What We’re Reading (Week Ending 09 February 2025)

The best articles we’ve read in recent times on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general.

We’ve constantly been sharing a list of our recent reads in our weekly emails for The Good Investors.

Do subscribe for our weekly updates through the orange box in the blog (it’s on the side if you’re using a computer, and all the way at the bottom if you’re using mobile) – it’s free!

But since our readership-audience for The Good Investors is wider than our subscriber base, we think sharing the reading list regularly on the blog itself can benefit even more people. The articles we share touch on a wide range of topics, including investing, business, and the world in general. 

Here are the articles for the week ending 09 February 2025:

1. Robert Litan: An Economist Walks Into a Bar at TEDxKC (Transcript) – Robert Litan

First guy, he approaches the first woman that he sees, offers her a drink. She turns him down. He, then, decides to walk his way down the bar. And, of course, all the women watching this, they see what he’s up to. And they all turn him down…

…He hasn’t learned from this experience, in the real world. So he decides to go to the virtual world. He goes to the Internet and joins Cupid.com and he tries the same technique, and sure enough, with the same result. They all turn him down…

…Cupid.com is in trouble too. And the reason they are, is that the women who have joined Cupid.com are being inundated with offers for men for dates. They get turned off, they quit. And if they quit, men quit. Cupid is in trouble. Who are you going call, to solve this problem. Know the answer is more obvious than ghost busters. You call an economist. Don’t laugh, you call economists. In fact, you call two of them.

This is Muriel Niederle of Stanford, and Dan Ariely of Duke. And they spend a lot of time, studying the problem of artificial scarcity and abundance, in the online dating context, which is a reason Cupid call them up. And they wanted to know how to fix their problem and the two economists said they had an idea, that was as simple as it was profound. Just put a sharp limit on the number of date offers that men could make to women each month. This is the notion of artificial scarcity. Taking what looks like an abundant resource, which is date offers, and artificially constraining them.

And the economists said to Cupid that if you do this, the men will take their offer seriously. They’ll look at more than just the women’s pictures and they’ll actually look at their profiles. And the women will know this, and they’ll be more likely to accept date-proposals. Artificial scarcity helped save Cupid.com, and other dating sites that copied the technique…

…Google collects about $50 billion a year, from advertisers, large and small, seeking placement on that right hand side. They auction off the site. But that’s not how the system started, because when Google was launched, online advertising was in its infancy, and Google, believe it or not, went door to door, advertiser to advertiser, trying to get them to place for an ad next to a search term. Highly laborious, you quickly can see that this is not going to scale, as the number of searches explodes on Google.

And so the founder of Google asked two young engineers, Eric Veach and Salar Kamangar, to come up with an automatic system, that would solve this problem. Well, they were instinctively attracted to auctions. But they were thinking about another problem. That is if they auction off the sites, they fear that the advertisers would bid a very low price, and then incrementally raise their prices just a little bit, and keep the auctions going on forever. And if this happened, and a lot of searches were also going on at the same time, the whole site would crash.

So, as an engineering solution, they came up with this idea. That the winning auction, or the winning placement will be the price, the second highest price that was bid plus one penny. This will cut off the auctions, greatly simplify the process, and in the process also solve another problem called “the winner’s curse“. I’m sure that many of you that have participated in auctions may have regretted winning because you felt like you’ve paid too much. Pretty obvious point…

…“You know, those two engineers, they have reinvented what this guy came up with.” This is William Vickrey, he was an economist at Colombia, who proved mathematically, that the second price auction was the ideal solution to the winner’s curse. And you know what, that won him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1996.

2. Emergent Layers, Chapter 2: Overserved and Underserved Customers – Alex Danco

Returning to disruption theory, the critical element we’re going to use from that framework is the idea of the overserved customer: the customer who is being served too much by incumbents. In mature industries, where everybody agrees what the scarce resource is and the core constraints are well understood and organized around, we see this happen a lot. As incumbent companies compete with each other for business, and customers are all being served adequately (for the understood job at hand), competition becomes a feature race where products improve or expand at a greater rate than customers’ capacity to use them. There’s a misalignment between what the customer needs and is getting, with that misalignment falling onto the side of “I’m spending way too much of my money or time for this.” Crucially, when customers are overserved for a particular job, it introduces the critical space and oxygen required for a new competitor with some sort of scalable, technological advantage to enter the market at the low end. The nature of over-service creates powerful incentives for incumbents to not engage with disruptive entrants, but rather to retreat upmarket towards higher profit margins…

…For a more recent but still “classic” example, let’s look at Airbnb. Airbnb was able to get off the ground because there was a critical subset of customers in the hospitality industry — initially young people, although not exclusively so — who were overserved by many aspects of the hotel industry. Hotels were serving customers along many axes of performance — comfort, privacy, loyalty reward programs, and so forth — that just weren’t very important to a specific subset of customers who didn’t care too much about all that stuff; they just want a place to stay. This gave Airbnb the critical oxygen necessary to get a foot in the door, and then expand upwards from a dramatically cheaper cost structure than Marriott can possibly compete with. The overserved customer is a very potent and dangerous one: they know what they’re looking for, and they don’t need to be educated when a new entrant comes along with the right proposition. If that new entrant gets a few critical things right, they’re looking at a large group of early adopters that need little prodding, little education and little advance notice. That’s a great basis to start a company.

Let’s now consider another kind of pain: underserved customers. Their pain appears to be more straightforward: they have some fundamental need that isn’t being met. But this situation is trickier than it seems: if a group of customers have a genuine need, then why aren’t companies stepping in to offer solutions? What’s the catch? It could be because the solutions are genuinely too hard, or face technical or feasibility obstacles. It could also be that customers aren’t aware they have the problem. Either way, that’s tough…

…Now let’s put these two types of customer pain together. What would happen if a customer were both overserved and underserved at the same time? Is this possible?

As it turns out, this situation is not only possible, but occurs regularly. And it’s highly volatile. The trick to figuring out how this works requires venturing one step beyond disruption theory, and recasting the job-to-be-done as a stack itself with a hierarchy of low-level to high-level needs…

…We can characterize the initial job where customers are being served as being at level j, where incumbents vie for customer dollars and products will inevitably trend towards over-service. Meanwhile, we can characterize the higher-order job as being at level j+1, which encompass the customer’s higher level objectives, and where companies are not, for whatever reason, currently serving anyone…

…Consider Uber: you have a large group of customers (myself included) who are overserved by owning their own vehicle. If your car sits idle & parked more than 95% of the time (which is about average in North America), you are clearly overserved by owning this car! Yet at the same time, that same set of customers is underserved at level j+1, or the reason why they own a car in the first place — “I need to get to specific places at specific times”. You have a schedule to keep, and it’s hard.

Notice that both of these conditions must hold true in order for Uber to work. If customers were not overserved, it would be difficult for them to abandon their current solution. (Consider someone who drives their vehicle for a living, many hours per day. They are significantly less overserved by their vehicle, and quite unlikely to switch to using Uber for the equivalent job.) At the same time, if they weren’t underserved for a higher-level job (get me places at a certain time), then the only way for a new solution to be truly compelling would be dramatically lower price — which makes for a tough business model. This is another thing outside observers get wrong about Uber when they exclaim, “I don’t see how this is cheaper than owning a car!” Well, here’s the thing — Uber doesn’t have to be cheaper than driving, because it’s superior to driving your own vehicle in many ways! You don’t have to worry about parking, insurance, drinking, maintenance, gas, or anything else. The simultaneous condition of being overserved and underserved by existing solutions is what made Uber so compelling, in a way that other ride-sharing services or carpooling didn’t quite get right. Uber works because it’s cheap, but its appeal is because it’s better…

…If customers only check off the “underserved” box, then it seems likely you’re dealing with a problem that’s a. very hard, or b. the customer isn’t aware they have. This isn’t a great position to be in — it’ll be very hard to build an initial solution and attract early adopters.

If they only check off the “overserved” box, then customers know what they want — but it may be that they’re only motivated by price. And that’s also not a great position to be in: you may get lots of adopters really quickly, but find it very difficult to extract any profit from them…

…The particular combination of customers overserved at level j while being underserved at level j+1, when it happens, explains how from time to time we see markets where the demand is zero and then all of a sudden a vertical line straight up.

3. Why Housing May Be In for Another Cost Shock Next Year – Tracy Alloway, Joe Weisenthal, and Lee Everett

Lee (04:44):

It’s interesting. I think stress is hitting sort of all sides of the market. You have your bigger, more well established shops that have been managing through this, able to handle the higher rate environment, but have obviously taken a very real valuation hit on their existing portfolios. Like 20% to 30% depending upon the portfolio composition. At the same time you’ve had record demand hitting the sector because cost to buy housing is exceptionally unattainable today. And then on the other side you’re having a very material impact on the supply side and I think that’s what’s really unique. If you think back to September, the 10-year was around a 3.6%, I think, the day Chair Powell cut us by 50 basis points. Well, we’re at almost a 4.6% today and I remember that night you heard reports about developers out at local dinners and they were calling it Fed Day and getting ready to put shovels in the ground.

Joe (05:37):

Drinking champagne and stuff like that.

Lee (05:38):

Exactly. And what you’ve seen instead is increased stress on both the short end and the long end of the curve. That’s given you trouble on the short end, to start new housing, and trouble on the long end to afford longer term for ownership housing…

…Lee (11:29):

Yes, I think frankly we’re about to transition from what has been a very renter friendly market to again a landlord friendly market over the course of the next two to three years. And that’s going to be particularly driven by what we’re seeing on the supply side. We’re going to have over a million units come to market over a two-year period here in ’24 and ’25, but peak supply is hitting in the next six months and if you look at relative time from a) peak supply and then b) to getting to a level of lower supply than you saw last cycle, every major market in the country will be there by the end of 2026.

Joe (12:13):

Be where?

Lee (12:15):

Delivering less housing units than they did on average from ’17 to ’19 in apartment buildings. So you’re going to go below prior cycle supply very quickly. At the same time, we do have exceptionally strong labor markets here and the demand story has been outstanding. So 2024 is going to end the year, depending upon the data provider you use, as the first or third highest year for rental demand ever. 2021 was the prior record. So we’re seeing people form rental households at unprecedented rate in the US and as that supply comes down, you’re going to see that demand struggle to frankly find high quality, well-located assets to move in, and you’re likely to see that relationship flip at that point.

Tracy (13:08):

So the other thing that affects multifamily housing construction other than interest rates has to be just general confidence, I guess, in the direction of the economy, the direction of the world and certainly there’s a lot going on right now. We’re recording this on January 28th and there’s news that the Trump administration is freezing a whole bunch of federal spending. I think it’s something like 20% of federal spending. That includes presumably stuff like Section 8 and other affordable housing measures. Would that be expected to hit multifamily as well?

Lee (13:46):

Yeah, and I think it’s probably easiest to sort of start at the top, right? When you’re building multifamily, you’re generally trying to build to an acceptable return on cost, but frankly what we’re doing is putting an investor’s money together and generating returns for them. Multifamily isn’t built for free and it can’t be in this sort of economic world and a general rule of thumb is a 6+% return on cost. So cost to build, you want to yield over 6% of that to get a building to pencil. That tracks up closer to 7% depending upon the institution, because you need to build to that yield on cost, you have to have rents that are high enough to generate enough rental revenue to drive that return. So in order to build today, you have to build it exceptionally high rent levels, because of the cost to build, because of the cost of interest rates.

The only way to drop that is to drop the cost and that cost drop typically comes for affordable housing from the federal government, be it HUD grants that are then deployed through the local housing agency, be it LIHTC, be it any sort of an ensemble of ways to cut costs. That’s how you can get to affordable rents on the supply side. And then on the demand side, you can cut rents by literally giving people a rent check, which is what Section 8 is. And that again comes from the federal government via grants given to the local housing agencies to deploy. And if that money dries up, you have immense problems in terms of a) fueling the demand for these people, because you’re cutting rent on the Section 8 side and b) encouraging future construction of affordable apartment buildings…

…Joe (17:47):

Let’s talk about deportation impacts on labor. What are the estimates for what percentage of the multifamily workforce, whether it’s construction or maintenance, whatever else, is undocumented labor?

Lee (18:01):

It’s estimated 20% of construction workers in this country are undocumented labor. I’d venture to guess it’s similar for the whole multifamily industry when you look at staffing and things along those lines, and I think when you look at a combination of deportation of construction workers as well as the sheer amount of labor it’s going to require to rebuild huge swaths of California, I think you could be looking at a massive deficit in labor within the construction space. And when you think about that, that’s going to be your strongest lever that’s going to hit your cost to build and that’s what’s going to drive up those rents that are necessary. Is all of this immense pressure you’re going to see in the labor costs.

4. Test-Time Search: A Path To AGI – Akash Bajwa

The GPT family of models performed poorly relative to o3 on the ARC benchmark because large models memorise knowledge rather than reasoning processes…

…As an example, Meta intentionally overtrained Llama 3 on 15 trillion tokens to lower inference costs (as they served their billions of users). The model weights become more optimised for common patterns and in-distribution tasks, trading off generalisability to novel tasks.

This architecture combined with ‘internet scale’ data has produced incredible recent advances, but the next leap will come from a new paradigm – instead of outputs, models will be trained on reasoning steps…

…This new vector of scaling will rely on a combination of synthetic and human generated reasoning data. As we’ll see, both will be expensive forms of reinforcement learning (o3’s performance of 87.5% on ARC AGI in high-compute mode cost thousands of $ per task)…

…Synthetic data will be most useful for domains where functional verification is possible, e.g. code, maths and engineering…

…Scaling inference time compute is in line with the Bitter Lesson – there are only 2 techniques that scale indefinitely with compute: learning & search.

DeepMind’s AlphaGo used Monte Carlo Tree Search during test time to attain superhuman status – if stripped of this capabilities, it drops in Elo from ~5,200 to 3,000 (top humans are around ~3,800)…

…The exorbitant costs stem from the many, many Chains Of Thought generated as the model searches for the chains that lead to the right answer – all of the other tokens are useless, but cost a lot to generate…

…Functionally verifiable domains are the most amenable to synthetic CoTs because engineering the reward is much easier than in domains where subjectivity is involved…

…Code execution provides an unambiguous, binary reward signal – either the code executes successfully or it fails, creating clearly defined success criteria for training.

In functionally verifiable domains, the correct CoT tokens become training data…

…Over time, this should have a deflationary effect on the inference cost of reasoning models, as we’ve seen with frontier models in the pre-training paradigm…

…As pre-training gains plateau (or become too expensive), we’ve found a new vector of scaling (test time search) that is demonstrating a path to truly general intelligence.

Data acquisition/generation remains the bottleneck on progress, not compute. Microsoft’s announcement of $80bn in capex for 2025 underscores the Street’s underestimation of hyperscaler capex and compute buildout.

The implications of inference scaling run up and down the stack. Instead of the densely interconnected supercomputers of the pre-training paradigm, we will see more distribution of workloads, perhaps some even running locally. How will market share evolve as companies look to optimise test time search workloads – will AI ASICs eat into Nvidia market share?

Instead of prohibitively expensive pre-training runs, enterprises developing their own models may opt to train smaller models with reasoning cores and decide when to scale up test time search for certain economically valuable tasks. The result is the alchemy of capex to opex and fixed costs to variable costs. CIOs will decide which tasks merit more investment and test time search – inevitably, this will still be cheaper than human labour.

5. Don’t Freak Out – Ben Carlson

The common theme across the Apollo missions was the sheer amount of planning involved.  There were months and months of simulations and training exercises to review every possible scenario. They wanted every process to be automatic.

But there was always the risk of an unplanned error, considering they were propelling these giant hunks of metal through space using rocket fuel that would allow them to reach speeds of more than 24,000 miles per hour…

…When Apollo 13 had an explosion mid-flight, it wasn’t something anyone thought could have been even a remote possibility. Astronaut Jack Swigert explained it after the fact like this:

Nobody thought the spacecraft would lose two fuel cells and two oxygen tanks. It couldn’t happen. If somebody had thrown that at us in the simulator, we’d have said, ‘Come on, you’re not being realistic.’

This is why NASA trained the astronauts in one skill more than any other leading up to their space flights — the art of not panicking. The only reason they could turn the Apollo 13 spacecraft around 200,000 miles from earth following an explosion onboard is because the astronauts and everyone on the ground remained levelheaded. No one freaked out.

Or if they were freaking out internally, they didn’t act on those emotions.

In a nutshell, that is successful investing.


Disclaimer: The Good Investors is the personal investing blog of two simple guys who are passionate about educating Singaporeans about stock market investing. By using this Site, you specifically agree that none of the information provided constitutes financial, investment, or other professional advice. It is only intended to provide education. Speak with a professional before making important decisions about your money, your professional life, or even your personal life. We currently have a vested interest in Alphabet (parent of Google), Meta Platforms, and Microsoft. Holdings are subject to change at any time.

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