We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.
Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!
But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.
Here are the articles for the week ending 15 May 2022:
1. An Interview with Coda Founder (and Bundle Expert) Shishir Mehrotra – Ben Thompson and Shishir Mehrotra
SM: Maybe we can start with some background on where I came from. Before I started Coda, I spent about six years running the YouTube products at Google. Most of that time, our presumption was that YouTube was going to be an ad-supported product. Obviously, this is still how the majority of YouTube is run, but we always thought that at some point we would add in this paid model, and we’d have some way for creators to make money from payments or subscriptions, or so on, but it wasn’t ever a top priority.
We tried things, but we always put our fifth or six priority on it, and they never really worked, I think over time I counted ten different experiments that we tried. One of my favorite ones was we spent nine months on this paid platform launch, it made a hundred dollars. Not a hundred dollars per day, or a hundred dollars per week, but all time, a hundred dollars. We bought pizza for the team, we shut it down.
Through this period, we keep trying these experiments, none of them work. At some point, I ended up having this conversation with a friend at actually one of the cable companies. We’re describing how this was working and he asked me how we felt about bundling. I said, “Oh yeah, we’ve tried everything, but we’re not going to do bundling. Bundling is evil.” He said, “What do you mean bundling is evil?” It was very interesting, it just stuck in my head.
This part, I definitely disagree with you, because I think bundling is the most amazing thing ever.
SM: For sure! That’s where I changed my mind. But it’s like, you ask anybody about bundling and first off, we say the word bundling, what do they think of? In the US, they think of Comcast and nobody really has positive interpretations of Comcast. In their head, they’re thinking bundling is cheating somebody, but we basically came to the conclusion that that is incorrect. So I developed, started doing all this research, and started coming up with this framework of what became this paper Four Myths of Bundling.
The core idea is that bundling is actually beneficial to all three parties. It’s beneficial to the consumer, to the providers, and to the bundler. This is because the heart of bundling is based off of balancing the needs of superfans and casual fans, I think this is one of the things that people often mistake about it. Of the four myths, the fourth one is the one that’s most cited, which is the reality that the best bundles are the ones that minimize superfan overlap and maximize casual fan overlap…
…I think it’s always been so important to have something physical — in the case of cable companies, they had a wire. That was an obvious bundling point that actually had nothing to do with the programming. You got the widest possible array of stuff that at the same time made total sense together.
SM: Yeah. When we talk about this at Spotify, we call this go-to-market alignment instead of superfan alignment, people mistake the two. A famous Spotify bundle that really worked was the student bundle. If you’re a student, you can get Hulu, Spotify, and Showtime for five bucks a month. Most people think that’s a big loss leader, or a marketing stunt, or so on — it’s not at all. It makes tons of money for all three parties, and has grown that business a lot. But one of the things that makes it work is that the wire, to use your analogy, is the student. What are all the things the student needs when they go to school? You can start stacking all these services into it. To pick something out of the B2B world, the most famous bundler in that world is Microsoft…
...As I understand it, it was kind of how you got connected with Daniel Ek and you ended up joining the Spotify board. I’m curious, to the extent you can talk about it, beyond that student bundle, how does your thinking about bundling impact the way Spotify is approaching things? Is podcasting a bundle play? How expansive is this?
SM: The student thing was probably the first step, but by far the biggest bundling experiment at Spotify is podcasting. I think the core idea — Daniel and I started riffing on this, to give lot of the credit, Daniel had basically the same ideas, we were very aligned on how to think about this. He just asked me to help formalize them and write them down, which turned into the Four Mythos of Bundling doc.
At that time, Spotify was synonymous with music and still is for a lot of people. One of the insights that Daniel had, in thinking about bundling, is what if we were to take something, let’s use your wire analogy, that still had a through line that people could understand, but drew a totally different group of superfans.
Daniel uses this line a lot that the video market, depending on how you size it is call it a trillion dollars in revenue a year — the audio market, radio and so on, is a tenth of that. He often talks about this idea that “Are your ears really worth the 10th of your eyes”? Of course not, it doesn’t make any sense, and he talks about how that market can grow. But all of that was I think Daniel did this genius job of saying, “Hey, this through line is going to be audio,” but fundamentally, what we’re going to do is we’re going to take products for which the superfans have incredibly distinct audiences. The set of people that care about listening to mystery podcasts, or to news bloggers, or to sports bloggers, or so on.
Or subscriptions to podcasts like Stratechery, available on Spotify.
SM: Exactly! We should talk more about that too; I think the fact that’s available on Spotify is amazing. But I think that idea of, “We’re going to pull this thing together”, is absolutely the idea of minimizing superfan overlap, maximizing casual fan overlap. You can actually see it, we have a team of economists at Spotify that try to measure that impact, there’s a part of the paper that talks about this concept we call Marginal Churn Contribution (MCC), which is, if you think about how you should divide up accountability or money in a bundle, we believe the right way to do it is something we call marginal churn contribution, which is if you were to remove this thing, how many people would churn from the product?
I love that. I’m going to completely steal that terminology, because you see this again and again when people are talking about sports, “Why does ESPN command so much money?”, or “Why do regional sports networks command so much money relative to their tiny audience sizes?” It’s this exact point. If you really like sports and your bundle does not have ESPN, you are going to leave. We saw this last year: Disney just put YouTube TV over the barrel because they tried to go one day without ESPN. It was like, “Nope, not going back going to happen.”
SM: Right. If you’re a Lakers fan, you’re going to end up getting that network. It works. The mistake many people make is they try to correlate usage with MCC, with marginal return contribution, and it’s generally wrong. In fact, if you were to take a graph and you plot on one axis you plot usage, on the other axis, you plot MCC, sometimes people call it anchor value, you could draw a diagonal line through it and everything below that line is things where usage matters more than anchor value, or more than MCC and above that line is things where your MCC matters more than usage. You get two completely different business models. For example, much of the content we had on YouTube at the time drove significantly more usage than it did MCC, if I removed any piece of it, you would still just come.
Which is sort of the UGC [user-generated content] idea in general, isn’t it? In that case, you’ve completely commoditized your suppliers because there is no special supply. There’s always other supply to put there.
SM: Well that’s not a very positive way to think about it! What it does do is it leads to an advertising-based business model. If usage is more important than MCC, then the right way to monetize that product is probably advertising. On the other hand, if you’re above that diagonal, and you have things where access is more important than usage, no matter how much I love your podcast and your newsletter, I can’t listen to them over and over again, I’m not going to read the newsletter over and over again.
Please don’t.
SM: You’re only going to get so much usage out of me, but I pay for it because why? I’m sure you’ve asked, but if you ask people, “Why do you pay for Stratechery”? I think it makes me feel smarter, I feel better informed when I’m in this other discussion. I think you know that you’re well read by some really important people out there. It creates a common understanding for us, but it’s uncorrelated to how much time they spend on it, it’d be a dumb way to measure it.
I get in trouble when I go too long.
SM: Right! Exactly. I don’t want that, I want synthesis out of you. One of the things that happens, one of the reasons I’m so excited about the bundling work, it’s a fun theory. People have all sorts of different hobbies, I have this weird one, I like bundling. (laughing) I have rather normal hobbies too!
(laughing) Theoretically, if this weren’t a podcast to talk about Coda, I’d be like, “Oh my God, I can talk about bundling for an hour. I’m ready to go.”
SM: That’s right. Well, I’ll tell you why the concept of bundling is relevant. We talk about it with some very literal examples, and you talk about product bundling, and Comcast, and so on. But the core idea of “people value access over usage” is a really interesting idea. This idea of marginal churn contribution actually applies to products in general. You’re building a product, and you like Coda, and you say, “Hey, what should I do next?” You kind of have two choices. You have things that are going to drive usage and things that are going to drive new users, you’re going to create MCC. You can apply the exact same philosophy the same way, “I’m going to add this thing, I think it’s going to add new users”, or prevent them from churning, versus things that are going to increase usage. When you use that framework, you see the world a little bit differently, you think about marginal impact, which is much more powerful than some of the other way of measuring success.
2. Terra Flops – Matt Levine
An “algorithmic stablecoin” sounds complicated, and there are a lot of people with incentives to pretend that it is complicated, but it is not. Here is how an algorithmic stablecoin works[1]:
1. You wake up one morning and invent two crypto tokens.
2. One of them is the stablecoin, which I will call “Terra,” for reasons that will become apparent.
3. The other one is not the stablecoin. I will call it “Luna.”
4. To be clear, they are both just things you made up, just numbers on a ledger. (Probably the ledger is maintained on a decentralized blockchain, though in theory you could do this on your computer in Excel.)
5. You try to find people to buy them.
6. Luna will trade at some price determined by supply and demand. If you make it up on your computer and keep the list in Excel and smirk when you tell people about this, that price will be zero, and none of this will work.
7. But if you do a good job of marketing Luna, that price will not be zero. If the price is not zero then you’re in business.
8. You promise that people can always exchange one Terra for $1 worth of Luna. If Luna trades at $0.10, then one Terra will get you 10 Luna. If Luna trades at $20, then one Terra will get you 0.05 Luna. Doesn’t matter. The price of Luna is arbitrary, but one Terra always gets you $1 worth of Luna. (And vice versa: People can always exchange $1 worth of Luna for one Terra.)
9. You set up an automated smart contract — the “algorithm” in “algorithmic stablecoin” — to let people exchange their Terras for Lunas and Lunas for Terras.[2]
10. Terra should trade at $1. If it trades above $1, people — arbitrageurs — can buy $1 worth of Luna for $1 and exchange them for one Terra worth more than a dollar, for an instant profit. If it trades below $1, people can buy one Terra for less than a dollar and exchange it for $1 worth of Luna, for an instant profit. These arbitrage trades push the price of Terra back to $1 if it ever goes higher or lower.
11. The price of Luna will fluctuate. Over time, as trust in this ecosystem grows, it will probably mostly go up. But that is not essential to the stablecoin concept. As long as Luna robustly has a non-zero value, you can exchange one Terra for some quantity of Luna that is worth $1, which means Terra should be worth $1, which means that its value should be stable
All of this is, I think, quite straightforward and correct, except for Point 7, which is insane. If you overcome that — if you can find a way to make Luna worth some nonzero amount of money — then everything works fine. That is the whole ballgame. In theory this seems hard, since you just made up Luna. In practice it seems very easy, as there are dozens and dozens of cryptocurrencies that someone just made up that are now worth billions of dollars. The principal ways to do this are:
- Collect some transaction fees from people who exchange Luna for Terra or Terra for Luna, and then pay some of those fees to holders of Luna as, effectively, interest on their Luna holdings. (Or pay interest on Terra, creating demand for Luna that people can exchange into Terra to get the interest.[3])
- Talk about building an ecosystem of smart contracts, programmable money, etc. on top of Terra and Luna, so that people treat Luna as a way to use that ecosystem — as effectively stock in the company that you are building and ascribe a lot of value to it.
These things reinforce each other: The more fees you collect and distribute to Luna holders, the more big and viable your ecosystem looks, so the more highly people value it, so the more Luna they buy, so the more activity you have, so the more fees you collect, etc.
But there is no magic here. There is no algorithm to guarantee that Luna is always worth some amount of money. The algorithm just lets people exchange Terra for Luna. Luna is valuable if people think it’s valuable and believe in the long-term value of the system that you are building, and not if they don’t.
The danger here is that Point 7 never goes away. Any morning, people could wake up and say “wait a minute, you just made up this all up, it’s worthless,” and decide to dump their Lunas and Terras. If people decide to dump their Lunas then the price of Luna goes down.
If people decide to dump their Terras — “wait,” you say, “there’s an algorithm; the price of Terra can’t go down.” If people decide to dump their Terras, then the price of Terra goes down from $1 to like $0.97, and arbitrageurs step in, buy Terras for $0.97 and exchange them for $1 worth of Luna.
Yeah. Well. The problem is that if people lose confidence in this system, they decide to dump both Lunas and Terras. Someone sells some Terras. Arbitrageurs step in, buy Terra for $0.99, and exchange it for $1 worth of Luna. Luna is at, say, $40, so each Terra gets you 0.025 Luna. Then the arbitrageurs sell their 0.025 Luna in the market, which drives down the price of Luna, which is falling anyway. Someone else sells some Terras, but now Luna is at $20, so each Terra gets 0.05 Luna, which arbitrageurs sell, and now Luna is at $10, so each Terra gets you 0.10 Luna, which then get sold, so Luna goes to $5, so each Terra gets you 0.2 Luna, etc. There is no natural stopping point for this process because Luna is just a thing you made up, and because it represents essentially confidence in your ecosystem, and as the price of Luna crashes that confidence ebbs away. And so eventually Luna trades at $0.0001 and you exchange one Terra for 10,000 Luna and you try to sell them and there are no buyers and so no one wants to arbitrage the price of Terra and so the price of Terra falls below $1 and everyone gives up on the stablecoin and the ecosystem and everything and it all goes to zero.
3. Jeff Jordan – Building & Investing in Marketplaces – Patrick O’Shaughnessy and Jeff Jordan
[00:05:31] Patrick: eBay, since it’s literally the perfect model of a marketplace is maybe the place to focus on for now. What kinds of actions did that mean when you were at eBay operating to try to promote price discovery or price equilibrium or something like that? What were you literally doing?
[00:05:46] Jeff: The most interesting thing is early on we try all these initiatives that we baked on our own and debuted the community. And we found out the leverage was way more to watch what the nascent behavior the community was doing and seek to amplify it. So the iconic thing there is Simon Rothman who’s bounced around. He’s a Valley veteran now. Early on in his career was just a early exec there and he has a very high interest in collectible cars. And one day I think he was searching for Maserati or Ferrari and expecting to see little replica cars and he found real ones. And it’s just like, “Why are people selling Lamborghini’s on eBay?” Well, it turned out Lamborghini’s are only sold on the coasts. And so if you’re in the middle of the country, it’s very hard to buy one typically and eBay entrepreneurs were figuring out, “Okay, here’s what we do.” So we took that nascent behavior and built eBay Motors, which then made it much easier to list and discover cars, generated the supply and created the awareness. The best actions we had was watch that nascent community behavior and amplify.
[00:06:51] Patrick: When you’re looking at a new marketplace for the first time, I’ll hold off on the discussion between horizontal and vertical marketplaces which we’ll come to at some point. But if you’re just looking de novo at a marketplace as an investor with your investor hat on, what are the features that you are zoomed in on most quickly that matter to you with all this experience?
[00:07:09] Jeff: Two main ones. One is fragmentation of the marketplace. I often have used the difference between OpenTable and Fandango in explaining this. OpenTable, the average restaurant owner on OpenTable owns one restaurant. And so aggregating them is a pain in the ass. But once you’ve aggregated them, it’s a very valuable thing. Whereas Fandango basically has deals with the five or six major theater chains and any one of them can have market power because if AMC pulls out of Fandango, I am motivated to go to amc.com and figure it out. When I was explaining this theory to a fellow board member and accolade Michael Klein and I explained the theory and he looks at me very quizzically and I go, “What?” He goes, “You do know I’m the founder of Fandango, right?” You’re like, “Oh crap.” So one is fragmentation.
The other is ideally lead gen. You’re creating relationships that otherwise wouldn’t have been created. The thing you try to avoid is “Okay, I have a relationship with my car repair man, my hair stylist, my whatever and it’s a frequent relationship.” Those don’t do well because the service provider, they’ll pay a little bit for convenience. They’ll pay a whole lot for a new customer. Ideally you have a combination of currently inefficient market that’s very fragmented and lead gen is a part of it. So Airbnb has lead gen. Hosts are being introduced to guests they never would’ve known. It’s spectacularly fragmented. The average host owns one property. It has those two characteristics.
[00:08:38] Patrick: Maybe we should just go read Andrew’s book to answer this question, but what have you seen in common amongst marketplace businesses that are especially good at thinking about that lead gen part of the equation? Because the fragmented supply side or the fragmented supplier base, like you said, it’s a pain in the ass to get them all, but it’s kind of straightforward, like you just got to go get them all. What about on that other side, what’s shared in common amongst the most talented people that you’ve seen thinking through this problem of lead gen?
[00:09:03] Jeff: The best models are ones that don’t really rely much on paid acquisition. The best entrepreneurs have figured out hacks to get user demand at scale through a user proposition. And one of the most brilliant hacks on this was the OpenTable hack that preceded me. The team figured it out ahead of time is they build a widget that restaurants could put on their own websites to empower online reservations, because the typical behavior at the time is “I want to go to The Slanted Door.” Okay, let me search on Google for the Slanted Door so I can find the telephone number. Go to the website and you see this widget that says make an online reservation. It’s just like, “Oh I’d rather do that than pick up the phone and have that experience of, ‘Can you hold sir?’ get back to you and then call multiple restaurants.” Just awful.
And so we put it on there and what it ended up doing, the diner would click on it and was redirected to The Slanted Door page on OpenTable. They would then discover, “Oh my God, I can make an online reservation at all these” and they’d come back to OpenTable. They wouldn’t go back to Google. They’d quickly learn a behavior to go do OpenTable. OpenTable was getting paid to acquire their restaurants consumers. While I was there, we didn’t spend a penny on demand acquisition and we’re growing very nicely based on that. So the best models don’t really rely on paid. They figured out some other way to get that distribution…
…[00:12:09] Patrick: Talent density. Obviously eBay is sort of like patient zero for this online digital marketplace concept. I’m sure working with Pierre there was a fascinating experience. You were there right in the thick of it. What stands out as the most important things that you learned as an operator at eBay?
[00:12:24] Jeff: I learned to be an operator. I’d only had a couple semi operating jobs up to that point. While I was a CFO at the Disney stores, I was also responsible for managing the Disney stores in Japan, but we had someone on the ground so I was kind of overseeing the person who was overseeing it. When I got to eBay, I’d never really run anything. And so I joined, Meg was building bench depth so she found a job for me and had me managing two people, one of whom promptly quit to go run a Baja Fresh franchise, which at that point might not have been the best financial decision unless he owns Baja Fresh at this point. I was managing one person, then a few months in she reorganized and gave me eBay North America, which was the ebay.com website. Seven years later, I was managing 5,000 people.
One of the blog posts that I get the most comments on is I think it’s titled Leaving It All On the Field. It brings a sports analogy to managing a hyper growth business. Because early on you’re the player, things are crashing around you and you’re making every call. And then there was a point where I remember one night when I go home, I get to work at 5:00 AM and it’s seven at night, there’s still a line outside my door waiting for me to make decisions. I go, “This is not scaling. I got to change something.”
And you become a coach. You hire a bunch of people. You try to get them into a place where they’d make most of decisions similar to how you would. And then the mode’s very different. You turn into a coach. At some point with hyper growth, they can’t make all the decisions. So they have to build a team. They become the coach and you become a general manager and you’re further and further from the action in the field each time.
And then take it to its logical conclusion, at PayPal with 5,000 people I was commissioner of the league. And it’s interesting, the job is fundamentally different. You’re not in the action. You are orchestrating it. I called it a bunch of -tions, organization, motivation, communication. And I didn’t like the job anywhere near as much. I was very gratified that I actually appeared to be pretty good at it. But my career was just, I continually went back to earlier stages. eBay grew, I went to PayPal, PayPal grew, I went to OpenTable, OpenTable grew… And there’s a point at which the good news is I got pretty good at that stage of growth, consumer marketplace businesses at that stage of growth.
The bad news is the learning curve just shallowed out like crazy. When I’m operating, I’m always on, always stressed, always tired. And then you throw on board on top of it and that was a pretty toxic combination…
…[00:22:08] Patrick: What were some of the early surprising aspects of coming at it from the investor side? I’m especially interested in the pricing of rounds. I was told to ask you about pricing Instacart, for example. What lessons did you learn on the investing side that were completely new and different in those early years?
[00:22:24] Jeff: The good news is I was looking for a steep learning curve and it was way steeper than I thought. I was like, “Wait, I’m in the same room. I’m just taking a different chair. How can it be that different?” And man, is it different. Lesson one was it is a steep learning curve. Some of the early lessons, and still learning them, which is the interesting part, 10 years in. You have to continue to be adopting your decision framework. One was whenever I saw a bargain, I should run. It’s a sign of no heat. Whenever I did a bargain, I regretted it later. Whenever I was forced to pay up, to date that has been a very good basket of companies. And you mentioned Instacart. I saw Instacart late when Apoorva was raising. I think he saw a blog I wrote on demand economy and just reached out. And he goes, “Listen, really late process but we’d would love to talk you.”
So we have this great conversation. And I think it was a Thursday or a Friday. And he goes, “Listen, I have to decide by the end of the weekend. I’m getting so much pressure.” I crunch away on the weekend, digging into the details. I want to do it. I get okay for my partners to go in with a number. And I think it was I go in with something that’s a 100x current GMV, like $90 million. And he goes, “Jeff, I’ve really enjoyed our conversations. I’d really love to work with you, but you’ve got to know you’re less than a third of any of my other term sheets. And by the way, I’m deciding tomorrow.” And so then do I want to play? If I want to play, I’ve got to triple. And so over a weekend… The interesting one, going back to your partners and saying, “You know I asked for $90? I need $300.” that was a gut check, but there was so much to like about it. They’re like, “Okay, I’m going to climb the ladder.” I’m glad I climbed the ladder on it. A lot of the very best deals have that kind of pricing pressure, and the pricing’s set by the market. It’s not set by metrics. So you have to figure out, “Okay, do you climb?” And I tend to climb if I think it’s legitimate heat…
…[00:26:56] Patrick: As you start to dig on the layers of what’s driving marketplace businesses, consumer ones specifically, what tensions are healthy? There’s a lot of stakeholders in marketplaces, and not everyone can get the best of everything all the time. How do you like to look and investigate tensions inside of a network?
[00:27:13] Jeff: Tensions are great because there’s two sides or three sides, and there’s always tensions. It started at eBay. The sellers paid us, and so the obvious thing, give the sellers what they want. But it turned out for me, what made eBay work was the buyers. Amazon and Yahoo both launched auction products early at eBay. By the way, they were the gorillas at the time. Particularly Yahoo. It was a $100 billion dollar market cap early. They launch auctions, they make it free. We charged a list. They made it free. Amazon made it free. And they quickly got millions of listings, but what they lacked were buyers. And so the sellers went there and it was like they put up billboards and no one walked by. And so they came running back to eBay and redoubled, their efforts on our platform. Long had the philosophy that why the sellers came is we had a robust buyer base, and so then growing the business requires optimizing the buyers’ base.
And so eBay and OpenTable, we did things that the sellers, the business side didn’t like. They viewed reviews on OpenTable. At OpenTable. I have four web windows open. I have the one for OpenTable, I have one for our map because we didn’t have a map. I had one for Zagat and Yelp because there were no reviews. And you’re like, “Okay, I think I see the path forward here, provide an integrated experience.” So we go to the restaurant and say, “Yeah, we’re going to debut reviews.” And they go, “You cannot publish a negative review from a customer I don’t know. You’re my technology provider. What are you doing?” Kind of thing. And you’re just like, “We did research. If a customer opened a review, they were twice as likely to make a reservation.”
You’re working with them. And then finally if we couldn’t convince them, we gave them the ability to opt out. “We will not show reviews on your page if you don’t want it. Just know that every other restaurant’s going to have reviews and you’re going to look pretty stupid.” So there are always those tensions. I almost always bias towards the buyer side of the equation. People come to Airbnb, hosts come to Airbnb because it has the largest guest network in the world. The more guests you have, the happier the host will be in the long term. You’re kind of optimizing for buyers, for diners, for guests, and in spite of the fact that the other side’s typically the one paying you, do
[00:29:22] Patrick: Do you have good examples of when the supply side is actually the harder side of the network? I remember talking to Gurley about this and saying, “Usually if you get all the buyers, the supply will show up.” But I’m sure there’s some examples where it’s different.
[00:29:35] Jeff: Airbnb’s been supply constrained almost since I got involved in the company. The supply’s expanding, but they believe they’d do more business if they had more supply, high quality supply. So it is interesting. Particularly in the unconventional businesses… I’ve said this probably. The first time I heard the Airbnb concept I said, “That’s the stupidest thing I’ve ever heard.”
[00:29:54] Patrick: So many, yeah.
[00:29:56] Jeff: I’m intensely private. I don’t want someone on my house, a stranger in my house. I don’t want to be in a stranger’s house. It was just like, “Oh.” When it’s that counterintuitive, the supply side, evangelical people to kind of say, “I see it, and I enjoy it.” And Airbnb was part economic empowerment but also part human relationships. They’re people who like meeting strangers and talking to them and learning about them and figuring out… There are multiple satisfactions involved in that experience. But there are a lot of marketplaces, particularly the weird ones, that can definitely use more supply…
…[00:35:35] Patrick: How far into the evolution of one of these marketplaces do you think it’s really important to start honing in on, I guess I’ll call it unit economics or margins, or something like on DoorDash or something? For a long time it was, “Well look, at scale these will be amazing.” And it’s kind of nebulous, what scale meant and when that would be. How much do you think about maybe the margin profile of a marketplace as you’re investing, especially if it’s early on?
[00:35:58] Jeff: I don’t not look at it if the margin’s not bad. An extreme case of this was Instacart. The time we invested, he was earning something like $12 a order in money to Instacart, and he was spending about $30. And so-
[00:36:16] Patrick: That’s a pretty bad margin.
[00:36:18] Jeff: That was pretty bad. And so the work I did that weekend was around profitability. And it turned out that he was just starting to do deals with grocery stores where the grocers would give him better pricing and share some of the incremental revenue from the economics. And that, at scale, would dramatically improve his economics. So one is you had to believe he’d get to the deals with the grocers. And then could he get to price parity? And he laid out this waterfall of, “This is how I’m going to make money.” And it was very detailed. Apoorva’s superpower is optimization. He’s just said, “These are the 19 things we need to accomplish to make the unit economics work. And I’m halfway on this one and just laid it out.” And I haven’t looked at that sheet in a while, but it largely came true. He made the unit economics work.
The big swing was he got the deals with the grocers and then the advertising business, I think Fiji, just announced it would be over $1 billion this year. Amazon showed that’s very high margin income. So the existence of that ad business means he can provide a very compelling value prop to the consumer because they don’t have to pay the full fare for the delivery. They get it partially subsidized through the advertising venue. And so that’s been key to the working, but the economics were awful when we invested. And so the leap of faith there wasn’t people would want groceries delivered to their homes. The leap of faith was he can make the economics work.
4. ‘Go for the Jugular’ – Sebastian Mallaby
On Tuesday, September 15, the pound took another beating. Spain’s finance minister telephoned Norman Lamont, his British counterpart, to ask him how things were. “Awful,” Lamont answered.
That evening Lamont convened a meeting with Robin Leigh-Pemberton, the governor of the Bank of England. The two men agreed that the central bank should buy the pound aggressively the next morning. As the meeting wound down, Leigh-Pemberton read out a message from his press office. Helmut Schlesinger, the president of the German Bundesbank, had given an interview to the Wall Street Journal and a German financial newspaper, Handelsblatt. According to a news agency report on his remarks, Schlesinger believed there would have to be a broad realignment of Europe’s currencies.
Lamont was stunned. Schlesinger’s remark was tantamount to calling for the pound to devalue. Already his public statements had triggered an assault on Italy’s lira. Now the German central banker was attacking Britain. Lamont asked Leigh-Pemberton to call Schlesinger immediately, overruling Leigh-Pemberton’s concern that the punctilious Bundesbanker did not like to have his dinner interrupted.
After several conversations, Leigh-Pemberton reported that Schlesinger believed there was no cause for alarm. His comments were not “authorized,” and he would check the article and issue an appropriate statement when he reached his office in the morning. Lamont protested that this was a dangerously leisurely response. Schlesinger’s purported comments were already on news wires; traders in New York and Asia would react overnight; Schlesinger needed to issue a denial quickly. But Germany’s monetary master refused to be hurried. He was not going to adapt to a world of 24-hour trading.
That night, Lamont went to bed knowing that the next day would be difficult. But he could not imagine how difficult.
Stan Druckenmiller, the chief portfolio manager at George Soros’s Quantum Fund, read Schlesinger’s comments on Tuesday afternoon in New York. He didn’t care whether they were “authorized;” he reacted immediately. Schlesinger had made it obvious that the Bundesbank was not going to help the pound cling onto its position inside the exchange-rate mechanism by cutting German interest rates. The devaluation of sterling was now all but inevitable.
Druckenmiller walked into Soros’s office and told him it was time to move. He had held a $1.5 billion bet against the pound since August, but now the endgame was coming and he would build on the position steadily.
Soros listened and looked puzzled. “That doesn’t make sense,” he objected.
“What do you mean?” Druckenmiller asked.
Well, Soros responded, if the Schlesinger quotes were accurate, why just build steadily? “Go for the jugular,” Soros advised him.
Druckenmiller could see that Soros was right: Indeed, this was the man’s genius. Druckenmiller had done the analysis, understood the politics, and seen the trigger for the trade; but Soros was the one who sensed that this was the moment to go nuclear. When you knew you were right, there was no such thing as betting too much. You piled on as hard as possible.
5. Tracy Alloway — Understanding Financial Crises (EP.104) – Jim O’Shaughnessy, Jamie Catherwood, and Tracy Alloway
Jamie Catherwood: What’s your process for learning those new things in each kind of major crisis? How do you approach going from no knowledge of plumbing or commodities kind of nitty gritty details today to being able to talk about it?
Tracy Alloway: So this is one of the reasons I really like the podcast format. And this is one of the things that we do on all thoughts quite a lot is we try to go as micro as possible. So if we know that there are supply chain issues, we will talk to people who are into trucking, people who are into shipping, people who are experts in the world of wooden pallets, which I didn’t know we had experts on wooden pallets, but it turns out we do. We have on the economics of nails, experts on trust plates, lumber, the list goes on and on and on, but we’ll try to talk to those people as much as possible to get a handle of what’s going on in their individual markets so that we can connect that back to the macro.
Jim O’Shaughnessy: That’s nice try by the way there, Jamie, trying to get her to subscribe to Investor Amnesia. I like it, always, always
Tracy Alloway: I am subscribed.
Jim O’Shaughnessy: [crosstalk]. Look at that. I got the pull quote for you though, Jamie. I do a lot of research for our guests. And then I also have a couple of colleagues who do research as well. And I love this quote that somehow got connected to you. And it’s on this idea, it’s a tale quote, which it’s basically, it’s much easier to be a macro bullshitter than a micro bullshitter, right?
Tracy Alloway: I’m not sure why that quote’s connected to me, but I do like it. I like it a lot. I think there’s a kernel of truth there, which is, you see a lot of prognosticators, a lot of forecasters who will come out and say, “The economy’s going to do this, inflation’s going to do this.” I give this eventuality a 40% chance, which is the ultimate MBS of prognostication. And with the macro, it feels like there are so many variables swirling around that. You always have an excuse if you’re off, right? Well inflation, maybe it was transitory, but now there’s possibly World War III with Russia and that’s led to more supply shocks.
Tracy Alloway: So really I was right. It was going to come down, but no one could have predicted that Russia was going to invade Ukraine. You see that all the time. With the micro, it is the ultimate expression of individual expertise. And if someone is living and breathing a sphere like wooden pallets or nails, the economic contribution of nails throughout history, they know that market. And if they fail to predict which way it’s turning, I feel like that’s really like, they have skin in the for something like that. So that’s why we really enjoy talking to the micro people. We enjoy talking to the macro people too, but you get different things from each group…
…Jim O’Shaughnessy: Switching gears a little bit here. What can you tell me about fancy chickens?
Tracy Alloway: I have an inordinate amount of interest in the subject of fancy chickens. I don’t know, my dream is to, Jamie knows this, one day I will own so fancy backyard chickens and they’ll be beautiful. And my dog Pablo will chase them around. And Jamie, your dog is invited too. So the reason I took an interest in chickens is I’m just interested in chickens, but there’s actually a really interesting financial history nugget that comes out of reading and researching about chickens, which is, there is a massive –
Jamie Catherwood: Great pun by the way, [inaudible] nugget talking about chickens.
Tracy Alloway: There we go. So in the late 1800s or mid 1800s, there was a massive chicken bubble driven by this Victorian fashion for having chickens. So the world was opening up. There was lots of travel. There was lots of exploration. People started discovering that you can go to Indonesia and find this really cool looking chicken and bring it back to London and sell it for a lot of money. So this industry of collecting and breeding chickens became a thing. Price has became absolutely crazy. There are pamphlets written about this. People saying how ridiculous it was that people were spending money on birds and objectively, there are a lot of weird financial bubbles that have occurred throughout human history, but chickens is probably one of the weirder ones alongside maybe be rabbits in Japan and things like that, beanie babies.
Tracy Alloway: But there’s actually a really interesting outcome of the chicken bubble, which is that it gave the raw materials for research to Charles Darwin, right? When he was really starting to think about evolution. So suddenly he was surrounded by all these wild chickens that had been brought in from Indonesia or Asia. And he was able to breed them with domestic chickens in Europe and then say, well, they can breed together. So they must be related even though they’re from opposite sides of the world, there’s a link here. And that was one of the foundational pieces of research to his theory of evolution that would come out a few years later. So, whenever we talk about economic bubbles, we usually talk about the economic damage that they reek on the rest of the world. But in this one instance, we can say that actually something useful came out of the crazy Victorian chicken bubble.
Jamie Catherwood: Well, one thing I wanted to mention, I think it was in Liverpool or Manchester when they, in the 1830s or ’40s when they unveiled the first railroad mine in one of those cities. I think the mayor took the first trip and died on the ride. I feel like I’m missing [crosstalk].
Tracy Alloway: Great advertising.
Jamie Catherwood: Something along those lines of, because people were worried. And it wasn’t really until, I think Queen Victoria rode the train that people kind of really trusted that it wouldn’t kill them. Because there’s some quotes of scientist saying that, that wouldn’t work because people will die of asphyxiation just because you’re going at such high speed.
Jim O’Shaughnessy: The high speeds, like 40 miles an hour.
Jamie Catherwood: Exactly. So it was just funny, the grand unveil makes someone trust in the railroads and dies in railroad.
Jim O’Shaughnessy: Let me pick up on that because I think that is something I’d like Tracy’s viewpoint on. What Jamie just said basically was a well-known and well trusted personage in this instance, Queen Victoria associated herself with the railroad and then suddenly everyone is like, “Okay, that’s good.” Is that possible anymore? Or have we so atomized the world that the Queen of England associating herself with something we’d be just like, whatever.
Tracy Alloway: So this is something that I think about a lot, which is one of our very early episodes was with an archeologist called Arthur Demarest, who he’s often described as the real Indiana Jones of archeology, he’s out in Guatemala or wherever digging pits. And I don’t know, finding offs snakes and that sort of thing. But he came on a couple times really in the early days of Odd Lots to talk about his research into the collapse of civilizations. And the thing that he pinpoints a lot of collapses on, particularly in South America is this over extension into complexity.
Tracy Alloway: So the society has become too complex to function both on a sort of a societal level, the way people are interacting with each other, but also on a logistical and supply level. So the way the cities are actually supplied from outside and the difficulty of getting resources in as you get bigger and bigger, and this is something that I think about a lot. I think there’s a very fractious media environment. My dad’s American, I just got back from visiting him. We watched a lot of Fox News and other [inaudible] content. And I can tell you, it is polar opposite to what I’m seeing elsewhere and when you have an environment like that, it becomes very, very difficult to be on the same page and to have those conversations about what is possible and what’s reasonable.
6. A Few Beliefs – Morgan Housel
The worst financial decisions happen when people risk what they need in order to gain something they merely want.
Unsustainable things can last years or decades longer than people think.
Tell people what they want to hear and you can be wrong indefinitely without penalty…
…The luckier you are the nicer you should be.
Past performance increases confidence more than ability.
Define what you’re incapable of and stay away from it…
…Read fewer forecasts and more history…
…A lot of denial masquerades as patience.
A lot of people have a hard time distinguishing between what happened and what they think should have happened given their world view.
About once a decade people forget that bubbles form and burst about once a decade…
…With the right incentives, people can be led to believe and defend almost anything.
Expectations move slower than reality on the ground, so a lot of frustration comes from clinging to the trends of past eras…
…Progress happens too slowly to notice, setbacks happen too fast to ignore.
We are extrapolating machines in a world where nothing too good or too bad lasts indefinitely
Optimism and pessimism always overshoot because the only way to know the boundaries of either is to go a little bit past them.
The world is governed by probability, but people think in black and white, right or wrong – did it happen or did it not? – because it’s easier.
7. Twenty Lessons Learned – Michael Batnick
Nothing lasts forever. When growth stocks were going up every day, it felt like it would never end. Now that growth stocks are going down, it feels like it will never end. Everything ends, eventually…
…Risk management is most critical when it feels like you’re getting punished for managing risk.
Nothing is a perfect inflation hedge. Not gold, stocks, crypto, or cash…
…Diversification is the only answer to an unpredictable future. If everything is working, you’re not really diversified…
…Analogs are dangerous. We know how things played out in the past. That doesn’t tell us how things will play out in the future.
The more confident somebody seems, the more cautious you should be in taking their advice….
You didn’t know this was going to happen. You don’t know what’s going to happen next.
Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. Of all the companies mentioned, we currently have a vested interest in Microsoft and PayPal. Holdings are subject to change at any time.
