In Pain Before Gain, I shared Walmart’s past business growth and corresponding stock price movement (emphases are new):
“From 1971 to 1980, Walmart produced breath-taking business growth. The table below shows the near 30x increase in Walmart’s revenue and the 1,600% jump in earnings per share in that period. Unfortunately, this exceptional growth did not help with Walmart’s short-term return… Walmart’s stock price fell by three-quarters from less than US$0.04 in late-August 1972 to around US$0.01 by December 1974 – in comparison, the S&P 500 was down by ‘only’ 40%. But by the end of 1979 (when inflation in the USA peaked during the 1970s), Walmart’s stock price was above US$0.08, more than double what it was in late-August 1972 (when inflation was at a low in the 1970s)…
…At the end of 1989, Walmart’s stock price was around US$3.70, representing an annualised growth rate in the region of 32% from August 1972; from 1971 to 1989, Walmart’s revenue and earnings per share grew by 41% and 38% per year…
…It turns out that in late-August 1972, when its stock price was less than US$0.04, Walmart’s price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio was between 42 and 68… This is a high valuation… at Walmart’s stock price in December 1974, after it had sunk by 75% to a low of around US$0.01 to carry a P/E ratio of between 6 and 7 the easy conclusion is that it was a mistake to invest in Walmart in August 1972 because of its high valuation. But as can be seen above, Walmart’s business continued to grow and its stock price eventually soared to around US$3.70 near the end of 1989. Even by the end of 1982, Walmart’s stock price was already US$0.48, up more than 10 times where it was in late-August 1972.”
In When Genius Failed (temporarily)*, I explored a little-discussed aspect of Teledyne’s history (emphasis is from the original passage) :
“Warren Buffett once said that Singleton “has the best operating and capital deployment record in American business… if one took the 100 top business school graduates and made a composite of their triumphs, their record would not be as good.”
Singleton co-founded Teledyne in 1960 and stepped down as chairman in 1990… According to The Outsiders, a book on eight idiosyncratic CEOs who generated tremendous long-term returns for their shareholders, Teledyne produced a 20.4% annual return from 1963 to 1990, far ahead of the S&P 500’s 8.0% return. Distant Force, a hard-to-obtain memoir on Singleton, mentioned that a Teledyne shareholder who invested in 1966 “was rewarded with an annual return of 17.9 percent over 25 years, or a return of 53 times his invested capital.” In contrast, the S&P 500’s return was just 6.7 times in the same time frame…
…based on what I could gather from Distant Force, Teledyne’s stock price sunk by more than 80% from 1967 to 1974. That’s a huge and demoralising decline for shareholders after holding on for seven years, and was significantly worse than the 11% fall in the S&P 500 in that period. But even an investor who bought Teledyne shares in 1967 would still have earned an annualised return of 12% by 1990, outstripping the S&P 500’s comparable annualised gain of 10%. And of course, an investor who bought Teledyne in 1963 or 1966 would have earned an even better return…
…But for the 1963-1989 time frame, based on data from Distant Force, it appears that the compound annual growth rates (CAGRs) for the conglomerate’s revenue, net income, and earnings per share were 19.8%, 25.3%, and 20.5%, respectively; the self-same CAGRs for the 1966-1989 time frame were 12.1%, 14.3%, and 16.0%. These numbers roughly match Teledyne’s returns cited by The Outsiders and Distant Force”
My article The Need For Patience contained one of my favourite investing stories and it involves Warren Buffett and his investment in The Washington Post Company (emphasis is from the original passage):
“Through Berkshire Hathaway, he invested US$11 million in WPC [The Washington Post Company] in 1973. By the end of 2007, Berkshire’s stake in WPC had swelled to nearly US$1.4 billion, which is a gain of over 10,000%. But the percentage gain is not the most interesting part of the story. What’s interesting is that, first, WPC’s share price fell by more than 20% shortly after Buffett invested, and then stayed in the red for three years”
Buffett first invested in WPC in mid-1973, after which he never bought more after promising Katherine Graham (the then-leader of the company and whose family was a major shareholder) that he would not do so without her permission. The paragraph above showed that Berkshire’s investment in WPC had gains of over 10,000% by 2007. But by 1983, Berkshire’s WPC stake had already increased in value by nearly 1,200%, or 28% annually. From 1973 to 1983, WPC delivered CAGRs in revenue, net income, and EPS of 10%, 15%, and 20%, respectively (EPS grew faster than net income because of buybacks).
Walmart, Teledyne, and WPC’s experience are all cases of an important phenomenon in the stock market: Their stock price movements were initially detached from their underlying business fundamentals in the short run, before eventually aligning with the passage of time, even when some of them began with very high valuations. They are also not idiosyncratic instances.
Renowned Wharton finance professor Jeremy Siegel – of Stocks for the Long Run fame – penned an article in late-1998 titled Valuing Growth Stocks: Revisiting The Nifty-Fifty. In his piece, Siegel explored the business and stock price performances from December 1972 to August 1998 for a group of US-listed stocks called the Nifty-Fifty. The group was perceived to have bright business-growth prospects in the early 1970s and thus carried high valuations. As Siegel explained, these stocks “had proven growth records” and “many investors did not seem to find 50, 80 or even 100 times earnings at all an unreasonable price to pay for the world’s preeminent growth companies [in the early 1970s].” But in the brutal 1973-1974 bear market for US stocks, when the S&P 500 fell by 45%, the Nifty-Fifty did even worse. For perspective, here’s Howard Marks’ description of the episode in his book The Most Important Thing (emphasis is mine):
“In the early 1970s, the stock market cooled off, exogenous factors like the oil embargo and rising inflation clouded the picture and the Nifty Fifty stocks collapsed. Within a few years, those price/earnings ratios of 80 or 90 had fallen to 8 or 9, meaning investors in America’s best companies had lost 90 percent of their money.”
Not every member of the Nifty-Fifty saw their businesses prosper in the decades that followed after the 1970s. But of those that did, Siegel showed in Valuing Growth Stocks that their stock prices eventually tracked their business growth, and had also beaten the performance of the S&P 500. These are displayed in the table below. There are a few important things to note about the table’s information:
- It shows the stock price returns from December 1972 to August 1998 for the S&P 500 and five of the Nifty-Fifty identified by Siegel as having the highest annualised stock price returns; December 1972 was the peak for US stocks before the 1973-1974 bear market
- It shows the annualised earnings per share (EPS) growth for the S&P 500 and the five aforementioned members of the Nifty-Fifty
- Despite suffering a major decline in their stock prices in the 1973-1974 bear market, members of the Nifty-Fifty whose businesses continued to thrive saw their stock prices beat the S&P 500 and effectively match their underlying business growth in the long run even when using the market-peak in December 1972 as the starting point.
You may have noticed that all of the examples of stock prices first collapsing then eventually reflecting their underlying business growth that were shared above – Walmart, Teledyne, WPC, and members of the Nifty-Fifty – were from the 1970s. What if this relationship between stock prices and business fundamentals no longer holds now? It’s a legitimate concern. Economies change over time. Financial markets do too.
But I believe the underlying driver for the initial divergence and eventual convergence in the paths that the companies’ businesses and stock prices had taken in the past are alive and well today. This is because the driver was, in my opinion, the simple but important nature of the stock market: It is a place to buy and sell pieces of a business. This understanding leads to a logical conclusion that a stock’s price movement over the long run depends on the performance of its underlying business. The stock market, today, is still a place to buy and sell pieces of a business, which means the market is still a weighing machine in the long run. This also means that if you had invested a few years ago in a stock with an expensive valuation and have seen its stock price fall, it will likely still be appropriately appraised by the weighing machine in the fullness of time, if its fundamentals do remain strong in the years ahead.
Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. I do not have a vested interest in any companies mentioned. Holdings are subject to change at any time.