Pretty easy to calculate. Here’s how much it costs, all right? Or waste, how much of a waste do I eliminate by implementing this software solution to measure some energy usage or something? It’s math at the end of the day, and you’ve got to have some analytics around the math. But that’s what we do. And we do it for every one of the companies. And so that gives you a sense for, okay, here’s how valuable that software is to that industry. Media industry, “Okay, if we give you this system to manage how your media spins or buys are done, how much more efficiently can you promote and/or sell it? How fewer resources do you need to develop or to devote to that activity?”

Robotic process automation, so you asked me an earlier question about, “Okay, where are we in the inning?” Okay, if you’ve got a bunch of people going around and doing some clerical work, let’s say, and moving one set of data from one system to another day-to-day, I call it a swivel chair kind of an enterprise, pull it out of one system, put it in another, versus put a robotic process automation system and, guess what, ROI is massive. It could be as simple as transaction reconciliation, how you reconcile a purchase order versus what was shipped. And if that’s done manually versus put an RPA system in it, guess what, you get massive, massive implications of ROI.

Patrick [00:23:56] So the 640% or whatever the number is, that napkin math is an absolute no-brainer for the customer. If we take that napkin math, I’ll call it, IRR napkin math now to the investing side, as you think about what you’re willing to pay in terms of a multiple, let’s say, for one of these businesses, how has that evolved over time? Like public multiples on enterprise software got so crazy a year ago, and now they’ve come basically back down to their long-term norm. But what are the key things in the napkin math that you’ve evolved over time as you think about the price you’re willing to pay for a single one of these businesses?

Robert [00:24:26] We kind of look at it in 2 buckets: there are the companies that are growing faster, and then there’s what I call the companies that have met their addressable market and they’re operating on a profitability metric, take out the last 6 months. But the prior 2 years has been the most frothy from a valuation perspective that we’ve seen in the history of enterprise software and the history of software, period. We at Vista took advantage of that and took 6 companies public and sold into that market. Valuations are rough, guess what, let’s sell into that market, right? And we actually were one of the few, and actually one of our investors pointed that out, that actually decelerated in the investing in that marketplace in terms of public market, not in the break of investing, but public market, which were really experiencing those lofty valuations.

Interestingly enough, we actually maintained the same market multiple. It actually biases down over those 2 years that we did than the prior 5. We used a thing called a growth adjusted multiple in the first, call it, half of the decade. A growth adjusted multiple, on average, in the overall market was like 0.43. The market in the last couple of years maxed out at twice that amount, 0.93.

Patrick [00:25:42] And what does that number mean? What is the growth adjustment?

Robert [00:25:44] How do you think about a price revenue growth multiple? What’s the price that you’re paying something relative to the growth multiple of that business? So you’ve heard of PEG ratios, price-to-earnings ratio?

Patrick [00:25:56] Yes, of course. Sure.

Robert [00:25:58] Rather than earnings, for a fast-growing software company, use revenue. So you do that, and you divide it basically by the growth rate of that business. So it’s kind of doubled over those 2 years. Our average was still, over the last 2 years, below that 0.43. Whereas the market went as high as 0.93, the market average went to 0.61, 0.62. These are people buying into these enterprise software businesses. We’ve always maintained a very disciplined approach to how we buy those businesses. In the last couple of years, we’ve been buying them at half the price the last 2 years of the overall market. The vast majority of those businesses we bought the last couple of years were private.

We only did 2 take privates in that period of time. Whereas any time there’s a downturn, we took 6 before that and 2 before that, 2 before that in terms of public to private type of models because those public markets were experiencing those lofty valuations. That’s one way that we really think about it, really evaluate and understanding that when the markets are being lofty, that’s a good time to sell into them, not surprisingly, makes sense. And when the markets have come down where they are today, and if you look at our overall market, these growth adjusted revenue multiples back down towards 0.41 type of a level, which is just slightly above where we’ve been buying our companies over the last couple of years.

Patrick [00:27:15] What have you learned about the role of churn, like customer churn inside these businesses? That seems to be a variable that’s coming at me from every direction, that this is the ultimate arbiter of revenue quality for a software business, not net dollar retention but just actual customers leaving and why. What did you learn about that over the 22 years?

Robert [00:27:34] We have a couple of metrics. One is recurring revenues, and one is retention rate. And we look at net dollar retention rate as an important statistic or KPI that we measure. In many cases, I mean, our overall portfolio, which is, whatever, call it fifth-largest enterprise software company if you just added all of it up together, over these last 2 years, it’s a 104% net retention rate. Think about that. That’s pretty staggering in terms of, okay, showing that what we provide to our customers is of value. The thing you have to think about in an environment like this, in a recessionary environment is, okay, where do you get that churn? We just walked through the mission-critical nature of these businesses, the actual ROI of the products that we sell to our customer base and how important it is.

So if you’ve got churn, you’ve got to look at it. Is it because the customers picked another solution or they went out of business? If they’ve gone out of business, is there some fundamental underlying element of that industry that you’re serving that gives you some suggestion that this is not one that you want to necessarily invest in?

Our teams — and I’ve just got a marvelous investment team, frankly, really think about that and unpack that and get very granular by geography, by segment, by customer, by customer size. And we really spend a lot of time on it to understand, are there some inherent issues with the industry or the product’s position in that marketplace that should give us some pause or confidence on how mission-critical, business-critical, not only the solution is, but that specific solution is with the company that we’re evaluating or the company that we own? And then that informs us as to how we bring forward our value creation motion and what are the things we want to focus on. Because that may inform me, guess what, here’s a segment in the marketplace that we need to spend more time on or invest in or build a different set of solutions for or enhance, call it, the go-to-market opportunity with that segment.

5. An Interview With Eric Seufert About the Future of Digital Advertising – Ben Thompson and Eric Seufert 

Let’s start there. Walk me through SKAdNetwork 4.0 and the changes that are coming.

ES: SKAdNetwork 4.0 is basically like a page one rewrite of SKAdNetwork. It seems like they just burned down the schematic and built something totally new with a blank page. It’s better across the board and so all credit due to Apple, this is a welcome change, I think there’s a lot of potential here. I wrote a post about it, there’s a lot of detail.

There’s three big buckets of change — really four but three that I care about. Basically at a high level, big concept, SKAdNetwork 3.0 very much operates on this binary conception of privacy, you either surpass some threshold that Apple has determined for privacy or you don’t, and if you don’t, then you get almost no in-app context back in the postback that gets sent, you basically just get an install log but it’s sent on this random timer system and so you don’t get it in real time, you get it on this delay. There’s this privacy threshold which is not public, we don’t know if it’s dynamic, there’s a lot of mystery around it. But either you surpass that or you don’t in terms of the number of events that have been captured from a specific campaign from a specific app, and if you don’t then you get no context.

What they’ve done is they’ve added gradations now. It’s not just binary yes or no, but there’s gradations, and if you reach the highest level of what they’ve called now in the new terminology they’re using here — it’s not new but it’s new to this — is Crowd Anonymity. Basically the more people that you have in a group the harder it is to identify any single one of them, that’s the crux of that idea. So what they’ve done is, as you increase the level of Crowd Anonymity with the number of events that are generated, then you unlock more value from the system. At the highest level of Crowd Anonymity, you get very many source identifiers that pertain to the campaign and you could codify those however you want. You could get potentially creative information embedded in that and various parameters of the campaign information encoded in that. You can set it up however you want, but if you don’t, then you get just the normal 100. They’ve done the same with Conversion Values. Now, if you reach the highest level of Crowd Anonymity, you get the 6-bit options of Conversion Values. But if you don’t, if you just reach that middle tier and there’s three tiers, then you get what they call a coarse grained Conversion Value, which it’s just three values. It’s high, medium, low. But you could encode information in that it helps you understand whether that’s a good campaign or not.

Just to jump in on this because I think this is actually a really important point. Big picture, we were pretty grumpy at Apple last time, we could try to put on our “Let’s try to give the best possible explanation for what Apple is doing” hats here. I think the concern is if you are sending super specific feedback and you only have ten users just to use an extreme example, you can back out who specific users are and so what they’re saying is if you have millions of users we can send you very specific events because it’s basically impossible to figure out whoever every single one was. I just want to put a stake in the ground on that, because I think that it’s actually super critical to understanding broader changes in the ecosystem. We’ll talk about the Unity stuff later, but by implication you have to be large because if you’re going to get the best feedback, you have to have a huge number of impressions and events to make this all work. I just wanted to double down on that specific point.

ES: What I would add to that, I’m not going to dig into the details here because I think it goes beyond the scope of the conversation, but yes you just described it really well. But the problem was before, there was a chicken-and-egg problem. I have a campaign, and I’m spending some minimum amount of money against it because I want to measure the performance before I start increasing the amount of money that I spend against it. But I’m not getting any data from the postbacks, because I’m not spending enough money to generate enough events.

You don’t want to dump millions of dollars into that campaign, you don’t know if it works.

ES: I’m at an impasse, I don’t want to spend more money on it because I’m not getting any performance feedback, but I’m not getting any performance feedback cause I’m not spending any money on it — so, chicken-and-egg. Now with this, if I spend a little bit more money and I get to that middle level of crowd anonymity, I get the high, medium, low feedback, and I can encode that to mean something that is relevant to me to give me some signal as to whether this campaign could be a good one. Just having that intermediary step gives me a lot of really valuable context that prevents this from being binary yes or no and breaks me out of that chicken-and-egg problem. Now I could spend a little bit more money because I’m getting some signal that, “Hey, this is all coming back with the high value” and if I’ve set that to mean the predicted value of this user after ninety days, “Okay that’s high”, that means these are good users, I should spend more money, and it gives you the signal that you need in that early stage to determine whether you can spend more money against the campaign or not to really unlock all the value.

Are they also speeding up the feedback loop so that once you start spending high, you can immediately see if this is worth it or not before you’ve spent too much and make changes?

ES: Yes. The other thing that I’m really excited about is they just did away with the timer system, which was overly engineered, complex, and convoluted. Now there’s just attribution windows, and there’s three. So now you can potentially get up to three postbacks, it’s not just a single postback and the attribution windows are fixed. Now they’re not zero day, it’s zero to two days is the first window, but it’s fixed and so you know when you’ll get that postback. On top of that, because you know what the fixed interval is, you can actually model much more easily on top of that to get to install estimates whereas before you couldn’t, because the timer system was random…

…Just to rewind though, you had three things about SKAdNetwork. You had the gradation sort of privacy, you had the faster and set time limits for when they’re giving you feedback, what was the third one?

ES: Just to recapitulate, so there’s hierarchical source identifiers, hierarchical conversion values, the third one is multiple conversions and then there’s a fourth one — those three are the primary considerations for me. There’s a fourth one that SKAdNetwork can now handle attributions from the web, so there’s four big new pieces of functionality coming.

There is one more point I wanted to make about SKAdNetwork: I would say that if at the outset, if at WWDC 2020, what Apple had presented to advertisers was SKAdNetwork 4.0, the spec, and they had unified the personalized ads texts across Apple’s own opt-in prompt and the ATT prompt, and Apple Search Ads used SKAdNetwork instead of the Apple Ads Attribution API, if all those things were true, and those all seem like reasonable things to ask for, I would’ve applauded ATT. I would’ve said, “This is the right thing to do, this is good for consumers, this is the direction that advertisers should have predicted they were going to have to move in.” I would’ve said, “ATT is excellent and I fully support this.”

The problem was SKAdNetwork 2.0 — 2.0 is what they unveiled at WWDC 2020 — was just totally dysfunctional and didn’t work. Then the differences in treatment between their own network and their own opt-in prompts between the ATT prompt and other ad networks. If all those things were addressed, I would be absolutely an advocate for ATT, I think it would’ve been the right policy, but it’s just the preferential treatment in addition to this totally dysfunctional SKAdNetwork, which to your point, was unnecessarily dysfunctional, it created pain that wasn’t necessary to protect consumer privacy…

…You mentioned this a little bit earlier, but as we’re wrapping up here, looking forward you can see Apple maybe doing some more crackdowns on fingerprinting or some of this third party stuff, there’s potential regulation. It kind of feels inescapable to me that there’s going to be more consolidation. The returns to being very large are going to be huge and I think particularly for Meta, it’s pretty interesting because if you have this situation where 1) you need to be large and 2) ads need to be increasingly contextual, which is going to just require a lot more computing capacity and modeling and things along those lines relative to an IDFA, which was kind of straightforward — you just match column A to column B. Is it wrong to actually be somewhat optimistic about Meta’s fortunes looking forward?

ES: No, I think you’re exactly right. So Sheryl [Sandberg] — what a run she had at Meta — in her last earnings call, brought up click-to-message ads like five times or ten times.

We’ll miss the Sheryl anecdotes in general, I should note.

ES: Yeah, she seems very optimistic about those and that kind of aligns with my content fortress thesis. [CEO] Mark [Zuckerberg] even said that one of the big initiatives of the company is to grow first party understanding of people’s interests by making it easier for people to engage with businesses in our own apps. So just to generate much more first party data that they can use to target ads. The other thing is Reels, obviously if your ability to target ads has been degraded, the value of the ads decrease. Well, how do you maintain the same amount of revenue? You show more ads, and you probably don’t want to increase the ad load — ad load is the number of ads seen per session. So then you want to increase the session length, or per minute of session or whatever is ad load and so if you increase the session length, then ad load can stay the same, you get more ads. Even though they’re lower CPM, which is exactly what happened to them last quarter, they had total ad impressions was up 15%, average price for ad was down 14% and they were down 1% year over year on revenue.

This is the counterintuitive thing about these businesses, that’s great news! I remember back when Google first IPOed and people would look at, “Oh, the cost per ad is going down.” It’s like, “That’s good!” It’s very counterintuitive because it’s dangerous when — this happened to Facebook a couple times — where they just run out of places to grow as far as ads goes.

This happened right before Stories. Their price per ad was going up, and people were getting excited about this, “Wow, look at the pricing power.” And it was like, “No”, this is actually a very problematic sign because that means they don’t have sufficient inventory to show, that also means advertisers are going to other platforms, it’s giving other platforms money and the ability to increase their competitive product, and Stories was this huge triumph from a business perspective because they just exploded their ad inventory and their price-per-ad plummeted.

It’s hilarious, because their stock got killed, the second biggest drop after Facebook’s first greatest drop this year was Facebook after the Stories earnings, when they announced that this was happening. I remember at the time I’m like, “No, this is really great news,” because it basically sets them up for multiple years of growth opportunities, which is what happened. And just to double down on your Reels point, them focusing on Reels, it’s kind of like of all the stuff that’s gone wrong for Meta/Facebook, the fact that they’re doing this Reels double down at the same time they’re having these ad business challenges is actually a piece of good fortune in my opinion.

ES: Yeah, I think so. Sheryl even mentioned that this is the playbook. It’s like we get a toe hold, we find a new front and we expand our inventory and then we get better at targeting ads in that inventory, so the value of the ads goes up. But that’s a process, you have to find the new port point of entry for showing these ads and then you’ll over time increase the value of them because you’ll get better at understanding what signals to use for targeting.

Just to follow up on what you said, it’s important, I think we’re getting to a point where size, scale, sophistication, all of those things are going to be really important just for any sort of competitive staying power, and especially with SKAdNetwork 4.0. Because 2.0 and 3.0 kind of leveled the playing field.

(laughing)It was terrible for everyone.

ES: Yes, exactly. With 4.0 your ability to parse out meaning from the added context that you’ll get with potentially three postbacks with the hierarchical conversion values, Facebook’s going to be able to do a lot more with that than probably any other ad platform except for maybe Google. So they’ll be better positioned to take that new context and build value out of it. If you’re thinking about — and Sheryl said this too — we’re at the beginning stages of clawing back the measurement that we lost. But I think they’re very realistic about where they are in this process. Just giving them more surface area to extract value from will benefit them in a way that a lot of the app install networks probably can’t do. Maybe even like a Snap, a Pinterest, a Twitter can’t do, I think it’s going to make the topography more diverse again so the playing field will no longer be level.

Yeah, you just need rules of the road. I think the problem with SKAdNetwork 2.0 is because it was worthless, everyone was just adrift on the sea and with the new SKAdNetwork, if you actually know the rules to play by, yeah those rules might be crappier than the rules you had previously so you’re going to have to build it again, but as long as there’s something you can rely on, and something you can model against, you can build something again. But to the degree it’s hard to do, the more that favors Facebook. It’s kind of like the GDPR thing, I wrote this at the beginning, I’m like, “This is so clearly going to benefit the biggest companies because they can afford to hire all the compliance officers, they can afford to do all this work.” I think it’s going to be a similar dynamic here.

ES: 100% and I think it’s doubly true with the AI initiatives. I think when Zuckerberg talks about AI, he doesn’t mean it in the way that most people interpret it. He’s talking about parsing signal out of video.

And it’s going to be the same problem. Show the right video to someone in Reels, and show them the right ad, it’s the same challenge.

ES: Exactly. But it’s a much more appreciable challenge than doing that with text, and who can compete there? Facebook’s got its own data centers with its own hardware, that was always Snap’s problem, by the way, their cost of revenue was so high because they were totally dependent on Google Cloud and Amazon Cloud.

That’s a great point. That’s going to actually get worse for them now that they have to start doing this AI analysis of video.

ES: Yeah, Facebook said they’re doubling or tripling a number of GPUs that they’re going to have in their own proprietary hardware, in their own owned data centers. Who can compete with that?

6. Why Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei’s new memo has gone viral on China’s internet – Iris Deng

A leaked internal memo by Ren Zhengfei, founder of Huawei Technologies Co., has gone viral on China’s social media, as his bleak outlook of the global economy strikes a chord in the country’s business and technology sectors.

The memo, which was first reported by Chinese media outlet Yicai on Tuesday, painted a gloomy picture of a world heading into economic recession. It called for employees to focus on the company’s survival and give up on wishful thinking.

Huawei declined to confirm or deny the memo, but sources told the Post that the text, which has been widely reported locally and shared on the internet, is authentic.

“The next 10 years will come down as a painful period in history, as the world economy goes into recession … Huawei needs to tone down on any over-optimistic forecast and make survival its most important creed in the next three years,” Ren wrote.

This is not the first time that Ren, 77, has reminded Huawei employees that the firm is navigating a business crisis. Huawei’s rotating chairman, Eric Xu Zhijun, also repeatedly said in 2020 and 2021 that the company’s goal was to survive US sanctions, which barred its access to US-origin technology, such as advanced smartphone chips.

However, Ren’s new warnings come amid fresh challenges, as Beijing carries on with draconian Covid-19 controls despite the Chinese economy being in its worst shape in decades.

China’s gross domestic product grew only 0.4 per cent in the second quarter, the worst since the first quarter of 2020, when the coronavirus shut down large swathes of the country, driving GDP down by 6.8 per cent.

7. Big beliefs – Morgan Housel

Most fields are a hierarchy of truths with big ideas at the top and laws, rules, and finer details branching off below them. Viewing ideas in isolation, without recognizing the family tree of where they came from, gives a distorted view of how a field works and can overcomplicate what are often simple answers.

Beliefs are the same. How many business and investing beliefs do I have – opinions, ideas, models, etc? I don’t know, thousands probably. It’s a complex topic. But most of them derive from a few core beliefs.

A few big things I believe:

The inability to forecast the past has no impact on our desire to forecast the future. Certainty is so valuable that we’ll never give up the quest for it, and most people couldn’t get out of bed in the morning if they were honest about how uncertain the future is…

...It takes less effort to increase confidence than it does ability. Confidence gives the impression of removing uncertainty, which we desperately want and are quick to embrace, while ability is constantly under attack from competition and an evolving economy…

…Sitting still feels reckless in a fast-moving world, even in situations where it offers the best odds of long-term compounding. It’s like being told that you should play dead if a grizzly charges you – running for your life just feels more practical. The bias towards action is one of the strongest forces in business investing for three reasons: It can be the only signal to yourself and others that you’re not oblivious to risks. It can be the only signal to others that you’re worth your salary. And it can provide the illusion of control in a world where so much is out of your hands.

It’s hard to determine what is dumb luck and what is unfortunate risk. Investing is a game of probabilities, and almost all probabilities are less than 100%. You can make a good bet with the odds in your favor and still lose, and a reckless bet and still win. It makes it difficult to judge others’ performance – lots of good decisions end up on the unfortunate side of risk and vice versa.

Calm plants the seeds of crazy. If markets never crashed they wouldn’t be risky. If they weren’t risky they would get expensive. When they’re expensive they crash. Same for recessions. When the economy is stable people become optimistic. When they get optimistic they go into debt. When they go into debt the economy becomes unstable. Crazy times aren’t an accident – they’re an inevitability. The same cycle works in reverse, as depressed times create opportunities that plant the seeds of the next boom. One way to summarize it: Nothing too good or too bad lasts indefinitely.

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Alphabet (parent of Google), Apple, Meta Platforms (parent of Facebook), and Tesla. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 21 August 2022:

1. Use Your Edge – Peter Lynch

What’s the best way to invest $1 million? Tip one: Don’t buy stocks on tips alone. If your only reason for picking a stock is that an expert likes it, then what you really need is paid professional help. Mutual funds are a great idea (I ran one once) for folks who want this sort of assistance at a reasonable price…

…If I’m right, then large numbers of investors must have lost money outright or badly trailed a market that’s up eightfold since 1982. How did so many do so poorly? Maybe they traded a new stock every week. Maybe they bought stocks in companies they knew little about, companies with shaky prospects and bad balance sheets. Maybe they didn’t follow these companies closely enough to get out when the news got worse. Maybe they stuck with their losers through thin and thinner, without checking the story. Maybe they bought stock options. Whatever the case, they failed at navigating their own course.

Amateurs can beat the Street because, well, they’re amateurs.

At the risk of repeating myself, I’m convinced that this type of failure is unnecessary – that amateurs can not only succeed on their own but beat the Street by (a) taking advantage of the fact that they are amateurs and (b) taking advantage of their personal edge. Almost everyone has an edge. It’s just a matter of identifying it…

…If you put together a portfolio of five to ten of these high achievers, there’s a decent chance one of them will turn out to be a 10-, a 20-, or even a 50-bagger, where you can make 10, 20 or 50 times your investment. With your stake divided among a handful of issues, all it takes is a couple of gains of this magnitude in a lifetime to produce superior returns…

…A lot of people mistakenly think they must search far and wide to find a company with this sort of potential. In fact, many such companies are hard to ignore. They show up down the block or inside the house. They stare us in the face.

This is where it helps to have identified your personal investor’s edge. What is it that you know a lot about? Maybe your edge comes from your profession or a hobby. Maybe it comes just from being a parent. An entire generation of Americans grew up on Gerber’s baby food, and Gerber’s stock was a 100-bagger. If you put your money where your baby’s mouth was, you turned $10,000 into $1 million. Fifty-baggers like Home Depot, Wal-Mart, and Dunkin’ Donuts were obvious success stores to large crowds of do-it-yourselfers, shoppers, and policemen. Mention any of these at a party, though, and you’re likely to get the predictable reaction: “Chances like that don’t come along anymore.”

Ah, but they do. Take Microsoft – I wish I had.

You didn’t need a PhD to figure out that Microsoft was going to be powerful.

I avoided buying technology stocks if I didn’t understand the technology, but I’ve begun to rethink that rule. You didn’t need a PhD in programming to recognise the way computers were becoming a bigger and bigger part of our lives, or to figure out that Microsoft owned the rights to MS-DOS, the operating system used in a vast majority of the world’s PCs.

It’s hard to believe that the almighty Microsoft has been a public company for only 11 years. If you bought it during the initial public offering, at 78 cents a share (adjusted for splits), you’ve made 100 times your money. But Apple was the dominant company at the time, so maybe you waited until 1988, when Microsoft had a chance to prove itself.

By then, you have realized that IBM and all its clones were using Microsoft’s operating system MS-DOS. IBM and the clones could fight it out for market share, but Microsoft would prosper regardless of who won. This is the old combat theory of investing: When there’s a war going on, don’t buy the companies that are doing the fighting; buy the companies that sell the bullets. In this case, Microsoft was selling the bullets. The stock has risen 25-fold since 1988.

The next time Microsoft might have got your attention was 1992, when Windows 3.1 made its debut. Three million copies were sold in six weeks. If you bought the stock on the strength of the product, you’ve quadrupled your money to date. Then, at the end of 1995, Windows 95 was released, with more than 7 million copies sold in three months and 40 million copies as of this writing. If you bought the stock on the Windows 95 debut, you’ve doubled your money.

2. Nuclear Fusion Breakthrough Confirmed: California Team Achieved Ignition – Jess Thomson

Researchers at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) National Ignition Facility (NIF) recorded the first case of ignition on August 8, 2021, the results of which have now been published in three peer-reviewed papers.

Nuclear fusion is the process that powers the Sun and other stars: heavy hydrogen atoms collide with enough force that they fuse together to form a helium atom, releasing large amounts of energy as a by-product. Once the hydrogen plasma “ignites”, the fusion reaction becomes self-sustaining, with the fusions themselves producing enough power to maintain the temperature without external heating.

Ignition during a fusion reaction essentially means that the reaction itself produced enough energy to be self-sustaining, which would be necessary in the use of fusion to generate electricity.

f we could harness this reaction to generate electricity, it would be one of the most efficient and least polluting sources of energy possible. No fossil fuels would be required as the only fuel would be hydrogen, and the only by-product would be helium, which we use in industry and are actually in short supply of…

…”The record shot was a major scientific advance in fusion research, which establishes that fusion ignition in the lab is possible at NIF,” said Omar Hurricane, chief scientist for LLNL’s inertial confinement fusion program, in a statement.

“Achieving the conditions needed for ignition has been a long-standing goal for all inertial confinement fusion research and opens access to a new experimental regime where alpha-particle self-heating outstrips all the cooling mechanisms in the fusion plasma.”

In the experiments performed to reach this ignition result, researchers heat and compress a central “hot spot” of deuterium-tritium (hydrogen atoms with one and two neutrons, respectively) fuel using a surrounding dense piston also made from deuterium-tritium, creating a super hot, super pressurized hydrogen plasma.

3. You can make any piece of data look bad if you try – Sam Ro

The reports are accurate. For months, layoffs have been affecting an array of companies, including well known names JPMorgan, Netflix, Tesla, Coinbase, Robinhood, and Peloton. And the numbers are not small. According to the BLS, 1.3 million workers were laid off in June alone. It’s an incredibly challenging situation for everyone impacted.

BUT, this is not yet a sign of a labor market downtown. Those 1.3 million layoffs represents represent about 0.9% of the 152 million employed during the period. Believe it or not, this is an unusually low layoff rate. In fact, the layoff rate has been below pre-pandemic lows for 16 straight months. Some experts even believe employers are actually reluctant to layoff workers despite the ongoing economic slowdown…

…The reports are accurate. There’s evidence that parts of the global supply chain continue to be tight. There’s no question there’s room for improvement.

BUT, supply chains have improved dramatically since their most troubled periods last year. Delivery times have gotten shorter, ocean freight rates have come down sharply, trucking capacity is up, and inventory levels are gradually returning to normal…

…The reports are accurate. Mortgage debt, credit card debt, and auto loan debt are all up. And delinquencies are rising.

BUT, any serious conversation about debt should also address the capacity to finance that debt. Asset values, cash levels, GDP … all sorts of metrics associated with the capacity to finance debt are way up relative to history. As result, debt payments as a percentage of income are low relative to historical levels.

And while delinquencies are rising, they remain depressed relative to normal historical levels…

…The reports are accurate. The odds of a recession in the coming months have gone up. Indeed, the Federal Reserve is actively trying to slow growth. And economic data confirms that growth has slowed dramatically.

BUT, not all recessions are created equal. The slowdown — and possible recession — we’re facing is not the result of consumer and business excesses run amok. Consumers and businesses have been pretty disciplined with their finances. This could mean any recession could be shallow and short-lived — and one in which unemployment goes from very low levels to just sorta-low levels…

…The reports are accurate. Mortgage rates have risen to levels last seen during the global financial crisis. This is a problem for prospective homebuyers who are already facing record-high home prices and may now have to wait months, if not years, to buy.

BUT, rising mortgage rates are exactly what the Fed wants as it aims to cool the economy in its effort to bring down inflation. Also, this is not a sign we’re about to enter another financial crisis. According to Goldman Sachs, only 3% of mortgaged properties have negative equity and 99% of outstanding mortgages have a locked-in rate that’s lower than the current market rate (PMMS).

Finally, adjustable rate mortgages are nowhere near as popular as they were during the housing bubble, which means very few mortgage holders are vulnerable to the rising mortgage rates that can come with them…

…The reports are accurate. While energy costs may have ticked lower over the past month, they are still way up from a year ago.

BUT, everything that requires energy continues to become more efficient, meaning energy cost spikes today don’t have the same kind of impact they did years ago. The average car currently gets about 25 miles per gallon (MPG), up from about 13 MPG in 1975. More broadly, spending on energy as a share of total personal spending has been trending lower for decades.

4. The Crypto Geniuses Who Vaporized a Trillion Dollars – Jen Wieczner

No matter that they had originally told friends they were shopping for a $150 million vessel; the superyacht was still the largest by well-established boat builder Sanlorenzo ever to be sold in Asia, a triumph of crypto’s nouveau riche. “It represents the beginning of a fascinating journey,” the yacht broker said in an announcement of the sale last year, saying it looked “forward to witnessing many happy moments aboard.” The name the buyers had in mind was cleverly chosen — an inside joke nodding to the cryptocurrency dogecoin that would both thrill their social-media acolytes and be intelligible to all the pathetic, poor “no coiners” out there: Much Wow.

Her buyers, Su Zhu and Kyle Davies, two Andover graduates who ran a Singapore-based crypto hedge fund called Three Arrows Capital, never got the chance to spray Champagne across Much Wow’s bow. Instead, in July, the same month the boat was set to launch, the duo filed for bankruptcy and disappeared before making their final payment, marooning the unclaimed trophy in her berth in La Spezia on the Italian coast. While she has not been officially listed for resale, the intimate world of international super-yacht dealers has quietly been put on notice that a certain Sanlorenzo 52Steel, the coveted Cayman Islands flag billowing above her empty balconies, is back on the market.

The yacht has since become the subject of endless memes and jokes on Twitter, the functional center of the crypto universe. Pretty much everyone in that world, from the millions of small-scale crypto holders to industry employees and investors, has watched in shock and dismay as Three Arrows Capital, once perhaps the most highly regarded investment fund in a burgeoning global financial sector, collapsed in excruciating and embarrassing fashion. The firm’s implosion, a result of both recklessness and likely criminal misconduct, set off a contagion that not only forced a historic sell-off in bitcoin and its ilk but also wiped out a wide swath of the cryptocurrency industry.

Crypto companies from New York to Singapore were the direct victims of Three Arrows. Voyager Digital, a publicly traded crypto exchange based in New York that once had a multibillion-dollar valuation, filed for Chapter 11 in July, reporting that Three Arrows owed it more than $650 million. Genesis Global Trading, headquartered on Park Avenue, had lent Three Arrows $2.3 billion. Blockchain.com, an early crypto company that provided digital wallets and evolved into a major exchange, faces $270 million in unpaid loans from 3AC and has laid off a quarter of its staff.

Among crypto’s smartest observers, there is a widely held view that Three Arrows is meaningfully responsible for the larger crypto crash of 2022, as market chaos and forced selling sent bitcoin and other digital assets plunging 70 percent or more, erasing more than a trillion dollars in value. “I suspect they might be 80 percent of the total original contagion,” says Sam Bankman-Fried, who as CEO of FTX, a major crypto exchange that has bailed out some of the bankrupt lenders, has perhaps more visibility on the problems than anyone. “They weren’t the only people who blew out, but they did it way bigger than anyone else did. And they had way more trust from the ecosystem prior to that.”

For a firm that had always portrayed itself as playing just with its own money — “We don’t have any external investors,” Zhu, 3AC’s CEO, had told Bloomberg as recently as February — the damage Three Arrows caused was astonishing. By mid-July, creditors had come forward with more than $2.8 billion in claims; the figure is expected to balloon from there. Everyone in crypto, from the largest lenders to wealthy investors, seemed to have lent 3AC their digital coins, even 3AC’s own employees, who deposited their salaries with its “borrowing desk” in exchange for interest. “So many people feel disappointed and some of them embarrassed,” says Alex Svanevik, the CEO of Nansen, a Singapore-based blockchain-analytics company. “And they shouldn’t because a lot of people fell for this, and a lot of people gave them money.”…

…During this early phase, Three Arrows Capital focused on a niche market: arbitraging emerging-market foreign-exchange (or “FX”) derivatives — financial products tied to the future price of smaller currencies (the Thai baht or the Indonesian rupiah, for instance). Access to those markets depends on having strong trading relationships with big banks, and getting in the door was “almost impossible,” BitMEX’s Hayes wrote recently in a Medium post. “When Su and Kyle told me how they got started, I was pretty impressed they had hustled their way into this lucrative market.”

At the time, FX trading was moving to electronic platforms, and it was easy to find differences, or spreads, between the prices quoted at different banks. Three Arrows found its sweet spot trolling the listings for mispricings and “picking them off,” as Wall Street calls it, often pocketing just fractions of a cent on each dollar traded. It was a strategy the banks detested — Zhu and Davies were essentially scooping up money these institutions would otherwise keep. Sometimes, when banks realized they’d quoted Three Arrows the wrong price, they would ask to amend or cancel the trade, but Zhu and Davies wouldn’t budge. Last year, Zhu tweeted out a 2012 photo of himself smiling while sitting in front of 11 screens. Seemingly making a reference to their FX-trading strategy of picking off banks’ bids, he wrote, “You haven’t lived until you’ve hit five dealers on the same quote at 230am.”

By 2017, the banks began cutting them off. “Whenever Three Arrows requested a price, all the bank FX traders were like, ‘Fuck these guys, I’m not going to price them,’ ” says a former trader who was a counterparty to 3AC. Lately, a joke has been going around among FX traders who knew Three Arrows in its early days and watched it collapse with a bit of Schadenfreude. “We FX traders are partly to blame for this because we knew for a fact that these guys were not able to make money in FX,” says the former trader. “But then when they came to crypto, everyone thought they were geniuses.”…

…“The Fund’s investment objective is to achieve consistent market neutral returns while preserving capital,” 3AC’s official documents read. Investing in a way that involves a limited downside no matter what the broader market is doing is, of course, known as “hedging” (where hedge funds get their name). But hedged strategies tend to spin off the most money when executed at scale, so Three Arrows began borrowing money and putting it to work. If all went well, it could generate profits that more than covered the interest it owed on the loan. Then it would do it all over again, continuing to grow its pool of investments, which would allow it to borrow even larger sums.

Beyond heavy borrowing, the firm’s growth strategy depended on another scheme: building lots of social-media clout for the two founders. In crypto, the only social-media platform that counts is Twitter. Many key figures in what has become a global industry are anonymous or pseudo-anonymous Twitter accounts with goofy cartoon profile images. In an unregulated space without legacy institutions and with global markets trading 24/7, Crypto Twitter is the center of the arena, the clearinghouse for the news and views that move markets…

…As it grew, Three Arrows branched out beyond bitcoin into a slew of start-up crypto projects and more obscure cryptocurrencies (sometimes called “shitcoins”). The firm seemed rather indiscriminate about these bets, almost as if it viewed them as a charity. Earlier this year, Davies tweeted that “it doesn’t matter specifically what a VC invests in, more fiat in the system is good for the industry.” Says Chris Burniske, a founding partner of VC firm Placeholder, “They were clearly spray and pray.”

A number of investors remember having their first sense that something might be off with Three Arrows in 2019. That year, the fund began reaching out to industry peers with what it described as a rare opportunity. 3AC had invested in a crypto options exchange called Deribit, and it was selling off a stake; the term sheet set the value of Deribit at $700 million. But some investors noticed the valuation seemed off — and discovered its actual valuation was just $280 million. Three Arrows, it turned out, was attempting to flip a portion of its investment at a steep markup, essentially netting the fund an enormous kickback. It was a sketchy thing to do in venture capital, and it blindsided the outside investors, along with Deribit itself. Says David Fauchier, a portfolio manager at Nickel Digital Asset Management who received the pitch, “Since then, I’ve basically stayed away from them, held them in very low regard, and never wanted to do business with them.”

But the firm was thriving. During the pandemic, as the Federal Reserve pumped money into the economy and the U.S. government sent out stimulus checks, cryptocurrency markets rose for months on end. By late 2020, bitcoin was up fivefold from its March lows. To many, it looked like a supercycle. Three Arrows’ main fund posted a return of more than 5,900 percent, according to its annual report. By the end of that year, it was overseeing more than $2.6 billion in assets and $1.9 billion in liabilities.

One of 3AC’s largest positions — and one that loomed large in its fate — was a kind of stock-exchange-traded form of bitcoin called GBTC (shorthand for Grayscale Bitcoin Trust). Dusting off its old playbook of capturing profits through arbitrage, the firm accumulated as much as $2 billion in GBTC. At the time, it was trading at a premium to regular bitcoin, and 3AC was happy to pocket the difference. On Twitter, Zhu regularly blasted out bullish appraisals of GBTC, at various points observing it was “savvy” or “smart” to be buying it…

…While Zhu and Davies grew accustomed to their new wealth, Three Arrows continued to be a giant funnel for borrowed capital. A lending boom had taken hold of the crypto industry, as DeFi (short for “decentralized finance”) projects offered depositors much higher interest rates than they could get at traditional banks. Three Arrows would, through its “borrowing desk,” take custody of cryptocurrency that belonged to employees, friends, and other rich individuals. When lenders asked Three Arrows to put up collateral, it often pushed back. Instead, it offered to pay an interest rate of 10 percent or more, higher than any competitor was delivering. Because of its “gold standard” reputation, as one trader put it, some lenders didn’t ask for audited financial statements or any documents at all. Even large, well-capitalized, professionally run crypto companies were lending large sums of money uncollateralized to 3AC, among them Voyager, which was ultimately pushed into bankruptcy.

For other investors, Three Arrows’ appetite for cash was another warning sign. In early 2021, a fund called Warbler Capital, managed by a 29-year-old Chicago native, was trying to raise $20 million for a strategy that largely involved outsourcing its capital to 3AC. Matt Walsh, a co-founder of crypto-focused Castle Island Ventures, couldn’t understand why a multibillion-dollar fund like Three Arrows would bother with onboarding such a relatively tiny increment of money; it seemed desperate. “I was sitting there scratching my head,” Walsh recalls. “It started to put up some alarm bells. Maybe these guys were insolvent.”…

…The trouble seems to have started in earnest last year, and Three Arrows’ huge bet on GBTC was the nub of it. Just as the firm reaped the rewards when there was a premium, it felt the pain when GBTC began trading at a discount to bitcoin. GBTC’s premium had been a result of the initial uniqueness of the product — it was a way to own bitcoin in your eTrade account without having to deal with crypto exchanges and esoteric wallets. As more people piled into the trade and new alternatives emerged, that premium disappeared — then went negative. But plenty of smart market participants had seen that coming. “All arbitrages die after a point,” says a trader and former colleague of Zhu’s.

Davies was aware of the risk this posed to Three Arrows, and on a September 2020 episode of a podcast produced by Castle Island, he admitted he expected the trade would fade. But before the show aired, Davies requested that the segment be edited out; the firm obliged. Unwinding the position was somewhat tricky — Three Arrows’ GBTC shares were locked up for six months at a time — but Zhu and Davies had a window to get out sometime that fall. And yet they didn’t.

“They had ample opportunity to get out with a graze but not blow themselves up,” says Fauchier. “I didn’t think they could be stupid enough to be doing this with their own money. I don’t know what possessed them. This was obviously one of those trades you want to be the first one in, and you desperately don’t want to be the last one out.” Colleagues now say Three Arrows hung in its GBTC position because it was betting the SEC would approve GBTC’s long-anticipated conversion to an exchange-traded fund, making it much more liquid and tradable and likely erasing the bitcoin price mismatch. (In June, the SEC rejected GBTC’s application.)

By the spring of 2021, GBTC had fallen below the value of its bitcoins, and Three Arrows was now losing on what was likely its biggest trade. Still, crypto enjoyed a bull run that lasted into April, with bitcoin hitting a record above $60,000 and dogecoin, a cryptocurrency started as a joke, rocketing off on an irrational Elon Musk–boosted rally. Zhu was bullish on dogecoin too. Reports put 3AC’s assets at some $10 billion at the time, citing Nansen (though Nansen’s CEO now clarifies that much of the sum was likely borrowed).

In retrospect, Three Arrows seems to have suffered a fateful loss later that summer — if of the human variety, rather than the financial one. In August, two of the fund’s minority partners, who were based in Hong Kong and routinely worked between 80 and 100 hours a week managing much of 3AC’s operations, simultaneously retired. That left the bulk of their work to Davies, Three Arrows’ chief risk officer, who seemed to take a more laid-back approach to looking out for the firm’s downside. “I think their risk management was a lot better before,” says the former friend.

Around that time, there were signs that Three Arrows was hitting a cash crunch. When lenders asked for collateral for the fund’s margin trades, it often came back pledging its equity in Deribit — a private company — instead of an easily salable asset like bitcoin. Such illiquid assets aren’t ideal collateral. But thThen in early May, luna suddenly collapsed to near zero, wiping out more than $40 billion in market cap in a matter of days. Its value was tied to an associated stablecoin called terraUSD. When terraUSD failed to maintain its dollar peg, both currencies collapsed. Three Arrows’ holdings in luna, once roughly half a billion dollars, were suddenly worth only $604, according to a Singapore-based investor named Herbert Sim who was tracking 3AC’s wallets. As the death spiral unfolded, Scott Odell, a lending executive at Blockchain.com, reached out to the firm to check in about the size of its luna hit; after all, the loan agreement stipulated that Three Arrows notify the company if it experienced an overall drawdown of at least 4 percent. “Was not that big as part of portfolio holdings anyway,” 3AC’s top trader, Edward Zhao, wrote back, according to messages made public by Blockchain.com. A few hours later, Odell informed Zhao that it would need to call back a significant portion of its $270 million loan and would take payment in dollars or stablecoins. Zhao appeared caught off guard. “Yo … uhh … hmm,” he replied in their private chat.

The next day, Odell reached out to Davies directly, who tersely reassured him that everything was fine. He sent Blockchain.com a simple, one-sentence letter with no watermark, asserting that the firm had $2.387 billion under management. Meanwhile, Three Arrows was making similar representations to at least half a dozen lenders. Blockchain.com is “now doubtful that this net asset value statement was accurate,” according to its affidavit, which was included in a 1,157-page document released by 3AC’s liquidators.

Rather than back down, a few days later Davies threatened to “boycott” Blockchain.com if it called back 3AC’s loans. “Once that happened, we knew something was wrong,” says Lane Kasselman, chief business officer of Blockchain.com. Inside the Three Arrows office, the mood had changed. Zhu and Davies used to hold regular pitch meetings on Zoom, but that month, they stopped showing up, then managers stopped scheduling them altogether, according to a former employee.

In late May, Zhu sent out a tweet that may as well be his epitaph: “Supercycle price thesis was regrettably wrong.” Still, he and Davies played it cool as they called up seemingly every wealthy crypto investor they knew, asking to borrow large quantities of bitcoin and offering the same hefty interest rates the firm always had. “They were clearly pumping their prowess as a crypto hedge fund after they already knew they were in trouble,” says someone close to one of the biggest lenders. In reality, Three Arrows was scrounging for funds just to pay its other lenders back. “It was robbing Peter to pay Paul,” says Castle Island’s Walsh. In the middle of June, a month after luna’s collapse, Davies told Charles McGarraugh, chief strategy officer at Blockchain.com, that he was trying to get a 5,000 bitcoin loan — then worth about $125 million — from Genesis to give to yet another lender to avoid liquidating its positions…

…In Three Arrows’ final days, the partners reached out to every wealthy crypto whale they knew to borrow more bitcoin, and top crypto executives and investors — from the U.S. to the Caribbean to Europe to Singapore — believe 3AC found willing lenders of last resort among organized-crime figures. Owing such characters large sums of money could explain why Zhu and Davies have gone into hiding. These are also the kinds of lenders you want to make whole before anyone else, but you may have to route the money through the Caymans. Says the former trader and 3AC business partner, “They paid the Mafia back,” adding, “If you start borrowing from these guys, you must be really desperate.”

After the collapse, executives at crypto exchanges began comparing notes. They were surprised to learn that Three Arrows had no short positions, which is to say it had stopped hedging — the very thing it had maintained was the cornerstone of its strategy. “It’s very easy to do that,” says the major lending executive, “without any of the trading desks knowing you’re doing that.” Investors and exchange executives now estimate that, by the end, 3AC was leveraged around three times its assets, but some suspect it could be magnitudes more.

Three Arrows seems to have kept all the money in commingled accounts — unbeknownst to the owners of those funds — taking from every pot to pay back lenders. “They were probably managing this whole thing on an Excel sheet,” says Walsh. That meant that when 3AC ignored margin calls and ghosted lenders in mid-June, those lenders, including FTX and Genesis, liquidated their accounts, not realizing they were also selling assets that belonged to 3AC’s partners and clients. (This seems to be what happened with 8 Blocks Capital, which complained on Twitter in June that $1 million from its trading account with 3AC had suddenly disappeared.)

After the firm’s traders stopped responding to messages, lenders tried calling, emailing, and messaging them on every platform, even pinging their friends and stopping by their homes before liquidating their collateral. Some peered through the door of 3AC’s Singapore office, where weeks of mail was piled up on the floor. People who had thought of Zhu and Davies as close friends, and had lent them money — even $200,000 or more — just weeks earlier without hearing any mention of distress at the fund, felt outraged and betrayed. “They are certainly sociopaths,” says one former friend. “The numbers they were reporting in May were very, very wrong,” says Kasselman. “We firmly believe they committed fraud. There’s no other way to state it — that’s fraud, they lied.” Genesis Global Trading had lent Three Arrows the most of any lender and has filed a $1.2 billion claim. Others had lent them billions more, much of it in bitcoin and ethereum. So far, liquidators have recovered only $40 million in assets. “It became clear that they were insolvent but were continuing to borrow, which really just looks like a classic Ponzi scheme,” says Kasselman. “Comparisons between them and Bernie Madoff are not far off.”

When Three Arrows Capital filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy, the process for foreign companies, on July 1 in the Southern District of New York, it was more or less a formality. But the filing itself did contain some surprises. Even as creditors rushed to file their claims, 3AC’s founders had already beaten them to it: The first person in line was Zhu himself, who on June 26 filed a claim for $5 million, along with Davies’s wife, Kelly Kaili Chen, who claimed she had lent the fund close to $66 million. The only documentation they had to back up their claims were simple, self-attested statements that did not specify when the loans had been made or the purpose of the funds. “That’s a total Mickey Mouse type of operation,” says Walsh. While insiders were unaware of Chen’s involvement in the firm, they believe she must have been acting on Davies’s behalf; her name appears on various firm entities, likely for tax reasons. Both Zhu’s and Davies’s mothers have also filed claims, according to people familiar with the situation. (Zhu later told Bloomberg News, “They’re gonna, you know, say that I absconded funds during the last period, where I actually put more of my personal money back in.”)

5. Industry Structure: Fabs are in Favor – LTAs are the Tell – Doug O’Laughlin

One of the things that I have found so fascinating about this inventory cycle in the semiconductor industry is the NCNR (non-cancelable, non-refundable) order. The reasoning behind the NCNR is that investing in a wafer fab is expensive, and recently those costs have been increasing; thus, fabless customers should have to bear some of the financial burdens of investing in a wafer fab and cannot cancel their orders. Foundries and Fabs have managed to enter long-term agreements with most of their customers, whether it’s the demand planning at Micron or the NCNRs at Globalfoundries and the like.

Note: I will refer to foundries and fabs interchangeable in this piece. A fab is the actual building where semiconductors are made; a foundry is a company that sells that building’s production as a service.

Let’s contrast this against history – when Fabs were thought of as cost centers, outsourced to Asia, and disposed of at the earliest possible convenience for the fabless company to flourish. If there is a pendulum of the importance of having a fab, we likely swung from peak fabless and fab-light to a geopolitically fab-hungry world. The entirety of 2020 amplified that.

The 2020-driven shortages highlighted the strategic importance of fabs, especially in industries like automotive. As a result, most companies had to rethink how to treat fabs and stopped treating fabs like an infinite and elastic supply pool when it is a strategic supply if you’re selling electronic goods…

…It wasn’t always this way. Fabs were once a dime a dozen, and I mean that literally. When I talked about the 1996 semiconductor cycle in my semiconductor history series, there were 10s of memory companies ramping capacity in unison, leading to oversupply. That picture is a bit different now – this chart from Yole paints a new picture. Even as recently as 2010, ten companies were at the leading edge. Fast forward ten years, and we are talking about three leading-edge companies with a dominant first-place leader.

This is partially due to the increasing scale and absolute difficulty of making a semiconductor at the leading edge. Companies split the fab and fabless company in two like AMD and Globalfoundries. And eventually, companies like Globalfoundries just gave up at the leading edge, saying it would be uneconomic to continue, and then chose to pivot to specialty technologies such as SOI and RF devices. Another aspect of this transition is that fabs were once considered relatively commoditized compared to excellent design. Designing and marketing the product needed for an end market had much better returns than just making the chips themselves. So why bother with a capital intense fab when you could just use TSMC?

This mantra led to decades of offshoring, first in packaging and then in fabrication. TSMC’s rise can be partially attributed to outsourcing the perceived less critical step of fabrication. Back in the day, everyone had a fab, and that wasn’t precisely a differentiating process in the 1990s.

But as Moore’s law’s torrid pace continued, simply hopping back into the fabrication game became increasingly complex. And as we hit more problems post planar scaling into FinFet and beyond, the fab became a scarce resource. And once you fall off Moore’s law pace, hardly anyone regains it. So fast forward a decade of outsourcing and divestitures, and here we are – fewer fabs than ever and more concentration than ever. In the Michael Porter framework, there are fewer suppliers than customers, and the power is shifting to the suppliers.

We outsourced a backend process that became critical, making it impossible to get that back. Path dependency shapes history, and a series of logical steps to improve your business into an asset-light and higher margin business over decades inadvertently signed over the keys to the kingdom. Fabs became necessary, but the US financed their construction in Taiwan. And what’s more, there are fewer players.

6. Matt Reustle – Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’ – Dom Cooke and Matt Reustle

[00:03:07] Dom: I’m very excited for today’s conversation. We’re talking Union Pacific, but I think it gives us a great reason to talk about rails in general. The world of freight railroading seems very under discussed relative to its importance in the US and just general global supply chains. So hopefully we can shed some light on how it works and what makes it interesting in the course of breaking down Union Pacific. To start, I think we need to spend some time on the industry itself. There’s a number of ways you can move freight around. Can you walk us through the transportation sector generally and why you would choose rails over, say, shipping, trucks or planes?

[00:03:40] Matt: To answer the second part of the question, you might not choose rails over the other transportation sectors if you had a choice. Many of these businesses, and many of the things that move on rails are just captive volumes that can’t economically move via truck or via plane. When you think about these heavy grains, commodities, steel, things that require a substantial amount of movement and a substantial amount of capacity, and rails are the only option there. But to frame the transportation market as a whole, in North America it’s about $900 billion in terms of market size. Rails make up about 10% of that. And you compare that to the much larger trucking sector, which is 600 billion. So you’re talking about substantially different sizes here. Rails, just owning that one portion where it’s a lot that has to do with the manufacturing economy, a lot that has to do with the industrial economy.

You compare it to something like air freight, where that’s similar in size to the rail economy at about $90 billion. And that’s going to be things that need to move much faster. They’re going to be much lighter in terms of weight and size, but things that you want to be getting to destinations at a much faster speed. So that’s just a high level overview. There’s other factors that come into consideration as well. If you think about something like rail versus truck, there’s a few rules of thumb that shippers generally use.

We’re looking about 400 or 500 miles as threshold, the break even threshold, where it starts to make sense to move something via rail. And if you think about the cost and time that it takes to get something somewhere, a rail, you’re going to save yourself 10 to 15 percent in terms of cost. And you’re going to be getting it about a day late relative to the trucking market, when you’re talking about those distances. But I would say that if many of the shippers that are moving on rail today had a choice, they would like to have lot more options to move their freight than they do today…

…[00:07:39] Dom: And maybe we can go there now and just put some finer details around the oligopolistic structure of the market and how those operate in their twos and twos and twos across the country. How in practice does that play out? Is it a cartel like behavior? Are they colluding on price? Are they colluding in other ways? Can you just give us some detail around that?

[00:07:55] Matt: It’s helpful to really trace back to the beginning of history for rails. And I think this will paint a picture in terms of how we got to where we are today. So if you go back to the 1800s. This was the Gilded Age. This is where you saw this vast amount of wealth generated in the US from the Vanderbilt, Jay Gould. And one of the key milestones was the transcontinental railroad, which was built in the 1860s, not finished until 1869. You could now get from the east coast of the US to the west coast of the US in just over three days. And that, compared to prior to that, being three weeks, if you were going to take a ship or multiple months, if you were going to try to take any other form of transportation. Crazy to think about how groundbreaking that was in terms of changing the dynamics of the markets, changing the entire economy and what was possible, in terms of coast to coast commerce.

So fast forward to the late 1800s, these railroad businesses are really dominating the economy. The first Dow Jones index, that came out in the 1890s, over 60% of it was represented by railroad companies. It got the focus of the regulators, where pricing power, I think Rockefeller was the only one who was able to avoid the pricing power of the railroads, but it became a major focus. And you had the Interstate Commerce Act come into play and start to heavily regulate railroads in terms of what prices looked like and how much control they had over that. And what that really led to was almost a century worth of deterioration in railroad networks, culminating with Penn Central Rail, which was a massive railroad in the US, declaring for bankruptcy in the early 1970s. And it was clear and obvious that, after all these networks were deteriorating, there was no capital even put into them.

It was an industry that was almost left to die. There needed to be a change. And that’s when the Staggers Act came. The Staggers Act came in the form of, really, loosening the regulatory nature around the rail industry, actually allowing for them to charge lower prices. That was before you had all these other forms of transportation around. You didn’t have automobiles at the time, you didn’t have a highway system, you didn’t have planes. So you had all these disruptive technologies at the same time, railroads weren’t able to fully control their business. Staggers Act changed that. And over the next 20 years, you basically saw a massive decline in railroad rates and that allowed for them to capture more business, reinvest back in their network, and that started the uprise, in terms of these businesses turning back into true operating networks. Then you get to the 2000s.

That’s when you start to see, there was consolidation along the way, but somewhat of a shift in behavior, where before it was capturing volume, getting things back onto the system, then it became a focus on operating efficiency, productivity, running these networks within ultimate focus on profitability. And that’s continued on for the past two decades. How that all culminates in terms of oligopolistic nature, there’s a few things that you see, but what I think is most notable is, you haven’t seen volumes increase for the rails, particularly in a large portion of their captive business over the past two decades, essentially. So rails have really just focus on where they have capped the business, that they are 100% the only option to take and exercising as much pricing power as possible. And at the same time, not willing to move or sacrifice their network or sacrifice anything when it comes to economics to move any other volumes.

And the regulatory system enables this in some creative ways. When you look at how the industry is governed today, it’s by the Surface Transportation Board. But in order for any type of review to happen, a shipper has to bring a rate case to the Surface Transportation Board. So it’s not as though rates are actually being set by a regulator. It is that rates could be protested and brought to a regulator. And those are the little pieces of friction that exist that really help rails protect their networks, protect their economics, enforce pricing power. And that’s led them to get to where they are today, which is a business that, at the start of the century, was earning 10% operating margins. And today that number is closer to 40% plus operating margins…

…[00:31:29] Dom: I think you framed the business model itself really well. So it’s probably time we hit on the financial model. Eric Mandelblatt came on Invest Like the Best earlier this year and talked about rails and and he talked about Union Pacific. One thing he mentioned was that they’ve actually got higher EBIT margins than Microsoft, which is surprising given how capital intensive rails are and Microsoft is known as a world class business. So can you walk us through the economic of a rail company through Union Pacific? What allows them to earn such high margins? What are the key markers you would pull out from their financials?

[00:31:51] Matt: It wasn’t always this way. You have businesses now that are earning north of 40% operating margins. It was early 2000s that these were 10 to 15% operating margins, which is insane to think about. Taking a dollar and keeping 10 cents versus taking a dollar and keeping 40 cents, when you’re talking about a 90 billion industry. So a substantial amount of profitability there that was generated. And it traces back to the rail industry outside of Union Pacific. It’s important to pay homage to the pioneer of all of this efficiency focus, Hunter Harrison, who was the godfather of precision scheduled railroading, which he implemented at Canadian National in the early 2000s, then at Canadian Pacific, with the help of Bill Ackman, putting him into place there. And then finally at CSX where he was put in by Ackman’s disciple, who spun out, started his own fund, Paul Hilal. And Hunter Harrison saw massive success at each of these businesses where he took out, we’re not talking about couple hundred basis points of cost, we’re talking about thousands of basis points of margin improvement.

So if you step back and say, okay, well what were the drivers of this? To frame it simply, it was longer trains, fewer stops, less people. And that obsessive focus was what took that dollar, where previously you might have been spending 30 cents of that dollar of revenue on labor, that number’s now closer to 20 cents. So labor being 20% of revenue versus 30% of revenue, major in terms of cost opportunity. That got removed from the system. You also had improvement from a fuel efficiency standpoint. So there’s two drivers to this, there’s fuel efficiency from the standpoint of we’re not going to move locomotives if they only have 40 cars attached to them. We want to have extremely long hauls and length of hauls. So we are going to, rather than come by your grain facility four times a week and take 25 rail cars each time, we’re going to come by once, and we’re going to take a hundred, and we’re going to tell you exactly when that time is.

So that’s going to save you quite a bit from a fuel standpoint, as you can spread whatever that is, in terms of the amount of diesel that it would require to move across many more rail cars, again, improving the economics. So fuel, that fluctuates as well, just in terms of fuel prices. While rails can pass through fuel prices, so they don’t wear the brunt of the impact. It has a funny way of working its way into margins, where just the arithmetic of passing through fuel inflation actually does diminish your margin profile. But that’s gone from basically mid teens to around 10%, even high single digits for periods of time. So that was another main driver of the margin improvement. So there you have labor, 20%, fuel being another 10%, something called purchase transportation, which has to deal with all of the other movements that a rail has to require. Other equipment that factors into things, that makes up another 20% of revenue. That’s stayed more or less the same, that’s probably come down from 25%.

And then the last thing is depreciation and amortization. The reason why that’s important for rails is because of the nature of the assets. Again, these locomotives have a 40 year useful life. The track has been around for decades, so that is held on the books at a substantially lower price than it would cost to build today. DNA being about 10% of revenue is mismatched with what you see from a CapEx perspective. So I think when investors historically have looked at, okay, how much cash am I actually converting from the income statement to the cash flow statement? Where you’ve seen the mismatch was, the DNA being significantly lower than the CapEx that I actually had to go into the network. So earnings conversion was closer to 80% range. Whereas today, as they began, focused on some of that efficiency, pulled back on some of that capital spending, you’ve seen that move slowly higher, and that is what could potentially offer a much more bullish regime for the industry, if you see more and more of that cash conversion come into play.

[00:36:04] Dom: And you mentioned, at the beginning, that people might not want to use the rails, but they have to. And then you just talked about how the rails have become more efficient, and as they’ve become more efficient, their margin profile has, has significantly improved. None of that sounds great for the end customer because they’ve essentially become less flexible to the end customer who wants to move their grain or coal or whatever it might be from place A to place B, and now the rails are turning around and saying, you’re doing it on our schedule, and our schedule just happens to work a bit better for us. Is that dynamic always at play in this industry? You don’t come across many businesses, which are able to treat their customers in quite a similar fashion, and end up retaining them, and improving their economic profile in the process.

[00:36:40] Matt: It gets into the regulatory dynamics again, which are fascinating. If you talk to the rails, they have a regulator who determines rates. And one of the drivers of those rate determinations is revenue adequacy, which is basically, does your revenue and the return that you generate, in terms of your assets, does that cover your cost of capital? And historically rails have shown that they really haven’t covered their cost of capital over time. Now in recent years, that has changed and that has flipped, where they meet revenue adequacy standards. Now the origins of revenue adequacy were created actually to support higher rates for the rails.

It wasn’t necessarily a protective measure, and there wasn’t much discussion around whether this would actually be creating a rate cap for rails, at any point, it would always be thought of as somewhat of a floor. I think what you’ve started to see recently, over the past few years is, shippers really pushing on the service transportation board and the regulators, in general, to have a little bit of a cleaner system allowing for them to protest rate cases, make this a little bit more of a balanced market for them.

So because they’re captive volumes and they really have no other option, they aren’t held completely hostage and they get some type of fair, appropriate market rate. But I think you point out a very interesting point, and that is the shift in focus, I would say, over the past 15 years, has been the shareholder focus, where if you look at the amount of job cuts that have happened in the industry, the frustration of some of the shippers, but the satisfaction of shareholders, where Union Pacific, from 2005 to today, has massively outperformed the index. And there was a stretch of time from 2005 to, I want to say 2020, where they outperformed the market every year, except for one. So just remarkable consistency and then remarkable cumulative outperformance. And that comes from, maybe, shifting focus a little bit away from your customer and being much more focused on the shareholder, which has its positive to negatives.

And the last thing I mentioned is, it’s a really interesting dynamic because if you look at how the class ones operate, there’s been all the shareholder pressure to implement precision scheduled railroading. Union Pacific was one of the last to do it, when you look at Canadian National, again, started, Canadian Pacific then CSX and Union Pacific. And in those interim periods of time, you always have management teams dismiss the benefits of PSR and say, it doesn’t apply here, or it’s not a system that we can implement, but time and time again, it’s proven that it has been a system that they can implement.

And Union Pacific used one of Hunter Harrison’s disciples to do it, so I think, when we look at legendary management trees, similar to coaching trees, the Belichicks and the Bill Walsh’s, who have all these former assistants that are now leading teams other places, you have much of that in the rails as well. Keith Creel at Canadian Pacific, there’s a large team at CSX, and Jim Vena was basically brought in as a free agent to Union Pacific, ran an operating plan for around two years, and has since left, and massively turned around that business by implementing all of these policies in that broader PSR scheme.

[00:40:04] Dom: It brings up an interesting point that you mentioned to me the other day, as we were thinking about Union Pacific, in that the railroad that Buffet and Berkshire your own, which is Burlington Northern, which is Union Pacific’s main competitor out west, haven’t implemented the same policy. Their margin profile looks materially different to Union Pacific than some of the other class ones. Is what you just said the opposite for them, and what are the reasons why they haven’t implemented it, or are there some other things going on there?

[00:40:27] Matt: It’s a lot of the same reasoning in terms of why they choose to vocalize that it wouldn’t necessarily work for them. And I think it’s because they do have a customer focus more than a shareholder focus, but they’re also quick to point out, Matt Rose, who has run Burlington Northern, would often say, by operating this way, you are attracting regulators. So when CSX went through their change to PSR, there was a lot of disruption. So shippers constantly having issues. And what ended up happening was the business was producing incredibly strong numbers, but there was a lot of frustration with shippers, to the point where the STB had a weekly call with CSX. So it was attracting a lot of focus. Who is this really benefiting? There’s often claims of the long term benefits, which I think we do see where you clean up the network, then you can run more efficiently over time.

You have to take a step back before you take a step forward. But Burlington Northern has pushed against this. I think there’s a case to be made that taking volume at 35% margin is reasonable and you don’t have to take every piece of volume at 45% margin or dismiss it completely. So it’s an interesting dynamic where you have what you’re prioritizing, in terms of an enterprise, and then also the regulatory nature and the dynamics there, where the more you push towards this focus on one particular stakeholder, in this case, the shareholder, that can attract things you don’t want to necessarily attract…

…[00:58:25] Dom: And as we wind down the conversation, as you know, the last question tends to be on lessons learned and how they might apply to other industries and other investors. What, from your time covering rails and Union Pacific specifically, would you point to as things that you’ve learned or changed your mind on?

[00:58:41] Matt: So I think one of the biggest items or lessons today is just the idea of revenue and the quality of that revenue. It’s something I tend to have a hyper focus on. But with all of these industries that have gone through massive growth, talking about network effects, here you have, potentially, the original network effect with the rails, the original OG networks themselves, that have actually given up a lot of revenue or have sacrificed from a volume perspective, because it just didn’t make sense in terms of what’s moving through the network. And I think there’s always this idea of riding industry waves and then controlling what you can control. In this case, these management teams have controlled what they can control and done a very effective job in terms of, what I would consider saving in many ways, an industry, as it relates to shareholders, by being so hyper focused on all of those things.

That’s one piece that I think is an interesting lesson. And the second piece, just from an investor perspective is, the importance of understanding how markets trade and how certain sectors trade. And I think we all like to have our own models for intrinsic value, discounted cash flow, the rate of return earned on assets and various different cash on cash returns, return on equity. Whatever metric you want to use, you can have your own methodology, but if you want to outperform in a certain sector, in this case, in transportation, there are usually key metrics which are the drivers and the single driving force of what results in outperformance. So when I started looking at this industry and I wanted to fight the idea of the operating ratio, I wanted to fight the idea that one single person, in this case, Hunter Harrison, could be the sole driver and the sole person with the knowledge and operating chops to implement this.

But the reality was the operating ratio was going to be the driver of outperformance of these stocks, and Hunter Harrison was able to do what many others were not able to do. So it was a bit of humble pie, in some ways, but also made me appreciate it’s healthy to be an outsider, but it’s equally healthy to understand how an industry operates and how the investors within that industry. Again, most of the transportation sector, it’s dominated by, what’s referred to as, the transportation mafia, which is a group of investors who’ve been around for decades and I have known these names ins and outs for decades, and they have strong communication, strong views, and they are a driving force in terms of how these stocks trade. So that was a major lesson and key learning experience for me going through it and trying to fight reality in some ways.

7. Why it is hard to lose when you invest in stocks – Chin Hui Leong

For some, investing is filled with visions of the enormous amounts of money made. The allure is not just in the amount made – but in how it is made.

Terms such as “strike it rich” or “a sudden windfall” are often associated with investing where great wealth is suddenly bestowed on a lucky few. This fervour for instant riches is further fuelled by stories of overnight wealth gained in bull markets. In fact, there are even movies made about how big gambles paid off handsomely for a select group of savvy investors.

Take The Big Short, a movie that raised the profile of hedge fund manager Michael Burry. Based on a book by Michael Lewis, the show had all the right ingredients to spur the imagination of the public.

There was Burry, depicted as a genius at crunching numbers. There was a US housing bubble forming in 2005 but was largely ignored by all but a few traders and hedge fund managers. Subsequently, there was a high-stakes bet by Burry on the bubble bursting.

Of course, by now, we all know what happened next. The stock market suffered one of its worst declines ever between 2007 and 2009 as the US economy fell under the weight of the housing crash.

But for Burry’s fund, which bet against the market, it made out like a bandit. Between November 2000 and June 2008, Burry’s Scion Capital produced a nearly 6-fold return, net of fees and expenses.

So there you have it. A big bet is made and as a result, big money is made. That’s what you need to win big in investing, right? Not so fast.

The movie’s popularity earned Burry the nickname, The Big Short, a label that has stuck with him until today. But here’s the kicker. You’d be wrong to assume that shorting is how he makes most of his money.

In an interview with Bloomberg after the movie’s release, Burry said it was ironic that he is best known for shorting the stock market. To correct the misconception, he made it clear that he does not spend his time looking for opportunities to short the market. Instead, most of his time is spent looking for “good longs”, or stocks that can be held for the long term.

Now that’s something they won’t make a movie about.

Eugene Ng, the founder of Vision Capital, shared some telling historical statistics on the S&P 500 on why you should invest for the long term. Simply said, the longer your time horizon, the higher your odds of a positive return.

So, here’s the deal. If you are trading in and out of the S&P 500 within a single day, your probability of netting a gain is not much better than a coin flip. Lengthen your holding period to a year, and your chances of a positive result will be around 7 out of every 10 1-year periods.

Stretch that out to 10 years, and history shows that you made money almost 90 per cent of the time. To cap it off, buy and hold the S&P 500 for 20 years and more, you will be 100 per cent positive and not lose any money.

Said another way, the path to positive returns depends on how long you are willing to hold.

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Apple, Microsoft, and TSMC. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 14 August 2022:

1. Everywhere you look there’s lag – Stacey (Trust, but verify)

What do London Heathrow’s flight caps, the inventory of retailers, interest rate policies, and the energy transition have in common? All are subject to systems lag and experiencing the effects.

Current world events show the importance of understanding systems and the inherent delays therein. By knowing what to look for, one can better see the forest from the trees. The best way to view the world is as it is. The tangible and intangible components of our lives are comprised of embedded systems…

…Every human, organization, animal, economy, and government is a complex system (with systems within this system which are called embedded systems). Another way to state this is as:

“an interconnected set of elements that is coherently organized in a way that achieves something. The system may be buffeted, constricted, triggered, or driven by outside forces. But the system’s response to these forces is characteristic of itself, and that response is seldom simple in the real world.” – Thinking in Systems

It is more than the sum of its parts – it can exhibit adaptive, dynamic, goal-seeking, self-preserving, and sometimes evolutionary behavior. They can be self-organizing, self-repairing, and resilient. Get all that? Let’s break it down into its essential parts.

A system must contain three things:

1. Elements: the building blocks; for a tree it’s the roots, branches, and leaves.7 Includes the intangible and tangible. For example, the bits within a computer are intangible.

2. Interconnections: relationships holding the elements together. In a tree system, it would be the physical flows and chemical reactions. Interconnections often operate via the flow of information. These flows of information are signals for the decision/action/leverage points within a system.

3. Function/Purpose: what is its aim; can only be deduced by its behavior. The purpose of nearly every system is to safeguard its survival. Further, successful systems work to keep sub-purposes and overall system purposes in harmony. The cells in your heart are different from your liver, but both function to keep you alive.

Of the three building blocks, changing the elements typically has the smallest effect on the whole. Swapping out all the players on a football team still makes it a football team. A human body regularly replaces its cells but continues to be a human body. Countries have regular elections, with different politicians occupying offices, yet nothing seems to change. As long as the interconnections and functions remain intact, a system generally goes on doing its thing.

Altering the function is often the most crucial determinant of a system’s behavior. It would be like if an animal’s purpose was changed from survival/reproduction to pleasure.

However, this is not to take away from the fact that elements, interconnections, and purpose are essential. If changing an element results in a changed relationship or purpose, de facto behavior is modified. Adjusting interconnections (the information flows) can materially affect a system – imagine changing the rules of football to those of soccer.

The system interacts with outside forces, but, importantly, its response is of its own character. Another way to say it is it has its own latent behavior within its structure.

However, a system’s behavior cannot be known based purely upon adding together its elements. Humans tend to think linearly, which is not necessarily how systems act.

Systems are often nested within other systems. As such there are purposes within purposes. According to Friedman’s economic theory, the purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder returns. Within that business, the purpose of the C-Suite may be to serve customers well or make as much money as possible anyway possible. Down at the middle manager role, the goal may be not to get fired. At the junior level it could be promotion and earning more money.

As you can see, often the sub-purposes come into conflict with the overall purpose at businesses. Like with individuals, the greater the sense of coherence within the corporation, the better the results.

What is not a system? An assortment of things without any specific interconnection or function.

“Sand scattered on a road by happenstance is not, itself, a system. You can add sand or take away sand and you still have just sand on the road.” – Thinking in Systems

Lags are inherent in systems due to their structure – it takes time for a given input to result in an output. Goods ordered from China do not instantaneously appear in a company’s warehouse.

To understand lags, first we need to take a step back into how the elements of a system are set up. The foundation of any system is its stock. These are the store, the quantity, the accumulation of material or information built up over time. You can see, count, or measure these items. The money in your bank account, the water in a bathtub, trees in a forest, or the population of a country are all examples of stocks.

Flows cause stocks to change. It’s the bathtub filling and draining, the births and deaths within a country, the dying and planting of trees in a forest, deposits and withdraws in a bank account. To understand much of the behavior of complex systems, one must understand the interplay of its stocks and flows.

A critical point is stocks typically change slowly. A forest doesn’t become deforested all at once. It takes a while for the population to unlearn skills. Groundwater can be pumped out at a faster rate than it is replenished for a long time. This occurs even when flows into or out of them change suddenly. Think of how much long it takes for trees to accumulate into a forest. Or for a productive labor force to be built up.

As such, stocks form the basis of system delays. They can also serve as system buffers. Just-in-time inventory has reduced the buffer of stocks. Taking slack out of the system results in decreased resiliency.

Time lags aren’t all bad – the stocks can be sources of stability…for a while. These delays allow room to experiment and revise policies that aren’t working.

Stocks allow inflows and outflows to be independent of each other and temporarily out of balance. Reservoirs allows residents and farmers to live downriver without adjusting their lives to a river’s yearly flows. But if hard rains happen for years, eventually the river will flood.

“Systems thinkers see the world as a collection of stocks along with the mechanisms for regulating the levels in the stocks by manipulating flows. That means system thinkers see the world as a collection of ‘feedback processes.’” – Thinking in Systems

If a system demonstrates a persistent behavior over time, the odds are good there’s a mechanism creating this consistency. It is manifested through a feedback loop. To find feedback loops, look for a system’s consistent behavior.10 Feedback loops can stabilize or de-stabilize systems. They can cause stocks to increase or decrease.

Donella Meadows in her excellent book on systems speaks of three types of delays: 1) perception delay; 2) response delay; and 3) delivery delay. Below shows the system flows for a car dealership’s inventory…

…The perception delay is intentional in this case. How often does the dealer react to changes in sales? Does he go off of daily, weekly, monthly, or some average? It’s key to pick the right time period to sort out real trends from noise.

Response delay is how much he orders. Does he order the whole lot needed or make partial adjustments to make sure the perceived trend is real?

The delivery delay is how long it takes to receive vehicle orders onto the lot.

Inventory oscillations result in a system where there are delays…

…Think about it: sales increase, causing vehicles on the lot to drop. Once they are sure the higher sales rate will last, more cars are ordered. The delivery delay means it takes time for the orders to actually arrive.

Yet during the interim period before orders hit the lot, inventory drops further if sales sustainably rise, meaning available inventory continues to decrease, so orders bump up a little more to bring inventory back to prior levels.

The larger volume of orders begins arriving, and, instead of recovering, inventory can shoot up more than expected, and the dealership can quickly turn from under-inventoried to over-inventoried. Orders are cut back, but elevated past orders are coming in, so less is ordered. Inventory eventually falls and can become too low. 

2. DeepMind found the structure of nearly every protein known to science – Nicole Westman

DeepMind is releasing a free expanded database with its predictions of the structure of nearly every protein known to science, the company, a subsidiary of Google parent Alphabet, announced today.

DeepMind transformed science in 2020 with its AlphaFold AI software, which produces highly accurate predictions of the structures of proteins — information that can help scientists understand how they work, which can help treat diseases and develop medications. It first started publicly releasing AlphaFold’s predictions last summer through a database built in collaboration with the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL). That initial set included 98 percent of all human proteins.

Now, the database is expanding to over 200 million structures, “covering almost every organism on Earth that has had its genome sequenced,” DeepMind said in a statement.

“You can think of it as covering the entire protein universe,” Demis Hassabis, CEO of DeepMind, said during a press briefing. “We’re at the beginning of a new era now in digital biology.”

3. Taiwan reports 1st child with cancer cured by CAR T-cell therapy – Keoni Everington

A 10-year-old girl suffering from leukemia is the first child in Taiwan to receive CAR T-cell therapy and to have fully recovered from the cancer as a result.

The girl, identified as Tingting (亭亭), was diagnosed with childhood B-cell acute lymphoblastic lymphoma four years ago. After undergoing first-line therapy, she still relapsed.

In the past, such a patient would have to wait for a stem cell transplant to save their lives. However, with the assistance of doctors at National Taiwan University Hospital (NTUH), she became the first CD19-targeted chimeric antigen receptor-engineered (CD19 CAR) T-cell recipient in Taiwan and has fully recovered, with no residual cancer cells detected in her body…

…Chou explained that the treatment principle relies on high-tech genetic engineering. First, T-cells are isolated from the patient’s body, and are genetically modified by adding a gene for a receptor called chimeric antigen receptor (CAR), which enables the T-cells to attach to a specific cancer cell antigen.

The cancer cells from childhood B-cell acute lymphoblastic lymphoma contain an antigen called CD19. Therefore, in this patient’s case, the CART T-cell technique was used to design T-cells to attach to the CD19 antigen.

Chou compared it to a precise “immunization army” that can accurately and continuously destroy cancer cells. The advantage is that a one-time injection can generate these results, said Chou, as was the case with Tingting.

In April of this year, NTUH became the first medical center in Taiwan to provide formal clinical use of CD19-targeted CAR T-cell therapy. Tingting was the first patient in Taiwan to receive the treatment and experience a full recovery.

4. An engineering breakthrough using DNA could unlock the quantum computing revolution – Chris Young

Scientists from the University of Virginia School of Medicine and collaborators used the building blocks of life to potentially revolutionize electronics.

The scientists utilized DNA to guide a chemical reaction that would overcome the barrier to Little’s superconductor, which was once thought to be “insurmountable”, a press statement reveals.

They used chemistry to perform incredibly precise structural engineering, allowing them to assemble a lattice of carbon nanotubes for Little’s room-temperature superconductor.

More than 50 years ago, Stanford physicist William A. Little proposed a type of superconductor that could be used at room temperature. This could potentially be used to enable hyper-fast computers and shrink the size of electronics devices, among a list of other benefits. In 2020, researchers from the University of Rochester revealed the first room-temperature superconductor, but high-pressure requirements make it difficult to utilize.

Edward H. Egelman, Ph.D., of UVA’s Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Genetics and graduate student Leticia Beltran applied their knowledge in the field of cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM) to the problem. Their work, outlined in a new paper in the journal Science, “demonstrates that the cryo-EM technique has great potential in materials research,” Egelman explained.

The researchers set about trying to realize Little idea for a superconductor by modifying lattices of carbon nanotubes. The main obstacle was controlling the chemical reaction along the nanotubes so that the lattice could be assembled as precisely as possible. According to Egelman, their “work demonstrates that ordered carbon nanotube modification can be achieved by taking advantage of DNA-sequence control over the spacing between adjacent reaction sites.”

The lattice the scientists built has not yet been tested for superconductivity, but it offers proof of principle, according to the researchers. “While cryo-EM has emerged as the main technique in biology for determining the atomic structures of protein assemblies, it has had much less impact thus far in materials science,” Egelman described.

5. Walmart – Benjamin Gilbert and David Rosenthal

David: There, one night at a bowling alley in Claremore, he meets and falls in love with a girl named Helen Robson. Helen was from Claremore, but her father, L.S. Robson, unlike Sam’s family, was a very wealthy and successful businessman, financier, and trader in the broader Tulsa area.

He ends up taking a big shine to Sam and would become hugely influential along with Helen because he marries Helen, of course. Sam would say, “The Robsons were very smart about the way they handled their finances: Helen’s father organized his ranch and family businesses as a partnership, and Helen and her brothers were all partners. Helen has a college degree in finance, which back then was really unusual for a woman, and Mr. Robson advised us to do the same thing with our family, which we did way back in 1953.”

That partnership that Helen and Sam set up is today Walton Enterprises which owns 36% of Walmart, and then individual family members and trusts—I think mostly Bud’s [Sam Walton’s brother] family—own the other 11%–12%.

Ben: This is the interesting seed plant of Walmart being a family business from the very get-go. They organized it interestingly. Each store was actually its own company so that different people could hold shares in each store—the management, different people who wanted to invest in the store, and that sort of thing—but at a really high level, Walmart always was a family partnership. It was always something where the economic and spiritual ownership and decision-making always was the Walton family. Of course, Sam’s the guy, but there were a lot of family meetings to make decisions for the business.

David: This is why, because the family was all partners in Walton Enterprises. They couldn’t just sell their stock and the partnership. The family as a whole had to decide to sell. That allowed them to keep majority control of Walmart all through history.

Sam talks about this. He says he thinks it’s the big reason why corporate raiders or larger companies like Kmart never came and acquired them because the stock was never splintered. It was all within the partnership. Then, he actually writes, “One of the real reasons I’m writing this book is so my grandchildren and great-grandchildren will read it years from now and know this: If you start any of that foolishness like changing the structure, selling off stock, going off and doing fancy thing—”

Ben: Buying NBA and NFL teams.

David: Buying NBA and NFL teams which they do now. “—I will come back and haunt you. So don’t even think about it.”…

…David: Sam and Helen get married and Sam gets posted in a bunch of places all around the country doing internal intelligence work for the army. He goes to Utah and plenty of other places. He decides that when the war ends and he gets out of the Army, he’s going to go back into retailing, but now, he has the support of Helen, her family, and her father, L.S. They’re financiers, so he knows, I now have access to some amount of capital. I can be an entrepreneur. I don’t necessarily have to work for somebody.

When the war ends, L.S. initially wants them to move back to Claremore, but Helen and Sam decide together. They’re like, well, we want your support, but we don’t want to be totally under your wing and in your shadow.

Sam got big ambitions. He and a buddy decide that they want to buy a Federated Department Store franchise in St. Louis. They’re going to be big. He comes from JCPenney in Des Moines. He wants to be a big city department store owner, magnate, and entrepreneur.

Helen vetoes this outright. We would not be talking about Walmart if Sam had moved the family to St. Louis. Helen says, look, one, I don’t want you doing any partnerships with non-family members. Sam says, “Her family had seen some partnerships go sour, and she was dead-set in the notion that the only way to go was to work for yourself and for your family.”

Two, she says, “I don’t want to live in a big city. I want to go live in a small town where I grew up just like Claremore. I don’t want to live in Claremore itself, but we are not allowed to move to any town that has a population of more than 10,000 people.”

Ben: Her whole thing was I want to raise my kids the way that I was raised. She looked at Sam and said, you were raised the same way in a small town and that’s what we’re going to do. Whatever business he did had to be family owned and controlled and have a small town-based strategy. What seems so intentional and so genius actually stems from the fact that she just vetoed his original idea….

…David: …Sam doesn’t stay down for long. I think he was a little disappointed that his wife had overruled him, but he finds a way. He goes back to the company that owned Federated, which is a company called Butler Brothers. They were franchisors of Federated. They’re based in Chicago.

He asks, well, do you have any department store locations that might be available in a small town of say 10,000 people or less? The Butler Brothers guys are like, we don’t really do department stores in towns like that, but we do have another spin-off operation that we run, which is our variety store franchising business.

Ben: There literally weren’t enough people they believed to support a department store. Variety stores are like glorified general stores. When you think about a town that’s 2000, 3000, or 4000 people, it really is like if you visited an old west town and looked at a general store. It’s like on steroids, but a few decades later.

David: Variety store businesses, that’s exactly it after the Depression and World War II. That was how small towns and areas were serviced to retail. They’re mostly franchise operations. This particular one was Ben Franklin, the brand name. Benjamin Franklin general store type of place.

Ben: When you say franchise operation, because it’s way too much of a burden to source your own inventory, carry your own inventory, and maintain all those different vendor relationships, if you’re in one of those towns, you’re serving 2000 people and you’re the one store there, what you really want is to sign a contract and just get the shipment of the stuff that goes into the Ben Franklin stores in all the small towns.

David: Yeah, and just be literally the merchant serving your customers. That mindset dominated. It’s worth a pause here to talk about what these stores were because it’s a very foreign concept to anything we’re familiar with today. These variety stores were also called five and dimes if you’ve ever heard that term.

Ben: A 5¢, 10¢ store.

David: The reason for that is that in most of them, every item in the store was either priced at 5¢ or 10¢. That was the level of sophistication here. The other big, big difference between how the stores operated in modern retail today, which says I’m really invented, was they weren’t self-service.

Ben: He didn’t invent that. He stole that.

David: We’re going to get to it. So you would walk into these stores and there would just be a counter area upfront that had clerks. You would tell the clerk what you wanted, and then the clerk would go back into the store, pick out what you wanted, bring it up to the front, and check you out.

Ben: Because there wasn’t really a choice. You’d be like, I need a hose, and they would go get the hose. It’s not like, well, let me see all the different brands, sizes, and colors. It was like, I know you have hoses here. Can you get me one?

David: The merchants weren’t making the decisions on the inventory. It was all just being handed down on high from Butler Brothers back in Chicago.

Ben: Yeah. I did not understand when reading this book when he kept referencing stores that were not stores where you walked around and got your own stuff off the shelf, that that is a modern concept. That is crazy.

…David: …Butler Brothers—Sam’s having this conversation with them—are like, well, probably, you want a Ben Franklin franchise, and it just so happens that we’ve got the perfect store for you in the little town of Newport, Arkansas. The current owner of the Ben Franklin franchise there wants to sell.

Newport is a little town of about 7000 people. It’s in eastern Arkansas. If you know where Bentonville, Arkansas and Walmart are today, it’s not in eastern Arkansas. Sam is like, great, I’ll take it. Now, you have to ask yourself, it is 1945 in America. The war has just ended. Unlike 1945 in Japan like we talked about with the Sony story, retail in the US is booming.

Ben: Everyone’s coming home, there was the G.I. Bill, everyone’s got new homes, everyone’s starting families, and there’s a lot of stuff to buy.

David: There’s a lot of stuff to buy. It doesn’t matter if you’re a department store in a big city or a variety store in a 7000-person town. Everybody in retail should be making money hand over fist right now.

The question that Sam didn’t ask himself and should have was why does this guy want to sell? He says in the book, “A guy from St. Louis owned it, and things weren’t working out at all for him. He was losing money, and he wanted to unload the store as fast as he could. I realize now that I was the sucker Butler Brothers sent to save him. I was twenty-seven years old and full of confidence, but I didn’t know the first thing about how to evaluate a proposition like this so I jumped right in with both feet. My naiveté about contracts and such would later come back to haunt me in a big way.”

He and Helen buy this store.

Ben: This distressed asset at not a distressed price.

David: Yes. They buy it for $25,000, $5000 of their own savings and a $20,000 loan from L.S., Helen’s father. Sam says, this isn’t what I dreamt, but I’m still going to set big goals. He decides that he’s going to set a goal that this store is going to become the most profitable variety store in Arkansas within five years.

Ben: It’s quite the turnaround and is also the first indication of Sam setting these big, hairy audacious goals. He has this subsequent obsession with set a goal, hit it, set a goal, hit it. That really does drive all of his need for experimentation because he finds himself in these situations where he has a goal set and he must invent some way to hit it.

David: It also sets the stage for what was to come. He sets this goal, and then he gets there. This is not a realistic goal.

He says, “Only after we closed the deal, of course, did I learn that the store was a real dog. It had sales of about $72,000 a year, but its rent was 5 percent of sales—which I thought sounded fine at the time—but which, it turned out, was the highest rent anybody had ever heard of in the variety store business. No one paid 5 percent of sales for rent. And it had a strong competitor—a Sterling Store which was another franchise across the street—whose excellent manager, John Dunham, was doing more than $150,000 a year in sales, double mine.”

Not only is it unlikely that he’s going to be the most profitable store in Arkansas, it’s unlikely he’s going to be the most profitable store in Newport. What does Sam do? He goes right across the street into the Dunham Store and he starts trying to figure out why Dunham is twice as successful as he is.

Ben: Yeah. Speaking of the first time Sam does something that he then does forever, he becomes notorious for going into competitor stores, bringing in a little notebook, later bringing in a little tape recorder, and just seeing what he can get away with interviewing clerks and associates at these stores.

Anytime he’s traveling with the family on vacation or anything, he’s just going into all these other stores, observing, taking notes, and figuring out what their systems are, what’s working, and what’s not working, so here he learns that valuable lesson for the first time.

David: So great. I was going to bring this up later, but I think he says in the book that he believes he has spent more time in Kmarts than any nonindividual store employee of Kmart including Kmart’s senior management.

Ben: Yeah. Also, we keep referencing Kmart. When I was growing up, it was like Walmart, Kmart. I think Kmart is kind of like Walmart, about the same scale, same size, and kind of a little lower end. That was my perception as a kid of Kmart. I didn’t realize that Kmart for a very long time was much, much larger than Walmart. They were Walmart’s big brother incumbent.

David: They were the gorillas.

Ben: I don’t remember what year this was, but I remember some quote from Walton where he’s talking about when we reached 5% the scale of Kmart. It’s like, well, that really puts it into perspective how big a lead they had.

David: You mentioned a notepad. It’s actually a yellow legal pad that Sam uses. Famously, he has this yellow legal pad and he’s going into competitor stores. He starts diving into dumpsters trying to get sales receipts, inventory orders, and stuff to figure out how these stores are operating.

He quickly realizes from both Dunham across the street—and also, he’s doing this all over the countryside, going into small variety stores all over Arkansas just trying to learn—that price, running promotions, and cutting prices on big marquee attractive items like health and beauty aids, toothpaste, mouthwash, makeup, and that stuff really drives customers in.

He starts doing that and he has some success, but there’s a problem. We talked about Butler Brothers as the franchisor. They’re controlling all the inventory. Sam as the merchant is just getting whatever they send to him at whatever cost they prescribe.

The Butler Brothers are doing great. They get about a 25% markup on all the inventory and they don’t even do anything. It’s almost like they set up the whole system just to keep these prices high out in the countryside and they just get a 25% skim off the top.

What does Sam do? He starts figuring out who the manufacturers are of some of these goods. For manufacturers that are also located there in the south in the Midwest, he starts driving around, knocking on their doors, and asking if they’ll do side deals with him and just clandestinely sell him some of the merchandise that he otherwise would be ordering from Butler Brothers and that they would be selling to Butler Brothers. They just give him a deal directly on that.

Ben: He’s operating a small enough scale that Butler Brothers doesn’t really notice. To be frank, there wasn’t good tracking or accountability at this point. There weren’t computers yet.

David: There’s no computerized inventory here.

Ben: You’d have to really be paying attention to figure out, oh, maybe Sam is not ordering quite as much of this stuff from us as he should be.

David: He’s driving around himself. There’s no management. He has some clerks working in the store, but it’s just Sam and Helen running the place. He’s out, he drives to visit them, and he’s got to get a deal done on the spot.

He goes, knocks on the door, and meets these people. He’s like, I want to buy it right now. I’ve got a trailer hooked up to my pickup truck outside. Can you just load the inventory right into the back and I’ll drive it back to Newport? He says, I bring them the inventory, bring it back, price it low, and just blow that stuff out of the store.

Ben: Which is an invention. This is a brand-new concept that we take for granted now, but it’s totally a Sam Walton invention to meet his own needs which is to create something that is astonishingly low price to get people in the store, take no margin on it, and make it a loss leader. Who cares? Get people in the door spending time in your store and they look at other stuff.

This would become a cornerstone of Walmart forever after this and for every other retailer. Even in the pricing of SaaS products now, when you look at it, it’s like, oh, I’m on the free plan. It’s not that he invented loss leadership as a category, but he figured out how to make it work in the retail model.

David: He figured out how to really merchandise and operationalize. Dunham’s across the street running promotions, but Dunham wasn’t thinking about, oh, well, maybe I could sell even lower if I go haul my pickup truck out to these manufacturers and get goods at a lower price.

Ben: Right. Of course, once you’re hauling your pickup truck to go meet the vendors directly, it’s not that far of a cry to say, well, what don’t I have in the store that I’m getting from Butler Brothers? What could be interesting? You start getting good at doing these direct deals, sourcing your own inventory, and figuring out how to merchandise products that you personally believe will sell.

This is really where he started to hone that skill, craft, and sixth sense for deeply knowing the American consumer—or let’s say consumers in this area in his communities—and having a real spidey sense of what would make them go crazy and have a real product-market fit in people’s homes.

David: Price, selection, and convenience are the holy trinity of retail, but nobody really knew this yet. Frankly, all of those things are important, but for the majority of people out there in the world, in America at the time, and certainly the vast majority of people in these small towns, it’s selection and convenience.

Ben: Life was inconvenient, so you’re going to go through some inconvenience to get things. Selection, there wasn’t much of no matter what. We just came out of the Great Depression. Price is very important.

David: Customers will go to great lengths to get lower prices.

Ben: People would make day trips. People would drive five hours to other cities to get a deal on goods.

David: It’s crazy. He says, “Here’s the simple lesson we learned—which others were learning at the same time and which eventually changed the way retailers sell and customers buy all across America: say I bought an item for 80 cents. I found that by pricing it at $1.00 I could sell three times more of it than by pricing it at $1.20. I might make only half the profit per item, but because I was selling three times as many, the overall profit was much greater. Simple enough. But this is really the essence of discounting: by cutting your price, you can boost your sales to a point where you earn far more at the cheaper retail price than you would have by selling the item at a higher price.”…

…This is incredible. He actually hits his goal. By year five of the Newport store, he’s doing $250,000 in sales at a $30,000–$40,000 annual profit. Remember, he bought the thing for $25,000. That’s including the crazy 5% rent charge in his expenses.

Ben: His operating margin on this is 24%. He’s making very, very real profits on this little store that he’s got.

David: If he had a better rent deal it could be 28%. But at those numbers, it is the most profitable store in Arkansas and the biggest store by sales not just in Arkansas but the whole Midwest and South region. He has found a winning formula here.

Ben: Which is interesting because I’m pretty sure at this point, he’s got a bunch of direct deals cut with the suppliers and he’s added a bunch of products of his own. He’s really merchandising. He’s really showing up on Ben Franklin’s radar and the Butler Brothers Corporation’s radar, and they know what he’s doing at this point. But it’s good for them. Even though it’s good for Sam, it’s also good for them because of volume and customers.

David: Right. He’s by far the best-performing Ben Franklin store in the country at this point. Unfortunately though, like I said, there’s a reason that Walmart is not headquartered in Newport, Arkansas. Butler Brothers weren’t the only related party to Sam who figured out what was going on here. His landlord that had pulled one over on the previous owner and had the super onerous rent terms also figures out, of course, how great Sam is doing despite having the deck stacked against him.

He decides he wants to take over the store. Year five is when the lease expires and there wasn’t an option in the contract to renew the lease. The landlord goes to Sam. He’s like, you know what, son, you’ve done a great job. Thank you for turning this property of mine around. I’m going to take it from here.

Ben: Just to contextualize this, it’s a 7000-person town. There are not really many other available storefronts. He’s got tons of shelves in there with tons of goods. It’s a meaningful amount of inventory that’s being carried on the business. It’s not like you can be like, oh, cool, I’ll move next door. That option does not exist.

His landlord comes to him and says this and he’s like, wait, oh my God, I have no other options.

David: He says, “It was the low point of my business life. I felt sick to my stomach. I couldn’t believe it was happening to me. It really was like a nightmare.”

I say this as a saving grace although the reality is Helen’s father would have financed Sam’s next venture no matter what. But the saving grace for Sam’s pride at least was that the landlord did buy out the value of the Ben Franklin franchise license, the hard assets, the inventory, the fixtures, et cetera in the store. He pays Sam and Helen $50,000 to take over the store. I’m going to guess that’s a 2X return.

Ben: What was the operating income from the previous year?

David: Thirty to forty thousand dollars.

Ben: Wow, brutal.

David: But at least they get the $50,000 out. This is now 1950. Sam and Helen hit the road again looking for a new town to bring their traveling circus to.

Ben: And have a little bit more knowledge on lease negotiation.

David: Yes. They go up to the other corner of the state in Northwest Arkansas. This is where they started looking around for the next place to set up shop for two reasons.

One, closer to Helen’s family in Oklahoma, Claremore. Two, like I said, Sam keeps it real. He was like, there’s some really good quail hunting up there and I really wanted to be closer so I could drag my bird dogs out and go hunting.

Ben: Yes, and more specifically, it’s not just that there’s good quail hunting. It is that he will be very close to four states which each have their own quail hunting season so that he can get the maximum amount of quail hunting in with an easy drive from his house.

Lots of business decisions being made here on family—we need to be in a small town and we need to only work with family. For Sam, I need to be able to hunt quail in the maximum amount of time that I possibly can.

David: The opportunity that they find and settle on is in a little town of 3000 people—less than half the size of Newport—that already in this town of 3000 people had 3 variety stores operating. Newport had 2 for 7000 people. This town has 3 for 3000 people.

As Sam says, he loves competition. That town is Bentonville, Arkansas. Sam probably almost assuredly is rolling over in his grave right now.

Ben: The new Walmart campus.

David: The new Walmart campus that they’re building. It looks absolutely gorgeous, which I’m sure he would be furious about.

Ben: Yes. If you thought Warren was a penny-pinching, very plain, no frills, no fancy things entrepreneur, Sam Walton—hard to argue who’s more frugal and less showy. Sam eventually got into airplanes for very practical use, but Sam was not a showy guy.

David: Actually, the anecdote that he and John Huey open Made in America with is I think it’s 1985 when Forbes ranked him the richest man in America and all these reporters start descending on Bentonville. They want to go interview the richest man in America. He still drives an old pickup truck that has cages in the back for his bird dogs because he goes hunting in the four states nearby.

It’s this big sensation that the richest man in America drives a beat-up, old pickup truck with cages in the back. He’s like, well, what am I going to drive my dogs around, in a Rolls Royce?

Ben: All right, so they arrive in Bentonville. Bentonville and the world are forever changed, but it doesn’t happen all at once.

David: No. The store that they buy is another Ben Franklin franchise that had done $32,000 in revenue the year before, quite a distance from the $250,000 that they left Newport with. Sam decides, all right, well, this is a small market. This is a small store. There’s a lot of competition, but I have big ambitions. He’s got his ear to the ground in retail and particularly in the Ben Franklin franchise network.

He hears through the grapevine that there are two Ben Franklin stores up in Minnesota that were trying a radical new concept. They were redoing the whole way. The store was laid out, the way it worked. They were removing the upfront counters, turning them into checkout counters, and letting customers go into the store, browse the merchandise, pick it up themselves, select it themselves, and then checkout.

He’s like, I got to go see this. He takes the overnight bus up from Arkansas up to Minnesota and checks them out. He’s taking notes the whole time on his yellow legal pad. He says about that trip, “I liked it. So I did that too”

Ben: I love how he’s so obsessed with first-hand experience. He couldn’t just hear about this and then implement it. He’s like, I must see it for myself because he so fervently believes that he picks up insights from actually spending time in stores and actually talking to customers. It seems like he does that more than any other entrepreneur we’ve ever talked about on this show, this obsession with first-hand experience.

David: I think everybody can apply this to their business. I was thinking about it while reading the book. I started so many passages and I already listened to lots of other podcasts unlike when we started Acquired and I didn’t listen to any other podcasts.

Ben: We should find the best ideas and incorporate them, yeah.

David: There’s a great quote about this when Walmart actually gets started later. I’m going to tease it for now. On July 29th, 1950, just about 72 years ago, they reopened the Ben Franklin store that they bought.

Ben: Still a franchise.

David: Still a Ben Franklin franchise, still working with Butler Brothers for “most of the inventory.” But they want to send a message that this is a new era, doing the self-service new store in Bentonville. They renamed it Walton’s Five and Dime and it became the third self-service variety store in the entire country.

Ben: It’s fascinating that they picked this name because part of the reason why you do a franchise is the brand. Sure, it’s nice to get the inventory, negotiated relationships, prices, and all this stuff, but really what you’re buying is people who know what a Ben Franklin is, so they would come to the store.

What Sam is saying is, eh, I feel pretty good about building my own brand. I know I’m in one way or another paying to use the Ben Franklin brand, but we’re not going to use it.

David: It really was rational because even though Sam on the margins is doing his own direct deals with manufacturers at this point, it’s a ludicrous concept that somebody in a little store in Arkansas could source all of their inventory and do all of their logistics by themselves. That is completely freaking crazy that a store servicing 3000 people in a little town would handle all of that themselves.

But they launched with a new name. It’s a new concept. It’s self-service. It causes quite a stir. I couldn’t find this exactly, but I believe, in that first year when Walton’s Five and Dime is open—remember, the previous Ben Franklin iteration of the store had done $32,000 a year in revenue, something like that—Walton’s Five and Dime did $90,000 in sales the first year.

I don’t know what the competitive dynamics were between the 3 stores in Bentonville, but remember, the town only had 3000 people. If you assume the previous three stores roughly had an equal market share—it’s a big assumption but just for argument’s sake—that would mean that the whole market size of Bentonville, the whole TAM, is $90,000. They did $90,000 in revenue, so what was happening here?

Ben: Yeah, is there a massively expanding TAM, did they expand that market because people are just buying more stuff than they otherwise would have?

David: I don’t know what happened to the other two stores, whether they went out of business or not. Certainly, they wouldn’t have right away. I think what happened was this caused such a stir that people started coming to shop at Walton’s Five and Dime from other towns.

Ben: I think it was the first time that Sam realized that shock value would bring customers much like I didn’t need anything the first time I went to an Amazon Go to try the cashierless checkout. People came for novelty value here. That taught him the lesson of, oh, maybe we should always have novelty value. Maybe there are reasons why people should be coming to Walmart even if they aren’t necessarily looking to buy something.

David: Yup. If you think about it, put yourself in the shoes of customers back then. Sam talks about this a lot in the book. For so long—we’ll get into the competition with Kmart—everybody thought Walmart, Sam, and all their customers were just kicks in the sticks. They are just complete morons out there. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

He says, my customers were also sophisticated retail customers. They knew about what was going on in the cities. They had relatives there they’d go visit. It’s not like they didn’t want first-class shopping experiences in their own hometowns.

Clearly, this makes a big splash. Sam realizes that he might have a tiger by the tail here so he starts looking. Unlike in Newport where he was satisfied, the store kept growing and he did $250,000 a year in sales. He starts looking to open up more locations.

Ben: More Five and Dimes.

David: He also doesn’t want to have all of his eggs in one basket and one lease like he did in Newport.

Ben: Right. Didn’t he open a store directly next door to one of his competitors just so that his competitor couldn’t expand their store? It wasn’t a high-performing store for him, but at least it didn’t let them get the square footage.

David: Yes. Clearly, he’s very competitor-focused. It’s funny. There are so many Jeff Bezos-isms that when you read this book and you learn about Walmart and Sam Walton, you realize that they were originally Walton-isms, Sam-isms, but in the whole Amazon we’re customer-focused and we’re not competitor-focused, Sam would have said absolutely not. We are absolutely competitor-focused. We’re focused on taking the best stuff from our competitors and implementing it here.

Ben: While we’re here, we have to say it. Eventually, a Walmart does go back to Newport. There is a little store that is run by a family member of the landlord that screwed over Sam that does get put out of business by that Walmart going in.

Sam makes the point, “You can’t say we ran that guy—the landlord’s son—out of business. His customers were the ones who shut him down. They voted with their feet.” To me, this is that perfect overlap of are you competitor-focused or customer focused? Well, both. You have to win in a market by counter positioning in some way. Walton did it by discounting but that obviously has an impact on your competitors.

You need to be able to counter a position against someone like a competitor. So when the big realization is, oh, customers always want lower prices, and satisfaction guaranteed, and all the other Walmart-isms, that will have impacts on your competitors. You have to pay attention to those competitors. But ultimately…

David: The customers decide.

Ben: Sam is willing to blame the customer for putting the competitor out of business.

David: In 1952, just a short while later, Sam opens up a second store in nearby Fayetteville, Arkansas, because again, it’s just Sam and Helen, when she can, helping out with the bookkeeping, managing the first store. Sam needs to hire somebody to go manage Fayetteville because he’s working in Bentonville. So he brings on a guy named Willard Walker, who was managing a variety store in Tulsa before that.

The way they convinced him to move to Fayetteville and take over this new concept is they make him an offer he can’t refuse. They make him a partner in the store. This is what you were referring to earlier. They give him a percentage of the profits that that individual store makes. In fact, they set up that store and all future stores as their own partnerships. This is something I didn’t understand until reading the book.

It became a huge part of the playbook for Walmart for decades, in which every store manager in a new store opening was given first equity and individual partnerships, and then later profit sharing incentives in that individual store. That sets up a true alignment of incentives. I don’t think anybody else was doing this at that point in time and then even better.

So all the pool of existing store managers, whenever they open up another store, Sam and Helen give them the opportunity to invest dollars in the new stores and the new partnerships. Now you’re incentivized on the success of the whole network, and you’re incentivized to share information. You want everybody to do better.

Ben: They get carry and they should make a GP commit.

David: Exactly. I think this is super brilliant. I was thinking about this, with regard to tech companies today and everything. Even though employees of tech companies get much better economic deals with stock options, I think psychologically, this is a better way to do it. What Sam was doing, you’re putting your own money at work. You’re incentivized both on your own personal performance in the store…

…David: Then reading more in the book about this. So during this period and in the early Walmart Corporation period, it was just the store managers who were doing this, not the hourly employees.

Ben: There was a gigantic chasm. I mean, there’s still a big chasm today but two completely different classes of humans in those early days between the store managers who were salaried and employed by the partnership and of course the to be called associates but the hourly workers who were not.

David: So a couple of interesting things. One, the people who were the store managers, this wasn’t quite like white collar workers. It’s somewhere in between. Most of these people didn’t have college degrees. They were salaried. Then they got equity in these partnerships. It wasn’t like these were Wharton graduates that were coming in and doing this.

Ben: Intentionally not. Those folks were discriminated against in the Walmart culture, especially in the early days of think you’re better than us, college boy.

David: Totally. One of the first managers was nicknamed The Bear and he had one eye. There are some crazy stories out there. They were bringing donkeys into the store.

Ben: Right. We’re talking Walmart. So take us to Walmart, how did we get from the Walton’s Five and Dime.

David: On the employee front, after Walmart went public, Sam instituted both profit sharing at the store level with the associates, with the hourly employees, but then also an employee stock purchase program. This is cool. Home Depot modeled their employee stock purchase program after Walmart’s and it’s brilliant. It’s the same thing. You put up your own money, but you can do it pre-tax dollars out of your paycheck at a 15% discount to the stock price.

Ben: This is what Microsoft let me do when I was a PM there. In addition to your stock-based compensation, they call it an ESPP (Employee Stock Purchase Program), Microsoft only lets us have a 10% discount, so it’s very kind of Walmart to give a 15% discount for market price.

David: There are stories in the book of hourly associates that made millions of dollars in the ’70s and ’80s off of the employee stock purchase program. It’s pretty cool…

…David: I’m totally inspired by Sam, Walmart, and everything. Okay, so back to the ’50s in Arkansas. Remember, we talked all the way back in the beginning of the episode about Sam’s brother, Bud. Well, Bud had gotten into the Ben Franklin business himself after the war in Missouri. One day, Sam is visiting Kansas City and he hears about a new suburb development going in just southeast of the city called Ruskin Heights, and it’s going to have a shopping center.

This newfangled concept is right in the middle of this suburb subdivision, and there’s going to be a grocery store, a drugstore, and real estate for a big Ben Franklin store. So Sam calls up Bud and he’s like, we got to go in 50-50 on this, this is a huge opportunity. They do, and it is a banger to earn $50,000 in annual sales the first year in Ruskin Heights, then $350,000 the year after and just keeps growing and growing.

Sam says when I saw that shopping center catch on the way it did, I thought, man, this is the forerunner of many, many things to come. The only problem was Ruskin was actually kind of a red herring. This was the future. This was the forerunner of many things to come, but it was still a little bit ahead of its time. This is really a 1960s thing, not only a ’50s thing. Sam is convinced though, that it’s the future. So he starts going around Arkansas and Missouri evangelizing the towns and city planners about putting in the shopping centers.

Ben: For which they would be the anchor tenant.

David: But it’s super slow dealing with local governments. It’s hard. It takes a long time. He wants to move fast. So he starts trying to put his own real estate deals together for multi-tenant shopping centers and fails. Eventually, because back to Helen’s advice, these multi-tenant shopping centers, I see the power in Ruskin, but it’s dependent on too many other people. But if I’m willing to invest some capital, I could just put bigger stores in the same locations myself. That’s what he starts to do.

Ben: Does he become his own landlord then and just buy the land or what requires more capital?

David: That’s a good question. I don’t know at this point if they were doing real estate themselves, but certainly, they are building out bigger store concepts, requiring capital to build the stores. It’s not like there were existing structures there then to outfit them with all the fixtures and all the inventory for the larger stores. But he and Bud together, start doing this. They call these new stores “family centers” and they start doing unheard of numbers—$1 million, $2 million.

Ben: Are they still sourcing the inventory from Ben Franklin from Butler brothers?

David: Yes. They don’t yet have their own distribution, inventory, and logistics network setup. That was the big step of Walmart. These were still just like much larger versions of Ben Franklins and they were working with them to get all the inventory to them.

Ben: Already at this point, they’ve bent so many rules with Ben Franklin like changing the store layout and concept, where they’re going, starting to dictate more terms, and naming them on their own. At this point, they’re really starting to treat Butler brothers as more of a component of the Walton business rather than Walton being a franchisee of Butler brothers.

David: Exactly. So these “family centers” that Sam and Bud were building are still Ben Franklin franchises. The Waltons are now taking over more and more of control of the concept, their self-service, they’re larger format, but it’s still part of the Butler brothers’ cartel, shall we say? Because they were part of Butler brothers, Sam and Bud were limited on how much discounting they could really do.

They were aggressive on pricing, probably more so than other merchants at the time, and they had self-service, the large format, and all this interesting stuff. But the prices weren’t that much different than other stores.

Ben: It’s worth knowing that we don’t think about the notion of discount stores today being counter positioned against something like all big stores have things at kind of the lowest price you can find them.

David: Because they’re all discounters now. I think 87% of market share in America is discounters.

Ben: Yeah. So there’s either specialty high end retail, which is often directly from the manufacturer sort of like vertically integrated or specialty sourced or something, or if you’re buying things that we consider a big regular store, they’re all discounters. At the time, there were no discounters. Everyone was marking up their goods by about 45%. If you’re buying something and then marking it up 45%, it means your gross margin is about 33% as a retailer.

David: And that was on top of the markups in the middle from the franchise operators.

Ben: The competition was so low that you totally could just do this. For reference, just so people have a sense today, Walmart probably has a gross margin between 20–24% at any given time, and every store had like a 33% gross margin. Even though Target is like a high end discounter—it’s sort of a nicer stuff, more expensive—they’re in the 29% category, but everyone was 33% or above gross margin at this point in history….

…Basically, everyone’s marking up their goods 45% and nobody has done other than Ann & Hope and a few other select folks that haven’t really rolled it out at scale or really popularized the movement. No one has done discounting, but what is discounting? Two major components. One is big loss leadership. Blow it out in order to get people in the store, do it in dramatic fashion, and then people buy other stuff.

Two is we make it up on volume, just don’t mark stuff up that much period across the whole store. Decide that you’re only going to mark things up 25% instead of 45%. Then when you do that, of course, you don’t make as much money per item. But everybody buys more stuff in your store. This hadn’t really been proven yet.

David: Yeah, and there’s another component. What you’re saying, which is Sam’s original lesson of, you actually make more profit dollars selling items at the dollar than you do at $120 because you sell three times as many. But there’s also the peace in the middle, the franchisor, the Butler brothers, remember, they’re taking 25% from the manufacturer to Butler brothers, and then out to the stores. That’s how most everything operated.

These discounters are like no, we’re going to go direct to the manufacturers for everything, just like Sam was starting to do in this but on the margins. We’re just going to completely not be a franchise operation. We’re going to own and operate everything. We’re going to operate our own back end, our own supplier relationships, and our own distribution.

Ben: There’s a great quote, this is again later in Walmart’s development. It’s when Sam Walton is informing the Walmart vendor relations team and merchandisers on how to deal with vendors.

He’s telling them, “Don’t leave in any room for a kickback because we don’t do that here. And we don’t want your advertising program or your delivery program. Our truck will pick it up at your warehouse. Now what is your best price? And if they told me it’s a dollar, I would say, Fine, I’ll consider it, but I’m going to go to your competitor, and if he says 90 cents, he’s going to get the business. So make sure a dollar is your best price.

If that’s being hard-nosed, then we ought to be as hard-nosed as we can be. You have to be fair and upfront and honest, but you have to drive your bargain because you’re dealing with millions and millions of customers who expect the best price they can get. If you buy that thing for $1.25, you’ve just bought somebody else’s inefficiency.”

David: Totally.

Ben: I love that. I mean, it is brutal but that encapsulates the philosophy so well.

David: There’s so much baked into that that people don’t even realize. To get to the point where you could do that, you need to operate the entire back-end of retail yourself. Sam and Bud and Walmart, they’re starting from they don’t have anything. To get to a point where you can have conversations with suppliers like that, you need your own shipping carriers, trucks. You need your own distribution centers. You need your own ordering systems. You need your own technology. They don’t have any of that.

Ben: You need to forecast. You need to be able to understand we’re going to sell enough of these units to go buy a crap ton at this super low price. We need to be able to be so confident that we can tell the supplier to spin up new inventory so that we will buy it to increase their production. Okay, that’s all the future. So at this moment.

David: Okay, so at this moment, Sam of course goes out. He goes and shops. He travels to the northeast. He shops in Ann & Hope. He goes out. He meets Sol Price, who he already knew.

Ben: And we’re in like the 1960s?

David: Late ’50s, early ’60s at this point, before 1962. He sees what they’re doing. They’re doing this proto discounting in big cities, and rings around big cities, not necessarily in the primo real estate downtown but where you have access to logistics hubs. You can sort of scrounge together and make this work. The idea that Sam could copy this and go do it back in Arkansas, it’s crazy. What manufacturers are going to ship stuff to Arkansas, especially big volume stuff?

He goes, he meets with Sol and Ann & Hope and he’s like, you know what, I think I can make this work. I think I can do it. Even he knows what a huge undertaking this is. He actually goes back to the Butler brothers. He’s like, we’ve been great partners. We’ve really innovated on a lot of stuff together. I’ve seen this discounting model. I think it’s the future. I know customers like low prices. I’ve got these new large format stores. Why don’t we work together on this? I need you to handle the backend. You have the scale to be able to do this. You already distribute out to small towns like mine. Let’s partner on this and do it together. And Butler brothers says no…

…David: In Butler brothers’ defense, they signed their own death warrant here, but that was the rational thing to do. This is like a counter positioning thing. they had all these other Ben Franklin franchises out there. If they had done what Sam is proposing and essentially taken out their markup on goods that they would provide to Sam’s stores, what are all the rest of their franchisees going to say?

Ben: It is literally the innovator’s dilemma because they have too much baggage to actually pull this new thing off. To be more specific about that, there is too much ongoing revenue that they would cannibalize in the short term by messing up all those relationships they had with their other franchisees where they would probably churn too much of that and risk the whole business so they could not take advantage of what could be the new wave.

David: Yep. The thing that Sam knew, the minute he saw discounting, was all of those stores were dead anyway.

Ben: Yeah, just a matter of time.

David: Somebody is going to bring discounting to Arkansas, Missouri, Texas, Florida, and everywhere else and those stores are dead.

Ben: It’s that insight that people who are out from cities want the same thing as people in cities, and so they’re just as bright. They want the same things in life. They just happen to not live in cities, so let’s not be pejorative. Let’s serve them with high quality retail experience.

David: Totally. So 1962, Sam and Bud secured a site in Rogers, Arkansas, which is pretty close to Bentonville. It’s got to say, they’re going to do this. It’s going to be chaos, but they’re going to figure out the backend, do this new discounting concept. They just need a name. Sam’s got a bunch of candidate names for what to call this new retail concept.

He’s talking with one of the early store managers, Bob Bogle, about his ideas. He says, what do you think? Bob says, you’ve got all these fancy names, but it’s pretty expensive. Building the neon signs of Walton’s Five and Dime and Ben Franklin. That’s a lot of letters. What if you just take part of the Walton name, keep that, make it a place to shop, and call it Walmart. Seven letters, that’ll be pretty cheap.

Ben: I love it.

David: The legend is born.

6. The Greatest Value Investor You’ve Never Heard Of – Macro Ops

The investor is Floyd Odlum.

Buried somewhere in the junk drawer of investing lore, Odlum’s story remains unknown. A quick Google search reveals his Wikipedia and IMDB pages. Yet in typical deep-value fashion, the last link on the page revealed Odlum’s investing story.

The Holy Financier’s blog post was that last link. The blog proved an excellent springboard for a deeper investigation into Odlum’s early life, initial career and his path to market fortunes. Although Odlum (pictured on the right) and Ben Graham never met, their investment philosophies are one in the same.

We’ll journey through his upbringing, his days as a struggling lawyer and his initial attempt at market speculation. Then we’ll see how Odlum turned $39,000 into $700,000 in two years.

Odlum wasn’t just a great investor. He also had a knack for choosing the most generic partnership names, such as his first “The United States Company”. The partnership, formed in 1923, was a couple’s affair. Odlum, George Howard and their wives seeded the partnership with $39,000 ($573K adj. for inflation).

What followed over the next two years was nothing short of incredible. According to Odlum’s biography, The United States Company grew 17x from 1923 – 1925. What started as a small partnership amongst friends turned into a $660,000 behemoth ($9.47M adjusted for inflation).

Odlum’s two-year CAGR is mind-numbing. If that wasn’t impressive enough, he generated these returns while working full-time as a law clerk!

How did he generate such outsized returns?

Well, he was a deep value investor. He searched for fifty-cent dollars and  scoured every corner of the market. According to documents from the Eisenhower Library, Odlum preferred two kinds of investments:

• Utility stocks
• Special situations

He defined a special situation as “an investment […] involving not only primary financial sponsorship, but usually also responsibility for [the] management of the enterprise.” The former lawyer wasn’t interested in flipping a business for a quick buck, either.

Embedded in Odlum’s strategy was the determination to see a special situation through until success, “[We will] stay with the investment until the essentials of the job have been done, and then move on [to] another special situation”.

Between 1925 – 1928, Odlum steadily grew the partnership. By investing in utilities and special situations, The United States Company AUM grew to $6M (over $88M adjusted for inflation). It was around this time that Odlum began sensing euphoria in the market. He smelled a top and he decided it was time for him to act.

In 1929, he rolled his original partnership into a new vehicle, The Atlas Corporation. Wary of a market top, Odlum sold half his assets. He stayed in cash and issued $9M worth of Atlas Corporation securities. With $14M in cash, Floyd sat on his hands. Waiting for the next market crash, which shortly followed.

But his bread and butter during the Depression was buying investment trusts. His strategy was simple. He found investment trusts that had fallen so much their stock prices were trading less than the value of their marketable securities. A good example of this in today’s markets is Manning & Napier (note: I do not hold shares).

He discovered he could buy these trusts, liquidate their assets, and reap large profits for his stakeholders. He was buying dollar bills for $0.60 and he milked this strategy for all it’s worth. He ended up buying and merging investment trust twenty-two times. The newspaper article profiled these dealings:

“He figured out that by buying all the outstanding shares of a particular trust, he was really buying cash or its equivalent at sixty cents on the dollar.”

When he didn’t have the cash to buy the trusts, he sold shares in his own company, Atlas, to fund the purchases. After exchanging his stock for the trust’s stock, Odlum would merge or dissolved the existing trust, keeping the cash and assets within Atlas Corp.

This strategy helped grow his assets to $150M ($2.2B adjusted for inflation).

Between 1929 and 1935, Odlum invested (and controlled) many diverse businesses. He owned Greyhound Bus, a little motion picture studio named Paramount, Hilton Hotels, three women’s apparel companies, uranium mines, a bank, an office building, and an oil company….

…He then pooled together another $39,000 to form his first partnership. That original $39,000 grew to $150M in controlled assets. All that during a span of just twelve years.

The math is incredible. Odlum grew assets 384,515% in a bit over a decade. That’s a 32,042% CAGR for asset growth.

And his early partnership returns are just as impressive. Odlum grew assets from $39,000 to $6M between 1923 – 1929. That’s a cumulative 15,284% return. In other words, Odlum compounded capital at an annual rate of 2,547%.

7. The Complex Case of Floyd Odlum – Frederik Gieschen

This is a piece about Floyd Odlum, a once-upon-a-time famous investor who made his fortune doing distressed deals during the Great Depression. But I want to start with a reflection on my process and the challenges of diving into a story. Here’s why.

I had read some twenty articles about Odlum, and his life seemed straightforward: a young lawyer from Colorado made his way to New York to become a dealmaker in utilities, one of the growth industries of the 1920s. He started an investment fund on the side, raised cash in 1929, and avoided the carnage. Through Atlas Corp., his publicly-listed investment trust, he masterfully acquired other trusts at steep discounts to their undervalued portfolios. By the time that Graham and Dodd published Security Analysis in 1934, Odlum had closed 22 transactions and amassed assets of $150 million. Once wealthy and famous, he married his second wife, racing pilot Jacqueline Cochran, served in the government during WWII, and retired to an estate in Palm Springs where he did deals by the pool and was visited by Eisenhower from time to time.

This story and its lessons seemed so clean. Stand back during the bubble, swing for the fences when opportunity presents itself, case closed.

I knew that Odlum’s records were kept in the Eisenhower Presidential Library. What I did not know until this week was that someone had combed through them all and put together a voluminous draft of a biography. After reading the outline, I reached out to the author, David Clarke, bought a copy of his unpublished work for $19.95, and dug in.

But then I stopped myself. This was supposed to be a short piece. Something that I could churn out on a weekly basis with a moderate amount of research. Reading an unfinished 700-page biography would blow up my schedule — and for what?

However, I quickly realized that the neat little narrative about Odlum’s life was wrong. I had no choice but to at least skim the work if I wanted to learn the real lessons of his life.

For example:

Odlum didn’t cash out before the crash. His utility stocks just didn’t decline as much and made a brief comeback, allowing him to redeploy the capital. It seems he never bothered to correct the origin story of his prescience which was repeated by one paper after another.

He made his early capital trading in utility stocks while being employed at one of the largest utility holding companies and running their foreign M&A efforts. While there is no evidence, and insider trading was not illegal at that time, Clarke suspects that this information edge played a significant role in Odlum’s early success.

Also, taking over investment trusts required convincing the board and key shareholders who often had no interest in selling. And it seems that Odlum was willing to bribe directors to get the deals done.

Around the end of WWII, Odlum made his last successful distressed investments, in oil and defense defense contractors, before departing from his circle of competence. Large bets on an airline, uranium mining, and a motorcycle manufacturer turned into sinkholes for capital in which he kept doubling down. His fortune started to dwindle.

His personal life was rife with tragedy as both of his sons died before him: one of alcoholism, the other of suicide after a string of failed deals and enterprises. In the end, Odlum’s wealth had been lost and spent. He and his wife, famous pilot Jackie Cochran, had to leave their beautiful ranch and live out retirement in a modest home.

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Alphabet (parent of Google), Amazon, and Microsoft. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 07 August 2022:

1. Will Thorndike – The Power of Long Holding Periods – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and Will Thorndike

[00:06:28] Patrick: 50’s pretty good. I’d love to dig into this interest that you have in long-term holding periods in as many ways as we can. The TransDigm episode and the conversation you had with Nick and some of the investors there really brings it to life where this is not a simple story, right? There’s a lot going on over a very long period of time. Obviously periods that long are fundamentally unpredictable. You don’t know what’s going to happen in the world. You don’t know what’s going to happen on the team. There’s a crazy amount of unpredictability that gets injected if you’re talking a 20, 30 year time horizon. So how do you deal with that amount of uncertainty and what are the benefits of having that sort of orientation? Is there a litmus test that you apply to the company to say, “This definitely won’t work over five years, but it could over 30.” Is that a positive thing? I would just love to start to understand the reason that you’re so interested in this, given that as you get longer, it just seems harder to predict things.

[00:07:22] Will: In the original Housatonic fund we still owned three of the eight companies that we invested in and the holding period for each of those companies is over 25 years now. And those companies have been very good outcomes, but they’ve also just been incredibly fun and satisfying to work on. You asked that question about how has the book influenced my investing, part of it is I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about those eight companies in the book, those three companies from the earlier Housatonic funds, and then a whole range of other companies I’ve been involved in over a long period of time with the idea that what correlates most highly with persistence in return profile over time? This is really translated into a lot of the work that we’re doing at Compounding Labs, but we’ve really become zeroed in on revenue quality. So the purest form of that is it a recurring revenue business? And if so, what’s the churn profile?

And what we’ve found is there’s disproportionate power in truly low churn businesses. And when I say churn, I mean, logo churn, gross churn, net revenue retention is, there are other metrics that are important as well, but really at the core of it is you start the year with a 100 customers, how many do you end the year with and why are there structural reasons for that? And so if you look across those companies, they tend to have this element of revenue persistence. It’s absolutely the case for TransDigm, TransDigm which I’m sure we’ll get into in some detail, their business is very specialized aviation components, airplane parts. When they get engineered into these core airplane platforms, frames, whether it’s the 737 commercial aircraft or the B-52 and defense aircraft, and those platforms tend to stay in active service for 70 or 75 years.

So if you’re providing a small, critical component part into those airframes, in order to be switched out, it requires FAA approval. It absolutely never happens. And so you have great visibility, predictability on your revenue stream around which you can then do a whole range of other things in terms of how you organize the company, whether you choose a decentralized organizational form, how you think about financing the company. It has a dramatic impact on your capital allocation menu of alternatives. So we’ve intentionally been trying to select for a very specific type of business model at Compounding Labs and also in the work we’re doing at 50X.

[00:09:42] Patrick: Maybe we could just keep digging in until we find a bottom on this concept of revenue quality. What are the most common things that you start to see early in the investigation of a business that indicate that this revenue quality that you’re after may be there? And what is the process like early on as you’re doing one of these deep dives, what kinds of questions are you asking of the business, or the inverse? What kind of things are you looking to actively avoid? Even if there’s, let’s say, low churn?

[00:10:08] Will: It’s one of these things the mathematicians talk about the simplicity on the other side of complexity. And so we’ve spent a lot of time on this over a very long period of time, across a lot of companies. At the end of the day, however, industries that are characterized by very low churn are just interesting places to be looking for these sorts of long holding period platforms. The Porter Framework is incredibly powerful. There are a lot of frameworks you can use to evaluate businesses, but I would argue at the end of the day, if a company has 2% customer churn that’s a very powerful indicator.

So then you have to look at, okay, so what are the reasons for that? And what potential dislocation risk is there that the reasons for that stickiness will change over time. It’s a very rich hunting ground we found, and you tend to get with that profile a lot of other good things. You tend to get relatively simple operations, you tend to get pricing power, you tend to get a high degree of capital efficiency, which is another thing we really focus on. We can talk a little bit about that. But a lot of positive economic attributes tend to correlate with those sorts of revenue profiles. It’s not in and of itself the only criterion, but it’s a very powerful leading indicator. At least for the work we’re doing…

…[00:17:45] Patrick: If you think about, I guess the power of that patience early on, and you’re doing these very deep dive looks at companies for the outsiders now for 50 X. What are the kinds of things that you’re uncovering about let’s say TransDigm, since it’s the most recent example. That you think would just be overlooked or underappreciated if you spent, I don’t know, five hours researching the company or some shorter period of time that probably a more traditional analyst new to the company would get familiar in five, 10, 15, 20 hours, something like that. What kinds of things would they miss maybe specifically for TransDigm, but what is the value of this like crazy deep dive, year long type research that you do?

[00:18:23] Will: It’s the peeling back the layers of the onion analogy. So examples of things you learned from diving deeper, pacing is one of them. You need to look really hard to get at that, but their approach to pacing was very different, very differentiated. Another item that’s important to them is they’ve retained the ability to do really small acquisitions as they’ve gotten bigger. That turns out to be a common thread across really long term serial acquirers, really small acquisitions tend to be very, very accretive for these companies over time and so the trap that some serial acquirers fall into is to just focus on larger deals. TransDigm has retained the ability to do a steady diet of these smaller, highly accretive transactions. Again, all done with debt. Game selection, so to speak was really good here. Nick and his team chose an excellent industry, but within that, it’s sort of optimized along every single dimension.

You can look at the decision they made around organizational structure. They chose an extreme what I would call hard form of decentralization and they’ve been able to maintain that as they’ve grown. The details of that, which are in the podcast are all things you would miss on first study, but they’re very important to understanding how sustainable that approach is going forward. The approach to compensation is unique among public companies and it’s tied directly into the decentralized organizational form and it’s just unique in ways that are sort of provocative. It’s entirely performance based, no time based vesting whatsoever and it’s tied to minimum thresholds of compounding for shareholders using a very sensible formula.

The lessons that come out about how to instill, imprint a culture widely in an organization, sort of idea of the simplicity of the value creation triad at TransDigm, which is repeated add in for an item. It’s repeated add in for an item across our podcast, but even more so within the company, this idea that’s productivity, pricing and profitable new business. Those are the only possible sources of value creation and every GM is evaluated on those and every review of every business unit quarterly is centered on those…

...[00:25:09] Patrick: You’ve mentioned this kind of decentralized structure a few times. An example would be helpful of people might think of Berkshire or something where there’s a lot of trust and responsibility and ownership that’s pushed down, maybe IAC. There’s other interesting modern examples of a slim home office, not a lot of G & A the home office and a lot of responsibility at the business unit. Why does this work so well? How does culture permeate across very independent business units? It seems like that would be almost contradictory that unique cultures at the business level, if it was fully decentralized. So I’m just curious to understand a bit more about why you think this works.

[00:25:44] Will: First of all, it’s not a universal panacea at all. So there are lots of companies that have been very successful with cultures and organizational structures that aren’t decentralized. I would argue that Danaher has been wildly successful as a serial acquirer with a culture that is not highly decentralized. It has elements of decentralization, but also importantly, elements of centralization. It’s not a universal solution at all. I think it’s very industry dependent. The characteristics of successful decentralized cultures, I mean, again, you can kind of super, roughly get at it quantitatively by looking at the ratio of people at corporate to total employees, relative to the peer group. So a lot of the companies and the outsiders and the book and TransDigm as examples were just off the charts, they had 10 X, five to 10 X, as many employees, total employees per employee at corporate.

With that is this idea that again, that you’re trying to retain entrepreneurial ethos, that’s an essential priority. So that’s one of the objectives of a decentralized culture. The other is you are lowering your cost and in these cultures, there tends to be an element of frugality scrappiness in the culture. It persists long past the early days. Another company that fits this model very well is Constellation Software, which famously has 500 plus maybe 600 now business units under Mark Leonard. If you’re the CEO of a company, you’re constantly faced with decisions about what to centralize versus keep independent. The tricky thing is in almost every case, the decision to centralize leads to a near term economy, like a quantifiable near term cost savings.

But the reality is that if you do it every time, if you follow that path to its logical conclusion, you tend to end up with a bureaucratic ossified organizational structure and culture. We talk about this with our CEOs all the time. What messes are you willing to step around? What things do you think are important to have reside at corporate and what should remain with the general managers?

[00:27:50] Patrick: I’m curious for an example of a mess that’s worth sidestepping. It would seem counterintuitive that a great business would actively avoid getting involved in a mess. So what’s a good example of that in your experience?

[00:28:01] Will: It’s sort of, what do you want to mandate? Do you want to mandate a certain type of Salesforce compensation program at all of your companies? And it’s this idea. Do you want to mandate it or do you want to suggest it? The other thing that happens in those successful decentralized companies is they tend to regularly assemble the general managers and compare their results and share ideas in a way that naturally promotes positive peer pressure or a little element of competition, but also shares good ideas. That would be an example. You have healthcare insurance, you’re going to make everyone on the same healthcare insurance program or let them choose their own. Even if you get purchasing economies, what’s the flip side? It’s sort of looking at that non-intuitive costs of efficiency sometimes.

2. How Caffeine Became the World’s Favorite Drug – Amy McCarthy, Cynthia Graber, Nicola Twilley and Michael Pollan

Gastropod: Where can you find caffeine molecules in the wild?

Michael Pollan: It’s produced by several plants, most notably the coffee plant, the tea plant. Members of the citrus family produce caffeine also — that’s a curious case — and the kola plant produces it. It was hit upon by plants during their evolution as an insecticide, and also as a chemical that discourages other plants from germinating near you. Plants are very protective of their territory — at least some of them are — and if they drop leaves of a caffeine-producing plant, it’s very hard for other plants to germinate in their presence. But the main purpose [of caffeine] in the life of a plant is to poison insect predators, which it seems to do pretty well.

So when did humans start enjoying this insecticide and in what form?

What’s really interesting about caffeine, at least if you look at it from the point of view of people who live in the West, is that compared to other psychoactive plants that we’ve been involved with for thousands of years — peyote is 6,000 years, alcohol probably goes back even further — caffeine came to human attention fairly late; in the case of coffee, not until the 600s or so. It doesn’t come to the West until the 17th century. Before that, it was known to people in East Africa, in Ethiopia, and the Arabian Peninsula, and it was commonly drunk in the Arab world long before it arrived in Europe.

That’s why it’s a really interesting case study, because we can really look at civilization before and after caffeine. And its effect on Western civilization is profound: It ushers in what amounts to a new form of consciousness, a new way of perceiving the world that was incredibly helpful to things like the scientific revolution and the capitalist revolution. Because it cleared the Western mind, which had been badly clouded by alcohol.

We have very little sense of how drunk people were much of the time, before the advent of caffeine in Europe. Alcohol was something that people drank morning, noon, and night because alcohol was safer than water — you got diseases from water, but the fermentation process and the alcohol itself sanitized the water. So when you read accounts, people were kind of slightly addled all the time.

When caffeine comes in, it doesn’t obviously eliminate the use of alcohol, but it does reduce it. And a lot of people observed this in the 17th century — that, as a result, they’re clear, more focused, able to do things they couldn’t do before. This has a profound effect.

To go back in time a little bit, why were people on the Arabian peninsula consuming it? What did it do for them?

One of the first uses of coffee and tea, interestingly enough, is in the religious context. Sufi monks would use coffee to help them stay awake during long nights of prayer or meditation. And this was true, too, for Buddhists in China, who learned pretty quickly that tea was an aid to meditation. It helps with the focus that you want, and it also keeps you from falling asleep on the cushion. It really begins as a tool for religious observance…

…One thing we thought was fascinating was that early scientists were trying to understand caffeine from a worker’s perspective. How were scientists trying to understand how caffeine and energy were related?

This comes a little bit later, around 1900, where you have this new academic discipline concerned with humans and work. Efficiency — kind of a mix of biology and social science — becomes a very important science. And one of the things they were trying to understand is, how was it that caffeine appeared to enhance people’s energy without giving them any calories. There was a pretty strict understanding that energy was a function of calories. But here was a noncaloric drink — leaving aside whether it was sweetened or not — that seemed to give people more energy. This seemed in violation of the laws of thermodynamics, and it looked very much like a free lunch in terms of giving people energy.

It was only later that we came to understand how you got energy from caffeine — that you were essentially borrowing it from the future. It wasn’t additional energy. The way caffeine works is that it, like a lot of drugs, closely resembles a neurotransmitter or neuromodulator. In this case, it’s adenosine, which is a very important neuromodulator that regulates the sleep cycle. Over the course of the day, adenosine levels build up in your body and create what is called sleep pressure. There are receptors dedicated to linking with adenosine. What caffeine does is hijack those receptors. It fits neatly into those receptors and then blocks the adenosine from doing its job.

But it’s not like adenosine goes away. The levels of adenosine in your bloodstream and in your brain continue to build. So when the caffeine is finally metabolized, the adenosine hits you like a ton of bricks because it’s been building up the whole time and you’re more tired than you would have been had you not had the caffeine.

3. A quick look at 2 companies innovating to overcome the short half-life of mRNA: is self-amplifying or endless RNA the future of mRNA vaccines? – Infinitty Capital

Conventional vaccine development takes time, about 10–15 years from initial research to market availability. In this COVID pandemic, mRNA technology has shown a clear advantage of speed over other modalities. However, the technology also faces several technical challenges with no near-term solution.

One drawback with mRNA vaccines is that the amount of antigen produced is dependent on the number of mRNA molecules delivered to the cell. This means that if more antigen wants to be produced a higher dose would be required (this might not be safe). Additionally, because the half-life (number of days before the mRNA is degraded) of mRNA is relatively short, this means that individuals need to get multiple doses to mount an immune response that is potent enough to provide protection.

To address both these issues, scientists have been researching & developing solutions that could increase the production of antigens and improve the half-life of the mRNA molecules.

Let’s look at two technologies that have been developed: self-amplifying RNA and endless RNA.

A self-amplifying RNA (sa-RNA) contains components that allow it to replicate itself in situ (create more copies of itself in the cell, see image below). These components are typically from Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEE), Sindbis virus (SINV), and Semliki forest virus (SFV) and they encode for an RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRP) complex. Therefore, the sa-RNA not only encodes the instructions for the host cell to make the desired protein, but it is also able to make more copies of the RNA containing those instructions. This technology thus allows for an increase in the copy number of mRNA templates but does little to improve the half-life of the template at the parent template is not being amplified.

Because it can replicate and amplify itself, sa-RNA vaccine can be given in a much lower dose, meaning that each dose can be smaller and cheaper…

…In the world of RNA, there are multiple types of RNA and circular RNA is a particularly intriguing format. In circular RNAs, the free 3′ and 5′ ends found in linear RNA forms are joined together to form a closed loop that appears to render them stable and long-lasting. However, circular RNAs are typically non-coding, meaning that they do not get translated into protein.

Laronde Bio (Private) has managed to engineer a closed-loop RNA into a translatable form of RNA, called Endless RNATM (eRNA). Different from sa-RNA which amplifies itself but is still unstable, eRNA is a versatile synthetic RNA platform that instructs cells to express the desired protein and it is naturally stable.

4. Data Centers Are Facing a Climate Crisis – Chris Stokel-Walker

When record temperatures wracked the UK in late July, Google Cloud’s data centers in London went offline for a day, due to cooling failures. The impact wasn’t limited to those near the center: That particular location services customers in the US and Pacific region, with outages limiting their access to key Google services for hours. Oracle’s cloud-based data center in the capital was also struck down by the heat, causing outages for US customers. Oracle blamed “unseasonal temperatures” for the blackout.

The UK Met Office, which monitors the weather, suggests that the record heat was an augur of things to come, which means data centers need to prepare for a new normal.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) says there’s a 93 percent chance that one year between now and 2026 will be the hottest on record. Nor will that be a one-off. “For as long as we continue to emit greenhouse gases, temperatures will continue to rise,” says Petteri Taalas, WMO secretary general. “And alongside that, our oceans will continue to become warmer and more acidic, sea ice and glaciers will continue to melt, sea level will continue to rise, and our weather will become more extreme.”

That weather shift will have an impact on all human-made infrastructure—including the data centers that keep our planet’s collective knowledge online.

The question is whether they are prepared. “From my point of view, there is an issue with existing data center stock that’s been built in the UK and Europe,” says Simon Harris, head of critical infrastructure at data center consultancy Business Critical Solutions. But it doesn’t stop there. Forty-five percent of US data centers have experienced an extreme weather event that threatened their ability to operate, according to a survey by the Uptime Institute, a digital services standards agency.

Data center cooling systems are built using a complicated, multi-stage process, says Sophia Flucker, director at UK data center consulting firm Operational Intelligence. This may include analyzing temperature data from a weather station close to the point where the data center will be built.

The problem? That data is historical and represents a time when temperatures in the UK didn’t hit 40 degrees Celsius. “We’re on the fringes of a changing climate,” says Harris.

“It wasn’t that long ago that we were designing cooling systems for a peak outdoor temperature of 32 degrees,” says Jon Healy, of the UK data center consultancy Keysource. “They’re over 8 degrees higher than they were ever designed for.” The design conditions are being increasingly elevated—but data center companies, and the clients they’re working for, operate as profit-driven enterprises. Data from consultancy Turner & Townsend suggests that the cost of building data centers has risen in almost every market in recent years, and construction companies are advised to keep costs down.

“If we went from 32 degrees to 42 degrees, blimey,” says Healy. “You’re having to make everything significantly larger to support that very small percentage of the year” when temperatures rise. “It’s got to be done with caution.”

Data center design companies are starting to consider the historical weather information outmoded and beginning to use projected future temperatures, says Flucker. “Rather than thinking my extreme is 35 degrees, they’re doing projections saying maybe it’s more like 37 or 38 degrees,” she says. “But of course, that’s only as good as how well we can predict the future.”…

…Companies are testing some unusual ways to tackle these challenges: Between 2018 and 2020 Microsoft ran Project Natick, which sunk a data center 117 feet below the sea offshore Scotland to insulate it from temperature fluctuations, among other things. Harris says that building data centers in ever more northern climates could be one way to avoid the heat—by trying to outrun it—but this comes with its own problems. “Developers will be fighting over an ever-dwindling pool of potential sites,” he says, a challenge when edge computing puts data centers ever closer to the point at which data is consumed, often in hotter, urban areas.

 Liquid cooling technology offers a more practical solution. Data centers are currently in an era of air-based cooling, but liquid cooling—where liquid is passed by equipment, transferring the heat and syphoning it away—could be a better way to keep temperatures down. However, it isn’t widely used because it requires a combined knowledge of cooling and IT equipment. “At the moment, these are two very separate worlds,” says Flucker. “There’s definitely some apprehension about making such a big change in how we do things.”

5. Mission impossible: Recovering 3AC’s missing assets – Scott Shuey

When DRB Panama first filed a suit against Three Arrows Capital (3AC), few people thought its claim would throw the massive hedge fund into a death spiral or kick-start a global hunt for hidden assets.

After all, 3AC was a giant, with assets estimated at US$10 billion, according to crypto intelligence firm Nansen. DRB Panama, the operations arms of dutch crypto exchange Deribit, was only seeking US$80 million.

But DRB was just the first in line at the courthouse. Other creditors quickly joined the suit, and it soon became clear that 3AC owed almost US$3.4 billion. To make it worse, the paper trail for the firm’s once incredible portfolio reads like a giant edition of Where’s Waldo?…

…DRB Panama filed the suit against 3AC at the end of June. It went to court in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), where 3AC has been registered since 2012. In under two weeks, the court decided that the crypto hedge fund’s liabilities far exceeded its assets and ordered the company liquidated.

The first thing lawyers had to do was identify what remained of the company’s assets and sell them off. These proceeds are then used to pay creditors, usually netting them pennies on the dollar and helping them pay off legal fees.

But 3AC’s situation isn’t your run-of-the-mill bankruptcy case. According to lawyers that Tech in Asia spoke to, this is the first major liquidation involving massive volumes of cryptocurrencies.

The job of finding 3AC’s crypto assets fell to Christopher Farmer and Russell Crumpler, both from the BVI offices of advisory firm Teneo, who were appointed as liquidators. Tech in Asia reached out to Teneo for comment but did not get a response…

…The majority of 3AC’s assets were in crypto. The company had an unknown number of wallets, though Tech in Asia has seen seven so far that are likely connected to 3AC.

Four wallets identified by Nansen as being associated with the hedge fund held US$50 million in tokens as recently as July 15. One wallet by itself held over US$38 million in stablecoins. Some wallets appeared neglected with only a small number of trades, while some include transactions that liquidators are still trying to explain.

Tech in Asia spoke to analysts, including lawyers and blockchain experts, who say that while some of the assets are sitting in plain sight, some will never be recovered.

Even the crypto assets that investigators do know about could be forever locked away, unless the private keys that can unlock them turn up. For all the world knows, those keys could be with 3AC’s founders, Zhu and Kyle Davies, whose exact whereabouts are currently unknown.

The need to recover cryptocurrencies might be a relatively new problem for the legal community, but lawyers are increasingly hiring blockchain analysts to track these assets.

6. RWH011: The Emotionally Intelligent Investor w/ Daniel Goleman – William Green and Daniel Goleman

William Green (00:12:35):

If I remember rightly Dan, you were actually bankrolled to go off to India and spend time researching this. And then, you came back and you wrote about meditation as an intervention for stress as part of your PhD program in the psychology department. Is that right?

Daniel Goleman (00:12:51):

It is right. But the detail’s a little more interesting. I had a fellowship actually from Ford Foundation that included a year of traveling study abroad, which I actually I didn’t know about. But then, I took advantage of when McClelland fronted for me saying, oh yes, he has serious research to do in India. And that allowed me to hang out with Neem Karoli and Lamas and Sufi and yogis. I was very interested in how meditative practices and related spiritual disciplines transform the mind and the heart.

Daniel Goleman (00:13:21):

And when I came back to Harvard, I thought I wanted to communicate this to other psychologists, but other psychologists weren’t very interested in the day. And, what I ended up doing was showing that meditation was a useful intervention in stress, which by now, decades later has been well established. But then, that was a radical idea.

William Green (00:13:43):

You said at the time that there were only three scientific papers on meditation, right? This must have seemed-

Daniel Goleman (00:13:50):

Well, William actually, by today’s standards, they were all somewhat dubious, they’re anecdotal reports. And two of them were anecdotal reports and one was a non peer reviewed publication. Our standards are higher these days. When I look at my dissertation, given the measurements we had decades ago, I don’t think it would be published today. Now, you would use brain imaging or you’d use much more sophisticated methodology. We didn’t have them back then.

Daniel Goleman (00:14:17):

So I would say this, that the hunch that I had that meditation really can help you be more calm and more focused has been tremendously well-validated. I finished a book published a couple years ago with a friend Richard Davidson, who was also a graduate student with McClelland at Harvard and Richie, as we call him, has gone on to become a world famous neuroscientist, University of Wisconsin. He and I wrote a book looking at the now thousands of peer reviewed articles on meditation, which shows very clearly there is a dose response relationship. The more you do it, the stronger the benefits are.

William Green (00:14:54):

It’s a brilliant book. We’ll hopefully talk much more about meditation later, but this is among other ways of controlling our emotions, both in investing and life. But this is a book called Altered Traits, which is on my table here behind me and I’ll put it in the show notes, but it’s a terrific book. So in a strange way, you were coming back as this exotic creature from India and I think Sri Lanka and coming back into this world that didn’t really know what had hit it, right? That wasn’t particularly interested in Eastern yogis.

William Green (00:15:21):

And so in some sense, is it fair to say that without maybe being conscious of it, you were somehow reconciling or bringing together these two very different worlds, the scientific realm of the Harvard psychology department and the realm of people like Ram Dass and Neem Karoli Baba, and their world of Eastern spirituality, where they’d been sitting around watching the brain for the last 2000 years. And, I think believed that you could change the brain, whereas Western psychology, am I right in thinking believed it was much more fixed?

Daniel Goleman (00:15:51):

Well, yeah, at the time when I came back, we didn’t have the understanding in neuroscience of neuroplasticity, that came much later. Neuroplasticity says, basically the more you exercise brain circuits, the stronger the connectivity between them becomes. This is now very well established. Then, no one even entertained that idea. Brain science was just beginning to emerge back in the day. And not only that, there was a lot of skepticism about the east when I wrote the book. So as you point out, I couldn’t really find a job that suited me in academia. After getting my PhD, I went into science journalism. I ended up at the New York Times and writing in science.

Daniel Goleman (00:16:32):

And, it was then that I wrote the book, Emotional Intelligence, which I was really thinking of people in the business world, in the education world. And the message was not one of, in Asia, they completely transformed their brains in mind, it was more, this will help you because the Western culture is very pragmatic. It’s like, what use is this? Can I focus better? Can I stay calm even in a turbulent situation? Think of an investor, your investment fails and all of a sudden you’re overwhelmed by fear or anxiety. How do you handle that?

Daniel Goleman (00:17:10):

Well, emotional intelligence speaks to that. And how do you stay focused, amidst all the distractions that we have today, emotional intelligence speaks to that. So I’ve really made a point of being more pragmatic, even though the way I think about it is deeply informed by what I’ve been exploring from Asia.

William Green (00:17:31):

So in a sense, you almost had to conceal the more spiritual part of your journey, because in a way it was so unconventional in those days, whereas now it’s probably much easier for you to talk about that openly.

Daniel Goleman (00:17:44):

Well, yeah, I think that the culture has changed enormously. Mindfulness is everyday news now. You mentioned I was in Sri Lanka, that was on a post-doc and I went to study with a monk named [Nana Panika Terra 00:17:58] who wrote about the mind and how to work with it and how to transform it, based on fifth century texts that were written as manuals for meditators. Nana Panika who actually was German by birth, but had been a monk since the twenties was a scholar of poly. And so he had access. And what I realized William, was there’s the psycho technology, which is well known in Asia, well established, it’s been functioning for thousands of years, literally, and that we know nothing about it in Western psychology until very recently. Very recently.

Daniel Goleman (00:18:35):

So, when I started looking into it, it was unknown. I faced a lot of actual open hostility about it, which probably encouraged me to be a little bit sub rosa at the beginning because things had not changed. And it may be that I and a host of other people had a hand in changing it. In India, I met someone named Joseph Goldstein who became one of the first major teachers of what’s called insight meditation and a whole generation. Sharon Salzberg, another name in that world.

Daniel Goleman (00:19:07):

I met Sharon and Delhi and I told her, hey, there’s this meditation course. So she went to Boga and learned what she now teaches. So, I guess I get some karma credit for all the good Sharon is.

William Green (00:19:17):

She’s an amazing teacher.

Daniel Goleman (00:19:19):

Yeah. But what I’m saying is that when we all started, this was very new in the west. And of course that small group can’t take credit for the transformation, but was part of it. And now it’s much easier to talk about these things…

…William Green (00:57:39):

And again, I think Sharon Salzberg teaches that on the 10% Happier app, which I hate to be a sheal for. And I’m not being paid to be a sheal for it, but it really helped me. And I think that it’s a very helpful app. You have an extraordinary thing in Altered Traits where you talk about Mingyur Rinpoche, one of these great Tibetan yogis and what was going on in his brain when he was doing compassion meditation. This is the deep end of the pool. Can you talk a bit about what actually we saw in his brain?

Daniel Goleman (00:58:06):

So Richie Davidson flew these yogis over from Nepal and India and Europe. One by one. One of them was this Yogi Mingyur Rinpoche who at the time had done 62,000 lifetime hours of meditation. Well, if you do a traditional Tibetan three year, three month, three day retreat, you get credit for about 10,000 hours. So this guy had done huge amounts. And when they asked him to do a compassion meditation, the circuitry in the brain for that increased in a moment by 7 to 800%. Never been seen before in neuroscience, such a voluntary jump in the activation of a brain circuit. And, this is a circuitry for compassion. And so I thought it was pretty astounding.

William Green (00:58:51):

Yeah. I think one of the things that’s so remarkable that your book shows is that we are seeing scientifically this thing that people are sitting in caves for thousands of years in Tibet and the like, figured out experientially. And so you no longer need to kind of sound like you are a woo woo mystic, you can actually show what’s going on in the brain. And I see this as a woo woo mystic myself. So I’m not dismissive of that.

Daniel Goleman (00:59:16):

Here’s the thing, I kind of have a foot in both worlds, in the world of Asian spirituality and methodology and the world of science and psychology and so on. And at first, there was a huge gap between those worlds. But as science has investigated these practices, it’s finding, oh, you know what, this works. And it seems to me there’s an ancient psycho technology that’s been well preserved in many Asian cultures. It’s only now becoming known in the west. I think it’s very important.

William Green (00:59:50):

It’s interesting because Buffet’s partner, Charlie Munger, who’s this 98 year old problematic genius who studies all these different fields will say, I observe what works and doesn’t work and why. And this is one of those things where it’s really interesting. You observe it in the laboratory, you observe it in people’s behavior. And you’re like, oh, it works. And so, I’m struck by how many very successful investors meditate on this podcast. I talked with Ray Dalio about the fact that he’s been doing transcendental meditation 20 minutes or 40 minutes a day for 50 years, basically. And so, here you have the guy who’s made more money as a hedge fund manager than anyone else in history. And I think that’s interesting.

William Green (01:00:29):

He claims that it also makes him much more creative. But, he talks about amygdala hijackings. Actually, he talks about the fact that he’s less likely to get swamped by emotion. And he’s gone through a great deal, as we spoke about in my interview with him, he lost his son a year or so ago. And so he’s dealt with extreme pain. And so the fact that meditation has helped to make him more resilient, more clear headed. I think it’s curious when these pragmatists like Dalio start to adopt something that used to seem fringe.

Daniel Goleman (01:00:59):

Well, that’s the culture shift that I’ve seen over the last several decades is that people like Ray Dalio are doing it as a matter of fact, not a big deal. It’s, I go to the gym and I meditate, it’s self care.

William Green (01:01:12):

And I think if I remember rightly that he said that anyone at his firm Bridgewater, they would pay for them to go meditate, for them to take transcendental meditation and training, which is very interesting that they would regard it as sufficiently a competitive advantage that they would actually bankroll it.

7. Reality Catches Up – Morgan Housel

An asset you don’t deserve can quickly become a liability

Maybe your portfolio surged during a bubble, your company hit a monster valuation, or you negotiated a salary that exceeds your ability. It feels great at the time. But reality eventually catches up, and demands repayment in equal proportion to your delusions – plus interest.

These debts are easy to ignore because they are often repaid in the form of self-doubt and crushed morale. But they are very real, and when you understand their power you become careful what you wish for…

…WeWork is currently worth $3.5 billion, which is a monster success for a 12-year-old company – it’s probably in the top 0.0001% of business successes. But of course no one feels that way. The company was worth $47 billion a few years ago, and it was trying to go public at a $100 billion valuation, which no one could justify but felt fun because those were the times we were living in. So by comparison today’s valuation feels like a corporate bellyflop – embarrassment, employees whose stock options expired worthless, and morale shattered as it laid off thousands of people. Every cent of valuation it didn’t deserve was a debt that came due without mercy. What should be a company celebrating its enormous success is instead a company whose head hangs low and whose former employees hold a grudge – that’s the debt coming due…

…I knew people during the housing bubble who went from earning $8 an hour delivering pizza to $250,000 a year selling subprime mortgages. Of course reality came due, and their income went back to normal. But not a single one of them considered their flash of money to be a lucky windfall – in every instance it became a number to anchor to, a source of bitterness and self-doubt when reality returned. And in every instance the money funded a lifestyle that eventually had to be surrendered, which became a point of social shame, particularly when a spouse and kids were involved. The money didn’t feel like a windfall because it wasn’t – it was a hidden form of lifestyle debt that abruptly came due.

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Alphabet (parent of Google). Holdings are subject to change at any time.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 31 July 2022:

1. Matthew Ball – A Manual to The Metaverse – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and Matthew Ball

[00:09:15] Patrick: Can you just define what you mean by the metaverse and what you think a good working definition is that allows us to test things to say, is this thing that everyone’s excited about, or is it not? It seems obvious from our many conversations that the trend has been towards more digital engagement and participation. And that somehow, people think of the metaverse as the natural endpoint of this, where there’s more sensory immersion in some virtual world, there’s more navigability, there’s less walled gardens. How do you define the metaverse in its simplest definition so that we can all work off the same idea?

[00:09:50] Matthew: A live 3D version of the internet as we know today is the best and simplest way to think about this. Why? Because it not only explains how it’s a little bit different visually experientially. It keys into some of what you just mentioned, which is how it might be more intuitive. Of course, we didn’t evolve for thousands of years to tap glass, to interact with 2D interfaces, static information. We explore, we immerse in 3D. It’s a much better interface for many tasks. Far from all, but many tasks. But most importantly, we take for granted the interoperability of the internet and how important that is to everything we do and create. We don’t think about this question of the New York Times can’t link to Washington Post. We don’t even think about the idea that you can’t link directly to the specific piece of content on the Washington Post. We don’t concern ourselves with, “Darn. I took a photo on my iPhone that I stored to iCloud, and the file format therefore doesn’t work on Facebook.” You can take a photo, upload it to Facebook, right click save as, put it onto Snapchat, screenshot it on Snapchat, upload it to TikTok. So we have this vast network that manages hierarchy, communications, reference, the transference of data across different autonomous systems coherently, safely, consistently. And then file formats and conventions that run university. We have a lot of 3D stuff today. There’s a tremendous amount of time being spent in 3D platforms. What we don’t have is a scalable network that actually interconnects. And as we’ve learned from the global economy, world trade, as we’ve learned with the internet at large, the utility that comes from that is extraordinary.

[00:11:26] Patrick: Can you say a few words about the state of the engines behind three dimensional creativity or three dimensional output? You already mentioned Unity, and you already mentioned Unreal being the two dominant engines that people might be familiar with. But maybe paint a more vivid picture of the history here. And if 3D is literally in the definition of metaverse, it stands to reason that the engine that produces and allows people to produce beautiful 3D outputs is really, really important or central. Can you give us the details on the state of the world today as it relates to 3D engines?

[00:12:00] Matthew: Sure. I love this question. And let me actually start answering it by talking about the state of the world decades ago. I like to position the metaverse as a fourth era of computing and networking. The first was the mainframe era began in the 1950s for the most part, ran until the late 1970s. Let’s keep in mind, mainframe still exists. It’s actually a bigger business than ever. But it was largely superseded in the late 1970s, early 1980s by the advent of the personal computer, Apple, Microsoft, and TCPIP the internet. By the mid 2000s, we hit the mobile and cloud era. And now we’re starting to talk about the next era in the metaverse. What’s fascinating about the metaverse in contrast to the preceding three waves is where it seems to be starting. Seems to be starting as you’ve identified in gaming, consumer leisure. In a small segment in consumer leisure. People like to talk about gaming being larger than film. It’s a bit of a misconception. You’re talking about the theatrical box office. That’s about 40 billion, but of course the video industry’s over 600 billion, gaming’s still around 200. When you take a look at those prior waves, mainframes started with mega enterprises. The internet began with government. Most of the early adopters were again, large corporations. Mobile began with enterprise and government as well. Each of these waves either never came to consumer leisure as was the case in mainframes or came there last. YouTube 2005, Netflix 2007, streaming wars 2019. Consumer leisure tends to be last.

So why is it that the metaverse seems to be starting in the other direction? The answer relates to constraints. Constraints always define a technology from inception to its termination. The constraints for computing and networking in those prior waves was often processing power, broadband speeds, bandwidth, etc. And the result was you couldn’t do much live. You couldn’t share a photo with your grandmother. You couldn’t stream video. But certainly, you could send a Blackberry message in the early mobile era. You could send an unstructured data file or CSV if you were a banker or accountant. So we needed substantial improvements in bandwidth and processing power for these new technologies to have consumer applicability. But the constraints that affected simulation, real-time rendered simulation, game engines was fidelity. It didn’t have the bandwidth or the processing power to do a rich simulation. And what that meant is the government had very little use for it. You couldn’t actually do a military simulation with fake fire. But it was fine for pong. It was fine for space invaders, Legend of Zelda. So we’ve spent decades with the primary area of development of game engines, of real-time rendering and GPU chips coming from consumer leisure. What has happened in the past few years is we have reached a point where the maturing and sophistication of these game engines coupled with the wide deployment of powerful processors means that that applicability has expanded. Automotive companies as I mentioned are using Unreal so that you can help drive your car. You can use LIDAR to scan the environment around you in your Range Rover, understand how to navigate, and then actually pre-drive your vehicle. You can live simulate a building.

And what has happened is the companies that happen to have that expertise come from gaming. Nvidia’s Jensen Huang. Of course, Nvidia’s now the seventh largest company globally. Known to many investors for several years, but largely under the radar compared to most other top 10 companies was founded in the early 1990s, not long after Snow Crash was published. And Jensen has said they never wanted to be a video game company, but focusing on gaming was the best strategic choice they’ve ever made because it had three unique attributes. It was large, it was fast changing, and it was technologically intensive. Many industries like pharmaceuticals have two of those attributes, but they don’t change that quickly. So the mixture of the intensity of these problems, the rapid improvements per Moore’s law has meant that almost all these expertise sit here. Lastly, when you take a look at what this means for the metaverse today, Microsoft’s Activision Blizzard acquisition, the largest big tech acquisition in history, 75 billion in enterprise value. Satya’s press release, the final line of the very first paragraph says it provides the building blocks for the metaverse, the foundations for the metaverse. And a lot of that comes down to game engines.

[00:16:25] Patrick: If you think about the role of IP in the bootstrapping of the first metaverses, what comes to mind? I remember from our first conversation going really deep on Disney, and Marvel, and the incredible gravity and momentum that great IP universes allow for. And that very often, technology supports IP and not the other way around. That ultimately IP is the thing people show up for. They want to do something, they want to watch something, they want to be immersed in something. Activision Blizzard maybe is a good example here, but what is the role of existing or new IP as it relates to speeding up this change?

[00:17:01] Matthew: As with anything that we want to do, any place that we want to go, there’s a reason why Disneyland is more fun than six flags is. If there’s a place that we want to go, especially in a consumer leisure environment, it stands to reason that we want to go to the places filled with the stories and characters that we love. This has classically been Horizon World’s fundamental problem. It’s technically more robust than it is popular. It has better distribution than many other platforms. It doesn’t have content, partly because it doesn’t have as many developers, but in particular, the other platforms have been populated by produced in UGC IP for years now. If we’re to go to a fantastical place, want that to be the place populated with the things we love. This isn’t new. Of course, medieval gardens are adored with gargoyles and giant statues of lions because it provides immersion. We don’t just want to walk down hedgerows. We want to feel like we’re in the place we imagine. This is why many come to the inevitable conclusion that another medium full entertainment or another technological wave which has IP in it is naturally going to advantage those that have the most resident IP today. Disney does not have a gaming business. I think that remains a problem. Mostly because they don’t have the capabilities for it. Whether or not they publish their own titles is a different question, but we’re going to want to live in Disney IP…

…[00:26:53] Patrick: As I think about my own usage of Oculus, and I’m a person that wants all this stuff to happen. The idea of the Ready Player One haptic suit, and omnidirectional treadmill, and everything that goes into it, this full immersive experience just sounds fun. I was a video game junkie as a kid. Spent countless hours in some of these virtual worlds. I’m inclined to want to do it and be an early adopter of the technologies. I think I had one of the first Oculus. And when I put it on, what stands out as the Star Wars game, I’m forgetting the name of it. But really being blown away looking around like this is wild. And obviously, it’s only going to get more and more perfectly rendered. I had the problem of getting a headache or a stomach ache when I moved artificially, which I want to hear about what you think about that. But at the same time as blown away as I was, I really haven’t spent much time with Oculus on. And I’m curious if my experience as someone prone to want this to happen who tried it but really didn’t last, is that indicative of the broader experience so far with Oculus? What do you think the reasons for something like that might be?

[00:27:50] Matthew: I want to hit a few different points here, because I think we’re really talking about the suitability of alternatives that challenges with the current technology. And then the likely progression of said technology. Neal Stephenson, who of course coined the term metaverse. So he didn’t originate the idea that spans nearly a century, has talked about the fact that yes, his conception of the metaverse was primarily an AR and VR experience. And he highlights the fact that that was a reasonable, if not the best hypothesis at the time, especially in the science fiction community. But he’s highlighted that technology is path dependent. What we found out in the decade sense is that actually, hundreds of millions can adequately navigate 3D space with WASD on their keyboard. Forward, left, right, and back. Billions can navigate 3D space and choose to do so on a monthly basis using a touch screen. He says that he no longer considers that essential. It may be the best, most popular preferred way eventually. But it’s not a requirement. And if you see Tim Sweeney at Epic shows very little interest, at least today in those new devices. The second part is talking about the experiences that you’ve mentioned. We have a good sense of what is likely to be required for min spec, for mainstream adoption of VR hardware. And I go into this a lot in my book. We tend to think for example that we need a refresh rate of 120 hertz on a VR headset. That’s 120 frames per second. We probably need an 8K display. And I’m going to put aside other concerns for now like battery life, the weight of the device, the heat generated by the device, the number of additional sensors and tracking cameras we need, which constrain all available resources, but just 120 hertz and 8K display. Right now, the top of the line devices typically do 90 hertz and 4K.

So we need a roughly 3X increase in the number of rendered pixels per second, just to hit min spec where people aren’t suffering from nausea. You then layer in these devices have essentially late PS3, early PS4 graphics. Their computational load is much lower. Call of Duty: Warzone is limited to PC and gaming consoles only, but in exchange, the graphics are great. You can have 150 users. Fortnite plays on most devices, but as a result, you can only have 100 users. Free Fire from Garena is designed to work on all low end Androids. And as a result, it only has 50 players. Population one on the Oculus, their battle royale has only 18 players. So now we have a device that has half the resolution we want, two thirds of the frame rate that we want. It has PS3, PS4 graphics. And you can only have 18 other users. And then again, it probably has one eighth the sensors that we want, one third the battery life. It’s probably 25% too heavy. There’s a lot that we need to solve for these just to become min spec for nausea and usage. And then on top of that of course, we need these devices to be more than min spec. They need to feel better. The rejection of sensors, which is unique to VR. You can multitask on your PlayStation, you know whether or not your house is on fire. Your kids are upset. Your dog is getting into trouble. Probably raises that above min spec. We’re getting there. We’ve roughly doubled resolution density. We’ve doubled processing power since 2017. So those who say we’ve been here before, people don’t like VR don’t appreciate the headway that we’ve made in these devices. But it’s a lot like GPAs. It’s easier to go from a 3 to a 3.4 than it is to go from a 3.6 to a 3.8. And we saw this recently as medic kicked out their releases for AR devices again, for the third time this decade. This is a hard tech problem…

…[00:37:07] Patrick: This idea of everything talking to everything brings up one of the most interesting topics in all of this, which is the word interoperability. This word has gone from no one ever saying it to everyone saying it in five years. Both because of the metaverse and this next era of computing, but also because of blockchains, interoperability means a lot, is critical. No one really knows what the hell they’re talking about it seems like when they bring it up. But it brings to mind things like standards and protocols. Again, the boring base layer stuff that makes the modern world possible. Whether it’s visa, or TCP/IP, or SMTP it, some of these things you and I have talked about before. Can you talk about why interoperability gets its own chapter in your book, why this is such a key critical concept? And who might actually sponsor or start these things? Because many times in history, they’re not for profit. It’s a protocol. So walk us through this concept, because it seems like it’s at the bottom of everything.

[00:38:00] Matthew: The fundamental premise of interoperability is a little bit foreign to the average person because we take for granted how interoperable online existence is today. You have a common identity at least in some way, shape, or form that you can take into multiple different avenues. Your content, the content that you create is inherently interoperable because the file formats are relatively standard and embraced everywhere. Ping runs everywhere. JPEG runs everywhere. Every unit of content we create today essentially runs everywhere else. Your text, your audio, your video, not just an image can be uploaded to every different environment. And in fact, the worldwide web itself works because of elements of TCP/IP, but also other consortiums and working groups of feathers that maintain a cohesive hierarchy or IP address, the domain registrar system. This is important not just for the continuity of the web, the cohesion of your personal experience, the persistence of things done online. But they’re also important for competition. If you don’t like your web hosting company, you can just move your information to another. You can change domain all the time. So we should think of interoperability as important to content creation, as important to user rights, as important to the actual thriving economy of the internet. And you’re right to talk about the ways in which those are not managed by a central for profit body. But ultimately, we can reduce it to a simple idea. It’s expanding the network effects of everything that you do online, but that doesn’t exist in the virtual world. Roblox individual worlds can identify one another, but they have no ability to understand, least of all, even identify another virtual world. Be it in Fortnite, an educational forum, a training sample.

Communicating from one live services suite to another doesn’t really exist either. There’s no consistent way to store information. And least of all, the ability to take a 3D object whether it’s created for industrial purposes for a simulation. Northrop Grumman wants to test an engine and then see how it performs in a specific environment. They don’t really have a cohesive way to take that object from one simulation to another. So this question about interoperability is really about expanding the utility, practical applicability of everything in the metaverse. And I’ll drop this down to a simpler example. The world economy of course runs on standards, defacto and otherwise. And it’s essential to reducing the friction to all transactions to increasing the utility of all investments and purchases. What are those standards? USD is one. English is another. The metric system is a third. The intermodal shipping container. You’ll note of course that there are often many other standards. We also use the Euro. We also use German. There are multiple different types of shipping containers, not all intermodal. Metric and imperial sit side-by-side, often in the same country, often within the same business. So we shouldn’t think of interoperability from a panacea perspective. And this is one of the flaws I’m often asked, can we ever have interoperability? Yes, we’ll never have it perfectly, never have it exhaustively. The world doesn’t work that way. The internet doesn’t work that way. We still have private networks, offline networks. We still have paid and proprietary protocols. You often need an installer to access experience A or B, and there are often paywalls. But making it so that every 3D object, every experience, more purchases can move, can endure, have utility beyond that first creation is going to be key to actually building up this economy.

[00:41:45] Patrick: Help me understand how we can bridge that gap of something I build, own, earn, achieve in some place that I want to bring to some place else. If I think about games, and maybe that’s the wrong way to think about it. The object I win and spend hours looking for in Diablo is really not relevant in Fortnite, is really not relevant in Sims. It seems like even though there are all these great worlds, the idea of bringing stuff between them is hard to imagine because the worlds themselves are so different. So how do you think this happens? How does Roblox get connected to Fortnite? How far down do we have to go to build the bridge?

[00:42:23] Matthew: One of the challenges with interoperability discussions is that we often focus on the easiest to understand, but arguably the least useful example. And that is taking your Peely banana skin from Fortnite and bringing it into Call of Duty. There are so many problems with that. The engines of course are different. And I just want to highlight how different these engines often are. Unity and Unreal actually have different coordinate systems for X, Y, Z. They store information Y and Z differently. Now that’s easy for a computer to manage. You just have a translator. It works the same way that English to German does. You say let’s swap Y and Z. But if they have fundamental disagreements on coordinates, you can imagine how sophisticated some of the disagreements are. That naturally leads game designers in particular to say, “Why does that matter?” Putting aside the economic considerations, do you want to be appealing in Call of Duty? Is it cohesive with the aesthetic? Does it fit in a doorframe? Frankly, the Peely file format might be stored in a way that makes it three stories tall in Call of Duty. When you look at my metaverse definition, I talk about the continuity of data from 3D objects to entitlements, payments, communications, history. The object itself, the avatar is probably the least important element of that. We’re a little bit more concerned with when you do an educational exercise in school, 3D simulation in school is probably one of the most important innovations that we can see. We’ve learned that distanced education is terrible. We have long expected the advent of the internet and digital devices to see productivity improvements in education. Haven’t happened. We know that multiple choice is terrible, that playing a YouTube video is terrible, that Zoom school is terrible. But the ability to make real The Magic School Bus is intuitive.

I grew up making volcanoes out of paper mache, baking soda, and vinegar. Now, you can start to do that in realistic simulations where you are personally agitating the magma being ejected into the atmosphere, and seeing the time lapse implications on the environment. Building a Rube Goldberg machine to learn physics, rather than just watching a video of a NASA commander drop a feather and hammer on the moon. You can take that Rube Goldberg machine to the moon, to Mars and Venus. But of course, we believe that some form of interoperability or continuity of what you’ve done, and what that information is, and who you are is essential. We’re not going to have the same school pack for chemistry as for English. So it’s not as important that I take my banana skin from A to B, it’s more important that I can consistently manage my profile. But all of this requires formats, more importantly conventions, a whole bunch of other buzzwords. Frameworks of frameworks, systems of systems. But how does it emerge? It emerges in a well known way, the same way that USD and English did. It’s often network effects reiterated the incentives of changing systems. But again, never perfectly. Last week, we had the establishment by the Khronos foundation, the metaverse standards form 28 companies. Many notable omissions, Apple, Google, many other content providers. But Epic, and Meta, and so forth, Qualcomm all saying, “Let’s start to standardize our roadmap. We have to understand what we can build towards for the collective utility.” That’s the easiest step. No one has to make a sacrifice to their tech roadmap. No one has to pick a standard they didn’t like. But that formation period has already begun. And even Roblox has started talking extensively about their need for their developer economy to start to figure this out.

2. CRISPR Technology for DNA Editing Might Raise Cancer Risk, Israeli Scientists Warn – Gid’on Lev

But Tel Aviv University researchers are highlighting the risks of CRISPR, which stands for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats. The scientists examined how the technology affects the immune system’s white blood cells – T cells – and found that some of the patient’s cells had chromosomal truncations – a loss of DNA fragments, a characteristic of cancer.

The first trial approved for using CRISPR to treat people was done by researchers under Prof. Carl June at the University of Pennsylvania. The scientists removed T cells from a healthy donor and changed the so-called cell receptor on them to better identify cancer cells.

The researchers also used CRISPR to destroy the original cell receptor so that the engineered T cells wouldn’t recognize and mistakenly attack cells of the recipient and another molecule that cancer cells use to exhaust T cells. The engineered cells were injected into cancer patients whose cancers did not respond to any other treatment.

The results were published in 2020 in the journal Science: The engineered cells survived in the patient’s body for a long period and homed in on the cancer cells, even though they didn’t destroy the growth entirely.

The general consensus in the field was that after CRISPR’s excising of undesired parts of DNA, the cell carries out repair. In the new study, the researchers conducted a test to determine if indeed this repair mechanism works perfectly or that maybe repair doesn’t always occur, and when it does, it’s not always complete.

To examine the technology that presents this risk, the scientists reconstructed the trial conducted at the University of Pennsylvania. They used CRISPR to cut the genome of T cells in exactly the same places where June and his colleagues did: at chromosomes 2, 7 and 14. (Each human cells has 23 pairs of chromosomes.)

They then analyzed thousands of cells and found that up to 10 percent of the chromosomes that were cut did not repair themselves…

…With CRISPR, T cells can be made to better recognize cancer cells and prevent the recognition of normal cells. Furthermore, CRISPR can be used to remove the molecules that act as brakes on T cells, allowing the cells to exert their full killing potential.

Following the use of CRISPR, a mechanism in the cell repairs the cut DNA, but sometimes the cell fails to be repaired and might even lose large parts of the chromosome. This is serious because of the association with diseases including cancer.

In reenacting the research at the University of Pennsylvania, the Tel Aviv University scientists – aided by the students Alessio Nahmad and Ella Goldschmidt, and research assistant Eli Reuveni – sought to investigate CRISPR’s safety in general, not just in treating cancer.

“CRISPR only cuts and removes the DNA sequence at desired points. The natural mechanism of DNA repair in a cell is what’s fusing the cuts together and keeping the chromosome intact,” Ben-David says.“But sometimes the cell fails to execute the repair, and after this failure large parts of the chromosome – or even the entire chromosome – are lost. That creates a very serious situation because of aneuploidy – a change in the number of chromosomes.”

Ben-David says aneuploidy occurs in 90 percent of solid tumors; it’s the most frequent genetic change in cancer, more so than DNA mutations.

“In healthy cells, it never happens. There are always 46 chromosomes,” he says. “If in the process of genome editing via CRISPR, aneuploidy cells are generated and injected into the patient, this could be a serious problem. Until now, this problem hadn’t been examined in depth.”

3. Tails, You Win – Morgan Housel

Long tails drive everything. They dominate business, investing, sports, politics, products, careers, everything. Rule of thumb: Anything that is huge, profitable, famous, or influential is the result of a tail event. Another rule of thumb: Most of our attention goes to things that are huge, profitable, famous, or influential. And when most of what you pay attention to is the result of a tail, you underestimate how rare and powerful they really are.

Venture capital is a tail-driven business. You’ve likely heard that. Make 100 investments, and almost all of your return will come from five of them; most of your return from one or two.

Correlation Ventures crunched the numbers. Out of 21,000 venture financings from 2004 to 2014, 65% lost money. Two and a half percent of investments made 10x-20x. One percent made more than 20x return. Half a percent – about 100 companies – earned 50x or more. That’s where the majority of the industry’s returns come from. It skews even more as you drill down. There’s been $482 billion of VC funding in the last ten years. The combined value of the ten largest venture-backed companies is $213 billion. So ten venture-backed companies are valued at half the industry’s deployed capital.

There is a feeling, I’ve noticed, that this low-hit, high-stakes path is unique to VC in the investment world.

I want to show you that it’s not. Long tails drive everything…

…J.P. Morgan Asset Management published the distribution of returns for the Russell 3000 from 1980 to 2014. Forty percent of all Russell 3000 stock components lost at least 70% of their value and never recovered. Effectively all of the index’s overall returns came from 7% of components. That’s the kind of thing you’d associate venture capital. But it’s what happened inside your grandmother’s index fund.

You can drill this down even more.

Amazon drove 6.1% of the S&P 500’s returns last year. And Amazon’s growth is almost entirely due to Prime and AWS, which itself are tail events inside a company that has experimented with hundreds of products, from the Fire Phone to travel agencies.

Apple was responsible for almost 7% of the index’s returns. And it is driven overwhelmingly by the iPhone, which in the world of tech products is as tail-y as tails get.

Who’s working at these companies? Google’s hiring acceptance rate is 0.2%. Facebook’s is 0.13%. Apple’s is about 2%. So the people working on these tail projects that drive tail returns have tail careers…

…A takeaway from that is that no matter what you’re doing, you should be comfortable with a lot of stuff not working. It’s normal. This is true for companies, which need to learn how to fail well. It’s true for investors, who need to understand both the normal tail mechanics of diversification and the importance of time horizon, since long-term returns accrue in bunches. And it’s important to realize that jobs and even entire careers might take a few attempts before you find a winning groove That’s how these things work.

4. Speculation in 1980s Taiwan – Michael Fritzell

The financial bubble that gripped Taiwan in the 1980s is one of the greatest that the world has ever seen. Stock prices went up by more than 12x in less than four years.

At the peak of the bubble, over 5 million – one-third of all Taiwanese over the age of 15 – were actively playing the stock market.

This is the story about the boom and the bust of Taiwan’s little-discussed but spectacular stock market bubble, as retold in the book The Great Taiwan Bubble by Steven Champion…

…Before 1983, there wasn’t really any effective, legal way for an international investor to buy Taiwanese stocks. In the mid-1980s, however – the stock market was finally opened to foreign investors. Money started pouring in.

Capital inflows caused interest rates to plummet. Meanwhile, households felt loss aversion now that their bank deposits yielded almost nothing. So they sought higher in other financial instruments. Some of that money ended up in the stock market.

In 1985 – at an early stage of the bubble – the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (Taiex) was trading around the 700-mark. It had come off a bit from a previous high in 1984, but not many people were paying attention to the market yet. That would soon change.

An illegal lottery called “Dajia Le” (大家樂) was launched in 1985. It spread like wildfire through the nation, especially in Central and Southern Taiwan. For as little as 300 or 500 Taiwan Dollars, you picked a number from 00 to 99 and could get a jackpot of 15-19x – far more than any of the state-sponsored lotteries. It became a great success throughout Taiwan. Suddenly, just about everybody was into illegal gambling.

The reason why Dajia Le flourished was because of the economic slump in the summer of 1985. The unemployment rate increased to a decade-high of 4.1% and 320,000 unemployed Taiwanese were walking the streets in search of jobs. Many of them became disillusioned and turned to gambling.

After a few years, the government cracked down on these illegal lotteries. The state-sponsored Patriotic Lottery ended abruptly in 1987 and illegal lotteries such as Dajia Le were also shut down shortly thereafter due to government pressure.

Author Steven Champion described how hundreds of thousands of these gamblers were then in search of a new fix. He imagined that many of them must have turned into stock market speculation as an outlet for their lust for gambling.

The author worked as a fund manager in Taiwan in the 1980s. In 1986, he observed the market and saw it rise through the key 1,000 level. In his letters to investors, he opined that the market had become extended and suspected it was due for a correction. He just couldn’t imagine that it would rise any further.

Optimism was in the air though. In 1987, Taiwan officially became a democracy and many believed that the future was bright. Martial law was lifted, new political parties were formed and media censorship was eased.

There was scepticism throughout the whole stock market boom, but the scepticism gradually dissipated as bullish voice turned louder. Financial professionals were most nervous when the market bolted through the 1,500 and 2,000 levels but got calmer and calmer as prices went into the stratosphere.

The central bank issued new brokerage licenses and eased listing requirements. There was a huge increase in the number of licensed brokerages, from 27 in June 1988 to 297 in March 1990. Easily available but generally illegal, margin credit was provided through many of these brokers.

The new brokerage firms pushed stocks to retail investors. The larger cities Taipei and Kaohsiung were blanketed with new brokerage offices. The major firms then set up new shops in the secondary cities of Taichung, Tainan, Chiayi, Hsinchu and Changwha. When those reached saturation, brokerage firms finally opened up offices in even the most obscure country villages like Shalu, Fuhsing, Chubei, Huwei, Wuchi, and Huaton. Looking for new market niches, brokers established offices specifically targeted at housewives, doctors, farmers and students to lure more customers in…

…Suddenly, just about every single Taiwanese became involved in the market. An astonished foreign media jokingly started calling Taiwan “the Republic of Casino” instead of its official name “Republic of China”.

Students at National Taiwan University began to cut morning classes. Primary school teachers quizzed their students to see what stocks their parents were buying. High school girls desperate to accumulate savings to throw into the market turned to part-time prostitution.

60% of financial reporters owned stocks, and 84% of this group admitted their involvement in insider trading. When interviewed, 30% of those reporters admitted to considering abandoning their profession so that they could play the market full time.

In 1988, Taiex broke through the 7,000 mark – up over 10x since 1985. In brokerage offices, retail investors celebrated with champagne and happy faces…

…The market wobbled briefly in 1988 but quickly regained momentum. During that year, new president Lee Teng-hui appointed Shirley Kuo as Minister of Finance. To control the stock market bubble, Kuo announced a tax on gains derived from securities transactions. Taiex plummeted for 19 straight days, dropping from above 7,000 to below 5,000. Investors took to the streets and laid siege to the Ministry of Finance and Kuo’s residence. Fearful of losing next year’s elections, the government backed down and cancelled the tax. Stock prices exploded with renewed fervour.

It only took a few months to recover the previous high. As the market surged through the 6,000 level, then 7,000 and 8,000 stockbrokers held wild celebrations on their trading floors. Brokers offered free champagne, exploding firecrackers, balloons, buffet lunches and musical performances to their most loyal customers…

…The compounded return over the previous five years had hit international records. The Taiex had gone from 1,000 points in 1986 to 12,000 in 1990. Stock prices multiplied by more than twelve times in less than four years.

By the fall of 1989, the average price-earnings ratio on the Taiex was 100x – roughly double the already-high P/E multiple of 51x in Japan at the time…

…In early 1990, the market started wobbling. It looked like the market was taking a rest before scaling new, unchartered heights – just like it had done so many times in the past. But instead, the market entered into a vicious bear market that stunned most retail investors.

Many retail investors thought that the government provided almost guaranteed protection on the downside. The Kuomintang party had used the booming stock market as a slogan for their recent election campaign slogan, “Big Profits and Great Prosperity”. Many interpreted this as an implied guarantee against market losses. Yet despite continued optimism, the market drifted lower.

Trading volume reached new highs just after the crash, with traders doubling down on every single dip.

And then slowly, denial turned to anger, to depression and a gradual acceptance of the new reality.

Taiwan’s stock market bubble was finally over.

5. TIP466: The Bear Has Arrived w/ Jeremy Grantham – Trey Lockerbie and Jeremy Grantham

Jeremy Grantham (00:10:27):

I wrote a piece, Reinvesting When Terrified that by sheer luck came out the day the market hit its low and it said, “Get a policy, get a plan, present it to your committee or yourself and start to throw your money back into the market. You feel paralyzed, everyone always does and now’s the time to wake up, the market is cheap.”

Jeremy Grantham (00:10:46):

Of course, that happened in 1974 and ’82, which were classic lows and the market got down to seven PE and what I call terminal paralysis, sets in where you’re so frightened you can hardly move. You can hardly get to work, forget to buy stocks and that’s of course, as Warren Buffet would’ve said, that’s exactly the time you have to do it and it’s only 5% of the time, they are much quicker than the crazy bull markets.

Trey Lockerbie (00:11:11):

Now, I know you’re a huge skeptic of the Fed. Have the Feds rate increases and tightening efforts on the market or the market’s response surprised you in any way?

Jeremy Grantham (00:11:22):

No, I expect the Fed to be behind the curve, to be deep into optimism and it doesn’t really have a clue about market bubbles and the damage they do when they break. They’ve been eager now since early Greenspan to encourage bull markets because they help the economy, they really do and they always forget that the bear markets to go along with them hurt the economy at just the wrong time.

Jeremy Grantham (00:11:46):

If I’d been asked a bet, would the Fed get inflation wrong when inflation came along? At any time I would’ve said, of course they’ll miss it, they’ll be late, their responses will be pretty ill-judged. The Fed’s record is terrible. What is impressive is how much room they have been cut by the market. I mean the market is incredibly forgiving to the Fed. The Fed happened for 25 years to benefit from that amazing era as 500 million Chinese erased into the big cities and were plugged from marginal farming into highly profitable industrial system.

Jeremy Grantham (00:12:22):

Then they joined the World Trade Association and made everybody’s stuffed dogs and everybody’s iPhones for that matter. During that phase 500 million extra Chinese, 200 million Eastern Europeans plugging away from communism into capitalism. That was a golden era, Goldilocks if ever there was one and the Fed got to take credit for that.

Jeremy Grantham (00:12:46):

Prime Minister of England once, Mr. Wilson got reelected because England unexpectedly won the World cup in soccer and he got credit for it. I mean the president gets in the end credit for everything, good weather, he takes the shock for inflation. These things are all way bigger than the president of the United States, but the president and the Fed gets to enjoy the environment, so this Fed had a wonderful environment, they did nothing right, but they were seen to be presiding over low inflation and decent growth. The growth rate actually has slowed way down since Greenspan.

Jeremy Grantham (00:13:22):

It was averaging three and a half before Greenspan and averaging two and a half afterwards and today more like one and a half. It’s done nothing in terms of increasing the growth rate, but superficially it felt like a golden age because asset prices went up. Asset prices went up because inflation came down and rates were allowed to come down and in the end, rates were forced down and low rates make leverage cheap, make private equity deals wonderfully easy and profitable and they push up the price of real estate and they push up the price of stocks and that’s the way it was and the Fed gets the credit for that and it’s due none.

Jeremy Grantham (00:14:02):

D merit accrues from the fact that it kept on pushing down interest rates far too long and dangerously increasing inequality which is, I like to say the greatest poison in the system these days. The degree of inequality we have in the US now it does damage the strength of the economy and that is probably part of the reason why the growth rate has slowed and continues to slow.

Trey Lockerbie (00:14:27):

Now that inflation has arrived, there’s a lot of concern that we’re entering into a 1970s or eighties scenario stagflation. As a historian, could you give our audience an idea of what was happening during that period and how it resembles today?

Jeremy Grantham (00:14:42):

Well, every period is unique. The seventies had problems with the oil crises. You can call it one giant crisis or you can call it two or three, but in any case a triple, quadruple, quintuple the price of oil. In a hurry, we’d come off 50 years of fairly stable, low prices and they shot up and stayed up for a long time and inflicted enormous pain on the system. They lowered the growth rate. Why wouldn’t it? If you have to pay three, four times for your energy and it also, of course pushes up the price, so there’s nothing like an oil price increase to increase stagflation and it did. This time, if you adjust for the passage of time, the price of oil is not as high, but it’s still multiplied recently by three times and so that is imposing pain on consumption and is imposing inflationary pressure.

Jeremy Grantham (00:15:36):

Because of the invasion of Ukraine, we have had some extra spikes in the price of food, fertilizer and natural gas particularly in Europe. Interestingly, they are now almost all of them lower in price than the day before the invasion and this is a lovely example of how the stock market works. The start market is saying, “Whoops, there’s so much damage from commodity prices et cetera, et cetera, that we’re going to have a recession.” The recession isn’t bad news because the recession is going to get the Fed back in our camp of lowering interest rates again and helping stock prices and we’re looking out into the future and therefore that’s the good news, so the fear of a recession becomes wishful thinking about future interest rates and so the market gets a repressed for a while. It’s quite remarkable, but it’s fairly typical.

Jeremy Grantham (00:16:30):

That’s what we’re having now and that’s why we might have a bit of a rally for a few weeks, I think. Yes, what we should cover is how dangerous it is to get involved in a bubble that has more than one asset class, equities, growth stocks mainly. This time we’ve also moved into housing. Housing was chugging along okay, but last year it had the biggest advance, 20% in 2021 [inaudible 00:16:56] it had ever had in history and it went up to a higher multiple of family income, house priced divided by family income. Higher multiple than the peak of the housing bubble of 2006, it just means there’s a lot of value there that can be lost and it is dependent on interest rates. As you know when you’re paying a mortgage that the bottom of the mortgage was two and a half and it went up to 5.7, 5.8.

Jeremy Grantham (00:17:19):

This is a brutal increase in mortgage and means a lot of people will not move houses who otherwise would’ve done, which means a lot of people will not take a new job because they’re not prepared to double their mortgage payments. Everyone expanded to pay as much mortgage as they could afford, which meant that they put merciless pressure upwards on housing prices as the mortgage rates came down, so that’s a problem and then you have problems with a bubbly commodities market inflicting pain on consumption. As if that wasn’t enough, we have the lowest interest rates in 6,000 years as Jim Graham would say or Edward Chancellor’s written a brilliant new book, The Price Of Time. Of course, with the lowest rates in 6,000 years, you have the highest bond prices and that’s obviously been taken to the cleaners this year, too.

Jeremy Grantham (00:18:04):

You have bonds, housing, stocks and commodities. The only people who’ve tried that was Japan in ’89, they’re still not back to the price of the equity market. They’re still not back to the price of the land and the housing market from 89, that’s 33 years and counting. We did some of that in the housing bubble where the stock market came down in sympathy and that was brutal. They give you much greater pressure on recessionary forces and we are playing with fire this time, which was not anywhere near as obvious a year ago before that huge move upwards in housing.

Trey Lockerbie (00:18:40):

The interesting thing about the housing part to me is that with high inflation and to your point about expecting it to have inflation for the years to come, is that it seems like you’d want to own hard assets, so the demand should be there to keep propping up for the foreseeable future.

Jeremy Grantham (00:18:55):

Yes, in the long run, of course housing and stocks are very good protectors of steady inflation. The bad news is that psychologically inflation is associated with a negative, with a drop in PE from a psychological point and pressure on proper margins in the short-term and then it’s adjusts, but it’s very painful adjusting. Of course, it’s associated with a much higher mortgage, but once it’s adjusted, then of course you’re in much better shape.

Jeremy Grantham (00:19:23):

The world is much better off with moderately high interest rates. You get money on your savings, people don’t speculate as much, they don’t leverage as much, the risk in the system declines and you can afford to buy a house at lower prices and you can afford to buy stocks and build a portfolio.

Jeremy Grantham (00:19:40):

At the moment at the peak in December, if you’re young, you can’t get into the game. You can’t buy your first house, you can’t buy an equity portfolio. The yields are half of what they used to be…

…Jeremy Grantham (00:20:38):

I think in the longer term, forget the next few quarters who knows what happens really, but in the longer term, we are really running the risk that this is back to the seventies. We have problems with the availability of plentiful cheap resources and we have problems with plentiful cheap labor. The birth rate has crunched in every developed country except Israel and China.

Jeremy Grantham (00:21:04):

That’s a very, very important segment of the global economy to say the least. Every one of them has a population growth rate lower than replacement level so in the end, after accumulating lots of older people as a higher percentage, we start to actually have the population drop. Secondly, we’re 10 and 20 years in depending on the country into having smaller baby cohorts, so we know with absolute certainty, since they’re alive already that the 20 year olds arriving in the market will be fewer and fewer for the next to 20 years.

Jeremy Grantham (00:21:40):

We have not experienced this before. This has happened incredibly fast. China has gone from plenty of babies to a baby crunch almost overnight and a fertility rate that needs to be 2.1 is probably running about 1.4. Even in the US, the UK we’re running about 1.7. We’ve never seen levels like this, so we’re going to have a hard time getting enough labor. We’re going to accumulate old people who are very resource intensive. They need a lot of medical care, they need a lot of people care and we’re not going to have all that many people there.

Jeremy Grantham (00:22:14):

The supply of people to look after us old fogies is dropping steadily from now on for the rest of your life about, for sure. At the same time, I believe the correct interpretation of the commodity data is that it wasn’t only the China shock, the rapid growth rate for 30 years in China, but it was also showing signs that the best and cheapest, most plentiful resources had simply been mined or pumped and that we are running down into the second tier.

Jeremy Grantham (00:22:45):

If you look at the copper ore for example, King Copper is really important to the industrial system. Over 80, 90 years, the amount of copper in a ton of oil has dropped to a third of what it was, so you’re using an awful lot more energy and the energy also, which used to run for a hundred years at $20 a barrel in today’s currency, now runs at a hundred, so you’re spending five times the cost of energy to mine one third the quality of copper oil.

Jeremy Grantham (00:23:14):

You better believe technology can’t keep up with that. It did for a long time, it did very, very well but starting about 2002, the real price of the typical commodity has gone up a lot, it’s basically tripled.

Jeremy Grantham (00:23:27):

In a hundred years it went from… Starting at a hundred, it went down to 30, a brilliant help for getting rich and then from 2002 until today, it’s gone from 30 to 90, so over 122 years commodities are just about flat adjusted for inflation. Only 20 years ago, they were down at 30 cents on the dollar. This is a huge shift, hasn’t been nearly enough fuss made about it, but it’s the direction that is interesting to me. The direction is steadily up.

Jeremy Grantham (00:23:56):

Now, there’s a lot of volatility and commodities everybody knows. You produce an extra ton and the price collapses and your short a ton and the price triples, but if you look at the trend, the trend has been pretty reversed since 2002. My guess is it will continue to rise and that will pose real stagflationary pressure for a couple of decades and that’s why I fear this is re-entering the seventies and eighties…

…Jeremy Grantham (00:39:04):

I don’t want to get into wishful thinking, but basically as a society, we show all of the signs the failing societies in history have shown and the top of the list is Hubris, “Oh, you’ve been saying bad things for a hundred years and it didn’t work out.” You think the Romans didn’t say that? 400 years and so on and some of the civilizations down in central America where around for a thousand years and they built water storage, they built aqueducts and they had wonderful armies, but eventually they fall foul of a lot of failings and we check them all off.

Jeremy Grantham (00:39:40):

We look like a failing civilization book, but I’m hoping we have a little escape clause We have a couple of things going for us that have never worked before. One of them is population, that has never been a gleam in the eye of [Mouthes and the boys 00:39:54] even as we got wealthier that we would choose to have fewer children.

Jeremy Grantham (00:40:01):

This is remarkable and then adding on top of our choice is the fact that the world is getting so toxic, that even when you decide to have children it’s now getting to be much harder. One way or the other we are likely to have over the next couple of hundred years, a declining population and we have some chance that, that will be a great help. It isn’t a sufficient condition, but it is a necessary condition. The planet, under any circumstances could not support for the 10 billion that one reads about all the time for a hundred years, it can’t be done.

Jeremy Grantham (00:40:35):

We would need two and a half to three planets to cope with that. We can perhaps deal with a couple of billion and we might get there quite graceful. The other one of course, is technology and the rebuttal to the technology argument is that every wave of technology takes more energy back and it takes more complexity, which is a killer because complexity itself is a failing characteristic.

Jeremy Grantham (00:40:57):

It takes too much effort, too much manpower, too much energy itself and if that wasn’t enough, it increases your [inaudible 00:41:06] your overconfidence, every wave of scientific progress and so it can be quite deadly, but this time we have some open ended technologies.

Jeremy Grantham (00:41:15):

I call them, Get Out Of Jail Free cards and because they’re almost infinite fusion, geothermal and brilliantly cheap, effective storage any one of those three and we may get out of jail because that’s enough green cheap energy to in the long run take care of poverty if we chose to, for sure and take care of climate change. The thing about climate change is when we finish, we started 150 years ago with 280 paths per million carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It’s only a little bit, but it’s a very powerful commodity. If we had no parts, we would be frozen at minus 20 to 25 degrees centigrade, a frozen ball with just bacteria around if we were lucky.

Jeremy Grantham (00:42:00):

It’s a very, very potent greenhouse gas. We started with 280 parts, a million we’re up to 420. That’s a bigger jump than the difference between the ice age, two miles of ice on Manhattan and the pleasant enough world that we have now. That’s a bigger jump, the ice age gap was just a 120 points and we have just gone up by 160 and we’re going to go up to about 525 and we need to go back to 300, so we’re going to have to get rid of 225 parts million of carbon dioxide as well as the methane.

Jeremy Grantham (00:42:31):

If you want to think about the carbon dioxide, that is 2 trillion tons or more, that is the absolute minimum. 2 trillion tons absolutely has to be taken out of the atmosphere over the next couple of hundred years and the Grantham Foundation, that’s all we do with our private investments, our venture capital. We have a team of half a dozen and all we do is focus on carbon dioxide extraction, biologically and every other method that we can get at, but that needs a huge amount of energy. However you do it, you’re going to need a lot of energy.

Jeremy Grantham (00:43:07):

One of our Get Out Of Jail Free cards would be very handy indeed. What are the probabilities? I think there’s probably 50/50 that fusion in the next few decades will come out with a viable engineering system, engineering and physics. The thing that I have doubt about is the cost. They’re going to be fairly costly plans, but 50/50 will have the technology and maybe it will be cheap and maybe it will not be cheap enough. Geothermal looks incredibly promising because the fracking industry has gone through the most amazing set of experiments, tens of thousands of wells, pushing, prodding, experimenting, shocking the rock using extra special mixtures of liquids to pump down and lateral drilling.

Jeremy Grantham (00:43:57):

It’s really been a revolution of engineering talent and if you could take all of that, which we can and apply it to geothermal and then start the same process with geothermal it would be almost surprising if we couldn’t, at least in some parts of the world have a really economically viable source of energy. The heat from the center of the planet here is more or less infinite, so that would do it.

Jeremy Grantham (00:44:22):

The third one would be a brilliant breakthrough in storage. We’ve come down to 10 cents on the dollar in the last 15 years. If we could come down, once again over the next 20 or 30 years to 10 cents on the dollar or even 20 would probably do it. We wouldn’t need a fusion or geothermal any one of those three will give us a chance of success. The problem is how much of the planet spirals out of control because of food problems, energy problems, creating fail states of the kind that we begin to see in Africa.

Jeremy Grantham (00:44:55):

If the temperature alone continues to rise, the whole Indian subcontinent, that becomes very questionable as to whether you could do regular farming. It has a wonderful share of the world’s arable land. If you see one of these maps, which is green for arable, you’ll see that India is one of the few places where practically the entire sub subcontinent is green. The problem is once you get over 35 degrees centigrade, which is about 95 Fahrenheit and you get humidity with it and you can’t stay out more than a few hours and they recently had 45 degrees centigrade for three weeks, as you probably read, the hottest they have ever had.

6. The Nightmare Scenario For Central Banks – Darlo Perkins

Officials feel utterly embarrassed about their “transitory” call in 2021, and you should never ignore the human element in policymaking. But the new bias goes deeper than that. It is also important to remember that the reason we have independent central banks is to ensure that the 1970s cannot happen again. So, we are talking about a risk that undermines the central bankers’ entire raison d’être, an existential threat. In fact, “price stability” is a prerequisite for everything else they do. It is the foundation of monetary policy. When investors ask about the pain central banks are prepared to tolerate, they are thinking about the wrong trade-off. The authorities are prepared to suffer a recession now because they fear a much worse recession in the future if price stability is lost. The trade-off, as officials see it, is intertemporal.

A recent report from the BIS outlines the nightmare scenario for central banks… The BIS analysis is largely statistical. It argues that there are two basic inflation regimes – “low” and “high”, each of which has its own self-reinforcing properties, although economies occasionally transition from one to the other. In the low-inflation regime, “relative” or sector-specific price changes are the dominant driver of the CPI. These tend to have a transitory effect, as they die out quickly. This is not a regime in which wage- or price-setters need to pay a great deal of attention to the overall inflation rate. Aggregate price pressures are subdued, and everyone takes this for granted. In the “high-inflation regime”, on the other hand, broader CPI developments start to have a much more discernible impact, with inflation itself becoming the focal point for private-sector decisions. This shift in emphasis leads, in turn, to behavioural changes that will cause inflation to become entrenched. In the high-inflation regime, even relative price shifts – such as spikes in energy prices – have persistent effects. And you know transitioning from a low inflation regime to a high inflation regime is under way based on the behaviour of prices within the CPI. Once they become more correlated, as they have over the past 12 months, there is a good chance – according to the BIS – that the economy is transitioning. 

7. Ben Clymer – Rolex: Timeless Excellence – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and Ben Clymer 

[00:14:33] Patrick: Maybe before we go into the history, which is so interesting and really important, we could just do a level set for the audience on Rolex the business and just some basics like how many watches do they produce a year, the revenue that they produce a year, maybe say a little bit about their very unique business structure, which is certainly shocking to me and I think will shock some people too that aren’t familiar with it. Just level set us on the size and type of the Rolex as a business.

[00:14:55] Ben: And I want to be completely clear, and I’m sure Rolex will listen to this, so I want to be clear for them and for the audiences that they don’t communicate anything so this is all speculative. The information that I’ll provide and that I’m sure you read is completely speculative. We have a good idea of what they might produce and what the revenue might be. The assumption is is that Rolex is making just north of around a million watches per year with an average wholesale price of around $7,000. So you can do the math there to kind of give you an idea of size and revenue. And a million watches per year is a lot, but it’s not the biggest by quantity. Apple, of course, would be bigger than that. Arguably, if you included Apple, they would be an even bigger watch brand than Rolex, but different thing obviously. But if you were to combine, for example, the entire Swatch group, which ranges from Swatch to Breguet, including Omega, it would be a larger business than Rolex, in theory. But again, Swatch is a publicly traded company, you can see exactly what their revenue is, whereas Rolex is, as I think you’ve alluded to, Rolex is quite the opposite. Rolex is in fact run by something called the Hans Wilsdorf Foundation, which was founded in 1945 when the founder, Hans Wilsdorf, set it up to basically be effectively, a nonprofit run by a group of families that are still highly involved with the business today that have, I would say, effectively zero public interaction. I’m pretty close with Rolex and I’m pretty close with the watch industry you could say and I have met, I think, one board member, one time. That was not by design. I think I met him at a bar and I was like, “Oh, you’re so and so,” and he said, “Yes.” These people are in fact, the most powerful people in watches and nobody even knows their name. Nobody even knows what they look like. I happen to because this is my job, but most people have no clue who’s really pulling the strings at Rolex. There’s a wonderful CEO named Jean-Frederic Dufour, who used to be the president of Zenith, which is an LVMH brand and he is absolutely the base and brain behind much of Rolex, but there is a board there and like any board, they have a different kind of influence over the brand.

Rolex is effectively a nonprofit, some say one of the largest nonprofits in the world, which I would believe. There are dozens and dozens of rumors that you may have heard, such as they’ve got the largest private art collection next to the Vatican, or they own more real estate. They make more money in real estate than they do in watches. Any of those things could be true. What I can say with the utmost certainty is that they will never reveal any of that to be true, even if it is. They’re not the type of brand, type of company that will ever stand on the rooftop and shout about anything. I mentioned this in the story that I wrote in 2015, whereas most brands, they’re trying to create stories where there aren’t any, a lot of brands will say a watch is in-house and you manufacture it in-house when it’s not. Rolex doesn’t do any of that. In fact, what’s so remarkable and I found this out on my own, doing my own research for that story in 2015, they will make several updates to products at some significant cost to themselves and not change the retail price and not even tell anybody about it and the only reason that I found out was when doing research for that story, I spoke to an independent watchmaker who is in New York City and is one of the best watchmakers in the country, if not the world, and he said, he works on Rolex, as well as other brands. These are the changes that they made to their movements without anybody knowing. By the way, these other brands that are communicating about LIGA, which is a manufacturing technique that allows you to have frictionless gears, a brand sent out a press release about that. Then, he came to find out that Rolex had been doing that for five years. It was in half their watches already. That’s what’s so wonderful about Rolex is they just are so remarkably Swiss. They are so conservative and thoughtful in the way that they communicate. When I wrote that story in 2015, I was one of the first journalists who ever be invited inside Rolex’s manufacturing headquarters in Bienne, Switzerland, which is what movements are made. They just are not out there to talk about themselves really ever. It’s incredibly charming. The luxury world is so much about Instagram and influencers and people touting how prestigious any brand might be and Rolex is just quietly the most prestigious…

…[00:19:39] Patrick: Maybe you can give us the, I don’t really care how long it is, as long as you want to make it because it’s so damn interesting, the history of Rolex, the brand and the company, its founding and its key timeline milestones.

[00:19:49] Ben: Rolex is younger than most other brands. It’s younger than Omega. It’s younger than Vacheron by 150 years. It’s younger than Patek. In the Swiss watch world, I wouldn’t call it a baby by any means, but not one of these grandfathers. I mean, Vacheron was founded in 1755. That’s older than the United States of America. Rolex was founded by a guy named Hans Wilsdorf, who’s Austrian, but he was a total anglophile. He really just was obsessed with the United Kingdom in the early part of the 1900s. He goes into the UK and starts a company called Wilsdorf & Davis in 1905. Back then, you have to remember that, forget digital watch making. Wrist watches were not a thing. The wrist watch was really a product of World War I, which was guys and trenches, trench watches, were strapping pocket watches to the wrist so that they didn’t have to pull out of their pocket. It was a little bit more complex, but that’s it at a high level. Wilsdorf, in 1905, decides to focus on wrist watches, which is crazy. I mean, it was a little bit, frankly like Elon Musk focusing on EVs 10, 15 years ago. People just weren’t ready for it. He committed to doing the wrist watch in the early part of the 1900s, 1905, 1908 and in 1908, he creates a company called Rolex. Again, there’s lots of hearsay on why it’s Rolex. I think at the very least it’s safe to say that he chose that word because it’s the same pronunciation in all languages. Some people say it’s the sound it makes. There’s no confirmation on that, but effectively what he does is he’s just the distributor. He’s not making anything from 1905 to about 1908.

In ’08, he buys a movement, which is what powers watch from a company called Aegler, A-E-G-L-E-R, which we’ll get back to later. They’re still around today, buys a movement, puts it in a case made by himself and sends it off to, it’s called an observatory, but effectively what it is, it’s a testing facility, effectively a nonprofit that says, these watches or time telling devices, clock, Marine chronometer or whatever, are accurate within, we’ll say X and Y, effectively saying, these are the most precise time telling devices on earth, typically done for Marine chronometers and if you know anything about this history of longitude, like that is effectively how longitude was discovered. This is just paramount to basically all exploration of the time period. Up until that point, no wrist watches had ever even been submitted to this thing called the QA, which is a British testing facility at that point. In 1908, he does that with an Aegler powered watch. It’s a 44 day test and it is given the QA certificate. Again, nobody had ever done it. Some years later, about 10 years later, he submitted 136 movements back to the QA. I think 24 of them were cased in 34 millimeter gold cases and then another 112 were in what we call boy size, which is really very small. I mean, at this point, it would look like a nickel, but these are effectively the formula one cars of watch movements. There were other watch movements at the time that to you and me and most people, would look exactly the same, but these were high performance calibers and they did it with a special escapement. Escapement is basically how time telling was regulated. These were effectively the formula one cars of watchmaking and they were done in a way that was very, even back then, very Rolex. There was really no indication that these were anything special on a dial, besides it would say QA on them. They’re around. You can buy them today for really less than you might think.

Once he had been given the QA certificates for the first wrist watch ever, he decided really to focus on three tenants of watchmaking, which really were not at all prevalent in that day at all, because it was really about utility. The watch can tell you the time pretty well or it was about luxury. At that point, we’re talking the Cartiers, Patek Philippes, complications, really. History tenants of manufacturing, which remain true to this day, would be precision, accuracy, waterproofness, which didn’t really exist at the time, and then self winding. What I mean by that is ability to not have to wind the watch manually. Precision was done. We’ve covered that. These watches were based on QA. They came up with a new escapement to make them more precise. Waterproofness, I think, goes back to the question you asked about five minutes ago, which is, how did you get something that more people know about that basically can afford or confine? He created something called the oyster case and now almost all Rolexes with the exception of the Cellini line, use an oyster case. That basically just means a waterproof case. Nobody was doing it at the time. Omega had something that was pretty close and actually predates the oyster case, but never really took off in the same way. Instead of using seals, it was almost like a locking system. It didn’t really take off, but effectively there was this woman named Mercedes Gleitz, who was a typist, of all things, basically a secretary in the UK and she had swum the English channel successfully, the first woman to swim the English channel successfully.

Hans Wilsdorf, the founder said, “Hey, wouldn’t it be cool if this woman, A, she’s a woman, B, she’s doing this amazing feat that no one had ever done before. Wouldn’t it be cool if she wore the watch around her neck?” She didn’t wear it on her wrist to be clear. She put her around her neck and she attempted to swim the English channel. She actually didn’t successfully do it. She failed, but nobody really cared because she had already done it before. He took out an ad celebrating the fact that this watch was around this woman’s neck for 10 hours in the English channel and the time keeping was flawless. That solidified Rolex as A, a household name because the oyster case had been validated in the English channel with this early brand ambassador, I guess you would call her. That was a huge deal and I think one of the earliest examples of real marketing by any luxury brand or any brand really at all, and then the final tenant would be self winding, which is, I would equate it to the automatic transmission. When the automatic transmission came around, all of a sudden, driving a car became a hell of a lot easier. It just became wider accepted, et cetera. Prior to, I guess it was around 19, I’m going to say, 30 something that Rolex patented the first self winding movement. To be clear, there was somebody called John Harwood that actually had a different self winding movement first. I think that was in the twenties and his idea was to make a hammer. Some of them would bounce back and forth like this to continue to power the watch. Rolex said, let’s go a different array. Let’s create a rotor, so a weight that would oscillate around inner circle to power the watch.

That worked and Rolex had, actually I remember the date. It was 1933 because it had a 20 year patent on it and Patek Philippe, which was another stall watch of traditional watchmaking, saw this and said, “Oh shit, we need to do that too,” but they couldn’t actually release anything until 20 years later because of the patent. The Patek 2526, which is their first self winding watch that came out in 1953. That’s a different thing all together, but effectively, Hans Wilsdorf said, “I want the watches to be precise,” check with the QA. “I want them to be waterproof,” check with the oyster case, “And I want them to be self winding,” check with the perpetual. If you see oyster perpetual on any Rolex, which you’d see in all Rolexes now, oysters are waterproof. Perpetual is the self winding. From there, Rolex went out to make watches and they were doing things very much in a similar style to everyone else at that time until the early fifties. In the post-war era, post World War II era, they created their first sports watch. By sports watch, the technical term is professional watch by Rolex nomenclature. It’s the Submariner, which is the diver’s watch, which is 1953. It’s the GMT, which is the pilot’s watch, which is 1955. Explorer I, which is an Explorer’s watch or an all day everyday watch, which is 53 as well. Then, you had the Daytona in 1963. Later, you had the Sea-Dweller in 67, which is a beef up version of the Sub. Then, the Explorer II in, I guess, 1970 or so. Those are the watches that I think most people now think of when they think of watch. You see rotating bezel in most cases. You see a black dial in most cases. You see an oyster bracelet, which is a very wonderfully produced bracelet with an oyster lock bracelet. That is really when things change.

To be clear, Rolex was not alone. There were other brands doing it. Some would say earlier, some would say around the same time, but the Blancpain Fifty Fathoms is credited to 1953. The Omega Seamaster 300 and 120 are around the same time as well. They were not alone and you have to remember that even Rolex in the watch industry in that period, it was really a smattering of different suppliers. If you look at, for example, and I wrote about this several times over the past few years, if you look at, say the Rolex Daytona from 1963 and the Heuer Carrera from 1963, it uses the exact same movement and I’m saying the exact same movement, and that’s a Valjoux 72. Same case maker, same dial maker, same hand maker. What is the actual difference? The assembly was done by Rolex and the assembly was done by Heuer, but the product itself was really very similar. If you look at early Seamasters and early Submariners, a lot of similarity there. The difference was of course the oyster case, but that was how watch making was done. If you look at say, example of Patek Philippe 2499, that’s based on a Valjoux movement. You don’t think of that. You think of Patek as Patek. This is the holy grail, but up until really, I mean the 2000s, they were using what you call an Ebauche movement, which is just really movement blank and then, it would be finished by Patek or finished by AP or Vacheron or whoever. Rolexes were really, I would say, finished to a higher quality than most, but I mean, any good Blancpain or any good Omega would do much of what Rolex was doing. It was really not until much, much later in the seventies first when we had the Quartz crisis, which is effectively the creation of Quartz, which is analog time, but with a battery, which is dramatically more precise, I mean, dramatically more precise than mechanical watch making.

What is interesting to think about, and I give full credit to my old colleague, Joe Thompson, who’s the legend in the watch writing world, is the Japanese came in with Quartz, Seiko created it, effectively, came in and there was a war between Swiss mechanical watch making and Quartz analog timekeeping. To be clear, the Swiss lost. The Swiss lost by a country mile. All of a sudden, those guys that were buying a Rolex or Omega or a Heuer, because they were the most precise thing in the world just said, “You know what” why would I do that? I can buy a Quartz watch that is 10 times more accurate,” 10 times, and by the way, you don’t need to have good service. You just swap out the new battery or whatever all the time and that decimated the Swiss watch industry to a point where very, very few brands were producing things at a profit of any kind. Jack Heuer, whose family owned TAG Heuer before it was TAG. It was just Heuer at the time. In his biography, I mean, he talks almost going into bankruptcy. If you talk to Gerry Stern, whose father Philippe Stern and his grandfather have owned Patek for generations. In the late seventies, they had to borrow with their bank.

[00:29:53] Patrick: It’s existential.

[00:29:54] Ben: Yeah, this was real. It wasn’t just the smaller brands. Patek had issues. Heuer had issues. Rolex was really smart in that, through that period of real turmoil when, I would say, their chief competitor Omega decided to make some Quartz watches, decided to make some funky looking things, Rolex stayed the course, and yes, they did make Quartz watches. The Beta 21, which was a Swiss conglomerates answer to Quartz, is the most expensive Quartz watch ever made. I mean like thousands and thousands of dollars, they said, “We’re going to focus on what we do best,” and the focus went away from precision and accuracy and time telling to luxury. That is when you start seeing the gold Rolex on, I hate to say it, but the used car salesman and the gold Rolex became the thing, seventies and eighties, opulence, you understand what the eighties were, of course. It just changed what Rolex was, but by the way, it worked and it allowed them to continue to be relevant when everybody else being Omega, Patek to a degree, Vacheron, these brands really struggled. That is why so many of them ended up in conglomerates. In the eighties and nineties, when watches were, mechanical watches, were really not doing so hot, a lot of folks came in and bundled them all up. Richemont owns a bunch of the great ones, including Vacheron. Swatch owns everything from Swatch to Blancpain, Breguet, Omega. It was a time of great challenge for sure. Rolex, they struggled as well, never to the degree that the others did, but it was not great for them. Then, the nineties started to come around and Rolex had a CEO by the name of Patrick Heiniger. His father was actually also CEO too, to give you an idea of how things work at Rolex. And he said, “I want to take Rolex in-house,” and he was really the first to do, frankly well before Patek or well before anybody else. Rolex was using 27 different suppliers to make, say, Submariner.

After he was done with it, they’re using four and now, those four are completely owned by Rolex. There are four different production facilities, two in Geneva, one in, what I would call, Proper Geneva one and Plan-les-Ouates, which is a little bit outside and then there’s one in Chêne-Bourg, which does dials and there’s one in Bienne, which makes the movements. What’s so amazing is, Rolex, to me, the secret sauce is equal parts case, equal parts movement. The case is, you can reverse engineer if you’re a competitor and say, “Okay, what’s an oyster case? It’s got this. It’s got that. It’s polished there. Seals are done by X, Y, and Z.” Movements are a different thing entirely. And what’s amazing is Rolex Geneva, which is basically dials, cases, bracelets, all that stuff, and Rolex BN, which is up in the mountains in Vallée de Joux, had a handshake deal for 70 years. And I mean, an actual handshake deal that the calibers made by what was then called Aegler, who made the first movement for Hans Wilsdorf, that company was making movements solely for Rolex Geneva based on nothing but a handshake. And I mean that literally. There was nothing in writing up until 2004, which is just insane to think about. I mean, Rolex was certainly a multi-billion dollar a year business before then. And up until 2004, there was no contract in place to say that Aegler couldn’t make movements for Omega or TAG Heuer or whoever. And so in 2004, Rolex said, “You know what? Enough’s enough. Let’s get married here,” and they purchased the company. And so now Rolex BN is basically what Aegler was up in the mountains until 2004. And so Rolex now has four different production facilities. As I wrote that story, I was among the first to be invited inside the movement manufacturing, which is really the source of the IP. That is where the sausage is made, so to speak. Just remarkable. If you haven’t read the story, it’s on Hodinkee called Inside The Manufacturer: Visiting All Four Rolex Locations. It was remarkable. As I started out in that story, this was 10 years ago or seven years ago, I was a lover of watches.

I was a lover of Rolex and I had four Rolexes then than had anything else at that point. None of them were as old as I was. They were all considerably older than me. And it’s funny, I reread the story to prepare for this interview. And now since then, I’ve bought more modern Rolexes than I have vintage. And the world is just a different place. But once you see everything that Rolex does to a watch, and what I mean by that is the fact that they have their own foundry, even the steel, not just the gold and precious metals, even the steel on Rolex is proprietary and it’s made by Rolex. It’s 904L. It’s wild. They make their own gold. It’s called Everose if it Rolex gold. It’s just remarkable. And what I think is even more telling of what Rolex is about is that one of their facilities they actually have, and I mean this literally, more than two Nobel prize-winning scientists on staff working on watches. Think about what that must mean from a material science perspective. The innovation done by Rolex is just above and beyond anything I’ve seen. I’ve been to every watch maker in the world. I’ve been to several car manufacturers doing this. I’ve been all over. I’ve been inside Hermès. There’s just nothing like this. They create machines to test their machines that make watches. They have their own oyster test, which of course provides artificial pressure on a watch to know that it’s waterproof. They have a machine that can open and close a Rolex clasp a thousand times a minute, which is kind of amazing, because you actually have to open. It’s wild. So, you open this. It’s actually kind difficult to do. Imagine doing that a thousand times a minute. They invented a machine to do that. They have a machine in Chêne-Bourg, which is their dial and gem-setting location, to sort through all the stones that they’re given. First of all, Rolex only works with IF, which is internally flawless stones, which is obviously the most expensive, highest end. To ensure that the stones that they’re given, whether it’s diamonds or rubies or anything are real, they created a machine to sort them at scale and ensure that all of them are real. And I said, “Well, are bad stones or fake stones are real problem for you?”

They said, “No, not really. But we just want to ensure that every watch we sell is what we want it to be.” And I was like, “How often do you get a fake diamond or a fake anything?” And the answer was, “One out of 10 million.” To be clear, this machine was created either by them or they paid somebody to make it for them. This is their machine. It’s not like it exists outside Rolex. And this gives you an idea of what they’re about and how they do things. And it is so wonderful and so different than traditional luxury, which frankly, I may say, even as a purveyor of luxury items, is full of shit half the time. I’m into sneakers, but not in the way that I’m into other things. Why would a pair of so special edition sneakers sell for $5,000? Sneakers are made in China by machines. They’re hand- stitched here and there. It’s just designed. It’s artificial scarcity, et cetera. When you see what goes into a, really, any high-end mechanical watch, but in particular Rolex, you really start to understand. The Submariner, we’ll say, is 8,000 bucks. That might be a deal after you see what goes into this thing. And I mentioned in the story, several competing brand presidents had told me before I went on this trip that, “Oh, not a human hand touches a Rolex before it’s made. It’s all done by machine.” Which is effectively the most insulting thing a Swiss person can say, meaning that it’s void of character. It’s void of humanity. It’s like luxury should be about people. It should be about craftsmanship. And they’re saying, “Rolex doesn’t have any of that.” And I was like, “Oh, okay. That’s kind of a bummer.” That may have informed why I didn’t own any modern Rolex at the time. You walk into Rolex HQ in Geneva and you see hundreds of people finishing watches. And they’re not finishing in the same way Patek or Lange would, by hand with little pieces of wood. They’re finishing maybe six or seven Rolexes at a time on a polishing wheel, but they’re still polishing really the way that it should be done.

They’re assembling dials by hand. They’re assembling the bracelet by hand. There’s an incredible amount of hand work that goes into the most basic of Rolex, being like a Submariner or a Datejust. Beyond that, what’s so fun about them is they know exactly how different they are than everyone else. They also know that everyone wants to be like them. So, at at least two of their four facilities you might drive by and say, “Oh, there’s Rolex. It’s five stories high. It’s, I don’t know, a few hundred thousand square feet.” When you go inside, you realize that it’s actually 10 or 11 stories high, but five or six of those stories are below ground. And I just remember thinking, “Why would they do that? What’s the point of that?” And it was in fact to suggest to anybody that drives by that Rolex is smaller than they actually are. And I think if we had any idea of how big the foundation was, it would blow all of us away. I think it’s enormous. I think they’re probably producing more than a million a year, but that’s the generally accepted number. It’s who they are. And if they’re going to do something, they want to do things at the highest level. I’m a golfer and have been lucky enough to meet some of their players. And Adam Scott became a good friend and I asked, “Why don’t you sponsor X, Y, and Z?” or, “Why don’t you go grassroots?” Whatever. And they said, “This is Rolex like my golf. If we’re going to do golf, we only want to be involved with the majors. So, the US Open, the BJ Championship, the Masters, and of course the British Open. And that’s it.” If they’re going to do tennis, it’s going to be Wimbledon and the US Open. They don’t even want to mess with some of the other majors in tennis. It’s just remarkable how committed they are to working with the very best. It’s wild. It really is.

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Alphabet (parent of Google), Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms (parent of Facebook), and Netflix. Holdings are subject to change at any time. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 24 July 2022:

1. CRISPR, 10 Years On: Learning to Rewrite the Code of Life – Carl Zimmer

In just a decade, CRISPR has become one of the most celebrated inventions in modern biology. It is swiftly changing how medical researchers study diseases: Cancer biologists are using the method to discover hidden vulnerabilities of tumor cells. Doctors are using CRISPR to edit genes that cause hereditary diseases.

“The era of human gene editing isn’t coming,” said David Liu, a biologist at Harvard University. “It’s here.”

But CRISPR’s influence extends far beyond medicine. Evolutionary biologists are using the technology to study Neanderthal brains and to investigate how our ape ancestors lost their tails. Plant biologists have edited seeds to produce crops with new vitamins or with the ability to withstand diseases. Some of them may reach supermarket shelves in the next few years…

…Will the coming wave of CRISPR-altered crops feed the world and help poor farmers or only enrich agribusiness giants that invest in the technology? Will CRISPR-based medicine improve health for vulnerable people across the world, or come with a million-dollar price tag?

The most profound ethical question about CRISPR is how future generations might use the technology to alter human embryos. This notion was simply a thought experiment until 2018, when He Jiankui, a biophysicist in China, edited a gene in human embryos to confer resistance to H.I.V. Three of the modified embryos were implanted in women in the Chinese city of Shenzhen.

In 2019, a court sentenced Dr. He to prison for “illegal medical practices.” MIT Technology Review reported in April that he had recently been released. Little is known about the health of the three children, who are now toddlers.

Scientists don’t know of anyone else who has followed Dr. He’s example — yet. But as CRISPR continues to improve, editing human embryos may eventually become a safe and effective treatment for a variety of diseases.

Will it then become acceptable, or even routine, to repair disease-causing genes in an embryo in the lab? What if parents wanted to insert traits that they found more desirable — like those related to height, eye color or intelligence?

Françoise Baylis, a bioethicist at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, worries that the public is still not ready to grapple with such questions…

…In the 1980s, microbiologists discovered puzzling stretches of DNA in bacteria, later called Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats. Further research revealed that bacteria used these CRISPR sequences as weapons against invading viruses.

The bacteria turned these sequences into genetic material, called RNA, that could stick precisely to a short stretch of an invading virus’s genes. These RNA molecules carry proteins with them that act like molecular scissors, slicing the viral genes and halting the infection.

As Dr. Doudna and Dr. Charpentier investigated CRISPR, they realized that the system might allow them to cut a sequence of DNA of their own choosing. All they needed to do was make a matching piece of RNA.

To test this revolutionary idea, they created a batch of identical pieces of DNA. They then crafted another batch of RNA molecules, programming all of them to home in on the same spot on the DNA. Finally, they mixed the DNA, the RNA and molecular scissors together in test tubes. They discovered that many of the DNA molecules had been cut at precisely the right spot.

For months Dr. Doudna oversaw a series of round-the-clock experiments to see if CRISPR might work not only in a test tube, but also in living cells. She pushed her team hard, suspecting that many other scientists were also on the chase. That hunch soon proved correct.

In January 2013, five teams of scientists published studies in which they successfully used CRISPR in living animal or human cells. Dr. Doudna did not win that race; the first two published papers came from two labs in Cambridge, Mass. — one at the Broad Institute of M.I.T. and Harvard, and the other at Harvard.

2. A Revolution Sweeping Railroads Upends How America Moves Its Stuff – Paul Ziobro

Freight railroads generally have operated the same way for more than a century: They wait for cargo and leave when customers are ready. Now railroads want to run more like commercial airlines, where departure times are set. Factories, farms, mines or mills need to be ready or miss their trips.

Called “precision-scheduled railroading,” or PSR, this new concept is cascading through the industry. Under pressure from Wall Street to improve performance, Norfolk Southern and other large U.S. freight carriers, including Union Pacific Corp. and Kansas City Southern, are trying to revamp their networks to use fewer trains and hold them to tighter schedules. The moves have sparked a stock rally that has added tens of billions of dollars to railroad values in the past six months as investors anticipate lower costs and higher profits.

The new approach was pioneered by the late railroad executive Hunter Harrison, who engineered turnarounds at two major Canadian railroads and Jacksonville, Fla.-based CSX Corp. by radically revamping their logistics.

His template won over Wall Street by boosting profits and stock prices, but it generated chaos on the tracks. The 2017 revamp at CSX caused crippling congestion east of the Mississippi River, jeopardizing operations at plants that made Pringles potato snacks, threatening deliveries of McDonald’s french fries and idling Cargill Inc. soybean-processing plants because of lack of railcars…

…“The board does not want to see any carrier implement so-called PSR the way CSX did,” said Ann Begeman, chairman of the Surface Transportation Board, the federal agency that oversees freight railroads. “It had unacceptable impacts on so many of its shippers and, frankly, other carriers.”

CSX spokesman Bryan Tucker said the company could have done better communicating the changes to customers, but he defended the actions by pointing to its financial results. He said CSX trains are running faster and with less downtime, and the railroad is hauling more cargo with fewer locomotives, railcars and employees.

Norfolk Southern estimates that its own plan will similarly allow its system to operate faster and more efficiently, while cutting about 3,000 employees from its current workforce of about 26,000 and shedding 500 locomotives from its fleet of about 4,100.

Ideally, the end result would be a more fluid railroad network that operates much like a moving conveyor belt, with fewer jams. It would allow shippers and customers to ship finished goods on a just-in-time basis, reducing carrying costs across the board.

Norfolk Southern is starting its overhaul with a process it calls “clean sheeting,” which involves dismantling and reassembling schedules and processes—one yard at a time…

…BNSF Railway Co., which operates alongside Union Pacific in the Western U.S., has resisted the industrywide push to cut capital spending and drastically change service plans. Executive Chairman Matthew Rose, who is scheduled to retire this month, said railroads that cut back on service risk pushback from regulators. Mr. Rose said BNSF, owned by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc., is focused on carrying more loads. “More volume leads to more investment,” he said.

Norfolk Southern, Kansas City Southern and Union Pacific all had service issues last year that they said exposed the perils of maintaining the status quo. When, in some cases, they responded by adding cars to handle the extra volume, congestion in some corridors got worse.

As Union Pacific tried to clear gridlock, it experimented with some strategies modeled after Mr. Harrison’s, which it then decided to adopt more broadly.

“We came to the realization that experimenting with pieces of precision-scheduled railroading was less effective on our network than going the whole way,” said Chief Executive Lance Fritz. The catalyst, he said, “was nothing more complex than our growing frustration and our customers’ growing frustration with the service product at that time.”

Norfolk’s Mr. Farrell, a 53-year-old former All American wrestler at Oklahoma State University, previously worked at both Canadian railroads where Mr. Harrison’s plan went into effect—Canadian National Railway Co. and Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. At Norfolk Southern, he spent more than a year crisscrossing the network as a consultant to identify problem spots, a process he jokingly called the longest-ever episode of “Undercover Boss.”

After he formally joined the company in November, he ramped up clean-sheeting sessions. As of mid-February, the railroad says, trains were running 13% faster and dwelling 20% less in yards compared with last year.

3. Little Ways The World Works – Morgan Housel

If you find something that is true in more than one field, you’ve probably uncovered something particularly important. The more fields it shows up in, the more likely it is to be a fundamental and recurring driver of how the world works…

…Part of the second law of thermodynamics is that you get the most efficiency out of a system when the hottest heat source meets the coldest sink – that’s when an engine will waste the least amount of heat, converting as much energy into power as it can.

And isn’t it the same in business and careers?

A genius entering a crowded and competitive field may find a little success, but put her in a “cold” industry full of idiots and she’ll create a monopoly, destroying competitors. Jeff Bezos famously said “your margin is my opportunity,” which is the same concept. The biggest opportunities happen when a hot talent meets a cold industry. Thermodynamics has proven this since the beginning of the universe – no one should doubt how true and powerful it is…

…Muller’s ratchet (evolution): Dangerous mutations tend to pile up when there’s no genetic recombination, ultimately leading to extinction. It’s is why so few species reproduce asexually. In the absence of variety, bad ideas tend to stick around, which is also exactly what happens in closed societies and large corporations…

…Cope’s Rule (evolutionary biology): Species evolve to get bigger bodies over time, because there are competitive advantages to being big. But big has its own drawbacks, and can often be the cause of extinction. So the same force that pushes you to become big can also cause you to go extinct. It describes the lifecycle not only of species, but most companies and industries.

Emergence (complexity): When two plus two equals ten. A little cool air from the north is no big deal. A little warm breeze from the south is pleasant. But when they mix together over Missouri you get a tornado. The same thing happens in careers, when someone with a few mediocre skills mixed together at the right time becomes multiple times more successful than someone who’s an expert in one thing…

…Tocqueville Paradox (sociology): People’s expectations rise faster than living standards, so a society that becomes exponentially wealthier can see a decline in net happiness and satisfaction. There is virtually nothing people can’t get accustomed to, which also helps explain why there is so much desire for innovation and improvement.

Cromwell’s rule (statistics): Never say something cannot occur, or will definitely occur, unless it is logically true (1+1=1). If something has a one-in-a-billion chance of being true, and you interact with billions of things during your lifetime, you are nearly assured to experience some astounding surprises, and should always leave open the possibility of the unthinkable coming true.

Liebig’s law of the minimum (agriculture): A plant’s growth is limited by the single scarcest nutrient, not total nutrients – if you have everything except nitrogen, a plant goes nowhere. Liebig wrote, “The availability of the most abundant nutrient in the soil is only as good as the availability of the least abundant nutrient in the soil.” Most complex systems are the same, which makes them more fragile than we assume. One bad bank, one stuck container ship, or one broken supply line can ruin an entire system’s trajectory.

4. Munger on Airlines, Cereal Makers, and Bottlers – The Investments Blog

From this 1994 USC speech by Charlie Munger:

“Here’s a model that we’ve had trouble with. Maybe you’ll be able to figure it out better. Many markets get down to two or three big competitors—or five or six. And in some of those markets, nobody makes any money to speak of. But in others, everybody does very well.

Over the years, we’ve tried to figure out why the competition in some markets gets sort of rational from the investor’s point of view so that the shareholders do well, and in other markets, there’s destructive competition that destroys shareholder wealth.

If it’s a pure commodity like airline seats, you can understand why no one makes any money. As we sit here, just think of what airlines have given to the world—safe travel, greater experience, time with your loved ones, you name it. Yet, the net amount of money that’s been made by the shareholders of airlines since Kitty Hawk, is now a negative figure—a substantial negative figure. Competition was so intense that, once it was unleashed by deregulation, it ravaged shareholder wealth in the airline business.

Yet, in other fields—like cereals, for example—almost all the big boys make out. If you’re some kind of a medium grade cereal maker, you might make 15% on your capital. And if you’re really good, you might make 40%. But why are cereals so profitable—despite the fact that it looks to me like they’re competing like crazy with promotions, coupons and everything else? I don’t fully understand it.

Obviously, there’s a brand identity factor in cereals that doesn’t exist in airlines. That must be the main factor that accounts for it.

And maybe the cereal makers by and large have learned to be less crazy about fighting for market share—because if you get even one person who’s hell-bent on gaining market share…. For example, if I were Kellogg and I decided that I had to have 60% of the market, I think I could take most of the profit out of cereals. I’d ruin Kellogg in the process. But I think I could do it.

In some businesses, the participants behave like a demented Kellogg. In other businesses, they don’t. Unfortunately, I do not have a perfect model for predicting how that’s going to happen.

For example, if you look around at bottler markets, you’ll find many markets where bottlers of Pepsi and Coke both make a lot of money and many others where they destroy most of the profitability of the two franchises. That must get down to the peculiarities of individual adjustment to market capitalism. I think you’d have to know the people involved to fully understand what was happening.”

5. The Dark Side of Solar Power – Atalay Atasu, Serasu Duran, and Luk N. Van Wassenhove

Solar’s pandemic-proof performance is due in large part to the Solar Investment Tax Credit, which defrays 26% of solar-related expenses for all residential and commercial customers (just down from 30% during 2006–2019). After 2023, the tax credit will step down to a permanent 10% for commercial installers and will disappear entirely for home buyers. Therefore, sales of solar will probably burn even hotter in the coming months, as buyers race to cash in while they still can.

Tax subsidies are not the only reason for the solar explosion. The conversion efficiency of panels has improved by as much as 0.5% each year for the last 10 years, even as production costs (and thus prices) have sharply declined, thanks to several waves of manufacturing innovation mostly driven by industry-dominant Chinese panel producers. For the end consumer, this amounts to far lower up-front costs per kilowatt of energy generated.

This is all great news, not just for the industry but also for anyone who acknowledges the need to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy for the sake of our planet’s future. But there’s a massive caveat that very few are talking about.

Economic incentives are rapidly aligning to encourage customers to trade their existing panels for newer, cheaper, more efficient models. In an industry where circularity solutions such as recycling remain woefully inadequate, the sheer volume of discarded panels will soon pose a risk of existentially damaging proportions.

To be sure, this is not the story one gets from official industry and government sources. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)’s official projections assert that “large amounts of annual waste are anticipated by the early 2030s” and could total 78 million tonnes by the year 2050. That’s a staggering amount, undoubtedly. But with so many years to prepare, it describes a billion-dollar opportunity for recapture of valuable materials rather than a dire threat. The threat is hidden by the fact that IRENA’s predictions are premised upon customers keeping their panels in place for the entirety of their 30-year life cycle. They do not account for the possibility of widespread early replacement.

Our research does. Using real U.S. data, we modeled the incentives affecting consumers’ decisions whether to replace under various scenarios. We surmised that three variables were particularly salient in determining replacement decisions: installation price, compensation rate (i.e., the going rate for solar energy sold to the grid), and module efficiency. If the cost of trading up is low enough, and the efficiency and compensation rate are high enough, we posit that rational consumers will make the switch, regardless of whether their existing panels have lived out a full 30 years…

…If early replacements occur as predicted by our statistical model, they can produce 50 times more waste in just four years than IRENA anticipates. That figure translates to around 315,000 metric tonnes of waste, based on an estimate of 90 tonnes per MW weight-to-power ratio.

Alarming as they are, these stats may not do full justice to the crisis, as our analysis is restricted to residential installations. With commercial and industrial panels added to the picture, the scale of replacements could be much, much larger.

The industry’s current circular capacity is woefully unprepared for the deluge of waste that is likely to come. The financial incentive to invest in recycling has never been very strong in solar. While panels contain small amounts of valuable materials such as silver, they are mostly made of glass, an extremely low-value material. The long life span of solar panels also serves to disincentivize innovation in this area.

As a result, solar’s production boom has left its recycling infrastructure in the dust. To give you some indication, First Solar is the sole U.S. panel manufacturer we know of with an up-and-running recycling initiative, which only applies to the company’s own products at a global capacity of two million panels per year. With the current capacity, it costs an estimated $20–$30 to recycle one panel. Sending that same panel to a landfill would cost a mere $1–$2.

The direct cost of recycling is only part of the end-of-life burden, however. Panels are delicate, bulky pieces of equipment usually installed on rooftops in the residential context. Specialized labor is required to detach and remove them, lest they shatter to smithereens before they make it onto the truck. In addition, some governments may classify solar panels as hazardous waste, due to the small amounts of heavy metals (cadmium, lead, etc.) they contain. This classification carries with it a string of expensive restrictions — hazardous waste can only be transported at designated times and via select routes, etc.

The totality of these unforeseen costs could crush industry competitiveness. If we plot future installations according to a logistic growth curve capped at 700 GW by 2050 (NREL’s estimated ceiling for the U.S. residential market) alongside the early-replacement curve, we see the volume of waste surpassing that of new installations by the year 2031. By 2035, discarded panels would outweigh new units sold by 2.56 times. In turn, this would catapult the LCOE (levelized cost of energy, a measure of the overall cost of an energy-producing asset over its lifetime) to four times the current projection. The economics of solar — so bright-seeming from the vantage point of 2021 — would darken quickly as the industry sinks under the weight of its own trash.

6. Why America Will Lose Semiconductors – Dylan Patel

The US has always been the world leader in semiconductors: design, manufacturing, and the tools to produce them. Semiconductors are the base of all technological innovation in computing and information technology. Without them, companies such as Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Meta, Apple, and Tesla would not exist. The US has slowly been losing its dominance over the semiconductor industry over the last couple of decades. In recent years, the rate of loss has been accelerating. If it is lost, then the foundational building block of modern technology is lost, and the US will cede its overarching technology advantage. In this article we will discuss the major causes of this problem and offer solutions which should be bipartisan in nature.

Before we get into the problem, let’s talk about the current state of the US’s semiconductor dominance. Most of the largest semiconductor equipment, design, and software companies are based in the US or have critical engineering in the US. In the equipment space, Lam Research, Applied Materials, and KLA are based out of the US. ASML, the widely known leader in lithography, does much of their critical engineering for the EUV Source and EUV Collector out of San Diego. These technology assets and teams come from the acquisition of San Diego based Cymer. ASML pays royalties to the EUV-LLC whose membership includes multiple US national labs. Without these tools, it is impossible to manufacture chips.

The critical software needed to be used to design chips is called EDA and it all comes from the US. Cadence, Synopsys, and Mentor Graphics (now owned by Siemens) are located in the US. Without this software, it is impossible to design modern chips.

American companies like Texas Instruments and Intel hold leading market shares in their respective fields while manufacturing their own chips. The 4 largest companies that design chips for external sale and use contract manufacturers are also American. They are Qualcomm, Broadcom, Nvidia, and AMD.

But that dominance is shifting away to countries that pose as geopolitical risks. US share of chip manufacturing is at an all-time low. The US will lose the semiconductor industry unless immediate action is taken. This is a national security crisis.

The US has been the hallmark of innovation through entrepreneurship, education, and making large investments. All three of these tenets are eroding, partially due to the private market’s attitude and partially because the government’s policies incentivize certain behaviors. The shift is occurring in favor of countries that have favorable government policies, regulatory support, focus on STEM higher education, and a general cultural recognition of the importance of semiconductor manufacturing…

…The US private market of venture capital and angel investing is completely off its rockers investing in software platform based “tech” companies. While this type of investing is fine, these same venture capital and angel investors have completely ignored the semiconductor and hardware space. We here at SemiAnalysis have seen it firsthand as we have helped a few firms in the semiconductor industry raise money. It’s extremely difficult to convince venture capitalists to invest in startups, even if they have promising technology and exceptional track records.

The private market has a strong prejudice against hardware startups. Semiconductors in general have higher startup costs, and the market potential is limited in comparison to a platform-based tech company. US based venture and angel investors that require them tend to think in terms of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars addressable markets. They want software platforms that can have a few dozen employees with the potential to scale to billions in revenue. There can only be so many Instagram’s, Uber’s, Shopify’s and Airbnb’s though. Hardware entrepreneurship is needed even if it doesn’t meet the wild dreams that US based venture and angel investors have. A friend of SemiAnalysis, Jay Goldberg has written about this phenomenon on his newsletter in posts titled Hard or Soft, and Hard or Soft with Math…

… Even if the startups and production facilities were in the US, there is now a severe shortage of skilled workers in the field. By 2025, this shortage is projected to be as high as 300,000 workers. Educated and skilled personnel is a cornerstone of innovation, and without them, the job cannot be done.

Most Americans who pursue a higher education do so in a non-STEM field. While not a negative in and of itself, this is a huge concern when viewed in light of the expected growing shortage of skilled workers in the semiconductor industry. Over 5 million people were granted degrees/certificates at postsecondary institutions in the US, yet not even 1/5th were in STEM according to the chart below from Statista.

2/3 of STEM PHD students in the US are foreigners. They were able to get student visas for their education, yet many of them have a very difficult time immigrating after their education despite hoping to do so. China has nearly 5 million people graduating with STEM degrees annually, population size differences make the gap between China and the US impossible to fill with domestic population alone.

The US must make it easier for educated people around the world to immigrate. It was much easier at other points in US history, which was part of the recipe for the US outpacing the rest of the world in innovation. The concept of brain drain is very real, and the best and most qualified in the world must be allowed to move to the US. 

7. Twitter thread on Three Arrows Capital’s bankruptcy – Jack Niewold

Three Arrows Capital was one of the biggest crypto hedge funds, at one point managing over $10 billion in capital— Until the founders dropped off the map. A 1000-page legal document came out today, bringing clarity to the case. I went through it. This is what I found:

To get you up to speed: After making a series of large directional trades (GBTC, LUNA, stETH) and borrowing from 20+ large institutions, Three Arrows Capital (3ac) went bust. Then the founders ran, and the loan defaults have lead to mass contagion in crypto.

As founders Su Zhu and Kyle Davies are nowhere to be seen, legal proceedings move forwards. Today, a court document was leaked, one which asks the Singapore Government (where 3AC is based) to recognize liquidation proceedings and cooperate with liquidators…

…1. CREDITORS
• 3AC owes over $3b
• The biggest creditor is Genesis, with $2.3b loaned
• Default on debts contributed to insolvency of Celsius and Voyager Digital…

…3. Reasonably Sized Yachts/Houses/Crimes
Between Sep 20 and June 22, Zhu bought two Singapore ‘Good Class Bungalows’ and a yacht that has yet to be delivered. It’s likely that borrowed money was used to fund it; the yacht was shown to lenders as proof of 3AC’s creditworthiness.

It looks like there was some really suspicious movement of ETH and stablecoins just before 3AC was widely known as insolvent. At one point, they made a down payment for the yacht while ignoring an outstanding loan payment.

Other potential crimes:
• Lying about extent of losses to lenders
• Lying about leverage and directional market exposure
• Movement of funds
• Not disclosing their liquidation to shareholders/creditors

4. The Business Structure.
Some reporting has recently been done around TPS/Tai Ping Shan LTD, which is a legal entity related to 3AC and owned by Su Zhu and Kyle Davies’ partner, Kelly Chen. It was recently transferred $31m in stablecoins by a 3AC account.

As for Su Zhu and Kyle Davies (well, his wife), they’re actually creditors in the suit against 3AC, claiming that 3AC owes them money.  That’s not part of these documents, but it’s wild enough to include…

…6. What’s left?
Equity and token agreements in 3ACs illiquid investments, some of which have surely been sold off. JPEGs, including ‘Crypto Dickbutt #1462’…

…7. How did this happen? 
Well, it looks like these lenders just didn’t do their homework. Take Blockchain.com as an example:
• 3AC was asked to to ‘keep them informed’ if their leverage went above 1.5x
• Davies signed the below letter confirming over $2.3b in TAM

And when can you pay back the loan, by the way…?

“Yo
uh
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We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 17 July 2022:

1. The first CRISPR gene-editing drug is coming—possibly as soon as next year – Sy Mukherjee

Until recently, CRISPR—the gene-editing technology that won scientists Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier the 2020 Nobel Prize in chemistry—sounded more like science fiction than medicine; lab-created molecular scissors are used to snip out problematic DNA sections in a patient’s cells to cure them of disease. But soon we could see regulators approve the very first treatment using this gene-editing technology in an effort to combat rare inherited blood disorders that affect millions across the globe.

In a $900 million collaboration, rare disease specialist Vertex and CRISPR Therapeutics developed the therapy, dubbed exa-cel (short for exagamglogene autotemcel). It has already amassed promising evidence that it can help patients with beta thalassemia and sickle cell disease (SCD), both of which are genetic blood diseases that are relatively rare in the U.S. but somewhat more common inherited conditions globally…

…The latest exa-cel clinical data, unveiled during the 2022 European Hematology Association Congress in Switzerland, found that all 75 patients with either beta thalassemia or SCD given the gene-editing therapy showed zero or a greatly reduced need for blood transfusions (in the case of beta thalassemia) or incidences of life-threatening blockages (in the case of SCD). All but 2 of the 44 patients with thalassemia hadn’t needed a single blood transfusion in the 1 to 37 months of follow-up after the treatment’s administration, and the remaining 2 had 75% and 89% reduction in how much blood they needed transfused.

Similarly impressive, all 31 patients with a severe and life-threatening form of SCD experienced no vaso-occlusive crises (the life-threatening incidents in which healthy blood is blocked from moving freely) in anywhere from 2 to 32 months of posttreatment follow-up. Those same patients usually experienced, on average, nearly four of these crises per year for the two years before they received exa-cel…

…CRISPR isn’t the only type of gene therapy that’s made waves in just the past few weeks. Earlier in June, a group of advisers to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) gave unanimous recommendations for a pair of non-CRISPR-based gene therapies from Bluebird Bio. The treatments target genes associated with beta thalassemia and a rare disorder afflicting children called cerebral adrenoleukodystrophy (CALD). The latter is a disease that eats away at white brain matter in children as young as 4, has few treatments, and usually leads to death within 5 to 10 years.

Bluebird’s eli-cel therapy has faced clinical setbacks because of its association with higher risk of a type of cancer, but the independent advisers decided its benefits still outweighed the risks for some patients with few other options. The FDA doesn’t have to follow the recommendations of its advisory panels, but typically does.

2. Stock Market Experiment Suggests Inevitability Of Booms and Busts – Jerry E. Bishop

Vernon L. Smith knows why the stock market crashed. He ought to. He’s seen dozens of “bubbles” — booms followed by sudden crashes — in the past three years.

Almost every time, Mr. Smith says, the bubble occurred because inexperienced traders dominated the market. In fact, traders had to go through at least two booms and crashes before they collectively learned to avoid these bubbles.

Mr. Smith is one of a new breed of economists who test economic theories by setting up laboratory experiments. For the past few years he and his associate at the University of Arizona in Tucson, Gerry L. Suchanek, and Arlington W. Williams at Indiana University in Bloomington have been running experimental stock markets in their labs…

…In these experimental markets a dozen or so volunteers, usually economics students, are given a set number of “shares” of stock, along with some working capital. All the volunteers are connected by terminals to a computer, which is set up to duplicate trading on the stock-market floor. A trading “day” lasts about four minutes during which the traders may have entered two or three dozen bids and offers resulting in anywhere from five to a dozen trades. A typical experiment during an afternoon or evening runs 15 days.

The booms and crashes occurred in a recent series of 60 experiments aimed at testing an aspect of one of the most basic of all stock-market theories — rational expectations. This theory says a stock’s price is determined by investors’ expectations of what dividend the share will pay. If investors are rational in their expectations, they all place the same value on the stock and it will trade at a price reflecting its true dividend value. The price will change only when new information comes along that changes the dividend expectations.

Mr. Smith and his colleagues assumed, however, that even if investors had the same information, their dividend expectations would differ and they would value the stock differently. Price speculation would then be possible. But, they hypothesized, investors would soon realize that speculative profits are uncertain and unsustainable and they would begin changing their dividend expectations until, at some point, they all came to a common and rational expectation. The stock would then trade at its dividend value.

To find out how long this learning process would take, they set up a laboratory market in which all traders began with the same information about dividend prospects. Traders were told a payout would be declared after each trading day. The amount would be determined randomly from four possibilities — zero, eight, 28 or 60 cents. The average daily payout would be 24 cents. Thus, a share’s dividend value on the first trading day in a 15-day experiment was $3.60 (24 cents times 15 days). As the days passed and dividends were paid, the dividend value would drop.

One typical experiment involved nine students. On the first four-minute “day,” trading opened when a student’s offer to sell a share for $1.50 was quickly accepted. A moment later a bid to buy a share for $1.30 was snapped up. Such bargain prices triggered a flurry of rising bids, and a boom quickly developed. By the middle of the fourth trading day the price topped $5.50 even though the stock’s dividend value had dropped to $3.

But at such high prices offers to sell began to outnumber bids to buy. A crash began and by day 11 prices were below the stock’s $1 dividend value. Only on the last two trading days prices settle at or near the dividend value.

Some of the more astute traders were able to post gains of as much as $50 in dividends and trading profits while others ended up with as little as $5, Mr. Smith says. If the stock had consistently traded at or near its dividend value, all nine students could have had a profit of $16.

Such market bubbles occurred repeatedly. “We find that inexperienced traders never trade consistently near fundamental value, and most commonly generate a boom followed by a crash in stock prices,” Mr. Smith says. Moreover, traders who have experienced one crash “continue to bubble and crash, but at reduced volume,” he says. But, he adds, “Groups brought back for a third trading session tend to trade near fundamental dividend value.”

To counter any criticism that the boom and crash reflected students’ naivete, the researchers used Tucson businessmen who had “real world” experience. They generated the biggest bubble of all and, like the students, had to go through two booms and crashes before settling down to trade at a mutually profitable dividend value.

3. Lifestyles – Morgan Housel

Anyone alone at sea for nine months will start to lose their mind, and there’s evidence both Crowhurst and Moitessier were in poor mental states when their decisions were made. Crowhurst’s last diary entries were incoherent ramblings about submitting your soul to the universe; Moitessier wrote about his long conversations with birds and dolphins.

But their outcomes seemed to center on the fact that Crowhurst was addicted to what other people thought of his accomplishments, while Moitessier was disgusted by them. One lived for external benchmarks, the other only cared about internal measures of happiness.

They are the most extreme examples you can imagine. But their stories are important because ordinary people so often struggle to find balance between external and internal measures of success.

I have no idea how to find the perfect balance between internal and external benchmarks. But I know there’s a strong social pull toward external measures – chasing a path someone else set, whether you enjoy it or not. Social media makes it ten times more powerful. But I also know there’s a strong natural desire for internal measures – being independent, following your quirky habits, and doing what you want, when you want, with whom you want. That’s what people actually want.

4. The Biggest Problem With Remote Work – Derek Thompson

But if the work-from-anywhere movement has been successful for veteran employees in defined roles with trusted colleagues, for certain people and for certain objectives,  remote or hybrid work remains a problem to be solved.

First, remote work is worse for new workers. Many inexperienced employees joining a virtual company realize that they haven’t joined much of a company at all. They’ve logged into a virtual room that calls itself a company but is basically a group chat. It’s hard to promote a wholesome company culture in normal times, and harder still to do so one misunderstood group Slack message and problematic fire emoji at a time. “Small talk, passing conversations, even just observing your manager’s pathways through the office may seem trivial, but in the aggregate they’re far more valuable than any form of company handbook,” write Anne Helen Petersen and Charlie Warzel, the authors of the book Out of Office. Many of the perks of flexible work—like owning your own schedule and getting away from office gossip—can “work against younger employees” in companies that don’t have intentional structured mentorship programs, they argued.

Second, remote is worse at building new teams to take on new tasks. In 2020, Microsoft tapped researchers from UC Berkeley to study how the pandemic changed its work culture. Researchers combed through 60,000 employees’ anonymized messages and chats. They found that the number of messages sent within teams grew significantly, as workers tried to keep up with their colleagues. But information sharing between groups plummeted. Remote work made people more likely to hunker down with their preexisting teams and less likely to have serendipitous conversations that could lead to knowledge sharing. Though employees could accomplish the “hard work” of emailing and making PowerPoints from anywhere, the Microsoft-Berkeley study suggested that the most important job of the office is “soft work”—the sort of banter that allows for long-term trust and innovation…

…Third, and relatedly, remote work is worse at generating disruptive new ideas. A paper published in Nature by Melanie Brucks, at Columbia Business School, and Jonathan Levav, at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, analyzed whether virtual teams could brainstorm as creatively as in-person teams. In one study, they recruited about 1,500 engineers to work in pairs and randomly assigned them to brainstorm either face-to-face or over videoconference. After the pairs generated product ideas for an hour, they selected and submitted one to a panel of judges. Engineers who worked virtually generated fewer total ideas and external raters graded their ideas significantly less creative than those of the in-person teams…

…The work-from-anywhere revolution has something of a kick-starter problem: It’s harder for new workers, new groups, and new ideas to get revved up.

So how do we fix this? One school of thought says face-to-face interactions are too precious to be replaced. I disagree. I’m an optimist who believes the corporate world can solve these problems, because I know that other industries already have.

Modern scientific research is a team sport, with groups spanning many universities and countries. Groups working without face-to-face interaction have historically been less innovative, according to a new paper on remote work in science. For decades, teams split among several countries were five times less likely to produce “breakthrough” science that replaced the corpus of research that came before it. But in the past decade, the innovation gap between on-site and remote teams suddenly reversed. Today, the teams divided by the greatest distance are producing the most significant and innovative work.

I asked one of the co-authors of the paper, the Oxford University economist Carl Benedikt Frey, to explain this flip. He said the explosion of remote-work tools such as Zoom and Slack was essential. But the most important factor is that remote scientists have figured out how to be better hybrid workers. After decades of trial and error, they’ve learned to combine their local networks, which are developed through years of in-person encounters, and their virtual networks, to build a kind of global collective brain.

If scientists can make remote work work, companies can do it too. But they might just have to create an entirely new position—a middle manager for the post-pandemic era.

In the middle of the 19th century, the railroads and the telegraph allowed goods and information to move faster than ever. In 1800, traveling from Manhattan to Chicago took, on average, four weeks. In 1857, it took two days. Firms headquartered in major cities could suddenly track prices from Los Angeles to Miami and ship goods across the country at then-record-high speeds.

To conduct this full orchestra of operations, mid-1800s companies had to invent an entirely new system of organizing work. They needed a new layer of decision makers who could steer local production and distribution businesses. A new species of employee was born: the “middle manager.”

“As late as 1840, there were no middle managers in the United States,” Alfred Chandler observed in The Visible Hand, his classic history of the rise of America’s managerial revolution. In the early 1800s, all managers were owners, and all owners were managers; it was unheard of for somebody to direct employees without being a partner in the company. But once ownership and management were unbundled, new kinds of American companies were made possible, such as the department store, the mail-order house, and the national oil and steel behemoths…

…The synchronizer—or, for large companies, a team of synchronizers—would be responsible for solving the new-worker, new-group, and new-idea problems. Synchronizers would help new workers by ensuring that their managers, mentors, and colleagues are with them at the office during an early onboarding period. They would plan in-person time for new teammates to get to know one another as actual people and not just abstracted online personalities. They would coordinate the formation of new groups to tackle new project ideas, the same way that modern teams in science pull together the right researchers from around the world to co-author new papers. They would plan frequent retreats and reunions across the company, even for workers who never have to be together, with the understanding that the best new ideas—whether in science, consulting, or media—often come from the surprising hybridization of disparate expertise.

5. The Trillion-Dollar Vision of Dee Hock – M. Mitchell Waldrop

This is one of Dee Hock’s favorite tricks to play on an audience. “How many of you recognize this?” he asks, holding out his own Visa card.

Every hand in the room goes up.

“Now,” Hock says, “how many of you can tell me who owns it, where it’s headquartered, how it’s governed, or where to buy shares?”

Confused silence. No one has the slightest idea, because no one has ever thought about it.

And that, says Hock, is exactly how it ought to be. “The better an organization is, the less obvious it is,” he says. “In Visa, we tried to create an invisible organization and keep it that way. It’s the results, not the structure or management that should be apparent.” Today the Visa organization that Hock founded is not only performing brilliantly, it is also almost mythic, one of only two examples that experts regularly cite to illustrate how the dynamic principles of chaos theory can be applied to business.

It all started back in the late 1960s, when the credit card industry was on the brink of disaster. The forerunner of the Visa system — the very first credit card — was BankAmericard, which had originated a decade earlier as a statewide service of the San Francisco-based Bank of America. The card got off to a rocky start, then became reasonably profitable — until 1966, when five other California banks jointly issued a competing product they called MasterCharge.

Bank of America promptly responded, franchising BankAmericard nationwide. (In those days, banks were forbidden to have their own out-of-state branches.) Other large banks quickly responded with their own proprietary cards and franchise systems. A credit card orgy ensued: banks mass-mailed preapproved cards to any list they could find. Children were getting cards. Pets were getting cards. Convicted felons were getting cards. Fraud was rampant, and the banks were hemorrhaging red ink.

By 1968, the industry had become so self-destructive that Bank of America called its licensees to a meeting in Columbus, Ohio to find a solution. The meeting promptly dissolved into angry finger-pointing.

Enter Dee Hock, then a 38-year-old vice president at a licensee bank in Seattle. When the meeting was at its most acrimonious, he got up and suggested that the group find a method to study the issues more systematically. The thankful participants immediately formed a committee, named Hock chairman, and went home.

It was the chance Hock had been waiting for. Even then, he was a man who thought Big Thoughts. Born in 1929, the youngest child of a utility lineman in the mountain town of North Ogden, Utah, he was a loner, an iconoclast, a self-educated mountain boy with a deeply ingrained respect for the individual and a hard-won sense of self-worth. And he stubbornly refused to accept orthodox ideas: before he’d started with the Seattle bank he’d already walked away from fast-track jobs at three separate financial companies, each time raging that the hierarchical, rule-following, control-everything organizations were stifling creativity and initiative at the grass roots — and in the process, making the company too rigid to respond to new challenges and opportunities.

He’d been a passionate reader since before he could remember, even though his formal schooling ended after two years at a community college. He read history, economics, politics, science, philosophy, poetry — anything and everything, without paying the slightest attention to disciplinary boundaries.

What he read convinced him that the command-and-control model of organization that had grown up to support the industrial revolution had gotten out of hand. It simply didn’t work. Command-and-control organizations, Hock says, “were not only archaic and increasingly irrelevant. They were becoming a public menace, antithetical to the human spirit and destructive of the biosphere. I was convinced we were on the brink of an epidemic of institutional failure.”

He also had a deep conviction that if he ever got to create an organization, things would be different. He would try to conceive it based on biological concepts and metaphors.

Now he had that chance. In June 1970, after nearly two years of brainstorming, planning, arguing, and consensus building, control of the BankAmericard system passed to a new, independent entity called National BankAmericard, Inc. (later renamed Visa International). And its CEO was one Dee W. Hock.

The new organization was indeed different — a nonstock, for-profit membership corporation with ownership in the form of nontransferable rights of participation. Hock designed the organization according to his philosophy: highly decentralized and highly collaborative. Authority, initiative, decision making, wealth — everything possible is pushed out to the periphery of the organization, to the members. This design resulted from the need to reconcile a fundamental tension. On the one hand, the member financial institutions are fierce competitors: they — not Visa — issue the cards, which means they are constantly going after each other’s customers. On the other hand, the members also have to cooperate with each other: for the system to work, participating merchants must be able to take any Visa card issued by any bank, anywhere.

That means that the banks abide by certain standards on issues such as card layout. Even more important, they participate in a common clearinghouse operation, the system that reconciles all the accounts and makes sure merchants get paid for each purchase, the transactions are cleared between banks, and customers get billed.

To reconcile that tension, Hock and his colleagues employed a combination of Lao Tse, Adam Smith, and Thomas Jefferson. For example, instead of trying to enforce cooperation by restricting what the members can do, the Visa bylaws encourage them to compete and innovate as much as possible. “Members are free to create, price, market, and service their own products under the Visa name,” he says. “At the same time, in a narrow band of activity essential to the success of the whole, they engage in the most intense cooperation.” This harmonious blend of cooperation and competition is what allowed the system to expand worldwide in the face of different currencies, languages, legal codes, customs, cultures, and political philosophies.

No one way of doing business, dictated from headquarters, could possibly have worked. “It was beyond the power of reason to design an organization to deal with such complexity,” says Hock, “and beyond the reach of the imagination to perceive all the conditions it would encounter.” Instead, he says, “the organization had to be based on biological concepts to evolve, in effect, to invent and organize itself.”

Visa has been called “a corporation whose product is coordination.” Hock calls it “an enabling organization.” He also sees it as living proof that a large organization can be effective without being centralized and coercive. “Visa has elements of Jeffersonian democracy, it has elements of the free market, of government franchising — almost every kind of organization you can think about,” he says. “But it’s none of them. Like the body, the brain, and the biosphere, it’s largely self-organizing.”

It also works. Visa grew phenomenally during the 1970s, from a few hundred members to tens of thousands. And it did so more or less smoothly, without dissolving into fiefdoms and turf wars. By the early 1980s, in fact, the Visa system had surpassed MasterCard as the largest in the world. It had begun to fulfill Hock’s vision of a universal currency, transcending national boundaries. And Dee Hock was seen as the system’s essential man.

“Utter nonsense,” Hock says. “It’s the organizational concepts and ideas that were essential. I merely came to symbolize them. Such organizations should be management-proof.”

In May 1984, at 55, Hock put his beliefs to the test. He resigned from Visa and three months later, with his successor in place, dropped completely from sight. Six years later, in an acceptance speech as a laureate of the Business Hall of Fame, Hock put it this way: “Through the years, I have greatly feared and sought to keep at bay the four beasts that inevitably devour their keeper — Ego, Envy, Avarice, and Ambition. In 1984, I severed all connections with business for a life of isolation and anonymity, convinced I was making a great bargain by trading money for time, position for liberty, and ego for contentment — that the beasts were securely caged.”

Visa never missed a beat.

6. America’s freight railroads are incredibly chaotic right now – Rachel Premack

A railroad engineer or conductor typically earns a six-figure salary, retires with a pension and enjoys union benefits. They don’t need a college degree; the monthslong training is provided on the job. It’s the kind of career that ought to be popular — but Doering said trainees and longtimers alike are getting burned out. It used to be a job with eight- or nine-hour shifts and plenty of time at home. Now, Doering says railroading demands too much time away from one’s family and workdays that last up to 19 hours, combining 12-hour shifts with hours of waiting around for transportation or relief crews. 

Union Pacific is struggling to find railroad crews after years of slashing headcounts. The $22 billion railroader had 30,100 employees during the first three months of 2022, according to its latest earnings report. Five years prior, the company had nearly 12,000 more workers. (A representative from Union Pacific declined to provide a comment for this article, as the company is reporting its second-quarter earnings later this month. The rep did share a company blog on the importance of supply chain fluidity and cooperation.)

This employment issue isn’t unique to Union Pacific. America’s railways are in an unusually chaotic state as Class I lines struggle to find employees. That’s led to congestion that analysts say is even worse than 2021, which saw some of the biggest rail traffic in history. Now, a strike of 115,000 rail workers could happen as soon as next week. 

“We’re spending more time at home-away terminals than we are at home,” Doering said. Doering is also the Nevada legislative director for SMART Transportation Division, a labor union of train, airline and other transportation workers. “So the attitudes out here, I think, are warranted. Morale is at an all-time low.” …

…So, while you may not have been keeping up to date with rail congestion, industrial bigwigs and lawmakers alike are furious. The coal industry is slamming rail for the “meltdown” in service capacity and grain shippers said they had to spend $100 million more in shipping costs to get their product moved amid poor rail service. The Port of Los Angeles is taking to the press to demand rail move those gosh darn containers away, saying that railroaders could cause a “nationwide logjam” with the unmoved containers sitting around. Members of the federal government’s Surface Transportation Board recently demanded answers from railroad executives in a May two-day hearing, but tensions seemed to have only worsened since then.

Even more exhausted are the rail workers themselves. Rail unions have been negotiating with their employers since January 2020, with a “dead end” in negotiations reported two years later. Now, President Joe Biden is being charged with appointing a “Presidential Emergency Board” to nail down a new contract. If he doesn’t do so by Monday, railroad crews could legally have their first nationwide strike since 1992. Such a strike, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, would be “disastrous.”…

…Let me tell you the hottest rail trend of the 2010s: precision-scheduled railroading. As The Wall Street Journal’s Paul Ziobro explained in a 2019 story, PSR means that railroads have set times for when they pick up cargo from their customers, not unlike a commercial airline. Before, railroads would wait for the cargo. 

There are endless implications that come from this system, some of which my colleague Mike Baudendistel delved into in this 2020 article. PSR allowed railroads to reduce capital budgets, slash headcount and merge internal operations with glee. But its biggest boon to the railroaders was how much it boosted their cred on Wall Street, creating billions in shareholder value.

“The railroad stocks have greatly outperformed the broader market in the past 15 years, which took place despite the major deterioration of coal volume, the railroads’ historical business,” Baudendistel wrote.

There are serious service issues with PSR, though. When the tactic was first implemented at CSX Transportation, dwell time at some terminals increased by as much as 26 hours, according to another 2019 WSJ piece by Ziobro. Trips that would take a few days stretched out to more than two weeks — a struggle for customers that relied on just-in-time supply chains…

…Rail giants, as you could guess, struggled during the early months of COVID. In April 2020, for example, rail carloads saw their biggest year-over-year drop since 1989 and intermodal loadings saw a decline not experienced since 2009.

Railroads were shedding employees from April until July 2020, when my colleague Joanna Marsh reported that crew headcount had finally begun to increase again. Still, there were 25% fewer crews than in 2019 and 28% fewer than 2018, according to data from the Surface Transportation Board.

The financial status of these firms was in question, which motivated them to furlough workers. “At least one Class I railroad held meetings to decide whether they had enough cash through the summer, if they had enough cash to pay the bills and could they stay in business,” Hatch said. “When they began to lay people off, much to the consternation today of the regulators and whatnot, you need some understanding that they did not know how long this would last.”

Railroaders struggled to re-hire those crews they furloughed. Many of them found work in construction or manufacturing, industries that allow workers to spend evenings and weekends at home, Tranausky said.

Unlike its siblings in trucking or ocean shipping, the railroad industry didn’t have a bonkers 2021 — but it survived. 2021 saw healthier volumes from the year before. They were still below 2019’s levels…

…Some issues are completely out of the railroads’ control. Most kinds of employers across the country are still struggling to find workers. Even finding shuttle drivers to take railroad crews to their terminal has been a struggle, from Doering’s observations. Recently, Union Pacific has put him in a taxi to go from Las Vegas to inland California. “We’re watching the little ticker up there in the cab go up to $400 or $500 for a trip,” Doering said.

Even in the best of times, it’s hard to find someone to sign up to be a railroad crew member. They have a similar lifestyle to, say, airline pilots, who must be away from their families for days at a time, living in hotels and manning massive, potentially dangerous pieces of equipment. Railroad crews are on call even during their home time.

They require months of training and after that need years or decades on the job to become truly masters of the rail. “There’s a learning curve,” Tranausky said. “[New crews are] not as efficient, not as productive as those higher-seniority crews.”

While Tranausky and Hatch said labor is the main driver of today’s congestion, one factor is totally outside the control of railroads. Unlike 2021, many warehouses are packed with inventory. Some insiders told FreightWaves that shippers are essentially using railcars as storage rather than moving the cargo into their own warehouse. That’s causing a shortage of chassis and increasing congestion — particularly in rail yards like Chicago.

7. TIP462: What Is Money? w/ Lyn Alden – Stig Brodersen and Lyn Alden

Stig Brodersen (01:11):

To kick this episode off, perhaps you can tell this story of the ancient Greek democracy in sixth century b.c. that used partial jewelry as a solution to avoid a catastrophic class conflict and how that relates to where we are in the debt cycle today.

Lyn Alden (01:28):

You have something that builds up decade to decade, even generation to generation, two or three generations, and it doesn’t self-correct enough, right? So, there’s basically the structural issues in society where things build up and get worse and worse. Basically, things have a tendency to concentrate, especially the way we structure things. And so, you have a given society where let’s say farmers, they harvest crops. They have a big harvest every year, but of course, they have to pay for things throughout the year. So, they might, for example, use debt with the promise to pay them back once their harvest comes in. That might work for 10 years in a row, but on the 11th year, they have a crop failure and suddenly, they find themselves in massive debt that they can’t pay.

Lyn Alden (02:13):

And back then, you could become a debt slave. There are all sorts of ways to deal with that in society. Problem is that over time, you have things build up where wealth consolidates and then it also feeds on itself. So, once you’re wealthy, you’re able to influence politics more, right? You have the ear of the king. Or if it’s a republic, you might have more voting power. Back then especially, only rich people could really vote anyway in societies that were republics. So, you can further make the rules in your favor and you get this tendency to consolidate one way or another. Societies had to deal with that in different ways and we have records going back to ancient Sumeria, Babylon, and Greece.

Lyn Alden (02:56):

And the one I used in this piece was Plutarch wrote about the ancient King Solon in Greece and this was an excerpt from Lessons of History by Will and Ariel Durant. I’ll just read it because it’s actually a really good paragraph. And in the Athens of 594 b.c., the poor finding their status worsened with each year, the government in the hands of their masters and the corrupt courts deriving every issue against them, began to talk a violent revolt. The rich, angry at the challenge to their property, prepared to defend themselves by force. Good sense prevailed, moderate element secured the election of Solon, a businessman of aristocratic lineage to the supreme archonship. He devalued the currency thereby easing the burden of all debtors, although he himself was a creditor.

Lyn Alden (03:43):

He reduced all personal debts and ended imprisonment for debt. He canceled arrears for taxes and mortgage interest. He established a graduated income tax that made the rich pay at a rate 12 times that required of the poor. He reorganized the courts on a more popular basis. He arranged that the sons of those who had died in war for Athens should be brought up and educated at the government’s expense. The rich protested that these measures were outright confiscation and then the radicals on the other side complained that he had not redivided the land. But within a generation, almost all had agreed that his reforms had saved Athens from revolution.

Lyn Alden (04:21):

And so, basically, when we talk about this multi-decade, multi-generational compoundings, usually, what you have is these sharp events at some point where either people revolt, right? Everyone’s a debt slave now. So, they say, “Wait a second. We outnumber these guys 100 to 1. Let’s just go burn their house down.” So, there’s that. Or they through politics basically say, “Okay, this is not sustainable. The courts are corrupt. We have so entrenched cronyism and the policy is not good. Let’s sharply reverse some of this without going too far.” And so, this was an example where they managed to moderate it. Most examples are not that successful.

Lyn Alden (05:00):

And so, this shows over time that when you have massive debts and wealth concentration built up in a society, there’s usually some release valve that in various ways, it’s painful for various groups. And then depending on how it goes, it could be extraordinarily painful for everyone if you have a collapse or a revolution of some sort…

…Lyn Alden (11:47):

The best money isn’t always the absolute hardest. There’s other attributes like the ease of transaction, the divisibility, the speed with which you could move it around. And that’s why I would argue for example that for the past 150 years, paper currencies have really outpaced gold, because even though gold’s harder, in practical terms, it has trouble keeping up. So, for thousands of years, commerce and money moved at about the same speed, which is the speed of humans, right? So, we go around on horses and chips and on foot and we transact with each other with gold, silver, copper pieces, or even our ledgers. Even if we started keeping ledgers, those physical ledgers could still only move at the speed of humans.

Lyn Alden (12:29):

We had to really bring them somewhere if you want to give them to another city. But with the introduction of telecommunications equipment in the 1800s, first with the telegraph and then the telephone, we lay these undersea cables under the Atlantic, starting in the 1800s. And so, by the time you got to late 1800s, institutions around the world could talk to each other almost instantly. And so, you could update ledgers and perform certain types of transactions on multi-continent basis far faster than physical goods, including physical money, could settle. And so, gold was no longer able to keep up with the speed of human commerce, and that really further, I think, led to the need for abstraction.

Lyn Alden (13:12):

So, historically, gold was abstracted, because it had limits on its visibility. Whereas now, we also had the even more important thing where we had limits to its speed relative to the speed we wanted transact. So, we had to abstract it more and that eventually opened up the divide between gold and paper currencies. And then eventually, they could be separated. Whereas, in some other world, if there was an element like gold that we could just mentally teleport to each other, it would’ve been much harder to ever introduce paper currencies, because it would’ve been seen right away as an inferior product, but because gold had those limitations and there was an advantage to using paper claims for gold, it was able to lead to that separation.

Lyn Alden (13:53):

So, in many ways, even though dollars are less hard than gold, they have other advantages over the past 150 years or so that has allowed them to at least keep up with gold and that more people use dollars than use gold, even though gold is a better store of value. So, gold as its hardness is better retained its store of value property, but it lost the medium of exchange and unit of account aspects to what is basically better technology. When you look at pure commodity monies, the stock to flow ratio is pretty paramount. There’s actually a really good example in the early American colonies. There was almost an accelerated version of why most monies fail.

Lyn Alden (14:39):

And basically, in pre-American before the revolution, you had these Southern colonies in the 1600s and they started using tobacco as money. They grew tobacco. It was a high value crop. It was reasonably liquid and fungible. And so, they started using tobacco as money. They even made it legal tender in some colonies like Virginia, where you could pay your taxes, you could pay all debts in tobacco. And so, it became money. Problem is that when you put on a monetary premium to something, you basically give everyone an incentive to make more of it. And so, tobacco’s not very resistant to debasement, so anyone could go and plant more tobacco. And so, they started to inflate the value of tobacco away.

Lyn Alden (15:22):

Basically, the prices of things as dominant to tobacco began to increase. And then so the government imposed restrictions. They said certain class of people couldn’t grow tobacco or there’s only so much tobacco that can be grown a year. They’re trying to artificially increase the stock to flow ratios. Then you had another problem where unlike gold, tobacco is not very fungible, right? So, there’s higher quality tobacco, there’s lower quality tobacco. And so, there’s an incentive to pay your debts in this marginal tobacco, the worst tobacco, and then to say, sell the good tobacco overseas or smoke that or whatever you want to do. Use that for better purposes. Give other people the worst ones.

Lyn Alden (16:00):

You basically have Gresham’s law in play, where the weak money dries out the good money. So, everyone’s trading around the bad tobacco. Then they had to say, “Okay, well, we need external auditors to come in and check the quality of tobacco.” So, they put tobacco in warehouses, grade it, and then trade paper claims for that tobacco. So, they basically had to try to increase the fungibility. And then eventually, they abandoned the whole situation, because it was untenable. And so, that’s an accelerated version of why any commodity that’s not resistant to debasement, meaning it can’t maintain a high stock to flow ratio given our level of technology, ultimately fails as money.

Lyn Alden (16:41):

When you look at the broad spectrum, all the different commodities of history, that’s one reason why gold keeps reemerging, because no matter how good our technology is, we’re not really good at making more gold. So, in the 1970s, for example, when the price of gold went up more than tenfold, if you look at the gold production, it barely changes at all, because we just literally don’t have the capability to make a ton of new gold in a short period of time.

Stig Brodersen (17:08):

I’m holding this amazing blog post. It’s another one of Lyn’s great blog post. The title is, “What is Money, Anyway?” I’ll make sure to link to that in show notes and you tell different stories about commodity money. I love all of them. One of them is about African beads, which is amazing itself and really the illustration of what you’re saying there about new technology coming in. I don’t know if I could ask you to share that story with the audience.

Lyn Alden (17:31):

Yeah. So, the African bead story, that’s probably the most tragic one, one of the most tragic examples in that piece. So, basically, for a long period of time, you had different groups in West Africa using beads as money. So, again, that goes back to the idea that money is technology. So, what is rare, liquid, fungible, desirable in an area could be different in other area. So, in that region, they didn’t have glass-making technology. And so, glass beads were very rare and desirable. And then also you had a pastoral society. So, you might have your herd of animals, shepherd. You’re moving around. So, you want to be able to bring your money with you. So, you could literally wear your beads. You could wear your wealth. And so, that was a useful type of money.

Lyn Alden (18:17):

They also used things like fine fabrics and things like that and certain herbs. These were money-like instruments, but beads were a key one for them. And the tragedy was that Europeans who at the time had glass-making technology when they were traveling around, they would identify and say, “These people like to use beads as money and so we can use that to our advantage. It’s cheap for us to make fancy glass beads and then we can start trading it for things of actual value. We can buy their animals. We can buy their resources.” And then sadly, there was a slave trade. So, you could buy slaves with these beads that you could make for almost free. So, they became known as slave beads in some circles. But then of course, the Africans had resistances against this.

Lyn Alden (19:06):

So, if the Europeans flooded everything with these say clear glass beads, they would start to say, “Okay, these clear glass ones are… No, they’re not good money. We want the purple kind.” But then of course, over time, the Europeans would adapt and say, “Okay, well, they want the purple kind now.” So, there was this cat and mouse game where beads were not fully fungible. There were different types and so there were different taste preferences. And then there were different reactions to the perceived scarcity of different types of beads. But eventually, that money became untenable for obvious reasons that there was a technology asymmetry between the cultures and then over time, that technology spread everywhere.

Lyn Alden (19:46):

And so, glass beads are in the long arc of time not good money. And it also that shows that if you don’t have hard money and if your money is not hard and if you’re using something as money that another culture or that some other group within your society can produce more of, then you’re at a disadvantage. So, that’s one of the tragic examples of why money is so critical, especially when different groups interact with each other…

…Stig Brodersen (33:52):

Yeah. And on that note, I would like to talk about the private to public de-leveraging. Usually, that is a process that’s inflationary and then we look at a country like Japan. They mainly stood for decades without almost any price inflation and with very low monetary inflation, but still many macro analysts look at this and they assume that “Well, if this is what’s happening to Japan, it’s going to happen to the US, to the rest of the world perhaps even.” You think that they’re wrong, why is that?

Lyn Alden (34:24):

Two main reasons. One, they own a lot more foreign assets than the collective foreign sector owns of Japanese assets. So, they actually have over trillion dollars, trillions of dollars of claims basically, that they can draw in to pay obligations as needed, right? So, they have this large investment base relative to the size of their GDP. So, that gives them one advantage that many countries now don’t have, especially United States. Number two is that that whole massive private de-leveraging and public leveraging happened primarily during the 2010s decade, which was a very disinflationary decade in terms of commodity market. So, there’s roughly this 10- to 15- to 20-year commodity cycle that happens worldwide where prices are low.

Lyn Alden (35:15):

So, nobody invests in commodities. They don’t build new production. Eventually, that causes a shortage. So, lots of money rushes in for a decade and builds all sorts of new commodity production. And eventually, we oversupply the world with commodities and then that breaks the price. And we start this cycle anew and that takes quite a while. That takes maybe 10 years of building and then 10 years working it out and 10 years of building and 10 years of working it out. Most countries are not big enough to really affect that cycle. United States and China are, but if you’re a country that’s a small percentage of GDP, you don’t really affect that on a global scale.

Lyn Alden (35:51):

And so, Japan happened to do this de-leveraging during a time of substantial commodity disinflation or actually outright deflation. Commodities were literally going down in price while they were doing this. And so, they basically had all the commodity needs available to them at low prices and you weren’t getting this scarcity and undersupply of commodities. That is a much harder thing to do if you’re not at the right part of the commodity cycle or if you’re big enough to affect the commodity cycle. And so, I would argue that Japan represents an almost perfect example of doing this with the right conditions and at the right time that we shouldn’t then just look at that and say, “Well, when all the other countries go through a similar process, it’s going to be just like Japan.”

Lyn Alden (36:41):

Actually, third factor I would say is that unlike most countries in the developed world, Japan has very little political polarization or rising populism intentions in the country. And part of that’s you have a rather homogeneous society and they’ve governed pretty well domestically. They don’t spend a lot of money on military, things like that. And so, a lot of the money just goes back to the people. You have a rather harmonious society. That doesn’t mean it’s perfect. There are obviously disagreements in society, but when you look at just quantitative ways of measuring political polarization, the United States and most European countries are in a much tougher spot there, whereas Japan has a rather harmonious society rather low levels of wealth concentration.

Lyn Alden (37:30):

And so, that gives them a deeper tool chest, I would say, to handle those storms. But of course, their main disadvantages right now are that they are a commodity importer, which now is becoming relevant. And then they also do have now a ton of public debt. And so, they have less ability to raise rates or otherwise protect the value of their currency because they can’t really service that debt otherwise. And so, I think, people over extrapolate the Japanese example by not realizing a lot of the nuances around the timing and the details for how they’re able to do that without it being inflationary.

Stig Brodersen (38:07):

So, let’s talk more about that. It’s very hard to talk about Japan macroeconomic terms without looking that huge debt burden they have. And we started out this interview by talking about forgiveness of debt restructuring. And so, keeping that in mind, the listener might be sitting out there thinking, “Well, we do know that a lot of money is being printed and that’s on the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet. Can’t they just forgive the government debt that they hold and thereby bringing down the debt burden?” I know that’s a question that you have asked yourself. What’s the answer to that?

Lyn Alden (38:44):

The answer is mostly no, but it is a good question, right? So, people think, “Okay, so if the central bank buys a lot of the government bonds and the central bank is more or less the government, why can’t they just forgive the debt that they more or less owe to themselves?” So, if the Bank of Japan ends up owning 75% of Japanese government debt, why can’t they just wipe that off their ledger and then they’ve lowered Japanese government debt by 75% and they start fresh? The problem is that the whole crux of this fiat currency system runs on the premise that a central bank and the government have some degree of independence from each other, right?

Lyn Alden (39:27):

Because if you have a dictator with absolute power over the money, that money’s going to get debased a lot quicker, just the way human nature works. Even if say there’s some philosopher king running a country, as soon as he dies, the next one’s going to be worse and he’s going to miss it, right? So, if you have centralized power, you’re more quickly going to debase the money. Whereas if you have all these checks and balances to make it hard to create more money, so you have to have Congress approve it, then you have to have the central bank finance it, you have to have the president not veto it, so you have to have all these different groups agree to create a lot more money, that really slows down the money creation.

Lyn Alden (40:08):

And that’s why countries with strong institutions and independent institutions generally have a much longer track record of maintaining a reasonably successful fiat currency compared to smaller countries with less histories of institutions and then the institutions get co-opted by some more authoritarian type of ruler. And so, going back to the premise, central banks are at least in theory supposed to be independent. Obviously, in times of war and things like that, that independence get seriously threatened, but it’s still not the president or a head of a country can just go and tell the central bank head to do exactly what he wants. If they do, they’re more like a banana republic. They’re more like that authoritarian model.

Lyn Alden (40:52):

And so, even though they might appoint the central bank chief, that central bank chief now has a term that can potentially persist through multiple administrations and that has checks and balances for how they can be removed, how a new one can be added, right? And so, there’s some degree of separation there. So, a president can’t just do something like cut interest rates three months before the election, make everyone happy, and then go back to having higher rates, right? So, they don’t have that fine control over interest rates, because it’s in someone else’s hands. It’s supposed to be independent.

Lyn Alden (41:24):

And part of maintaining central bank independence is that they can’t be insolvent, that they have to have assets that are equal or higher than their liabilities, because otherwise, they’re reliant on financing from the government and that they’re entirely reliant on that government. And therefore, they no longer have any credible independence. And so, the way central bank balance sheets work is that the currency is their liability. So, physical currency is their liability and bank reserves of commercial banks that are assets for them are liabilities of the central bank. So, those are their primary liabilities. And on the other side of that ledger, their assets are things like primarily their government debt that they own. That’s their key asset.

Lyn Alden (42:10):

And then depending on the different central banks, some of them have mortgage-backed securities. Some of them even have equities, but the core of their assets is that government debt. And so, if they were to erase that government debt and say, “Look, you don’t owe us anymore. Let’s just start fresh,” well, now, that central bank has a multitrillion dollar hole on the asset side of its ledger but still has all those liabilities. And so, they are now technically insolvent organization. They have no independence. They’re entirely reliant on government financing. And so, that whole model of some degree of credible decentralization goes away, credible independence.

Lyn Alden (42:51):

And so, while you might not have any overnight effect from just say, wiping away central bank owned government debt, it’s not like you wake up tomorrow and the currency hyperinflated. But going forward, that central bank is now 100% captured by the government more or less. And so, the long term ability to do that degrades and that’s why most of them have laws in place to prevent that from happening, that the central bank can’t just wipe it away. Now, there are other tricks that they can do, right? So, you could, for example, make the government could issue a special bond that is 100-year bond that doesn’t pay interest.

Lyn Alden (43:30):

Now, you have this bond that’s different from the other government debt that doesn’t pay interest. And so, basically, there are things that they can do like that and there are other tricks they can do to keep the ledger, the asset side, and the liability side technically solvent, but merely deleting the asset side is generally untenable at least the way that we’ve structured the system now for a century or more in many countries.

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Here are the articles for the week ending 10 July 2022:

1. Kenneth Stanley – Greatness Without Goals – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and Kenneth Stanley

[00:08:44] Patrick: In the book and in the presentation you gave last week, there’s a key central example that, like you said, you stumbled upon via some of your own research. I would like to walk through that story. I want to just plant the key idea before we do that with another quote from the book, which is that, “Almost no prerequisite to any major invention was invented with that invention in mind.” You used that term stepping stones, the things that we combine. You gave the example of vacuum tubes and computers. People working on vacuum tubes weren’t thinking about computers, and there’s a million examples like this. So I just want to plant that idea out there. The stepping stones thing not resembling the final invention is the reason why it can’t be so deterministic, and here’s our objective, set up the steps between now and there. Maybe you can start to introduce that concept via the Picbreeder example that I think was the way that you originally alighted upon this idea in your research.

[00:09:31] Ken: It’s neat because, in a way, this is a story of serendipity, which is about serendipity. I mean, basically, this pic breeder just serendipitously led to this insight. Picbreeder was an experiment that I was running with my lab. I was a professor at the time at the University of Central Florida, where we allowed people on the internet to go and breed pictures. I know this is a major digression from what we were just discussing. We were discussing all these important things and we’re talking about breeding pictures. So how do these things connect? Breeding pictures, it is a little esoteric from general societal concerns perspective, but it’s basically about searching through a space in a way. This was an opportunity for us when we were doing artificial intelligence research to crowdsource. Crowdsourcing is really interesting. Let’s say you to take people on the internet because you’ve got access to potentially thousands, millions of people and have them try to do something collectively. Wouldn’t have been possible in the past if you didn’t have access to the internet. What we wanted to do was to crowdsource people, to search through the space of images or pictures and what that meant. So we used breeding. So basically, what it meant was that you could take an image, say a blob or something, and in fact, the site would start you off with random blobs if you started from scratch and you could say, “Look at some blobs and you could pick the one you like the best,” just like you might if you were breeding horses or dogs, “Pick the one you like the best.” You might have different reasons or criteria, but whatever your criteria is it’s fine, and then it would have children.

So it’s a little strange. It sounds strange. The picture has children, but this is inside of a computer. So if you think about it, why not? The picture can have children. The children or the offspring of the picture are like any other children. They look like it. They’re not exact duplicates just like if you have children, they look a little bit like you. They’re not exact duplicates of you or your spouse either. That’s the case here. So then what’s cool is that then you can see that if your picture that you chose has children, then you can look at the children and then you can pick from those children which one you like the best. You can see that this is in effect breeding. So then out of those, you pick your favorite there. It has children, and then you get to choose from those, and then so on and so forth. You’re basically iterating generations of breeding, where it goes depends on what you choose up to you. To tie this back quickly, what does this have to do with anything? If you think about those images, they’re basically a metaphor for discovery in general. If you think about like what you said about vacuum tubes and computers, computers are a discovery, vacuum tubes are a stepping stone on the road to that discovery. So somebody chose to use those vacuum tubes to try to build a computer. When it comes to image breeding, if I see an image that looks like something interesting, and then I choose to breed it further and then I get something else, maybe a picture of a skull, which actually was discovered, then I basically used that stepping stone to get to a discovery. So somehow, there’s a metaphor, an analogous metaphor here.

What’s cool about this site, what made it, I think, compelling to me was that because it’s crowdsourced, what we allowed people to do was to come in and look at what other people had bred. So there’s this big database and it’s being displayed in a natural way, a way that makes it easy for people to see what’s been discovered to surface things that are interesting. So those you can think of as stepping stones. You might see a butterfly or a face or something like that. Then someone who sees that is allowed to instead of starting from scratch, instead of starting from blobs like you would if you were starting from scratch, they can start from your discovery. If you found a butterfly and somebody wants to breed new butterflies, then no problem. They don’t have to start from scratch and get to a butterfly. They can start from your butterfly and then breed from there. It’s called branching. So that means that people are building off of the discoveries of their predecessors or you could think of as standing on the shoulders of their predecessors, which is, again, it’s a really nice analogy, I think, to how human innovation proceeds in general, where someone invents something, discovers something, comes up with an idea, and then someone else that they might not even know later in the future goes back in history and sees that thing and realizes this could be used for that, and it transfers that idea over and it becomes a stepping stone to something else. This has been going on for as long as civilization, basically is civilization. That’s what basically causes civilization to happen. So pic breeders are a microcosm of that, but here’s where the thing that leads to the insight that’s profound and to me was shocking was that after running this site for a couple years, so this is a long time, and letting people just breed and discover things and they discovered all kinds of things, butterflies and cars and planets.

[00:14:01] Patrick: We’ll put a link in and a collection to some of these. It’s really staggering, the things that you see that started with black blobs.

[00:14:07] Ken: Yeah. Yeah. So you’ll get a chance to see it. They found all this stuff after a couple years of watching this. Then what we found was that underneath the hood, we were able to look at how. If you think about just for a second, just think about why Picbreeder is fascinating. At first, it might seem like a toy or something. What is it actually for? People are playing around and breeding images, which have no purpose other than just that they’re images, but actually, what is, I think, profound about having something like that is that it is basically a history of discovery in all of its minute detail. Every little thing that everybody decided to do throughout the history is recorded. We don’t have artifacts like that. We don’t know every step of every invention that’s ever been made. A lot of it just happened inside of someone’s head. So this is not recorded, but Picbreeder is one of the few things, maybe the only thing where every single step of everything is recorded completely. So that meant that after a couple years, we could go back and find out what actually explains how everything was discovered, and I turned out to be, I think, shocking. The shocking revelation was that in almost every single case, more than 99% of cases, if you looked at something interesting, like a car, for example, or a butterfly or a bird or whatever it might be, if you go back in its history and you look at what were the steps that led to that thing, the steps look nothing like it at some point back. Right before you get to it, it might look like it, but if you go back far enough, you will find a stepping stone that looks absolutely nothing like it in 99.9% of cases.

Why is that a revelation? Well, the problem is that if you think about it, what that means is that the only way to discover any of these things was to not be trying to discover them. Now, usually if you say things like that, that sounds like some new age statements, discover things by not trying to discover, and that’s mystical or something. Now, think about this. I’m not talking in the new age perspective. This is an empirical observation. This is actually what happened. The people who discovered these things who are responsible for the stepping stones that led to the discoveries were not actually trying to discover those things because if they had been, then they wouldn’t have chosen the things when they had their selections. They had these blobs they could look at. They could choose one of them. They wouldn’t have chosen the ones they chose if they were trying to get the final product. For example, you have a case where there was an alien face that led to a car. Who would choose an alien face if they want a car? That would not be a good idea, but what happened was the wheels of the car, which was depicted from the side, actually derived from the eyes of the alien face. Again and again and again, you see this phenomenon that in hindsight, you can see what happened, but looking forward, you would never imagine that these connections could be made. This shows, in fact, it’s true in Picbreeder that you can only find things in the long run by not looking for them. You need to take your eyes off the ball in order to be able to accept the stepping stones that ultimately make finding the ball possible, which I think is totally contrary to our culture, to our way of making discovery, the way we think things should be done, which is always objectively driven. So the connection that I need to make, I think, beyond that is to justify why I would extend from that discovery to real life.

[00:17:21] Patrick: If you think about the power of these images, most of them were achieved across what I’ll call a modest amount of generations. We’ll talk about AI and machine learning a little bit later on, which is so interesting because almost all of it has an objective function. It’s almost all objective-based. So that’ll be an interesting part of our conversation, but when you put up the number of generations of breeding to get from a blob to a clear bird, let’s say, it was only 80, 90, 40, 100. It wasn’t that many iterations. Then you showed us a skull, a picture of a skull, and really drove the point home by describing, “Okay. Now, let’s imagine this specific skull or one very close to it is our objective.” Could we get close to it across way, way, way more generations and actually targeting it? Maybe you can describe that experience because I found that to be a powerful nail in the coffin.

[00:18:10] Ken: So basically, we took this and we said, “Let’s try to drive the point home and also just see if we can validate this hypothesis that you can only find things by not looking for them by actually looking for them explicitly.” Just to make it fun, I think this twist makes it fun, let’s look for things that we already saw were discovered. That makes this crazy because it’s like we know that these can be discovered in this space. Like you said, I think it is an important point that these things were not discovered with a lot of compute, so to speak. If I recall, I think it’s 72 generations, might be 74, 72, 74 steps or iterations. That is just ridiculously low. When you think about it in terms of compute, of course, these are humans making these selection steps, but in machine learning, modern machine learning, it’s pretty reasonable to have millions of iterations to get to something meaningful. Here, we’re talking about dozens. In some way, that says these are easy. These are not hard discoveries. In some sense, they’re still impressive because of the fact if I just randomly choose blobs in blob space, in the space of the Picbreeder, you’ll never find anything. 99.99999% of the space is just garbage blobs. So these are still needles in haystack, but what’s weird is that the needles in the haystack are discoverable within a few dozen steps. One conclusion you might draw naively would be that, “Oh, they can’t be that hard to find.” The skull is let’s say 74 steps trivial, basically, from a compute perspective. So let’s set up an experiment and see. So what we can do is we can say, “Let’s get an image matching algorithm,” which are available, which basically tells me if I show this algorithm a blob, I input this blob and I ask it to compare it to the skull, it’ll tell me how far away we are, how close is this image to a skull.

That comparison will help me because when I show a bunch of blobs, I can just have it automatically pick the one that’s closest to the skull. It’s really simple. Then every iteration can be done now by the computer instead of by a human. So we can automate it. Good old fashioned machine learning here. We just automate Picbreeder. No more humans in the loop, and we’ll just automate it to go to the skull. I think to me, this sounds like a worthy adversary. I would be worried this might actually work. It shouldn’t work though our hypothesis is correct because our hypothesis here is that you can only find things by not looking for them. Now, this is explicitly looking for the skull. This is a metaphor for how we do things in our culture. So we say, “This is our goal. This is our OKR. This is what we’re going to achieve this quarter, and now we’re going to work towards it. You’re going to give me a metric. In this case, it’s skull matching. Let’s match the skull picture,” and then you’re going to cut off branches that don’t seem to be maximizing that metric and go by the branches that do seem to be maximizing the metric and just move towards the skull. We’re going to do that now explicitly. We gave it 30,000 steps. This takes about 74 steps, let’s say, for the first discovery by a human. Now, we’re giving an automated algorithm, 30,000 steps, just for fun, just in case, I don’t know, it needs extra time. We’ll give it way extra time, orders of magnitude. What happens? Failure every single time. We ran this dozens of times. It’s every single time failure.

It’s also fun to look at the failures because you can see it’s trying. You see it shadows. It’s like somebody stumbling, almost getting there but not quite. Well, it’s not even close, but it’s like getting the silhouette shadow of what it wants, but it can’t get even close. It’s just fascinating. That’s much more compute. It should be able to eventually overcome it, but the thing is that it highlights the reason that this is happening in if you look at it. Why are all discoveries happening this way in Picbreeder? It’s actually because the world is deceptive, which means that the things that lead to skulls don’t look like skulls. This is the fundamental insight, which is not being recognized across society. It’s that the things that lead to the things you want don’t look like the things that you want. There’s actually a name for this in philosophy. It’s called the like causes like fallacy. I think it’s from Mills. We all seem to assume. It seems to be almost like built in to us biologically that the things that lead to what we want are going to resemble what we want. I don’t know why we all believe this, but it’s not how the world works. If you think about it, that makes total sense. If the world actually worked that way, if the like causes like fallacy was actually true, actually things do resemble where you want to go, we would solve all that problems…

…[00:24:01] Patrick: There’s one piece of this that I love that hasn’t been mentioned yet, which is the role of the individual and their decisions relative to I’ll call this heterogeneous decision making versus homogeneous ruling by committee or something or making choice by committee. Talk about the importance of the individual and their choice in this web of invention and disruption.

[00:24:20] Ken: Yeah. This is a funny thing. It’s true. This is another very popular mythology, I think, in our culture is let’s get together and collaborate, bring all the smart people into the room. It’s not just like, “Let’s get interdisciplinary collaboration. Let’s get the computer scientists sitting there with the economist.” All these things are very exciting to us. I just want to say I’m not saying we shouldn’t have collaboration. That again would be this crazy cranky thing to say. What I do want to get to what you’re asking about is that collaboration itself also is subject to a number of caveats because of the insight about the paradox, the objective paradox, and that means there’s a right way and a wrong way to think about collaboration. It’s quite dangerous. We tend to do it the wrong way. The issue that comes up here is that if you look at Picbreeder, I think something that’s very intriguing about what happens in it is that once somebody sees a stepping stone on the site, so if you recall, like I said, all the discoveries that other people had made are made available for you. So what it means is you are seeing a history of stepping stones when you go to this site. You don’t have to start from scratch. If somebody found a butterfly, you can start from their butterfly.

When you come in and see that butterfly, that is a point of collaboration. It’s implicit collaboration, but it is collaboration because somebody else did work, they found the butterfly, and now you’re building off of that work. So collaboration is happening. However, the moment you choose to continue or what we call branch from the butterfly to breed it further, you are on your own. This is a very unique thing. At first, it sounds like, “Oh, well, what’s the big deal? You’re on your own, okay,” but think about it. We almost never allow people to do that in collaborative situations in our culture. We always bring people together and move towards consensus almost immediately, but in Picbreeder, it’s not like that. Instead, you choose the thing you think is interesting and it was your choice and nobody else was involved in that choice. Now, think about this compared to, for example, I was a professor for a long time. So I think a lot about asking for grants, science grants. That’s like picking an image. It’s like what project do I want to pursue. You come in and you see a butterfly and you want to pursue the butterfly. It’s like you’re sending a grant proposal to the NSF. You think something interesting will happen if you choose this butterfly, but the thing about the NSF is now it’s going to go to a committee. I am not allowed to just go off on my own and work on that butterfly now. There’s going to be a committee that thinks about the decision that I’m making, and I have to justify usually objectively in the sense that I’m going to have to say where it’s going to lead.

What are you going to get by doing this butterfly? That is not how Picbreeder is. You are on your own completely, and not only are you on your own by choosing the butterfly, you’re on your own every single step of the way until you publish the thing you discovered. So there’s no interference, whatsoever, and you’re just on your own. Think about the difference between that and the way we run things where it’s basically you come into a room with all these people, you bring up these ideas, you have this discussion, you try to come to consensus. All the crazy things you would’ve done are basically cut off at the start by this surge towards consensus, which is going to lead to what I would call convergent consensus because we’re trying to move toward convergence very quickly. What you’d understand from Picbreeder is the proliferation of the stepping stones that gives the power to the process. The reason that I can get to cars, there was a discovery of a car which came from an alien face, was because of the discovery of the alien face. No one would ever think that you needed an alien face to get to a car, but the alien face is there not because somebody was thinking about cars, but because there is a general culture inside of Picbreeder of proliferating stepping stones.

This is not generally how we run collaborative systems because we run them by consensus, which is the exact opposite. That’s about pruning out stepping stones. People start generating things and then we start saying, “No, no, no. Committee doesn’t like this. Committee doesn’t like that.” We then converge to the thing, which is basically the consensus basis of current thinking, which tends to be dogmatic and tends to be status quo and everything that we basically want to get away from, and then all these radical stepping stones, which are the interesting things which could lead to places we’re not expecting for the very reason that the things that we’d want to get to don’t look like them so we need the radical stepping stones are the things that we cut out. You can see from this theory or philosophy way of looking things that a lot of the way we run collaborative systems is just totally kneecap at the start, and also should, I think, be rethought.

[00:28:31] Patrick: Can you describe when you put a consensus mechanism into this experiment, the outcome falling to all this? I promise we’re going to get to some of the bigger implications here in a minute, but this simplified example is this so damn powerful for how we all are going to spend our time in our lives. Maybe just describe the outcome when you insert consensus mechanism into how these generations progress.

[00:28:54] Ken: This is super interesting, and it’s funny because it’s just a coincidence that this happened because there was another project that was launched around the time of Picbreeder called the living image project. It had nothing to do with me other than it used basically the same in coding under the hood as Picbreeder. This is nice because it creates a controlled experiment by accident because both Picbreeder and this other thing, the living image project, have this underlying coding that’s the same. So what that means is in principle, they can achieve the same thing. They could find similarly cool stuff in principle, but there’s this one difference, which makes this very interesting as a comparison, which is this living image project did work by consensus. I mean, the reason it did is because I think it’s because there’s this cultural assumption just like riding on top of that. They’re like, “This is a good way to do things. Let’s have a vote.”

So basically what they said is, “Okay. Here’s what we’re going to do. Just like Picbreeder, there’s these blobs, they’re arranged on the screen, you can see all these blobs, and we’re going to pick one of them. That’ll be the parent of the next generation of blobs.” However, the difference from Picbreeder is that the choice will be made by a vote. So over the course of a week, people will come in and it would turn out basically hundreds of people would come in, and they would vote on their favorite blob and then we’ll choose the one that gets the most votes. To a lot of people, this is really intuitive. More opinions are better than one. Let’s use the crowd to decide what to do, but consistently with what I just argued, the result are starkly different and terrible in comparison. I don’t mean to cast any dispersion on the living image project. I think it was a cool idea to try it. It really helps to illustrate. The problem here is that you get a washout effect. Imagine you come in, okay? There’s hundreds of people coming in. Imagine you like butterflies and I like cars. Now, what’s going to happen when we vote and we’re just looking at blobs? The blobs don’t look like butterflies yet and they don’t look like cars, and you want a butterfly and I want a car. What is going to happen? Complete washout is what’s going to happen.

There’s no way you’re going to get enough people on your side. You don’t even know. We don’t even know what each other are doing or have understanding of how you even get these things. So what’s going to happen is you get this mildly aesthetic blobby pattern type of consensus. We get the mildly, most pleasing blob aesthetic, and then that’s going to happen at every iteration because there’s another few hundred people voting at the next iteration and another few hundred, and after thousands and thousands of, I think it was 25,000 votes, you can look at the top ranking, all you have are amorphous rainbowy blobs every single thing. I think it’s just stark and shocking. Even though it’s in this totally obscure genre of stuff like breeding pictures, I think it should give us all heart palpitations because we’re running our culture this way…

...[01:08:29] Patrick: It’s incredible, and I think demands one last question. This idea that you’ve referenced over and over again that no one is telling people how they have to behave in something like pick breeder. There’s a permissionless nature to it. There’s a individuality and individual interpretation of events. With all that in mind, for those whether it’s running a grant organization or running a labs, an AI labs or innovation labs inside of a company or anyone that has resources like Ed did that want to deploy those resources in service of disruption and innovation, either generative or protecting against it or whatever, you’ve already talked about what they do wrong. If you were in-charge of one of those, an allocator of resources to create innovation, how would you do it?

[01:09:14] Ken: I think if you’re in a position like that, you’re a gatekeeper. So you are responsible for the perpetuation or not of this objective culture. It’s especially relevant if you’re purportedly involved in fostering innovation because that’s where this gatekeeper has a huge influence. Yeah. I would recommend doing things differently. You probably exist in their framework where that’s very difficult because you answer to somebody. They don’t understand where you suddenly say, “Well, I’m not assessing things in this normal objective way anymore.” They’re like, “What the heck are you doing? How do we know this is working?” So this takes some courage, I think. The first thing I would say, get the courage because there’s nothing we can do about that. You have to explain to them, “If we’re not going to follow the usual security blanket rooted things, the people in the chain are going to have to be convinced and that’s hard work.” That’s why I think it’s worth having a conversation like this show. That’s why we wrote the book. It’s like we wanted to start people having these conversations. So get the courage to have the conversations and really fight because it’s not going to happen if you don’t. You’re just going to shut down. You’re going to think, “I want to do this, but, eh. On the other hand, my boss wants this. His boss wants that. There’s a funding agency out there or we have investors.” You’re like, “Forget it. It’s too complicated.” Somehow you got to fight this.

Now, in terms of actually practical implementation, what should you do? What I would say is you should be maximizing stepping stones in the pursuit of innovation, not maximizing an objective performance. There’s two things, maximizing stepping stones and maximizing exposure to stepping stones. The thing that makes innovation work is that the people who could run with something are exposed to the thing that they could run with, and that is what’s missing I think from a lot of these organizations is that we have these filters, which are extremely narrow, which decide what comes through, and they end up pruning out things. It’s the conversion consensus problem. Things don’t get exposed to a person who would react dramatically if they were exposed to that thing. What we should do is greatly broaden the filters that go from idea to exposure to the people who could run with the ideas and then also change the criteria for what should be pursued. You have to recognize that if you pursue something that requires investment, so it costs money. So we’re not talking about decisions that can be made lightly. Nobody can say, “Well, everything will pursue because now we’re all going to be open-minded. We’re just going to do everything everybody wants.” That cannot happen. Some things have to not happen, but the way that we decide what happens, I think the criteria should be quite different.

It should not be trying to move to consensus, get a committee to agree with something, get the most vote, something like that. It should be many people within the context of the organization, whatever many means. Many people are exposed to the ideas that are being generated, and that basically only one or two need to trigger the success of that idea or to say, “This is worth investing,” but then you say, “Well, how can that be?” Then every idea would have to be invested because somebody might want to invest in everything. The reason I think it can make sense is if there’s skin in the game for the people who are validating the ideas. If I see something that is so exciting to me that I’m personally willing to pursue it that I didn’t come up with myself, just like the alien face that led to the car in Picbreeder, then I’m actually willing to spend my time on what you did. I’m actually giving something away. I could have had that time. I could have invested in something else. What should make the confirmation of something meaningful and really worth investment is if the person who’s confirming it is giving something away. Maybe they lose their right for some period of time to have their idea even considered or they give away the resources that they were giving for some project that they had. There’s obviously finite resources, but if someone’s willing to do that, that means that this thing means a lot to them, and it only takes one person, magic connection, electric connection to happen, and we have to somehow create those connections. It’s not going to be consensus matter. It’s going to be a niche thing. When there’s something incredible, it’s not going to be tons of people see, it’s going to be one out of a hundred see it, and that has to be honored somehow. We have to find a way to do that.

2. Conversation at Panmure House – Howard Marks and Patrick Schotanus

PS: In fairness to Russell, it was in my introduction to Russell’s question [i.e., not in Russell’s question itself] that I said the economy is mechanical and that’s the definition of mainstream economics.  Russell and I do not necessarily agree on that.  But to continue on mechanical economics as a theory: In your memo On the Couch, you talk about your own early exposure to the efficient-market-type classes.  For the audience, EMH is based on the rational expectations hypothesis; EMH states that markets are rational because any pockets of irrationality are averaged away [i.e., the errors made by the group become smaller than those made by individuals].  In contrast, you also highlight the reality of irrationality that can be observed in markets, something that both Alan Greenspan and Robert Shiller called “irrational exuberance.”  Later, the GFC, or the Global Financial Crisis, painfully hit home that what seems rational for an individual can be dangerously irrational if done collectively.  So my first question is, can we square this circle?  For example, is irrationality just about semantics, or is it something real that not only exists, but because of the collective dynamic, can actually threaten the economic system and may thus not necessarily be averaged away?

HM: To me, Patrick, the answer lies in my view of the efficient market hypothesis.  Again, the efficient market hypothesis says that due to the concerted actions of so many investors, who are intelligent and numerate and computerized and informed and highly motivated and rational and objective and willing to substitute A for B, prices for securities are right, such that they presage a fair risk-adjusted return.  I believe that’s the definition.

But you get into a problem, because when I listed off the qualities that are necessary for a market to be efficient, I snuck in there the economist’s notion of the perfect market and its requirement that the participants be rational and objective. And in investing, they’re not.  That’s really the point.

“Economic man” is supposed to make all these decisions in a way that optimizes wealth.  But she often doesn’t, because she’s not always objective and rational.  She has moods.  And those moods interfere with this arriving at the right price.  So my definition of the efficient market hypothesis is that because of the concerted efforts of all the participants, the price at a given point in time is as close to right as those people can get.  And because it’s as close to right as most of them can get, it’s very hard to outperform the market by finding errors – what theory calls “inefficiencies” and I just think of as “mistakes.” 

Sometimes prices are too high.  Sometimes prices are too low.  But because the price reflects the collective wisdom of all investors on that subject, very few of the individuals can identify those mistakes and profit from them.  And that’s why active investing doesn’t consistently work, in my opinion.  I think my version of the efficient market hypothesis makes it roughly just as hard for active managers to beat the market as does the strong form of the hypothesis, that everything’s always priced right.  But I think mine is more reflective of reality.  I wrote in one of my memos – maybe it was What’s It All About, Alpha? – about a stock that was $400 in 2000 and $2 in 2001.  Now it’s possible – but to me it’s unlikely – that both of those observations were “right.”  Rather, I think they merely reflected the consensus of opinion at the time.

This business – I shouldn’t say “this business”; that sounds derogatory – the idea that inefficiencies will be arbitraged away by the operations of the market ignores one of the key elements that I think describes reality, and that is mass hysteria.  And I think the markets –economies too, but more importantly the markets – are subject to mass hysteria.

I think it was in On the Couch that I said, “in the real world, things fluctuate between pretty good and not so hot.  But in the markets, they go from flawless to hopeless.”  Just think about that one sentence.  If it’s true – and I believe it’s true – that shows you the error, because nothing is flawless and nothing is hopeless.  But markets, I believe, treat things as flawless and hopeless, and there’s the error.

The book I mentioned, Mastering the Market Cycle (I’m going to keep repeating the title in the hope that everybody will buy a copy) . . .  You know, I’m a devotee of cycles.  I’m a student of cycles.  I’ve lived through a half a dozen important cycles in my career.  I’ve thought about them.  I think they dominate what I do.  And I got about two-thirds of the way through writing that book and something dawned on me, a question: Why do we have cycles?

The S&P 500 – I mentioned Jim Lorie – the Center for Research in Security Prices told us almost 60 years ago, that from 1928 to ’62, the S&P 500 had returned an average of 9.2% a year.  Things have been better since then and I think if you go back and look at the whole last 90 years, it’s 10½% a year, the return on the S&P 500.

Here’s a question:  Why doesn’t it just return 10½% every year?  Why sometimes up 20% and sometimes down 20%, and so forth?  In fact – and I included this factoid in one of my memos – it’s almost never up between 8% and 12%.  So if the average return is 10½%, why isn’t the return clustered around 10½%?  Why is it clustered outside the central range?  I think the answer is mass hysteria.

And by the way, the same is true of the economy and mainstream economics, which of course you described as mechanical, and I think that many people would describe as mechanical.  But, certainly, economics is driven by decisions made by people, who are not always rational and objective.  Maybe in theory they’re closer than investors to being rational and objective, but still they’re not always.

But anyway, my explanation for the occurrence of cycles is “excesses and corrections.”  You have a secular trend or a “normal” statistic.  Let’s say it’s the secular trend of the S&P 500.  Sometimes, people get too excited.  They buy the stocks too enthusiastically.  The prices rise.  They rise at more than a 10½% annual rate until they get to a price that is unsustainable.  And then everybody says, “No, I think they’re too high.”  So then they correct back toward the trendline.  But, of course, given the nature of psychology, they correct through the trendline to an excess on the downside.  And then people say, “No, that’s too low,” so then they bring it back toward the trendline and through it to an excess on the high side.

So excesses and corrections: that’s what cycles are about, in my opinion.  Where do the excesses come from?  Psychology.  People get too optimistic, then they get too pessimistic.  They get too greedy, then they get too fearful.  They become too credulous, then they become too skeptical, and so forth.  Oh, and the big one: they become too risk-tolerant, and then they become too risk-averse.

PS: If I can just follow up on that – particularly for our cognitively inclined audience – implied in this you suggest that there might be mental causality, and my next questions are basically also to motivate future research as part of economics revision.  But during your September podcast, in which you revisit the On the Couch memo, you talk about causality and how complex it can be.  And we agree and highlight this in our work.

For example, when Alan Greenspan, in that famous ’96 “irrational exuberance” speech, mentions the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy, and I’m quoting him now: “It chiefly concerns, at least in our view, this dualism of the psychological of the former and the physical of the latter.”  Now, saying this, mental causality is highly controversial and complex in cognitive science, but cognitive science is the area that really studies this.  So, you also specifically refer to Soros’s reflexivity in that context, and as you already indicated just now, but also in your memo, you equate prices almost to psychology.  And finally, we’ve all experienced this dangerous – to the point of existential – tail-wagging-the-dog dynamic surrounding Lehman’s collapse.  So my first question is, if we agree that we will not gain much by identifying yet another behavioral bias, nor by running yet another regression, what would you like to see investigated by cognitive scientists that could potentially lead to more important insights, especially regarding our understanding of the interaction between these two domains of the real and financial economies?

HM: Well, the people at this symposium know much more than I do about how to get to the bottom of these things.  But clearly there’s so much grist for this mill.  Now, exactly how you quantify mood, and so-called animal spirits and irrational exuberance, is beyond me.  I always say, Patrick, and I think I said it in Mastering the Market Cycle, that if I could know just one thing about every security I was thinking about buying, it would be how much optimism is in the price.

When you watch TV and you hear the newsreaders talking about what happened in the stock market today, you get the impression that prices are the result of fundamentals and changes in prices are the result of changes in fundamentals.  And that is vastly inadequate.  (By the way, they always say, “The market went up today because of X” or “The market went down today because of Y.”  I always say, “Where do they go to find that out, because I haven’t found it yet?”  I haven’t found where you go to get an explanation of the market’s behavior, even after the fact.)  But it’s not true that it’s all about fundamentals.  The price of an asset is based on fundamentals and how people view those fundamentals.  And a change in an asset price is based on the change in fundamentals and the change in how people view those fundamentals.  So, facts and attitudes.  Any research that could capture changes in attitudes, I think is important.

Now, what about quantifying these animal spirits?  In one of the more jocular portions of my first book, The Most Important Thing, I include something I called “the poor man’s guide to market assessment.”  I have a list of things in one column, and I have a list of things in the other column, and whichever list is more descriptive of current conditions tells you whether it’s optimism or pessimism that’s governing the market.  There are things like, do deals get sold out or do they languish?  Are hedge fund managers being welcomed on TV or not?  Who does the crowd form around at cocktail parties?  What is the media saying: “We’re going to the moon” or “We’re cratering forever”?  I don’t know how to quantify these things.  But these are among the very important things that I listen to in order to figure out where we stand in the cycle.  And I believe where we are in the cycle plays a very strong role in figuring out where we’ll go next.  (In fact, take the title of my second book, Mastering the Market Cycle.  When I was thinking about writing it, it was called Listening to the Cycle. “Listening” in the sense of taking our signals from where we are in the cycle.  “Listening” also in the sense of obeying.  The publisher thought we’d sell more books if the title implied the book would help you master the market cycle.)  But I, as a practical investor, try to figure out what’s going on around me.

Now let’s go back.  I didn’t do what I should have, because I didn’t answer Russell Napier’s real question: can I name two episodes that showed this kind of thing in action?  I was glad to have the questions in advance, because it allowed me to think about the two episodes I want to propose.

In the spring of 2007, I wrote a memo called The Race to the Bottom.  This was when the subprime mortgage mania was at its apex, I think, and when the logs had been stacked in the fireplace for the conflagration that became the Global Financial Crisis.  It happens that I was driving around England in the fall of ’06 – maybe November or December ’06 –and I was reading the FT (I mean I wasn’t driving and reading; I was being driven so I could read), and there was an article in the FT that said that, historically, the English banks had been willing to lend people three-and-a-half times their salary in a mortgage.  But now, XYZ Bank announced that it was willing to lend four times your salary, and then ABC Bank said, “No, we’ll lend five.”  And that bidding contest – to make loans by lowering credit standards – seemed to me to be a race to the bottom.  And I wrote that markets are an auction place where the opportunity to make a loan, or the opportunity to buy a stock or a bond, goes to the person who’s willing to pay the most for it.  That is to say, get the least for his money, just like in an auction of a painting.  And so, in this case, the bank that was willing to have the lowest credit standards and the weakest loans was likely to win the auction and make the loans: race to the bottom.  And I said this is what happens when there’s too much money in the hands of providers of capital and they’re too eager to put it to work.  Mood!  And, of course, we all know the Global Financial Crisis ensued.

Now fast forward from February ’07 to October ’08: Lehman Brothers goes bankrupt on September 15, 2008, and now, rather than being carefree, the pendulum has swung, and people are terrified.  Rather than seeing risk as their friend, as in, “The more risk you take, the more money you make, because riskier assets have higher returns,” now people say “Risk bearing is just another way to lose money.  Get me out at any price.”

So the pendulum swung, and of course people’s optimism collapsed, the S&P 500 collapsed, and the prices of debt collapsed.  So I wrote a memo right around October the 10th of ’08 – maybe that day was the all-time low for credit, I don’t know exactly – that was called The Limits to Negativism, based on an experience I had. I needed to raise some money to delever a levered fund that we had that was in danger of melting down due to margin calls, and I went out to my clients.  I got more money.  We reduced the fund’s debt from four times its equity to two times.  Now we’re again approaching the point where we can get a margin call.  Now I need to delever it from two times to one time.  I met with a client who said, “No, I don’t want to do it anymore.”  And I said, “You gotta do it.  These are senior loans, and the default rate on senior loans has been infinitesimal over time.  There’s potential for a levered return of 26% a year from what I consider incredibly safe instruments.”

This client – excuse me if I belabor this, but I think it’s interesting – this client said to me, “What if there are defaults?”  And I said, “Well, our historical default rate on high yield bonds – which are junior to these instruments – is 1% a year.  So if you start with 26% and you take off 1% for defaults, you still get 25%.”  So she said, “What if it’s worse than that?”  I said, “The high yield bond universe default rate has been 4% a year, so you’re still getting 22% net.”  She says, “What if it’s worse than that?”  And I said, “The worst five years in our default experience is 7½%, and if that happens, you’re still getting 19%.”  She says, “What if it’s worse than that?”, and I said, “The worst year in history is 13%.  If that recurs every year for the next eight years, you’ll still make 13% a year.”  She says, “What if it’s worse than that?”  And I said, “Do you have any equities?”  She said, “Yes, we have a lot of equities.”  I said, “If we get a default rate on high yield bonds of more than 13% a year every year into the future, what happens to your equities in that environment?”

I describe myself as having run back to my office after that meeting to write that memo, The Limits to Negativism.  What I wrote there was that it’s very important when you’re an investor to be a skeptic and not believe everything you hear.  And most people think being a skeptic consists of dealing with excessive optimism by saying, “That’s too good to be true.”  But when it’s pessimism that’s excessive, being a skeptic means saying, “That’s too bad to be true.”  That particular investor couldn’t imagine any scenario that couldn’t be exceeded on the downside.  So, in other words, for that person, there was no limit to negativism.

And when I conclude that the other people in the market, the people setting the market prices, are excessively negative and excessively risk averse, then I – an inherently conservative person – and my partner, Bruce Karsh, who runs our distressed debt funds – also an inherently conservative person – we go crazy spending money when we conclude there’s excessive pessimism, fear, and risk aversion incorporated in asset prices [meaning they’re lower than they should be]. So it’s not just the mechanical aspects that determine market prices – it’s psychology.  It’s mass hysteria, which comes in waves from time to time, that leads to market cycles that prove excessive.

3. This Diamond Company Wants To Help Carbon Capture Take Off – Maddie Stone

That company is Aether, a lab-grown diamond startup that just raised $18 million in a funding round led by Helena, a “global problem solving organization” that includes both a for-profit investment and nonprofit action arm. Lab-grown diamonds are a hot market, and there’s no shortage of companies claiming that these synthetic gems are more ethical or environmentally friendly than their Earth-mined counterparts — and there are even other companies also focused on making diamonds using carbon dioxide from the air. But Aether’s claims are backed up by some ambitious facts about its operation: not only is it making diamonds in a process powered by clean energy — it’s pulling an additional 20 metric tons of CO2 out of the atmosphere per carat it produces.

While the cost of capturing all that carbon would be high for a company selling, say, cement, it’s one the luxury jewelry brand says it can easily absorb. And the world needs businesses that can pay for so-called direct air capture and still generate a profit if the nascent technology is ever going to make a dent in climate change…

…Aether, which also works with Climeworks, wouldn’t disclose how much it’s paying for direct air capture services. But it says it can transform one ton of captured CO2 into “millions of dollars’ worth of diamonds”. On a per carat basis, those diamonds, an ultra high-purity breed known as Type IIa diamonds that are difficult to find in nature, sell for anywhere from $4,900 to over $10,000. Shearman says this price range is higher than many competitors in the lab grown space and closer to that of mined diamonds because of the additional work that goes into making the fabrication process as clean as possible.

That process starts with Aether purchasing carbon dioxide from Climeworks’ facility in Switzerland and shipping it to the United States, where the diamonds are grown. Aether puts that CO2 through a proprietary process to convert it into high purity methane, or CH4. That methane is then injected directly into the company’s diamond reactors, where a method known as “chemical vapor deposition” is used to grow rough diamond material over the course of several weeks.

The chemical vapor deposition process involves heating gasses to very high temperatures under near-vacuum conditions, and considerable energy is required to do so. Shearman tells The Verge that this process and other manufacturing stages are powered entirely by carbon-free sources like solar and nuclear. Once the diamonds finish growing, they’re shipped to Surat, India, where they’re cut and polished before being sent back to New York City’s diamond district for sale…

…Aether only needs a relatively small amount of carbon dioxide to make the diamonds themselves — think fractions of grams rather than tons. Then, for every carat of diamond it sells, the company says it removes an additional 20 metric tons of carbon from the air, using a mix of direct air capture and other carbon removal methods that involve long-term carbon sequestration. Shearman says the company based this commitment on the fact that the average American has an annual carbon footprint of approximately 16 metric tons, meaning most customers can expect to roughly cancel a year’s worth of personal emissions by purchasing an Aether diamond. “It’s something that has proved to be difficult but doable, and we’re really proud to be able to do that,” he says.

Aether started shipping its first diamonds to customers in the middle of 2021. While Shearman wouldn’t offer specific sales figures, he says that the company produced “hundreds of carats” of diamonds last year, and this year plans to produce thousands. Shearman described the $18 million in Series A funds raised by Helena as “the fuel that’s going to enable us to increase our production footprint this year.”

4. An introduction to Integrated Photonics – Jessica Miley

Integrated Photonics (IP) is the use of light for applications traditionally tackled by electronics. It can be used in a wide range of areas including telecommunications such as 5G networks, biosensors for speeding up medical diagnosis, and in automotive where it is used in LiDAR. IP consists of integrating multiple photonic functions on a Photonic Integrated Circuit (PIC) fabricated using automated wafer-scale generic integration technology over silicon, silica, or Indium Phosphide (InP) substrates. Integrated photonics dramatically improves the performance and reliability of these photonic functions while simultaneously reducing the size, weight, and power consumption.

A good introduction to IP is by understanding its similarities and differences with traditional electronic circuits. Where electronics deal with the control of electrons on a chip, photonics does the same with photons. Photons are the fundamental particles of light.

Conventional integrated circuits (ICs) conduct electricity by allowing the flow of electrons through the circuit. Electrons are negatively charged subatomic particles that interact with both other electrons and other particles. These interactions slow electrons down as they move through circuits, this limits the amount of information that can be transmitted; it also generates heat, which in turn causes energy and information losses.

Photonic integrated circuits (PICs) use photons. Photons move at the speed of light with almost no interference from other photons. This greatly increases the bandwidth (the data transfer rate) and speed of the circuit, without big energy losses making PICs significantly more efficient than their IC counterparts.

Integrated photonic components use “waveguides”, which confine and direct the light in the desired directions (by total internal reflection), much the same way as metallic wires do for electrical signals. A PIC provides functions for information signals on optical wavelengths typically in the visible spectrum or near-infrared 850 nm-1650 nm.

The elements on a PIC are connected via waveguides. The chip elements can be both passive (e.g. couplers, switches, modulators, multiplexers) and active (e,g amplifiers, detectors, and lasers). These components are integrated and fabricated onto a single substrate, which creates the compact and robust photonic device.

A key difference between electronic circuits and PICs is in the primary device that is used for fabrication. In an electronic integrated circuit, the main device is the transistor. But, in PIC, there is no particular main device that dominates in the fabrication. According to its application, the PIC will be designed with a range of fabrication devices. This integration presents opportunities to reduce current bulky, complex, and expensive optical systems in an integrated chip-scale way that has increased stability and robust operation, reduced size and power consumption, and cost-effective large-scale fabrication of even complex circuits.

5. It’s worse than you think – Oliver Burkeman

Here’s a surprisingly useful question to ask yourself next time you’re stumped by a problem, daunted by a challenge, or stuck in a creative rut: “What if this situation is even worse than I thought?”

This question, I admit, appeals to my taste for bloodyminded contrarianism. But its real value is that it expresses what I think of, more and more, as a fundamental truth about human psychology: that we often make ourselves miserable – and hold ourselves back from what we might be capable of achieving – not because we’re too pessimistic, but because, in a sense, we’re not pessimistic enough.

We think of certain kinds of challenges as really hard when they are, in fact, completely impossible. And then we drive ourselves crazy trying to deal with them – thereby distracting and disempowering ourselves from tackling the real really hard things that make life worth living.

A case in point: you feel overwhelmed by an extremely long to-do list. But it’s worse than you think! You think the problem is that you have a huge number of tasks to complete, and insufficient time, and that your only hope is to summon unprecedented reserves of self-discipline, manage your time incredibly well, and somehow power through. Whereas in fact the incoming supply of possible tasks is effectively infinite (and, indeed, your efforts to get through them actually generate more things to do). Getting on top of it all seems like it would be really hard. But it isn’t. It’s impossible…

…Anyway, you get the picture. And you probably get the point, too – which is that when you grasp the sense in which your situation is completely hopeless, instead of just very challenging, you can unclench. You get to exhale. You no longer have to go through life adopting the brace position, because you see that the plane has already crashed. You’re already stranded on the desert island, making what you can of life with your fellow survivors, and with nothing but airplane food to subsist on. And you come to appreciate how much of your distress arose not from the situation itself, but from your efforts to hold yourself back from it, to keep alive the hope that it might not be as it really was.

And then, crucially – because some people tend to mistake this for an argument for nihilism, or a life of mediocrity, when it’s really the opposite – that’s precisely when you can throw yourself at life’s real hard challenges: the impressive accomplishments, bold life choices, and deeply fulfilling relationships. You get to live more intensely, because you’re no longer making your full participation in life dependent on reaching some standard – of productivity, of certainty about the future, of competence, etcetera – that you were never going to reach in the first place.

6. Alex Danco – Tokengated Commerce – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and Alex Danco

[00:05:11] Patrick: Can you give an example that is not at all Shopify related on interoperability and the power of platforms from history that people might be familiar with?

[00:05:20] Alex: Let’s talk about interoperability for a second. People use this to mean a lot of things, but in general, what it means is that imagine that you have two levels of a system where one level of the system needs to interact with the other level, and you have n players on level one, and you have n players on level two, they both need to be able to work with each other in a way that just works fluently without really having to talk to each other very much. I’ll give you an example, which is the shipping container. I know you love talking about shipping containers on the show. I have a factory that makes inputs and you have a factory that takes those inputs and you build something value added out of them. And I need to ship it from me to you, how do we do this? Well, we could work together on figuring out, what is the shape of box that best fits this part? And how do I work with a shipper to make sure that box is going to go on their boat or on their plane effectively?

And how do we negotiate all these things? Or we could just put it all in the same, exactly standardized 40 foot box that goes on boats that know how to fit exactly that box on it, and through a supply chain that knows how to deal with this thing and then out the other side with neither of us ever having to even know about each other or what we’re putting in. This is this idea of a constraint that de constrains. It’s a very, very common motif that you see in interoperability, which is this idea, a free for all is actually no freedom at all. A very, very common lesson here. I can give you all sorts of examples throughout history of saying, if you give people no rules whatsoever, and then everybody tries to work with itself, that’s a mess, nothing ever gets done. However, if you have these really nice constraints or conventions or platforms or standards, many different angles of approaching this problem of interoperability, you can actually unlock something pretty magical, which is this community of n people on one side and this community of n people on the other side can actually create n times n different things without needing n times n different bits of glue stitching all of those things together…

…[00:12:05] Patrick: Can you think of an example where that’s violated, where someone’s trying to create a constraint standard but there is too many degrees of freedom and it failed?

[00:12:13] Alex: Sure, that’s almost every standard. Most standards do not succeed. And the reason why they do not succeed is because they just don’t grasp the problem entirely correctly. There’s that XKCD joke, which is like, “There are 12 standards, what we need is a common standard for how everybody represents this. The next day, there are 13 standards.” Standards work is very, very difficult to achieve because so many things have to go right. But if you look across, even in the history of computing, there are several incredible reference standards that are held up. Unix is one of them. The IP internet protocol is probably the greatest one of all of them, it is a very, very, very restricted way in which you can represent the information going through the internet, but what it means is that any webpage, any application, any whatever can submit something that can then get communicated over any kind of communications network. It could be sent over copper wire. It could be sent over ethernet. There are some aficionados that have sent message by carrier pigeon over internet protocol. You can do it. It doesn’t matter. As long as it runs through internet protocol, anything will work on either side. This overall design, I know you talked with Tobi the last time he came on the show, this overall design is something called hour glass architecture or narrow waist architecture. It’s one of the most powerful ideas in building things. This idea of, if you want many, many things to be able to inter-operate with many, many other things, there needs to be a narrow waist that is as constrained as possible between them.

A very, very important idea, and so Shopify really, really understands this, as evidence through how we built Liquid and how every app developer can make apps that works with every theme developer and they don’t talk to each other and you don’t need a piece of custom glue like you would with enterprise software, it just works. The same with anything can go into the internet protocol and it can be communicated over anywhere. Another good example of a narrow waist in computing is the X86 architecture, which Intel made. Anybody can submit instructions to this instruction set, and then it can be executed on any processor that knows how to deal with the X86’s instruction set, but there’s this common waist that it goes through. And I’m including Intel in there just to show that there are a couple of different ways that a narrow waist can come about. It could come about through a bunch of different academics getting together, it could come through with a standard body, but also it could come through when one monopoly says so. In the case with Intel, there’s not any one way to do this, but they’re hard to achieve, and when you do, you have something that’s going to last for a very long time.

[00:14:24] Patrick: It’s sort of obvious with the examples you’ve given, whether it’s the shipping container, or the internet itself, X86, ISO, whatever, that when you get one of these right, it crazy amount can be built on top of it in ways that you could never envision when you set the standard, the creativity that can exist on top of it is fast and unpredictable. That brings us to the topic at hand, which is tokengated commerce, maybe we need to start with why blockchains are potentially interesting narrow waists. But before we do that, tokengated is two parts, token and gated, give us a high level description of why you were doing this, why you were spending your time on it, why Shopify is heavily invested in this notion? This is a new idea, and I want to understand it at a high level.

[00:15:03] Alex: First, let me actually tell you what is tokengated commerce, because at its heart, it’s actually a very simple idea. Tokengated commerce means, here’s a product and I’m going to put a gate in front of it. And if you want to pass the gate, you need to show me a token that says I pass the gate. More generally speaking, what does this look like in practice? Well, what it looks like is, “Hey, I’m a brand. I have all these cool products. I want to make them very exclusive. If you want to unlock the product, you have to connect your wallet, a crypto wallet, sign a transaction showing that you own this wallet and this wallet owns,” let’s say, “the right NFT.” Because I own this NFT, I can unlock this product. Or it could be, because I own this NFT I unlock early access to a drop. I can get to the drop 15 minutes earlier than everybody else. Or because I own the rare version of this NFT, I’m able to get the rare version of the hoodie. Anybody can get the black version, but if I have the rare NFT, I can get the red version and that red version is cool. Or because I own this NFT, I’m able to buy this product and you can only buy one product per number of NFTs you own. These are all various ways of implementing this simple idea, which is, there is context somewhere. And that context is going to influence how my business wants to treat you. What if, as the buyer, I can bring that context with me and sign with it, proving I am me and here’s how I show I have some ownership over this bit of context?

And my storefront can respond to this and say, “Okay, now that I see that you’ve signed for this bit of context, my storefront is going to respond to that context by doing something appropriate.” Maybe it’s unlocking a product. Maybe it’s giving you really access to a drop. Maybe it’s letting you get into a party. It could be anything. It could be, “Here’s something live and in person. Here’s access to 15 minutes of a live stream with me.” It could be anything. It doesn’t just have to be products. This idea of token gating, defined it very, very simply is it’s a kind of behavior that is very, very natural. It’s how do I get into the exclusive thing? How do I show that I have done the challenge of gaining access? How do I get the thing that I want to get that is hard and feels like a reward? These are very, very old ideas in commerce, this idea of commerce is a challenge that the buyer and the merchant do together. And token gating, we are finding, is an incredible foundational piece of UX for the basic idea of the most meaningful kind of commerce is a challenge that you do together.

[00:17:08] Patrick: If you think about the many, many aspects of this, I want to start with the token itself, because if you think of non-fungible token, which have been popular, you own a Bored Ape, you own a Crypto Punk, you own whatever, piece of art, whatever, you could see a world where brands build specific product lines that tailored to you have to own one of these things that are already independently exclusive. So we’re sort of riding the scarcity of Bored Apes, let’s say, as a cool way to create something custom for them. Talk to me what you’ve learned here. Do you think that most merchants will outsource the scarcity function of the tokens themselves, or are you going to empower them to also create their own tokens that trade? It just seems like the world has coalesced around a small number of the most popular projects. Like all the examples you hear are, “If you’re an owner of one of those special things, we’re going to treat you differently, because it’s like you have a black card or something.” So start with the token piece. How do you think it will work?

[00:18:00] Alex: In that question, there were like three or four really good questions. So I want to try to answer them in the right order here. First, if you look at these NFTs, what are these things? What are they any good at representing? What do they all have in common? Let’s break down a couple of common aspects of these NFT projects. One aspect of them is these entities are owned by people, and the way that they own them is through their wallets. What is a wallet? Well, at a very basic level, a wallet is I have my public address and I have my private key and I sign my private key to show that I am who I am. My wallet address is associated with this token on this smart contract, which means I own this ape. First of all, let me just present a very basic observation, which is what are people doing with their wallets? Well, they’re connecting them everywhere. They’re connecting them to discords, to get into the discord. They’re connecting them to adapt. They’re connecting them to any kind of application that is asking them to authenticate in a certain kind of way. Now what we’re seeing is people want to connect these wallets to storefronts to say like, “Hey, I’m not a fungible buyer. I’m a non-fungible buyer because I have this token.” We really like saying NFTs aren’t a kind of product. They’re a kind buyer, a non-fungible buyer. I really want to get this into people’s minds. NFTs fundamentally to us are an input for commerce. They’re a piece of context that the buyer brings with them when they show up to the storefront. It can also be an outcome of commerce. We can do a commercial transaction where one of the outputs of this commerce as I’ve been to new NFT and give it to you. It doesn’t have to be an NFT either. It could be an ERC 20. It could be any number of other things.

These are very, very flexible ideas, but even this very basic thing of, “I have an NFT. I connect it to the storefront, it unlocks a product. Then I go check out. And maybe on the other end of the checkout, you want to sell me another NFT and I may buy that also. Then maybe I’ll use that somewhere else.” All of these are very, very interesting kinds of outputs and inputs to what we call commerce. But as you said before, I want to make sure that I’m answering your original question here, which is over the last year or two, there was this explosion of communities who were all issuing these tokens and everybody was getting in. “Oh, this is cool art.” These are going to have utility. Who are all these communities? And now what we’re seeing is yeah, a lot of these communities didn’t really have much of a game plan, but some of them do. And the ones that do are actually turning out to be formidably impressive media companies, because they have this fascinating way of creating fan bases. One way to look at NFT is this is a new way of creating a fan base, but it’s creating a fan base on the very beginning. You have to have some idea of what you’re doing with your brand. But nonetheless, the specific example of a merchant that we work with closely is Doodles. Doodles is one of the premier NFT brands. They understand fully that they are merchants and they are brands and they are media powerhouses. They understand that that’s the kind of business that they’re building. And they see these tokens as a new fundamental piece of what is it that their fans have that they can bring with them and connect into places in order to bring all that context with them…

…[00:28:14] Patrick: I’ve gone way too far into the conversation without asking what the literal mechanic that Shopify is building will let people do and won’t let them do. Is it as simple as saying, “If I’m a merchant, you can sign with whatever and I’m going to go through a menu and pick the tokens that I want to let and tie them to a certain thing and then you handle the rest”? What is literally going to be the thing that you offer?

[00:28:32] Alex: That’s actually a very good way to put it, which is that the number of things people want to do with token gating is very diverse and very hard to predict. We cannot know what all of them are. But you know what? We don’t have to. We’re a platform that is what app developers do. This is how Shopify is built. This is exactly like the problem of saying, “Well, there are many themes in the theme store and there are many apps that want to make mechanics. Do I have to think of every single thing that an app could do so that themes can know about it?” No. We just build our platform in a way where we present the right constraints and the right formats for saying, “Hey merchant, you want to do some token gating. Well, there are a lot of different ways that you might think your token gating wants to do. Some people want to token gate for discounts. Some people want to token gate around mechanics to do a cool sneaker drop. Some people want to token gate so that people can buy variants on a product to correspond to variants of their NFTs.” All of these are perfectly valid ways to do token gating and we’re not going to come up with what they are. What we are doing is we are creating a common platform for app developers to go make whatever kind of token gating rules you want to make in a way where those token gating rules can be presented in any selling surface where the merchant wants to go.

Maybe they want to sell on the online store, and that’s great. Maybe they want to sell at a retail point of sale environment. We have merchants doing this now. They’re doing a popup store and they’re an NFT brand. They’re like, “Oh, I only want to sell this thing in my popup store to people who have this NFT and can sign for it. And I want to do it on retail POS.” No problem. Some people want to buy things on mobile, and we have the shop app, which is our mobile app for shopping, and there’s some merchants who want to set up a little token gated store in the shop app that works really well on mobile. We have a product called GM shop that I’ll tell you about it in a minute that is exactly that. But your general question of what is the product that Shopify lets merchants do? It’s, well, you can do anything because we’re a platform. That’s the hard work of being a platform is coming up with what are exactly the right constraints that anybody can make inputs to it and anybody on the other side can read them and go carry out token gating instructions if we’ve come up with exactly the right constraints in the middle. The slogan I like to say when people say, “What are you doing with your life?” I say, “I’m making Shopify wallet aware.” That’s what I’m doing. Wallet awareness is not a single thing. It is an idea around everybody accepting a certain set of constraints that become deconstraining. They’re constraints that become liberating…

…[00:38:58] Patrick: You started to answer a key part, which is if all you wanted was an unlimited amount of people to have a certain access then pure text is great. If you want to limit it somehow obviously then the non fungible nature of the tokens becomes very important. So I get it. And you could certainly see the world normalizing too in your browser, you have a wallet, and you’re constantly like getting shit in your wallet from different people and they represent different things and blah, blah, blah. So now let’s talk about demand, this big topic of what is demand? Where does it come from? How does it tie into this whole story? And why is this new primitive for unlocking demand?

[00:39:32] Alex: Demand is one of my favorite topics because it’s simultaneously such a basic thing that everybody has opinions about. But also it’s one of the hardest things to conjure. You’re not a business until you have demand. A business plan is not demand. Nothing is a substitute for demand. Demand is the thing. Every business owner knows this. What is this mysterious thing, and how do I get it, and once I have it, how do I turn it into more? Before I was at Shopify, before I worked in DC, before we knew each other, long before that, I was in a band. I was in a band called The Fundamentals. We were on a label called Stomp Records out of Montreal, it’s a ska punk label. We never made it big, but we toured around. We had a record deal. We were trying to make it big. This is what we were doing with our lives.

And when you’re in a band, your business model is you lose money recording music, so that you can break even selling concert tickets, so that you can make money selling merch. That is how it works. You are a merchant. What you sell is apparel, basically, to your fans and you give them a reason to buy your stuff. Everything else is more or less a loss leader for your merch business when you’re at that size of band, anyway. I’m sure Taylor Swift makes money at all slices of the pie, but even like the Taylor Swift merch empire is, this is massive, massive, massive business, because there is demand for Taylor Swift merch. How do you make that demand and where does it come from is the question of being a retailer or the question of being a merchant. I can tell you honestly, when you’re a band, demand is something where it exists in two states. If I’m a band and I have these fans that are all out there in the world, they like me in a very sort of abstract way. They listen to my music. They’re thinking about me sometimes. The demand for them to buy my stuff is not really activated. It doesn’t exist in a more tangible form. The proof of this by the way is if you look at musicians merch businesses, let me ask you what percentage of a band’s merch do you think is sold online as opposed to at shows?

[00:41:08] Patrick: 50%.

[00:41:10] Alex: Almost none. So the rule of thumb is that no matter how big you are, your online merch business per year is about the same as two weeks of tour dates.

[00:41:19] Patrick: Oh, wow.

[00:41:19] Alex: Yeah. It is a very, very, very strong ratio. This is more or less universal whether you’re a small band or a big band or whoever you are. This is not to say that people don’t like Taylor Swift, unless they’re in the Taylor Swift concerts. No, they like Taylor the whole time. But you need there to be a precipitating event to cause people to be compelled to buy the merch now. The demand has taken a more meaningful form. It’s almost as if the demand isn’t like a gaseous state and then it becomes more active when certain things happen. And I want to tell you about those things because there are some universal rules to them in how culture works. When you’re a band, you have all these fans and they exist and they know who you are. But then when you come to town, what you do is you play a show. You sell tickets to the show, people buy the ticket, and they enter in this space, and this is very intimate space. And you do a challenge together called dance to the music. On completion of the challenge everybody lines up to go by the merch. This is a universal rule of music. There is a very, very specific orchestrated sequence of events that causes people to buy your stuff. Everybody who has active experience with being a certain kind of culturally cool merchant will recognize their version of this. Demand isn’t enough. It has to be activated demand. It has to be awakened by something. And the thing that awakens demand is a challenge of some sort. I think you were posting about this on Twitter or something. Challenges are the things that make life meaningful. They’re the thing that give us identity. They’re the thing that give us purpose. They’re the thing that makes us feel good about ourselves. Challenge and overcoming the challenge. Demand in absence of challenge is cheap and stupid.

It’s not necessarily stupid, but it’s baseload demand. I have baseload demand for paper towels. That’s fine. I can get them from the corner store. I can get them from Amazon. That’s fine. But the more meaningful kind of demand that actually is something meaningful to my life, that kind of demand is only awakened by a challenge. It might be the challenge of being in a particular store and really, really talking to a merchant and figuring out what I want. It could be the challenge of going to a show. It could be the challenge of being in a cool collab or whatever it is. But ultimately demand has to be activated by something and that thing is challenge. What kind of challenges are the things that people really care about? Well, the basic challenge that we care about is identity and group association. I’m a part of this group. I have these peers. I’m living up to a certain challenge that the peer group does. This is through the basis of all culture. That kind of culture is the basis of a certain kind of retailing called products that people buy to be cool or products that people buy to be a part of a group or products that people buy because they have some sort of meaning to them. The number of different kinds of products like this are quite varied. It’s not just t-shirts that bands sell. It could be memberships to something. It could be getting tattoos. Everybody has this thing that they’re really, really into. But ultimately demand, I want to bring this back to this sort of nebulous concept of demand, is something that people have understood as a part of commerce for thousands of years, but only up until recently that demand was always in person. There’s a challenge that the buyer and the merchants come together to flesh out what context is the buyer bringing with them? Under what circumstances does this demand unlock and activate the challenge? This is something that people naturally do face to face really well.

But online, it’s really hard to do this. It’s hard to show up to an online storefront and bring a vibe with you, do a challenge together, or engage in any of these things. I would say the first mechanic that people online came up with that actually activated this was the drop, the concept of, “Okay, at noon the sneakers are going to drop and you have to get them as fast as possible.” That’s fun. That is a great example of how you sell things. That’s how you get demand to actually convert into purchases is you do a drop or you make an exclusive thing or like you create a challenge and you motivate people to get behind the challenge. I believe it was Modest Proposal was on your podcast a long time ago, talking about eCommerce and this idea of getting all the friction out of commerce. That’s really not it. There’s some kinds of friction that are bad, but there are actually some kinds of friction that are really good. I talked to you about this in the Shopify podcast. This idea of a challenge is required to turn demand into buying. Different cultures do it in different ways, different kinds of retailers do it in different ways. A luxury brand like Gucci will do this in a very different way than a fast fashion brand like Forever 21 will do it. They’re obviously very, very different retailers. They move different kinds of merch for different kinds of price points. But they’re doing the same thing. Look at a really, really well run retailer like Aritzia. All of Aritzia is keyed into getting this latent demand to come in the door, activating it around this certain kind of challenge, and then converting it into incredible brand loyalty. That’s what really powers these businesses. Same on the merchant side, you have the challenge of tack. How do you convert that into something that will produce LTB for a very, very long time?

7. TIP457: Why The Dollar Is Not Collapsing w/ Jeffrey Snider – Trey Lockerbie and Jeffrey Snider

Trey Lockerbie (00:02:14):

So, we have a whole global monetary system right now that I think a lot of people would call a Petrodollar system, and we’re going to work a little bit backwards from what that means. There’s also the Eurodollar system in play that people may or may not be as familiar with. So, I want to actually start there with the Eurodollar. It’s a big loaded question, but going back to basics here, just simply tell us what is the Eurodollar?

Jeff Snider (00:02:39):

Well, technically speaking, and going back all the way to the beginning, Eurodollar refers to a very specific term, and it means US dollars on deposit outside the United States. In the early days, it actually took the form of actual cash deposit, physical Federal Reserve notes, bills, cash bills and things like that, that found their way mostly to Europe, but not just exclusively to Europe, thus the term Eurodollar. It doesn’t have anything to do with the European common currency. It is, again, the term Euro simply means offshore, because this goes way back to the 1950s and 1960s long before the European common currency was ever introduced. So, whenever you hear the term Euro and then attached to a currency denomination, what that simply means is money that the banking system uses outside the jurisdiction of the United States or even any of the other currency denominations that are floating around in it.

Jeff Snider (00:03:31):

So, there are things like Euroyen, for example, which means yen outside of Japan, that’s in this offshore currency system or even something like the Euroeuro, which is offshore euros. So, essentially, after beginning sometime in the 1950s and spreading through the 1960s, we have a huge, very much comprehensive global monetary system that undertook the roles of the reserve currency, global reserve currency, but it’s not actual cash. It’s not actual currency. There’s no money in it. It’s a virtual ledger system, a distributed ledger system that the global banking system operates and therefore has undertaken the roles of a reserve currency because banks have been able to flexibly and dynamically respond to the world in which they live in.

Jeff Snider (00:04:18):

So, for the last 60 years, this Eurodollar system has been essentially the global monetary reserve. And because it’s offshore, it’s outside the jurisdictions, not just the US, but pretty much anywhere, which is kind of a strange concept because these banks are located and doing business someplace. They’re physically located somewhere. But they have located and they have been able to take advantage of various regulatory blank spots, regulatory boundaries. So, this currency system has been able to grow and expand basically outside the reach of national governments, national regulators, bank regulators, whatever it may be and operate throughout the rest of the world. Again, so the point being to create this global reserve currency arrangement that goes back a long, long time.

Trey Lockerbie (00:05:05):

That last point there, what I hear you describing would maybe otherwise be called something like shadow banking, right? Or is that correct? And if not, what is a shadow bank and what is the shadow economic system?

Jeff Snider (00:05:16):

Well, shadow banking is part of it. That’s more about some of the non-bank participants who actually in this global monetary arrangement. I like to use the term shadow money, because they’re actually monetary forms that they don’t show up in any of the statistics. They don’t show up in any regulatory discussions. They’re not involved in any of the mainstream policy framework, because, again, this is outside the United States, it’s outside of every regulatory regime on earth and regulators are not too keen about people knowing about this vast, huge monetary system existing outside of their reach when their entire monetary policy and really political existence, it relies upon the idea that they are very much in control of this system and this arrangement.

Jeff Snider (00:05:57):

So, it’s outside of everyone’s reach, but also the ways in which these banks operate monetarily as well as credit has evolved and changed so that you have monetary forms like currency swaps, for example, that function every bit the same as cash would, except a currency swap doesn’t fit into a monetary aggregate, it doesn’t fit into any sort of quantitative measure, nor qualitative understanding. It doesn’t even fit into the bank balance sheets in a intuitive way. In essence, this is a virtual ledger money system, that’s a shadow money system because of the way the banks operate on their balance sheet.

Trey Lockerbie (00:06:32):

We’re going to explore the significance of that in a minute, but let’s keep with the basics for a minute. So, let’s say the US, we were on a gold standard for a very long time. We had to pay for some wars and stuff and we had to kind of break our promise that was the dollar was backed by gold, we kept changing the money multiplier over time. And at some point, it was unfeasible to continue on with the gold standard. So, like 71-ish, Nixon says, “Hey, you know what, we’re going off the gold standard into this fiat system.” And a lot of people said, “Okay, well,” there was this meeting with Saudi Arabia and we developed this agreement with them to now produce something called the Petrodollar system. And that’s what a lot of people believe we’re operating on today. But is that correct, Jeff? What’s your opinion?

Jeff Snider (00:07:12):

The short answer is no. And it’s a common misperception, because you can understand why. The Bretton Woods system, which was a quasi-gold-backed system, a commodity-based monetary system that grew out of World War II, in the ashes of World War II, where Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes in particular said, “We can’t just have an international currency arrangement because nobody will accept it. So we need to tie this international currency to some national reserve.” And historically speaking, people wanted to use gold, because gold for various reasons that we don’t need to get into here.

Jeff Snider (00:07:40):

So, you had the Bretton Woods system 1944, which always had this inherent flaw or inherent tendency in it as Robert Triffin called it in the late 1950s, eventually become called the Triffin’s paradox or Triffin’s dilemma, which was that in order to operate a global reserve currency, you need to have enough currency floating around the world to be effective. Because what is a global reserve currency? It’s a mediating currency where vastly different systems can connect to each other through this third-party mediating system or mediating currency so that trade, financial flows, all of the free market capitalism that we’ve come to love and honor, those things can happen in a very efficient fashion so that we can have a globalized, highly efficient economic system.

Jeff Snider (00:08:24):

The problem was by tying this international currency and using, for example, the US dollar or the British pound and backing that currency with national stores of physical bullion, there was always going to be the problem where there’d be too much currency needed outside the US, which would then lead to anyone ending up with that currency, redeeming the paper for national reserves. Eventually the national reserves of gold would be drained from the system and Triffin’s paradox would be that once those reserves were drained, the whole thing would just fall apart, which by the way, came close to happening in the late 1950s.

Jeff Snider (00:09:00):

So, we’re talking about not even really 15 years into Bretton Woods, it was already falling apart. So, this is where the Eurodollar steps into it, because it divorces the national currency from the national store of reserves. So, long before 1971, you had this global monetary arrangement, because it was reserveless, because it was ledger money that it began to undertake the roles of the former Bretton Woods system as it broke apart. So, by the time you get to August of 1971 and President Nixon closing the gold window, the Eurodollar had long undertaken all of those roles of the reserve currency before that.

Jeff Snider (00:09:36):

So, August of 1971 represented nothing more than the symbolic end of Bretton Woods when the functional end started a decade and a half before that. So, in terms of the Petrodollar, it wasn’t like we moved from a commodity goal-based monetary system to a oil-based system in the 1970s. We moved off of the commodity-based monetary system long before that. And it had superseded the Petrodollar, the stuff that happened in 1973, for example, and basically all of the functions of the Eurodollar were up and running for more than a decade by then. And even the Eurodollar system itself had become absolutely huge and immense by the early 1970s.

Jeff Snider (00:10:15):

So, the transition took place into something that was a ledger of ledger virtual currency system long before then. And it took place into this offshore bank-centered sort of blank canvas where banks could experiment in all different types of money, so that we transitioned long before from a commodity gold exchange system, the Bretton Woods, to this virtual reserveless currency system under the Eurodollar over a long period of time before we even get to 1973…

…Trey Lockerbie (00:13:59):

So, how much of the narrative that we’re currently operating on comes to us from our actual own Federal Reserve, or even say the media or education around the system that we’re currently in? Because as I understand it, your research has led you to study papers from internal employees at the Fed and elsewhere. And some of them know what’s going on. Some of them are discovering what’s going on through their work. And others just have no clue maybe because they’re in the system and they have that kind of myopic view. So, from the research you’ve done, what’s the takeaway of how informed the people within the system even understand how the global system is operating?

Jeff Snider (00:14:36):

The funny thing is, we always think scientific progress is linear. It always goes in one direction. But here’s an example of how monetary scholarship, academic scholarship about money actually move backwards. When you go back in time to do the historical research, you see there’s much more awareness, much more understanding, not the whole thing, but much more understanding about at least the basics of the Eurodollar system in contemporary time. So, back in the 1960s, for example, it took international authorities and national authorities about a decade after the Eurodollar system began to really start investigating it, because it had become that big of an issue even for national authorities like the Federal Reserve.

Jeff Snider (00:15:11):

But when they did, they were sort of putting bits and pieces of it together through… I mean, which makes sense because it’s a brand new development banks were doing things, they were not sharing the information with anybody, which is, again, why we call it shadow money. So, there was a huge, huge blind spot for even regulators and officials to try to deal with. But at that time, they did attempt to try to understand this Eurodollar system. But then they just, they stopped and they gave up, which begs the question, what is it the Fed did? What does the Fed actually do now? Which goes back to one of the initial quote that you said at the top, when I say the Fed isn’t a central bank, this is the reason why, because what happened was in the 1960s and 1970s, Federal Reserve officials, Treasury officials, government officials, officials at the BIS, or the IMF realized this monetary and banking evolution that was going on through the Eurodollar system made it almost impossible to define, let alone measure and regulate and keep on top of the monetary system.

Jeff Snider (00:16:08):

And if you’re a central bank, if you’re a legitimate central bank, whose job it is to regulate the monetary system, as we all believe, going back to Walter Bagehot in the 19th century, how do you do that when the monetary system has evolved, and it has evolved in these offshore, outside of regulation spaces that make it almost impossible for you to have much of an influence, let alone direct relationship with the banks operating there? So, what ended up happening was around the turn of the decade in the 1970s and 1980s, central bankers decided they just kind of threw up their hands and said, “Well, the monetary thing, it’s too complicated. It’s outside our jurisdiction. So, we can’t really do money anymore. Instead, we’re going to try to make it so that people believe we do money, this expectations-based policy, where we’ll communicate to the public that we’re doing something and hope that the public and banking system and business people all around the world or inside the United States will behave in ways that we want them to behave.”

Jeff Snider (00:17:02):

For example, it became commonplace that, Alan Greenspan, for example, would raise or lower the federal funds rate whenever he wanted to do something. So, if he wanted to “tighten credit” and tighten the monetary system, would he actually tighten the monetary system? Would he go into the monetary system and take money out? No, he raised the federal funds rate, which was nothing more than a signal to the economy at large and try to get the economy and try to get the markets to tighten conditions based on that signal, based on expectations. As he said, during that time, as his predecessors said before, “We just can’t keep track of the monetary system. Therefore, this is what we have left to be able to do to try to get some form of control over the economy and the marketplace.”

Jeff Snider (00:17:44):

So, it’s really about this evolution in money in banking that took place outside of their purview, which left official scrambling to try to do something else to at least attempt to maintain the role of what a central bank used to do, but it’s not a monetary role. It’s not involved in the monetary system itself. So, once that happened, monetary scholarship simply dried up. The term Eurodollar kind of disappeared, not just from internal discourse, but from public discourse as well. So, you have a wealth of scholarship up to around early 1980s and then just nothing. Because what happened was we were told, we were all told, we were taught this in school. “At that point, don’t fight the Fed, just whatever the Fed says, whatever the Fed, they must know what they’re talking about when it comes to money, you don’t need to know. Just trust Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. They’ve got it all covered.” So, once there was a vibrant monetary or debate and argument, it just kind of disappeared and dried up and went away.

Trey Lockerbie (00:18:40):

But it’s not all an illusion, is it? Because if we fast forward to today, we’re seeing it happen and play out in real time, where inflation is now high again as it hasn’t been for decades and they’re raising interest rates. And now we’re starting to see things like mortgage rates go up and home prices get underwritten in a new way. We’re seeing real economic impact from these decisions or actions from the Fed. So, where does the detachment actually occur in your opinion?

Jeff Snider (00:19:05):

Well, because that isn’t actually inflation. This isn’t due to money printing. This is sort of the federal… I mean, that’s why you didn’t see consumer prices react to QE6 back in 2020. Consumer prices didn’t start to skyrocket until March and April of 2021, which was coincident to the US treasuries helicopter drops. So, this wasn’t money printing, this wasn’t the Fed creating money. This wasn’t the Fed being a central bank. It was essentially a supply shock, which was the US government redistributed borrowing through the Treasury and mostly Treasury bills actually, the US government essentially redistributing cash into the pockets of consumers. And then consumers wind up spending that cash at a time when the ability of the global economic system to supply goods and then transport goods in particular was at its lowest point. So you see inventories of goods actually crash during these periods because we had essentially a supply shock.

Jeff Snider (00:19:59):

So, it isn’t inflation as much as it was consumer prices reacting to small E economics. Whenever you have a demand curve shift out to the right, especially when supply isn’t as any elastic as it was during that time, consumer prices have to react. I know most people are saying, “Who cares? Consumer prices went way up. What does it matter if it’s inflation? Or what does it matter if we call it inflation or not?” The issue is how it ends, because if it’s nothing more than a supply shock, it’s always going to be temporary and transitory rather than something like the 1970s, where you ignite the monetary spark of excessive currency, that leads to all sorts of, well, great inflation type of problems. So, how do we tell one from the other?

Jeff Snider (00:20:40):

And one of the things that consistent with excessive currency and money printing would’ve been destruction of the US dollar has been long proclaimed, long predicted, and long forecasted. But what you see ever since last year is the US dollars exchange value going up against almost every currency, because it wasn’t money that was printed. It was simply a supply shock. And because it wasn’t money printing, the way this is likely to end is in another bad way, which is a recession. That’s really what markets have been predicting over the last more than a year, actually, because the yield curve has been flattening. So, even as interest rates have been rising, the yield curve has been flattening. The Eurodollar futures curves have been flattening. All of the signals from the monetary system itself have been sending, “Hey, there’s no money here. This is not money printing. This is a supply shock and this is going to end predictably in something like a contraction or recession.” So, it was never inflation to begin with. It was simply small E economics of a supply issue.

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Amazon and Shopify. Holdings are subject to change at any time..

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

Here are the articles for the week ending 03 July 2022:

1. Why Foundational Models will Revolutionize the Future of Work and Play – Daniel Jeffries

It’s 2033 and you’re coming home from a dinner and realize your sister’s birthday is tomorrow and you forgot.

You ask your phone what’s the best gift for her and where you can get it at this late hour?

Your phone has dedicated processors for running Machine Learning (ML) models locally but it’s not powerful enough to answer that question with its small memory and slower chip speed.  But it is strong enough to ask a more powerful model in the sky.

The local model also learned a lot about what you and your family likes over time, so it packages up some key things it knows, anonymizes them, and fires off a query to a Foundational Model (FM) in the cloud via API.

In a fraction of a second, the answer comes back.

Your sister’s latest social media pics show she recently got on a serious health kick, lost weight, stopped drinking and got really into vegetarian cooking so it recommends an AirBnB cooking experience near her, with a local vegetarian chef.  It gives you two alternative experiences that are good but a bit further away and not as highly rated.  You don’t even need to go to the store and it’s the perfect present that makes you look like a hero…

…Across the world people are using cascaded FM’s networked together to do amazing work.  FMs on their own are amazing but working together they’re capable of astonishing feats and when they work with you they’re centaur units, a combination of man and machine working together to create something neither could do on their own.

Centaurs are named after Gary Kasparov’s early experiments with chess tournaments, where an AI and human teams bested pure AI and humans on their own. The tournament’s name came from the mythical beast of Greek legend that’s half horse and half man, symbolizing how man and machine can work together better…

…Biotech companies search through massive databases of proteins and chemical interactions and quickly use a fine tuned FM to design twenty potential drug candidates to fight a rare motor neuron disease that recently cropped up in South Africa.

A musician jams out a new tune and then asks the models to iterate on the chorus.  The 17th one is awesome and the musician plays it and then modifies it with a few tweaks to make it even more catchy based on a song he couldn’t get out of his head a week ago that he overheard on a radio at the local park. It goes on to be a huge hit on Soundcloud.

Materials scientists are designing new materials that make everything stronger and lighter, from skyscrapers that flex more easily to resist earthquakes, to electric bikes that are light enough to carry on your shoulder and fold up neatly to carry on the train.

Elite coders are simply telling the coding model what they want it to do and its spitting out near perfect Python code but it also recommends Go for several libraries because it will be faster and more secure.  It automatically does the translation between languages and tests it. It’s paired with an evolution through language model (ELM) coupled with a Large Language Model (LLM) and those models helps the coder create brand new, never before thought of code too, in a domain the model was never trained for by iterating on concepts quickly.

All of it is happening because of a vast global network of ambient AI models.  AI is everywhere now.  Every device is waking up and getting smarter.  We’ve industrialized intelligence and sparked a revolution in how we work, design, and play.

Welcome to the age of ambient AI…

…What are Foundation Models and why do they matter?

In essence, FMs are large models that exhibit remarkable capabilities, such as the ability to understand language, reason, create working computer code, do translations and arithmetic, understand chains of logic, generate totally new art from text prompts, and much much more.

The basic concept of FMs comes to us from Stanford University where they primarily refer to Large Language Models (LLM), like GPT-3, that are typically transformers. But the implications of FM’s go way beyond today’s architectures.  They’re a groundbreaking type of software, that’s not limited to transformers or language.

We can think of FM’s are any large and sophisticated model.  We can also think of them as a chain of cascading models that work together to do a complex task such as generate music or images or video, create mathematical proofs, design new materials or discover new drugs and more.

Many of them are already here.

GPT-3, from OpenAI, powers GitHub co-pilot that quickly writes code for developers, especially boring, repetitive code so they can focus on more creative tasks.  It’s one of the first fantastic examples of a centaur.  Originally, GitHub’s team wasn’t sure who would use it.  Would it be beginning or advanced coders?  Since its wider release to all developers, the answer is clear: advanced coders love it and use it most often.  Advanced coders are in the best position to understand when the model makes a mistake and it dramatically speeds up their day to day coding…

…In another article, called The Coming Age of Generalized AI, I highlighted researchers who were working on even more groundbreaking approaches by combining mega-models with several other key techniques.  One of techniques, called progress and compress that comes to us from DeepMind, combines three techniques, progressive neural networks, elastic weight consolidation and knowledge distillation.

The idea is simple. Create two networks, a fast learning network and a base model. That roughly mirrors the functioning of our brain yet again. Think of it as the hippocampus and neocortex. As Hannah Peterson writes in her article on catastrophic forgetting,  “In our brains, the hippocampus is responsible for “rapid learning and  acquiring new experiences” and the neocortex is tasked with “capturing  common knowledge of all observed tasks.” That dual network approach is called a progressive neural network.

The fast neural network is smaller and more agile. It learns new tasks then transfers the finalized weights to the base model. So you end up with a lot of stored neural networks good at a bunch of tasks.

But there’s a problem with basic progressive neural nets. They don’t share information bi-directionally. You train the fast network on one task and freeze those weights and transfer them to the bigger network for storage but if you train the network first on recognizing dogs, it can’t help the new network training on cats. The cat training starts from  scratch.

Progress and Compress fixes that problem by using a technique called knowledge distillation, developed by deep learning godfather Geoffrey Hinton. Basically, it  involves averaging all the weights of different neural nets together to create a single neural network. Now you can combine your dog trained model and cat trained model and each model shares knowledge bi-directionally. The new network is sometimes slightly worse or slightly better at recognizing either animal but it can do both.

It opens the door to cat-like intelligence.

A cat is a remarkable creature. It can run fast, sleep in tiny boxes, find food and water,  eat, sleep, purr, defend itself, climb trees, land on its feet from  great heights and a hundreds of other subtasks. A cat won’t learn language or suddenly start composing poetry. That’s perfectly fine because a cat is really well suited to its set of tasks; it doesn’t need  to build skyscrapers too.

Having a cat level intelligence is incredibly compelling. If you have a cleaning robot that can wash  dishes, pick up clothes, fold them, carry them from place to place and  iron shirts, that’s an incredible machine that people would clamor to buy. It doesn’t also need to write music, craft building blueprints, talk to you about your relationship problems, and fly a plane too…

…AI is a universal, general purpose technology.

The greatest breakthroughs in history are always universal technologies that affect a broad range of sectors as they branch into countless other domains and inspire unexpected breakthroughs.

Think of the printing press and the way it leveled up human knowledge across the board because now we could scale, save and replicate knowledge much faster.

Think steam engines that changed the very nature of work from human and animal powered muscle work to work done by machines.

Think of the microprocessors and computers that changed how we do art, communicate, design skyscrapers and houses, fight wars, find love, do science, make music and movies and more.

A general purpose technology like AI has direct and secondary effects on the world at large, both good and bad and everything in between.

We can think of ideas and technology as they grow and change and affect both their own domains and unexpected domains as a growing tree.  The roots are precursor ideas that eventually inspire the primary idea.  The trunk is the central breakthrough idea, which leads to a branching series of closely related ideas and some unexpected inventions in parallel domains.

2. Reducing Inflation Will Come at a Great Cost: Stagflation – Ray Dalio

More specifically, I now hear it commonly said that inflation is the big problem so the Fed needs to tighten to fight inflation, which will make things good again once it gets inflation under control. I believe this is both naïve and inconsistent with how the economic machine works. That’s because that view only focuses on inflation as the problem and it sees Fed tightening as a low-cost action that will make things better when inflation goes away, but it’s not like that. The facts are that: 1) prices rise when the amount of spending increases by more than the quantities of goods and services sold increase and 2) the way central banks fight inflation is by taking money and credit away from people and companies to reduce their spending. They also take buying power away by raising interest rates, which increases the amount of money that has to go toward paying interest and decreases the amount of money that goes toward spending. Raising interest rates also lowers spending because it lowers the value of investment assets because of the “present value effect” (which I won’t get into because it would be too much of a digression), which further lowers buying power. My main point is that while tightening reduces inflation because it results in people spending less, it doesn’t make things better because it takes buying power away. It just shifts some of the squeezing of people via inflation to squeezing them via giving them less buying power.

The only way to raise living standards over the long term is to raise productivity and central banks don’t do that…

…In summary my main points are that 1) there isn’t anything that the Fed can do to fight inflation without creating economic weakness, 2) with debt assets and liabilities as high as they are and projected to increase due to the government deficit, and the Fed also selling government debt, it is likely that private credit growth will have to contract, weakening the economy, and 3) over the long run the Fed will most likely chart a middle course that will take the form of stagflation. 

3. The Beer Game – Peter Dizikes

Thursday, August 29, 1:00 p.m.

It is a miserably muggy afternoon in Cambridge as the incoming class of the MIT Sloan School of Management—roughly 400 students from 41 countries—files into a second-floor ballroom at the Kendall Square Marriott. They are here to play the Beer Game, a Sloan orientation tradition. Unfortunately given the weather, the Beer Game does not involve drinking cool beverages…

…Rather, the Beer Game is a table game, developed in the late 1950s by digital computing pioneer and Sloan professor Jay Forrester, SM ’45. Played with pen, paper, printed plastic tablecloths, and poker chips, it simulates the supply chain of the beer industry. In so doing, it illuminates aspects of system dynamics, a signature mode of MIT thought: it illustrates the nonlinear complexities of supply chains and the way individuals are circumscribed by the systems in which they act…

…1:30 p.m.

Each Beer Game team is divided into four units of two players each, who play the roles of retailer, wholesaler, distributor, and brewer. The goal is to keep team operating costs as low as possible. We learn that teams will be penalized for having too much inventory (50 cents per case of beer per week) or unfilled back orders ($1 per case per week). Each link in the supply chain keeps track of its own costs, but a team’s score is the sum of these tallies. The lower the score, the better.

As we begin the first of 50 rounds (which represent weeks), each retailer unit draws a card indicating consumer demand for cases of beer; at the same time, all the units send slips of paper with orders up the supply chain. In response, cases of beer—represented by poker chips—move in the opposite direction, from brewer to retailer. A small number of chips are already at every station when we start.

2:15 p.m.

After 20 rounds, my team is on a hot streak.

I’m sitting at the retailer station with finance student Adah Jung, who’s been submitting orders at a level closely mimicking consumer demand. Our score at the retail station is low, and there are few chips elsewhere on the table, meaning our team’s costs are minimal. It’s hard to see how things could go wrong: with seven smart teammates and a stable supply chain, why can’t we win this thing? I can almost hear Sterman asking us to stand for a round of applause.

2:35 p.m.

Seemingly out of nowhere, our team’s distributorship has an inventory of 178 surplus cases of beer, which lasts seven weeks, adding $623 to our costs in a game where the average score after 50 weeks is $2,000 per team. How did that happen? Can’t someone tell our two teammates at the brewery just to stop making so much beer?

Well, no. “I can’t tell them anything,” observes teammate Juan Trujillo. Indeed, to simulate the incomplete information we deal with in real life, players cannot communicate across stations, apart from relaying orders. And somehow, someone on our team ordered way too much beer…

…3:30 p.m.

Sterman’s assistants tape charts to the ballroom walls detailing every team’s performance. Today’s winning score was $460 (the best possible score is about $200), while the worst-performing team racked up $6,618 in costs.

Sterman initiates a discussion, pointing out how inventories and backlogs spike and plummet erratically. The distributor on today’s last-place team went from a backlog of 70 cases to an inventory of 191 in three weeks.

One thing to learn from the Beer Game, then, is why many businesses experience boom-and-bust cycles—oil and gas exploration and housing among them. Complex systems produce nonlinear phenomena.

4:15 p.m.

Sterman pounds home a bigger lesson: our psychological habits and limited perspectives often keep us from properly understanding complex systems. To prove it, he asks distributors, wholesalers, and brewers to estimate their consumer demand; their responses are wildly inaccurate.

All too often, Sterman adds, this means we attribute problems to other people rather than to flawed systems. For instance: “I found that some people were kind of slow to take corrective action,” offers one student—who had just played for the winning team, a fact Sterman emphasizes to much hilarity.

It doesn’t make sense for us retailers to blame our teammates—who had imperfect information—for our disappointing scores. “It just cannot be true that, by chance, all the smart people ended up as retailers and all of the people running the factories were dumb,” Sterman says. The Beer Game’s structure makes it hard for certain players to perform well. It’s not the people; it’s the system.

Thus, firing people tends to be a futile management action. “Your role as a leader is to create a system in which everybody can thrive,” he says…

4. Why does the Stock Market go up? – Eugene Ng

A Google Search of “Why does the Stock Market go up?”, and Investopedia gives you up a broad range of factors.

The factors range from the supply and demand of buyers and sellers, to economic indicators, consumer confidence, wars/politics, concerns over inflation / deflation, government fiscal / monetary policy, technological changes, natural disasters or weather events, corporate or government performance data, regulation/deregulation, and the level of trust in the financial sector and legal system, amongst so many others.

But this doesn’t really answer the question, doesn’t it? It only leaves you, more confused, and begging for a better answer…

…The factors listed above are not wrong. Yet, they do not help you figure out why stock prices rise.

In the short-term, stocks will move up and down for a variety of random reasons — all of which does nothing to increase your chances of a positive return.

Thus a better question would be:

“Since the short-term does not really matter as much, why then does the stock market go up over the long-term?”

To get closer to the truth, you need to understand the components which drive the returns on your stock investment.

The Total Shareholder Return (TSR) from holding common publicly-traded stocks can be broken down into three key components: (1) growth in Earnings per Share (EPS), (2) change in the Price-to-Earning (PE) valuation multiples, and (3) earnings from dividends…

…With S&P Global providing us with historical data on the S&P 500’s closing levels, Sales per Share (SPS), Earnings per Share (EPS) and Dividend per Share (DPS), they provide clues on what the growth has been thus far…

…Take 2021 to 2003, the longest period spanning over 18 years (first row, last 5 columns from the right). During this time, the S&P 500 Index more than quadrupled from 1,112 to 4,766, with TSR* growing by ~4.3X (8.2% CAGR).

The contribution of the Earnings per Share (EPS) growth is telling. Earnings per Share (EPS) grew by ~4.1X (8.1% CAGR) from 48.7 to 197.9. Further breaking down that EPS growth, Sales per Share (SPS) grew by ~2.2X (4.5% CAGR) and Net Income Margin Growth (NIM) grew by ~1.8X (3.5% CAGR).

Thus the growth in earnings (EPS) accounted for the majority (~95%) of the TSR* growth, with growth in sales/revenues (SPS) and improvement in net income profit margins (NIM) accounting for ~52% and ~43% of TSR* growth respectively…

…Given what we have laid out so far, you, you should not be surprised to learn that over the long-term, it is earnings growth, supported by revenue and profit growth, that drives the stock market higher, and to a much lesser extent, valuation multiples.

5. Pioneer Helped Turn Her Family Store Into Japan’s Biggest Retailer – Chieko Tsuneoka

First her father died young, then her mother, then her older sister. At 23, Chizuko Okada inherited the job of running her family’s clothing store in Mie prefecture, Japan.

It was 1939, and war with America was just around the corner. Few could have foreseen that the little business would develop into Japan’s largest retailer by sales—or that a woman would be its driving force.

By the time Chizuko Kojima—her married name—died on May 20 of old age at 106, the company now known as Aeon Co. had thousands of stores around Japan and the rest of Asia and annual revenue equivalent to $64 billion…

…Ms. Kojima was born on March 3, 1916, as the second daughter of the Okada family, which had run a fabric and kimono store since 1758 in Mie prefecture, just west of Nagoya in central Japan.

Chizuko’s father, Soichiro Okada, modernized the business but died of heart disease in 1927 at age 43. Then Japan was hit by the Great Depression, which caused bankruptcies and joblessness.

In a 2003 book, Chizuko wrote that she believed it was necessary to be ready for such cataclysms by studying history. The hard times deprived her of a chance to pursue higher education in Tokyo.

After taking over the family business, Chizuko managed to keep it going during World War II until a U.S. bombing raid destroyed much of their home city of Yokkaichi in June 1945, including the Okada store’s stock.

At the time, customers held coupons similar to gift certificates entitling them to store goods. The store no longer had anything to offer, but Chizuko posted notices throughout the city saying her shop would give cash in exchange for the coupons, recalled her younger brother, Takuya, in a 2005 autobiography. It was a way of maintaining customers’ loyalty that would pay ample dividends in years to come.

Chizuko loved studying and during the war, she read a book about Germany’s inflation after it lost World War I. When Japan surrendered in World War II in August 1945, she predicted the same would happen. She gathered her cash and bank loans and bought as much merchandise as possible, reopening the shop in March 1946, ahead of an inflationary surge that hurt other businesses.

“All the merchandise flew off the shelves,” Takuya recalled.

Chizuko wrote of the episode, “Through my own experience, I learned the importance of studying and reading records of the past.”…

…In 1959, when the Okada family business still had just two stores, she came back to take charge of personnel and other behind-the-scenes management issues.

That year, Chizuko and Takuya made their first visit to the U.S. and toured the famous Sears, Roebuck and Co. store in Chicago. Takuya wrote that he was impressed by the giant scale of the business. Paging through the thick Sears catalog full of pictures of refrigerators, washing machines, clothing and a myriad of other goods, he imagined the day that Japan, too, would enjoy that kind of affluent life.

Chizuko was impressed by the Sears pension system, thinking it would create a loyal workforce. She introduced one a decade later, as her brother rapidly expanded the retailer through mergers. She also introduced an in-house training organization, today known as the Aeon Business School…

…Chizuko was one of the first managers in Japan who aggressively hired female full-time employees and homemakers as part-timers. She saw that many women worked in the U.S. and believed Japan should follow suit.

By having women at the company, “we were able to bring on board the viewpoint of the customer—how much to sell and at what price,” she said in a television interview when she was 90.

6. Make Haste Slowly – Chris Mayer

I had been reading The Art of Worldly Wisdom: A Pocket Oracle, a book written in 1647 by Baltasar Gracian, who was a witty Jesuit from Spain. His book of 300 aphorisms, with  his commentary on them, has been translated into many languages and has earned the praise of many philosophers ever since.

Arthur Schopenhauer loved it so much that he prepared a German translation himself. Schopenhauer said it was particularly good for young people, as it would give them experience it would otherwise take years to obtain. “To read it through once,” he wrote, “is obviously not enough; it is a book made for constant use.”…

…Anyway, there is a passage where Gracian talks about the motto “festina lente.” This Latin phrase is usually translated as “make haste slowly.” One must be very patient and yet ready to act swiftly. And the fastest way to achieve your goals is sometimes by doing nothing.

The motto was a favorite of the Roman Emperor Augustus. Engravers captured the idea with an emblem of a dolphin wrapped around an anchor, which they stamped on coins. Another emblem captured the same idea with a crab and a butterfly; again marrying this idea of fast and slow.

Festine lente recurs throughout history and has been captured in a variety of images, such as a rabbit coming out of a snail shell. The Medicis chose it as their motto and illustrated it with a sail-backed tortoise.

I thought the idea beautifully captured an important idea in investing that is often counterintuitive: to get where you want to go the fastest often means acting very slowly if at all…

…It does seem incredibly counterintuitive to say, “No, you shouldn’t  try to sell before a recession.” Or: “No, you shouldn’t ‘reposition’ your portfolio based on recent events.”  Don’t these seem like logical things to do?

Not if you want to enjoy the wonderful effects of compounding capital over long periods of time. The main problem with trying to do the above is they are too hard to do well enough. You have to think about trying to do these things repeatedly over a lifetime of investing. The odds against you are very great. Sure, you may be right sometimes. But you will most certainly sit out stretches of time where you could have earned great returns because you’re afraid of a recession. Odds are you won’t get those “repositionings” right repeatedly either.

7. How Parents’ Trauma Leaves Biological Traces in Children – Rachel Yehuda

After the twin towers of the World Trade Center collapsed on September 11, 2001, in a haze of horror and smoke, clinicians at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai in Manhattan offered to check anyone who’d been in the area for exposure to toxins. Among those who came in for evaluation were 187 pregnant women. Many were in shock, and a colleague asked if I could help diagnose and monitor them. They were at risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD—experiencing flashbacks, nightmares, emotional numbness or other psychiatric symptoms for years afterward. And were the fetuses at risk?

My trauma research team quickly trained health professionals to evaluate and, if needed, treat the women. We monitored them through their pregnancies and beyond. When the babies were born, they were smaller than usual—the first sign that the trauma of the World Trade Center attack had reached the womb. Nine months later we examined 38 women and their infants when they came in for a wellness visit. Psychological evaluations revealed that many of the mothers had developed PTSD. And those with PTSD had unusually low levels of the stress-related hormone cortisol, a feature that researchers were coming to associate with the disorder.

Surprisingly and disturbingly, the saliva of the nine-month-old babies of the women with PTSD also showed low cortisol. The effect was most prominent in babies whose mothers had been in their third trimester on that fateful day. Just a year earlier a team I led had reported low cortisol levels in adult children of Holocaust survivors, but we’d assumed that it had something to do with being raised by parents who were suffering from the long-term emotional consequences of severe trauma. Now it looked like trauma leaves a trace in offspring even before they are born.

In the decades since, research by my group and others has confirmed that adverse experiences may influence the next generation through multiple pathways. The most apparent route runs through parental behavior, but influences during gestation and even changes in eggs and sperm may also play a role. And all these channels seem to involve epigenetics: alterations in the way that genes function. Epigenetics potentially explains why effects of trauma may endure long after the immediate threat is gone, and it is also implicated in the diverse pathways by which trauma is transmitted to future generations.

The implications of these findings may seem dire, suggesting that parental trauma predisposes offspring to be vulnerable to mental health conditions. But there is some evidence that the epigenetic response may serve as an adaptation that might help the children of traumatized parents cope with similar adversities. Or could both possible outcomes be true?..

…It is tempting to interpret epigenetic inheritance as a story of how trauma results in permanent damage. Epigenetic influences might nonetheless represent the body’s attempts to prepare offspring for challenges similar to those encountered by their parents. As circumstances change, however, the benefits conferred by such alterations may wane or even result in the emergence of novel vulnerabilities. Thus, the survival advantage of this form of intergenerational transmission depends in large part on the environment encountered by the offspring themselves.

Moreover, some of these stress-related and intergenerational changes may be reversible. Several years ago we discovered that combat veterans with PTSD who benefited from cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy showed treatment-induced changes in FKBP5 methylation. The finding confirmed that healing is also reflected in epigenetic change. And Dias and Ressler reconditioned their mice to lose their fear of cherry blossoms; the offspring conceived after this “treatment” did not have the cherry blossom epigenetic alteration, nor did they fear the scent. Preliminary as they are, such findings represent an important frontier in psychiatry and may suggest new avenues for treatment.

The hope is that as we learn more about the ways catastrophic experiences have shaped both those who lived through those horrors and their descendants, we will become better equipped to deal with dangers now and in the future, facing them with resolution and resilience.

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Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Alphabet (parent of Google) and Wix. Holdings are subject to change at any time.